As could be observed from the phased process analysis, the talks on the Kyoto Protocol went through several phases. Transitions between these phases regularly coincided with the evolution of the textual bases on which the deliberations were conducted (Depledge 2005: 166). This allows for isolating turning points in the narrative, enabling a determina-tion of EU inf luence on the basis of a condidetermina-tional causal analysis covering the f ive constitutive dimensions of the concept (see Chapter 1).
The negotiations remained in a pre-negotiating and issue def inition mode for the f irst half of the AGBM process. AGBM 4/COP 2 then marked a f irst turning point because it provided a different framing for the further talks, with the US joining the group of parties in favour of le-gally binding emissions reduction targets. Entering into the more concrete positioning phase, talks were marked by several key proposals, notably
regarding targets, before or during AGBM 8. As these proposals consider-ably reduced the number of options on the table, AGBM 8 can be inter-preted as the second turning point. F inal decisions were, however, mostly taken towards the end of COP 3, which marks the third turning point.
Where these turning points concerned primarily the emissions reductions target, one more turning point needs to be added.
This f irst, major turning point during the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol could be observed very early in the process. Regarding the issue of responsibilities (who is to take on emissions reductions obligations?), the evolution of the negotiations at COP 1 in Berlin proved crucial for the f inal outcome. As seen, the proposal of the AOSIS coalition prior to the conference and the negotiation position issued by the like-minded group of G-77/China members during the COP had categorically opposed the start of protocol negotiations if these should lead to the adoption of (bind-ing) obligations for developing countries. The “green paper” issued by this group had therefore demanded that “the consultations will not intro-duce any new commitments whatsoever for developing country Parties”
(UNFCCC 1995c: point 4, emphasis added). This position was quickly supported by the EU, eager to begin a new negotiation process and fearful that the opposition of developing countries could prevent a decent out-come of this COP.13 This broad coalition of the majority of G-77/China and the EU, supported by the environmental NGO community, would build suff icient pressure to impose its view on the reluctant JUSSCANNZ and OPEC countries. The Berlin Mandate that was ultimately adopted con-tained a range of safety clauses for developing countries, including sever-al references to the CBDR principle (UNFCCC 1995e). It made it patently clear that the newly begun negotiation process should “not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I” (UNFCCC 1995e:
point 2 (b)). This provision would become the point of reference through-out the further negotiation process whenever attempts were made by the US and others – including the EU, with several submissions calling for voluntary developing countries’ commitments, and New Zealand with its sharply contested “progressive commitments” proposal in the f inal week at COP 3 – to convince key developing countries to do their share in the emissions reduction efforts, either voluntarily or in a future commitment period. On this basis, the G-77/China, assisted at times by Chair Estrada, employed its numerical superiority to successfully prevent any mention of new commitments for its members in the Kyoto Protocol. De facto, COP 1 in Berlin thus pre-emptively eliminated all other potential paths
13 And this was despite the fact that it had previously timidly alluded to the necessity of emissions reductions by the most advanced developing countries (see EU submission to INC discussed above – UNFCCC 1994: point 9).
on this very issue, locking it in, and demonstrating thus an interesting example of enduring inf luence of the G-77/China bloc. This inf luence was fundamentally grounded in the group’s structural achievements of the past: its successful insistence on the prominent insertion of the CBDR principle in Art. 3 of the UNFCCC during the period 1991–1992 would allow the bloc to constantly refer to this provision. This inf luence based on the exploitation of previously created structures was rooted in the size of the coalition, traditional attempts at keeping the lines closed in support of shared interests, but also in apt coalition-building with the NGO com-munity and key countries from the EU at crucial moments in the talks (Rajan 1997: 283). At this turning point, and thus on the issue of the sharing of responsibilities between developed and developing countries during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in general, the EU clearly failed to exert any inf luence. With its at times ambiguous position – which ac-knowledged the rights to development of the non-Annex I countries in the immediate future, but at the same time the f indings of climate science that called for the eventual inclusion in collective mitigation efforts of those developing countries whose emissions were projected to rise steeply – it did not succeed in changing any other party’s preferences or behaviour on this issue. Quite on the contrary, it had itself to change its position on the possibility of advanced developing countries emission reductions at COP 1, and repeatedly failed to build any sort of momentum for even the slightest mentioning of such (voluntary) action in the new treaty after-wards (absence of temporal sequence, no goal attainment) (Yamin 2000:
63). This, in turn, meant that the EU was unable to gain any leverage over one of the core pillars of the reformed climate regime.
