With the Protocol f inally ratif ied and f irst steps undertaken towards a post-2012 dialogue, the beginning of a new era of climate regime devel-opment seemed around the corner.
The Context: Major Developments in Global Politics and Climate Science
Important changes to the broader context into which the regime dis-cussions were embedded occurred towards the end of the time period ana-lysed in this section. Considering the broader global politics of climate change, while the focus had clearly been on the UN regime as long as the Kyoto Protocol was not yet ratif ied, numerous processes were initi-ated outside the UN framework in 2005. This was primarily the result of activities by the United Kingdom, which held both the EU and the G-8 Presidency in the second half of that year (Vogler 2008: 21). Part of the reason for promoting the use of fora outside the UN context was the desire to re-engage the US, which was considered as indispensable for ensuring the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime, but remained sceptical of both the multilateral process and the science of cli-mate change (Af ionis 2008). At the G-8 summit in Gleneagles in July 2005, a communiqué was nonetheless adopted in which all leaders, in-cluding the US President, underscored that “climate change is a serious and long-term challenge” and that it was “in our global interests to work together, and in partnership with major emerging economies” to reduce GHG emissions (G-8 2005: points 1 and 3). Further, the G-8 reaff irmed that “the UNFCCC is the appropriate forum for negotiating future action on climate change”, but still agreed to begin an extra-UN, G-8 “Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development” (G-8 2005: points 14, 9). The Dialogue’s aim was to share best practices and promote the transformation of energy systems; it was open to “other in-terested countries with signif icant energy needs”, notably the f ive major emerging countries (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa) already present in Gleneagles (G-8 2005: point 9; Af ionis 2008: 3–5). The G-8 issued a work plan to that end, creating several working groups (Af ionis 2008: 4). The EU, represented by its big member states and Commission President Barroso at the summit, endorsed this plan (Af ionis 2008: 4).
Only months later, before a f irst Gleneagles dialogue meeting, the US itself co-initiated another small multilateral forum, the Asia-Pacif ic Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change (APP, US, China, India, Australia, Japan, South Korea). The aim of this partnership was equally to advance cooperation on clean energy technologies outside the
UN process (APP 2009). Both the G-8+5 and the US-led initiative would diversify the landscape of global arenas in which climate change would be discussed from the mid-2000s on. These trends would increase a feel-ing of uncertainty about where and how best to pursue global debates.
Regarding the issue itself, 2006 has been referred to as the “year of cli-mate change”, as it saw a rise in public and political interest in the topic, with the effect that important f indings by climate scientists slowly be-gan to transfer into “popular knowledge” (Sterk et al. 2007: 139; Davies 2006). The attention of the public was drawn to the issue, for instance, by a documentary f ilm written by and starring former US Vice-President Gore. “An Inconvenient Truth” became a public success in many parts of the world. Further, a study on the economics of climate change, commis-sioned by the UK government and conducted by a team led by Nicholas Stern, appeared in late October 2006 and became a key reference for politicians and the interested public. The central message of the Stern re-port (2007) was that early action to mitigate climate change would come at lower cost than late adaptation and mitigation measures. F inally, the year 2007 would see the gradual release of the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report, discussed in detail in the Introduction to this work.15 All in all, the degree of attention climate change attracted from 2006/2007 on was bound to have an impact on the emerging discussions about the further reform of the climate regime.
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime and their Positions Prior to the f irst COP/MOP, the Umbrella Group was split on how to proceed with regime development. While the US and Australia were not particularly inclined towards discussing further reductions at all, the other members of the group made it clear that they considered it necessary that major developing economies engage in GHG reduction measures, but di-vergences existed regarding the modalities of such efforts (ENB 2005b:
13–14; Germanwatch 2006: 5). By contrast, the G-77/China camped on its old position: it wanted by all means to prevent debates about own targets, preferring to focus discussions about regime development on the review of the commitments for Annex I countries stipulated in Article 3.9 KP (ENB 2005b: 13; Kasa et al. 2008: 116).
