and the second conference of the parties coincided (8–

19 July 1996, Geneva). Regarding the two issues of targets and inclusive-ness of the regime, talks were mostly held under the AGBM track. The main

foci of the debates were quantif ied emissions targets, and, linked to this, policies and measures. Positions, as far as expressed, had been gathered in several compilations of proposals (AGBM 1996a and c). They testif ied to the marked differences in approach between the EU, supported by most of the developing countries, favouring policies and measures and opposing differentiation on the one hand, and the US and most of JUSSCANNZ, de-manding more f lexibility, on the other hand (AGBM 1996a). The Japanese position had now moved to occupy the ground somewhere in between, advocating differentiation and f lexibility, but equally seeing possibilities to combine policies and measures with targets (AGBM 1996c: 2). Despite these differences, the EU repeatedly pushed for an acceleration of the ne-gotiations, arguing for the preparation of a draft protocol as soon as AGBM 6 (ENB 1996b: 7).

The high-level segment of COP 2 brought new impetus to the debates (Grubb et al. 1999: 54). The discussion of the Second IPCC Assessment Report was taken as an opportunity by the US to considerably clarify its position. In a speech on 17 July 1996, US Under-Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Timothy Wirth stated that – on the back-drop of the latest science – “we must do better”, which is why “the US recommends that future negotiations focus on an agreement that sets a realistic, verif iable and binding medium-term emissions target”, to be achieved through f lexibility mechanisms such as “reliable activities im-plemented jointly, and trading mechanisms around the world” (Audio 1996, 17 July 1996, emphasis added). According to Wirth, PMs did not fulf il the criteria of being “realistic” or “achievable”. Although it did not specify any reduction target, this statement opened up new possibilities for collaboration, as it “was in fact the f irst time that any major Party had specif ically called for quantif ied commitments adopted under the negotiations to be made binding” (Grubb et al. 1999: 54). With a sim-ple declaration, the US had thus unexpectedly joined the group of parties (above all AOSIS, the EU) who acknowledged the urgency with which wide- reaching measures against climate change had to be taken. At the same time, it had also positioned itself clearly vis-à-vis those who want-ed to slow negotiations down, especially OPEC, but also Russia (ENB 1996b: 4). Yet, Wirth’s forceful statement in favour of the concept of f lex-ibility, introducing the idea of emissions trading, also effectively coupled the adoption of legally binding targets – the core of the whole regime and main purpose of the Berlin Mandate – to f lexible trading mechanisms.

This stance exacerbated the differences between the advocates of f lex-ibility from the JUSSCANNZ group and the EU, supported by many de-veloping countries (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 62).

The EU greeted the US change in position and, together with the majority of the G-77/China, took the Americans up on their promise to

accelerate the negotiations (ENB 1996b: 10). In the f inal days of the COP, a “Friends of the Chair” working group drafted a non-binding declara-tion, which the majority of parties adopted in plenary against the opposi-tion of 16 parties, including Russia and Saudi Arabia (ENB 1996b: 10, 13). The Geneva Declaration reiterated the Berlin Mandate, endorsed the SAR and reminded Annex I countries “to limit and reduce emissions”

faster (UNFCCC 1996: point 2). Further, the Ministers “instruct[ed] their representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument” including “policies and measures”

and on “quantif ied legally-binding objectives for emissions limitations (…) within specif ied time-frames” (UNFCCC 1996: point 8). The latter emphasis on legally binding targets and timetables marked the true nov-elty for the AGBM talks.

The negotiations in the Working Group had to wait until their sixth session to see some form of acceleration. Until then, talks would stagnate in the positioning phase. For AGBM 5 (9–13 December 1996, Geneva), the UNFCCC secretariat had prepared a synthesis of proposals by the parties as a basis for further discussions (AGBM 1996e). This document and the debates at this session demonstrated to what extent the talks had become more complex after the US had opened up to the idea of legally binding reduction targets. Setting such targets required the prior settling of numerous other issues regarding inter alia gas coverage, level and tim-ing, distribution of commitments and degrees of f lexibility (ENB 1996c:

4). Following an invitation from the Chair to submit new proposals, the EU made its second major inf luence attempt in these negotiations when it submitted an “elaboration” of its draft protocol structure (AGBM 1996d:

19–24). The proposal contained different types of commitments and in-troduced a new category of parties, “Annex X parties”, which were to adopt quantif ied emission targets. The submission suggested that Annex X should include not only developed parties, but also other, not further specif ied ones. This indeterminacy caused some confusion in the talks, and the EU had to defend itself against criticism from the G-77/China bloc by clarifying that Annex X covered Annex I and new OECD mem-bers (ENB 1996c: 4).⁷ After its strong position-taking at COP 2, the US also made two written submissions in 1996. In its “Elements of a new legal instrument” paper of 21 October, it called for “a shift away from un-realistic, near-term targets” to “legally-binding, medium-term targets that are both realistic and achievable” (AGBM 1996d: 50–54, 51). In its more extensive “non-paper” of December, it underscored the need for a long-er-term goal, and “for all nations, including developing nations, to take actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions” (AGBM 1996a: 26–37, 26).