COP 2 in Geneva marked a second “decisive turning point in the ne-gotiations” (Grubb et al. 1999: 54), particularly regarding the core norm of emission reduction targets. Up to that point, the negotiations had been fairly inconclusive, with parties working on the assumption that the f inal outcome would not be legally binding (Grubb et al. 1999: 54–55). US Under-Secretary of State Wirth’s speech at COP 2, in which he called for negotiating legally binding targets linked to f lexible mechanisms, changed this approach completely. The consequences of this US change in position were manifold: in the short run, it allowed for the adoption of the (non-binding) Geneva Declaration, in which the ministers “instruct their representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument”, thus setting the negotiations on a clear track towards legally binding, quantif iable emissions reductions (UNFCCC 1996). Proposals by countries that had initially refused legally binding targets (Russia, OPEC) were thus clearly off the negotiation ta-ble. Moreover, the core of the AOSIS proposal (high emissions reduction targets) was, as aptly noted by an observer quoted in the ENB, virtually
“dead in the water”. Once obligations were to become legally binding, they would necessarily tend to be less ambitious because the US and other JUSSCANNZ members would never accept – in their view – exceedingly high binding objectives (ENB 1996b: 13). F inally, reduction targets be-came inextricably linked to the notion of f lexibility mechanisms, effective-ly opposing the US and its coalition partners’ quest for cost-effectiveness to the EU’s command-and-control approach of PMs. Through a simple declaration of intent, the US exerted undeniable inf luence on the further course of the talks. The US change in position has been interpreted as a result of its reception of the latest scientif ic advances in the Second IPCC report. Wirth’s statement made several references to the science, criticiz-ing those who still contested it, thus effectively targetcriticiz-ing his speech also at a domestic audience (Grubb et al. 1999: 54; Harrison 2000: 104–105).
The modif ication of the US stance was thus clearly not the result of any other party’s inf luence attempts. This, in turn, means that the EU did not exert any inf luence at this turning point. It neither was at the origin of the US change of beliefs or preferences, nor had it itself been successful in demanding a legally binding outcome (absence of purposive behaviour, temporal sequence, interaction and goal attainment). By contrast, and in a similar way as on the issue of responsibilities at COP 1 (where the EU followed the G-77/China), it was fairly easy for the Union’s negotiators to support the US proposal (Grubb et al. 1999: 54). As a by-product, the US science-based and domestically motivated mind change effectively also altered the EU’s negotiation strategy: where it had concentrated on PMs before, it quickly shifted its attention to targets after COP 2.
The third major turning point in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations oc-curred arguably before and at AGBM 8 when some of the key players would f inally make public statements about their negotiation position regarding quantif ied emission reduction targets. While the positions on the details of an emission reductions article in the future treaty (gas cov-erage, commitment year or period, differentiation among Annex I coun-tries) had been known for a while, the numbers that several critical parties were prepared to commit to had been held back until October 1997. From the major emitters, only the EU had openly def ined its stance as early as March 1997, calling, as seen, for –15% by 2010, and later also for –7.5%
by 2005 (compared to 1990 levels, for a basket of three gases). Before AGBM 8, Japan (–5% and differentiation between Annex I countries), the G-77/China (support for the EU’s approach for each gas individually, plus a 35% reduction objective for 2020) and the US (stabilization of GHG emissions at 1990 levels over the period 2008–2012, linked to f lexibility) clarif ied their stance. With these proposals, the number of options regard-ing the issue of an overall target was essentially limited to three alterna-tives: the maximalist EU and G-77/China proposal, the US minimalistic
approach, supported by JUSSCANNZ, and the Japanese middle-ground proposal. Only a compromise between the extreme poles would allow for reaching agreement. The fact that the EU’s proposal remained fully on the table demonstrates that the Union had exerted inf luence with regard to the core norm of the regime up to and beyond this important watershed.