Since 2004, the European Union was operating with the described new internal division of labour in the climate change domain. The lead negotiator and issue leaders arrangement was bound to show its real im-pact on the Union’s actor capacity during the more complex, two-track
15 As the concrete f indings of the report would really only have specif ic consequences for the talks from the 13th COP in Bali on, they are recalled in Chapter 5.
talks that were to come with the COP/MOPs. One sign of a greater inter-est for strategic thinking in the Union’s foreign climate policy approach was a major transformation of its outreach activities. In reaction to the proliferation of fora addressing climate change and the increased im-portance of mini- and bilateral partnerships (ENB 2006: 19), but also to generally boost its foreign policy strategy, the EU sought to improve its bilateral relations with individual countries or groups of countries during the years 2005 and 2006 (European Commission 2005: 10). Further, the Union stepped up its diplomatic efforts for generalized outreach by ex-ploiting the Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) to promote its positions on climate change. In terms of bilateral relations, the EU institutionalized talks with both Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Older relations with industrialized countries were reinvigorated. On top of long-standing rela-tions with Canada, the Union had created, as early as 2002, a US-EU High Level Representatives Dialogue on Climate Change to keep the channels of transatlantic communication open despite substantive disagreement on how to deal with climate change (European Commission 2009b, 2009c).
Moreover, EU-Japan relations were further strengthened: since 2001, they were based on a rolling work plan in the environmental domain, foreseeing regular high-level exchanges between the Troika and interloc-utors from the Japanese ministries of environment, economy (MITI) and foreign affairs (Interview EU representative 24, European Commission 2009d). New and more wide-reaching efforts to strengthen cooperation were undertaken vis-à-vis the two major emerging countries, China and India. In 2005, the EU-China Summit adopted a Joint Declaration on Climate Change, establishing a partnership covering concrete cooperation in the f ields of carbon capture and storage and clean energy technology, but also ensuring regular political dialogues (Interviews EU representa-tives 1, 31; European Commission 2009e; Joint Declaration 2005). In the Indian case, a joint action plan and a 2005 EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change were to ensure a collaborative promo-tion of public-private partnerships for research and development of clean technologies as well as continuous dialogue on climate change (Interview EU representative 31; European Commission 2009f). Furthermore, the EU also attempted to forge stronger relations with least developing coun-tries. In 2004, the Council adopted an “Action Plan on Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation” (European Commission 2007a: 10). It intended to help developing countries in building capaci-ties to cope with mitigation and adaptation, and was meant as a basis for more concrete partnerships with LDCs. F inally, the Union also started to integrate debates about climate change into existing bilateral dialogues, e.g. the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (European Commission 2009g).
In terms of wider diplomatic efforts, the EU began to undertake attempts
to further coordinate its outreach via the Green Diplomacy Network, an informal network of environment experts within the foreign ministries and embassies of the 27, supported by the Commission (Interviews EU representatives 12, 1, 26, 24, 30). This network had carried out a f irst series of démarches in key countries before COP 10 in Buenos Aires and would repeat this activity before each of the subsequent COPs (European Commission 2009a: 2). The démarches, conducted about three weeks be-fore the conferences in countries considered central for the outcome of the UN climate negotiations, consisted in an exercise of informing nego-tiation partners of the EU’s position and an exchange of views (Interviews EU representatives 12, 1, 26). Based on instructions agreed in the WPIEI-CC, the local GDN would normally target the message to the specif icities of its host country (Interviews EU representatives 12, 1, 26). This permit-ted the EU to explain its position more thoroughly than ever and, at least in theory, to gain an understanding of the concerns in partner countries so as to strive for an adaptation of its position and behaviour. Regarding the Union’s internal climate regime, a policy decided earlier would come to full bloom in 2005: the ETS began its f irst trial period. In the same year, the Commission equally launched its second European Climate Change Programme, focusing on topics like emissions from aviation, cars and carbon capture and storage (European Commission 2008c). Concrete new legislation was added to the EU’s acquis in 2006, notably a directive on energy eff iciency and energy services (EP/Council 2006) (see Jordan/
Rayner 2010: 68–71). F inally, the Union’s negotiation position on issues related to regime development had become more concrete: in early 2005, the Commission communication “Winning the battle against climate change” (2005: 10) had demanded
to establish a multilateral climate change regime post-2012 with meaningful participation of all developed countries and the participation of developing countries which will limit the global temperature increase to 2°C (…). The reduction commitments that the EU would (…) take (…) should depend on the level and type of participation of other major emitters.