7 The EU provided a list of Annex X countries in July 1997 (AGBM 1997e).

On the issue of targets, it made several proposals regarding, above all, a multi-year instead of a single-year target, banking and borrowing of emis-sions, a f lat-rate approach for all Annex I countries and comprehensive gas coverage. Further, the paper contained elaborations on the f lexibility mechanisms championed by the US (emissions trading, joint implemen-tation). During the debates at AGBM 5, the US “hard commitments to soft targets” and long-term approach came into apparent conf lict with the EU’s, AOSIS and Norway’s preferences for legally binding early Annex I actions (ENB 1996c: 4). On differentiation, however, the US and the EU were united in their argument for a f lat-rate approach – against other JUSSCANNZ members (Canada, Japan, Australia and Russia), who sup-ported different targets for Annex I countries (ENB 1996c: 4). F inally, regarding f lexibility, which had become inextricably linked to the tar-gets, both JUSSCANNZ and the EU supported joint implementation. The Union was, however, much more cautious about emissions trading, which it did not believe to be able to replace PMs (ENB 1996c: 5). The session concluded with parties authorizing the Chair to provide a compilation of these proposals (AGBM 1996g: 8).

Already for AGBM 5, many EU member states, including the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, would have liked to see the European Union produce a concrete proposal for reduction targets (Kanie 2003:

349–350). Under the impression of the SAR, the Union had, in fact, geared up its efforts, calling for global average temperatures not to exceed “2 de-grees above pre-industrial levels” (Council 1996: para. 3). This, in turn,

“should guide global limitation and reduction efforts” (Council 1996:

para. 6). The idea of proposing concrete emission reduction targets that would meet this overarching objective had been tabled under the Italian Presidency in the f irst half of 1996, and discussed in depth under the Irish Presidency in the second semester of that year (Kanie 2003: 349–350).

Prior to AGBM 5, the Environment Ministers had, however, been un-able to def ine a common position due to diff iculties related to sharing the burden of emissions reductions (Kanie 2003: 350; Agence Europe 1996). The incoming Dutch Presidency of early 1997 made the def inition of such a position one of its key priorities. Consequently, the topic was taken up again in discussions of the Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Change in February 1997, and earlier proposals of a 15% reduc-tion by 2010 were re-discussed. In these debates, agreement on burden-sharing among the member states could, however, only be reached for a 9.2% reduction (Agence Europe 1997a; Vogler 2008). Nonetheless, on 3 March – the f irst day of AGBM 6 – the Environment Council took the decision that the EU would propose to reduce the emissions of three gases (CO₂, N₂O, CH₄) by 15% until 2010 (compared to 1990 levels) and that the burden-sharing of roughly “10% would be enough until Kyoto”, as

the remaining 5% could be distributed in accordance with the outcome of the negotiations at COP 3 (Council 1997; Agence Europe 1997a; for an in-depth discussion: Kanie 2003; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 63). This proposal would become the EU’s third major inf luence attempt during this nego-tiation process.

Discussions at the sixth AGBM session (3–7 March 1997, Bonn) were thus continued on the basis not only of a framework compilation of positions, but also of the updated EU position and a comprehensive US submission (AGBM 1997a, b, c). The reception of the Union’s target proposal on the second day of the meeting was decidedly mixed. Some parties, mostly from the G-77/China bloc, praised the ambitious num-bers the EU had put forward, while others, notably JUSSCANNZ mem-bers like the US or Australia, criticized the insuff icient burden-sharing agreement, calling the EU’s proposal “unrealistic” (ENB 1997a: 1). The US had itself, in its submission of 17 January 1997, abstained from any kind of numerical specif ication, but had provided a quite detailed “Draft Protocol Framework” instead (AGBM 1997b: 78–87). In this document, it introduced the idea of “emissions budgets”, underscored its position on f lexibility, and provided for the voluntary inclusion of new countries into Annex I, while demanding measures for the “advancement of the imple-mentation of Article 4.1” (obligations) for all countries (AGBM 1997b:

79, 82). Further, it suggested that the “Parties shall adopt, by [2005], binding provisions so that all Parties have quantitative greenhouse gas emissions obligations and so that there is a mechanism for automatic ap-plication of progressive greenhouse gas emissions obligations to Parties, based upon agreed criteria” (AGBM 1997b: 87). Similar proposals with regard to f lexibility and non-Annex I commitments were introduced by Australia and New Zealand, inter alia in a joint submission with the US (AGBM 1997b: 65; ENB 1997c). The fact that both the EU and the US had now made fairly detailed and different proposals led to an intensif ied transatlantic polarization of the debates (ENB 1997c: 8–10). While most developing countries supported the EU approach, JUSSCANNZ was not completely behind the US position. Notable differences existed regard-ing the issue of differentiation among developed countries. Contrary to the US, Australia and Japan were strongly in favour of differentiating be-tween Annex I parties. In a roundtable discussion on this issue, a Japanese representative argued that differentiation was an integral part of the Berlin Mandate, which had emphasized the “different starting points” of coun-tries (ENB 1997b: 2). He further explained that three options existed for differentiation: a formula-based approach working with one specif ic indi-cator (e.g. per capita emissions), a selective approach (based on GDP) or a purely political negotiation approach (ENB 1997b: 2). During the same discussion, Australia used the EU’s burden-sharing approach as example

for differentiation (ENB 1997b: 2). At the end of the session, all main proposals – certainly regarding the two topics of interest here – with the exception of concrete (numerical) positioning on targets by key industrial-ized countries, were thus on the table for the remainder of the negotiations.

For the following meeting, the UNFCCC secretariat was asked to prepare a negotiating text, following the “six-month deadline”, which stipulated that half a year before COP 3 no fundamentally new ideas should be in-jected into the debates (Art. 17.2 UNFCCC; ENB 1997c: 1).

The fact that the end of the proposal phase was drawing to a close might have led several parties to clarify their stances also outside the UN arena. One forum for this was the G-7+1. At a summit held in Denver on 20–22 June 1997, the four EU members (France, Germany, Italy, the UK) advocated the Union’s 15% reduction target, but only obtained a weak statement in favour of an agreement with some form of a target for 2010 (G-8 1997: point 16). Remarkably, given the clarity of the Berlin Mandate on this issue, the richest countries of the world also declared:

“Action by developed countries alone will not be suff icient to meet this goal. Developing countries must also take measurable steps, recogniz-ing that their obligations will increase as their economies grow” (G-8 1997: point 17). Some days later, at the UNGA Special Session (23–27 June), which was to assess the implementation of the 1992 Earth Summit decisions, several developing countries demonstrated their commitment to concluding a strong agreement in Kyoto, while US President Clinton explained his incapacity to exercise leadership given the continued resist-ance from Congress (ENB 1997d).

Talks at AGBM 7 (28 July–7 August 1997, Bonn) were, for the f irst time, held on the basis of a 128-page synthesis of proposals that had been prepared by the Chair in late April 1997. The “negotiating text” presented alternative suggestions – in legal language – on all major issues, but no longer explicitly attributed specif ic submissions to particular countries (AGBM 1997d; Depledge 2005: 166). In several submissions prior to the negotiation session, the EU had given extensive, in-depth input into the negotiation process, commenting on the Chair’s proposal and completing its own position (e.g. AGBM 1997f: 35–51; 1997q). It had also further clarif ied its emissions reduction proposal through the def inition of an intermediate target of –7.5% by 2005 (compared to 1990 levels) in sup-port of its overarching aim of reducing emissions to a level that would allow limiting global temperature increase to 2° Celsius (AGBM 1997g:

6). By contrast, none of the large countries of the JUSSCANNZ coalition had made a specif ic numerical proposal yet, with the US explaining that

“it was not possible to decide what kind of numerical target might be undertaken without knowing what constraints would be imposed on such

a target” (ENB 1997e: 2). Negotiations at AGBM 7 were conducted in four “non-groups”: in addition to the ones previously established on com-mitments under Art. 4.1 as well as on institutions and on mechanisms, two new groups dealt with PMs and targets and timetables (ENB 1997e).