Checking the constitutive dimensions of inf luence shows that the EU had intentionally attempted to set the agenda on this issue (purposive behav-iour), had reached out to promote it vis-à-vis other parties (interaction) prior to all other major players (temporal sequence) and had attained its (intermediate) goal of having its proposal considered among the f inal ones (goal attainment). Going into the ultimate stages of the talks, the EU had thus managed to substantially inf luence the agenda on this crucial item.
With its arguably central inf luence attempt in the whole negotiation pro-cess, it had altered the behaviour of the G-77/China and JUSSCANNZ.
While it may have been fairly self-evident that the G-77/China bloc would adopt a position similar to the EU’s due to internal differences rendering a support for the even more ambitious proposal by AOSIS impossible, JUSSCANNZ members were forced to accept the EU’s proposal as valid proposition, even though they did not agree with it (test on absence of auto-causation). The decision on what would become the core provision of the Kyoto Protocol, however, had to await COP 3.
With few f inal decisions taken, but some pathways excluded, COP 3 marked a fourth turning point at which parties had to determine the main features of the ultimate agreement via the conclusion of a package deal.
Three parties (and Chair Estrada) would prove to be central to elaborating the f inal compromise: the US, Japan and the EU (Depledge 2005; Schröder 2001; Oberthür/Ott 1999; Grubb et al. 1999; Interviews EU, US representa-tives 5, 17). The entire agreement hinged on the decision on emission re-duction targets for Annex I countries. In the course of the negotiations, this issue had become broader than “just” the def inition of numerical targets.
Unsettled questions at the beginning of the second week in Kyoto con-cerned not only the numbers, but also the modalities of emissions reduc-tions (gas coverage, budget periods or target year, differentiation). Further, the issue of targets had – ever since the US change in position at COP 2 – been inextricably linked to the notion of f lexible mechanisms, supported by JUSSCANNZ, but moderately opposed by the EU and strongly refuted by the G-77/China. Each of these issues merits brief discussion. The question of gas coverage opposed essentially the US (proposing six gases) to the EU and Japan (in favour of three gases). The US proposal for comprehensive coverage of all gases on the basis of the Berlin Mandate f inally prevailed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol because the EU and Japan accepted US arguments, and successfully obtained as a concession that 1995 instead of 1990 was stated as a base year on the three additional gases (HFCs, PFCs,
SF6) (Yamin 1998: 118, for the full story: Grubb et al. 1999: 69; 75–76;
Oberthür/Ott 1999: 120). Concerning the base year and whether to adopt a target year or a budget period (UNFCCC 1997a: Art. 3.1, alternatives A and B vs. C), consensus was quickly found on the idea of 1990 as a base year, which had been a reference point in the discussions for a long time.
With regard to the end date, the Berlin Mandate and earlier proposals by AOSIS, the EU and others had clearly favoured single target years (2005, 2010, 2020), whereas the US had argued that spreading the risk over budget periods (e.g. 2006–2010) would be a fairer solution. In the course of the negotiations, other parties, including the EU, had apparently come to ac-cept the rationale of this argument (Oberthür/Ott 1997: 119). In the last versions of the negotiation text, the idea was thus adopted and only the name changed: from budget to “commitment” period. The Chair’s proposi-tion of 2006–2010 as the initial period was later changed, with the EU’s explicit approval, to the original US proposal for 2008–2012. Hence, on these technical issues, the US position almost completely prevailed, with the EU bowing voluntarily to what it perceived as the better arguments in the context of an overall compromise regarding the emission reduction obligations. On the matter of differentiation, the EU was inf luential mal-gré elle. It had opposed the idea of differentiation other than for REIOs throughout the entire talks. Its own burden-sharing approach had, however, weakened its argumentation strategy. Surprisingly, the US was not among those in favour of differentiation at f irst, as it had accepted EU differen-tiation as a form of “zero-cost emissions trading” (Grubb et al. 1999: 86).
This changed radically at COP 3 when the Americans suddenly signalled openness to differentiation on the basis of a Russian proposal. This, to-gether with the fact that the Japanese were also advocating differentiation, heightened the pressure on the EU to abandon its resistance. Differentiation became thus the third element of the discussion on emissions reductions targets on which the EU had to give in, delivering – through its own “bub-ble” – itself the best argument for its opponents. The f inal component of the decision on the core norm of the regime, the numerical targets themselves, was negotiated between the EU, the US and Japan during the last few days of COP 3. A f irst quantif ied proposal by Chair Estrada, assigning 10% re-ductions to the EU, 5% to the US, and 2.5% to Japan, was refuted as unac-ceptable by the EU (Schröder 2001: 79). It was then the UK, as member of the Troika, that – as seen, in informal talks and with high-level telephone diplomacy going on in the background – successively negotiated more ac-ceptable targets for the EU, compensating the Union for its concessions on other points, especially the f lexibility mechanisms (Cass 2007: 79–80).14
14 The UK was criticized in the aftermath of COP 3 for having given up on the EU’s ambi-tious targets too early, despite the other member states’, notably Germany’s opposition (Delreux 2008: 147). Before and during the negotiations, many observers had actually
The f inal outcome, a 8–7–6% cascade for the EU, US and Japan respective-ly, can be interpreted as a classical compromise and very much the median between the extreme positions taken by the US (0%) and the EU (–15%), even if it meant very different efforts to the three parties (Interview EU representative 5).15 For the EU, this outcome was acceptable, since it im-plied almost no differentiation between the large three GHG emitters, and was within the range of 10% reduction which the internal burden-sharing covered. Although the overall target of 5.2% reductions came close to their original proposal, it was Japan as much as the US that had to deviate from their preferred outcomes on this item. The other JUSSCANNZ countries, in return, would make arbitrary “voluntary pledges” based on their “willing-ness to pay” (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 120).
In the f inal analysis, the EU had thus managed to exert considerable inf luence on the core norm of the reformed climate regime: it had been the f irst major actor to proactively state a numerical target, backed up by internal burden-sharing (purposive behaviour, temporal sequence), and to demand comparable efforts of other countries (interaction), thus not only setting the agenda, but also determining the scope of what was to be dis-cussed in the further talks. Its goals were partially attained: it managed to pull others away from their minimal positions to reach a fairly ambitious, legally binding overall target as well as fairly high individual targets for the other two major industrialized emitters. In counterfactual analysis, check-ing the negative pole of the concept of inf luence, the outcome may have looked much different without the Union: “Without the 15% f igure and the determination of the EU to push the US and Japan to a comparable reduc-tion (…), the targets contained in the Kyoto Protocol may well have been much weaker” (Yamin 2000: 55). Especially striking is the fact that the EU had gained leverage over emissions in both the US and Japan by effectively managing to change these countries’ behaviour – not through argumenta-tion, but bargaining on the basis of a comprehensive position on its target.
As concession, and this was the non-negligible downside of its successful inf luencing, it did have to give up on most of its ideas on binding poli-cies and measures, and on its initial opposition to the f lexible mechanisms which had been a conditio sine qua non of the US position.
felt that the f inal outcome would hinge on “how hard-nosed the EU is prepared to be”
at COP 3 (ENB 1997k: 16). To the surprise of some, including Chairman Estrada and Dutch minister de Boer, it appeared as not having been “hard-nosed” enough in insist-ing on its –15% target (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 121). Others have pointed to the fact that the target was considered, by the majority of member states, as a negotiation position anyway (Cass 2007: 78).
15 For Japan, with an already comparatively energy-eff icient economy at the time, this outcome arguably meant a far greater effort than for the EU or the US.
When extrapolating from the inf luence on the two core pillars of the regime, the EU’s overall inf luence on the talks can be determined. As the Union almost entirely achieved its apparent real aim of 10% legally bind-ing reductions for key emitters, its inf luence on the norm of the regime (the overall magnitude of the emission reduction target) must be regarded as fairly high, while leverage over the crucial principle of responsibili-ties was not discerned. Over many other issues not explicitly analysed in
When extrapolating from the inf luence on the two core pillars of the regime, the EU’s overall inf luence on the talks can be determined. As the Union almost entirely achieved its apparent real aim of 10% legally bind-ing reductions for key emitters, its inf luence on the norm of the regime (the overall magnitude of the emission reduction target) must be regarded as fairly high, while leverage over the crucial principle of responsibili-ties was not discerned. Over many other issues not explicitly analysed in