Regarding the issue of targets, the “negotiating text by the chairman”

listed 16 (!) alternative formulations (AGBM 1997d). During the debates on this topic, the non-group on quantif ied emissions limitation and reduc-tion objectives (QELROs) took up the issues of a budget or multiple-year approach and of gas coverage. While the former remained unresolved, the comprehensive US proposal of covering six gases became generally ac-cepted (ENB 1997f). Moreover, this group discussed – without reaching consensus – differentiation among Annex I countries (ENB 1997f). On the key conf lict opposing supporters of hard targets and PMs (mainly the EU) to advocates of f lexibility and soft targets (the US, Australia, New Zealand), the f irst possibilities for compromise emerged. It became evi-dent that the EU was prepared to accept f lexibility demands, notably trad-ing, if adequate reduction commitments were made by all industrialized parties. In return, the US, despite its opposition to differentiation, demon-strated that it was prepared to accept the EU’s internal burden-sharing if trading would become a prominent feature of the f inal agreement (ENB 1997g: 12–13). As for the issue of responsibilities, the non-group on Article 4.1 (“further commitments”) originally discussed on the basis of two texts: a negotiating text and a text by the group’s Chair (ENB 1997g: 5).

The latter text contained two alternatives regarding the inclusiveness of the regime. One supported by the developing countries and the EU stressed the CBDR principle and, in line with the Berlin Mandate, re-fused the introduction of commitments for non-Annex I parties. The other stated that such parties should take measures contingent upon the im-plementation of Annex I country commitments, f inance and technology transfer (ENB 1997g: 5). In a previous proposal, the EU had recognized that “in the long term emissions of greenhouse gases from countries not included in Annex I must also be regulated if the long term objective of the Convention is to be met (…) this should be considered as one element in the f irst review of the Protocol” (AGBM 1997g: 14). This soft word-ing contrasted with the approach inherent in the US framework protocol proposal of “automatic application of progressive (…) obligations” to all parties (AGBM 1997b: 87). This latter proposal had already been ab-sent from the Chair’s negotiating text and was effectively discarded by Estrada during the talks as not falling under the Berlin Mandate (ENB 1997g: 13; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 229). The EU’s formulation was equally not considered further. While parties had thus managed to develop their positions during this session, ref lected in the reports by the chairs of the informal groups (AGBM 1997h; Depledge 2005: 166), no agreement on

any of the issues under debate could be reached. Recognising the impor-tance of targets to the f inal agreement, the Chair demanded that “two Parties’ target def inition” (i.e. those of the US and Japan) should be unveiled (ENB 1997g: 3).

Before the f inal AGBM and COP, the pressure on the JUSSCANNZ members to advance clear positions on the reduction targets had thus become intense. Especially the host country of COP 3 was expected to demonstrate its willingness to reach an agreement: on 7 October 1997, after lengthy internal negotiations, Japan was then also f irst to yield to the pressure when it presented a 5% emissions reduction proposal over the period 2008–2012 for three gases (CO₂, N₂O and CH₄) (Matsumura 2000:

11–15; Schröder 2001: 44–45). The proposal represented a compromise between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in favour of sta-bilization, the Environment Agency of Japan, advocating effective mitiga-tion policies and thus higher targets, and the Foreign Ministry, which was above all concerned with Japan’s image as a global player (Kameyama 2004: 72–73). It can be interpreted as seeking middle ground between the EU and the US (Schröder 2001: 46; Matsumura 2000: 14). In the US, the debate about an international climate agreement had, in the meantime, become very complex. Whereas the Republican-dominated Congress re-mained hostile towards environmental regulation, public opinion did not display great concern about climate change (Harrison 2000: 104–105).

Against this backdrop, the Senate had, a few days before AGBM 7, adopt-ed a brief resolution sponsoradopt-ed by Senators Byrd and Hagel. Adoptadopt-ed by a 95-0 vote, it sent a very clear message to the US negotiating team: the Senate would ratify a newly negotiated international climate treaty only

“if the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specif ic scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period” (Senate 1997: point 1(A)). Under these circumstances, the Clinton administration had not yet decided on a target proposal before AGBM 8.

The EU used the period prior to AGBM 8 to reaff irm and further ref ine its negotiation position. On 1 October 1997, the Commission pub-lished “The EU Approach for Kyoto”, which explained the logic behind the Union’s internal strategy for emissions reductions and its international negotiation position (European Commission 1997). In this document, the Commission bluntly stated what the EU demanded from other parties in the global talks. F irstly, “all industrialized countries must be committed to comparable action”, i.e. GHG reductions of 15% by 2010 (European Commission 1997: 18). Secondly, “it is important (…) that the more de-veloped among the developing countries gradually assume bigger respon-sibilities when their level of development justif ies it. There is no room for free riders on this issue” (European Commission 1997: 19). With this

latter position, the Commission signalled, albeit ambiguously, that the EU was not going to demand any (binding) commitments from the develop-ing countries in an agreement that would result from the Berlin Mandate

latter position, the Commission signalled, albeit ambiguously, that the EU was not going to demand any (binding) commitments from the develop-ing countries in an agreement that would result from the Berlin Mandate