The March 2005 European Council endorsed this EU “blueprint for a post-2012 world” (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 69), reiterating its “determi-nation to reinvigorate the inter“determi-national negotiations” (European Council 2005: 15). Without specifying a target, the heads of state and government stated that they aimed at “reduction pathways for the group of devel-oped countries in the order of 15–30% by 2020” compared to 1990 levels (European Council 2005: 16). The Union was thus determined to start talks on the future of the climate regime as soon as possible, and sought ways to promote broader participation in emissions reductions efforts by engaging major emerging economies and the US.
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
The seminar on the future of the UN climate regime that had been the subject of much controversy at COP 10 was organised in Bonn in May 2005 and proved to be an “open, frank and broad-ranging” dia-logue (ENB 2005a: 7). It had, however, not succeeded in overcoming key conf licts, as the general impression was that persisting differences “could soon translate once more into heated discussions and intransigence once formal negotiations resumed” (ENB 2005a: 7). Proceedings at COP 11/
MOP 1 (28 November to 10 December 2005, Montreal) would there-fore become crucial with regard to further regime development. Against the will of the US and Australia, the majority of countries had been in favour of holding the two meetings in parallel. While all parties to the UNFCCC, including the US, were gathering as COP, parties who had not ratif ied the Kyoto Protocol were granted observer status under the MOP.
This entailed limited speaking and no voting rights. To structure talks, the Canadian COP Presidency had identif ied three broad agenda items:
implementation, improvement and innovation (known as “the three I’s”) (Bausch/Mehling 2006: 195).
Regarding implementation, the f irst meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol proved to be productive: without much conf lict, parties formally adopted the Marrakech Accords. Concerning the agenda item improve-ment, several decisions were taken on the modalities of the CDM and joint implementation as well as on the compliance committee (Wittneben et al. 2006; Depledge 2006; Bausch/Mehling 2006; ENB 2005b). Main agenda items of the COP concerned ongoing issues (deforestation, adap-tation), but discussions did not result in major advances (ENB 2005b).
As far as the last, and for this analysis most crucial agenda item was concerned, innovation through a further development of the regime, prob-lems emerged.
The MOP had to deal with two related issues in this regard. The Protocol itself foresaw a review of the adequacy of Annex I parties’ com-mitments seven years prior to the end of the f irst commitment period, i.e.
in 2005 (Art. 3.9 KP). At the same time, it also called for a general review in light of the “best available” science, and “at regular intervals and in a timely manner” (Art. 9 KP) (Bausch/Mehling 2006: 196–197). In a contact group on “future action”, the usual cleavages quickly resurfaced: while the EU and Japan jointly introduced the idea of linking these two reviews to start discussing broader commitments beyond a mere review of Annex I targets, the G-77/China submitted a proposal that did not mention Article 9 and refused categorically any debates about non-Annex I reduction obli-gations (Depledge 2006: 18; ENB 2005b: 13–14). An informal group was nonetheless formed to discuss the review process under Article 9.
In parallel, discussions were conducted in yet another group on a pro-posal by the Canadian Presidency foreseeing the initiation of a dialogue on long-term cooperative action under the Convention, introduced to pro-vide a forum in which the US could be a full member (ENB 2005b: 14;
Depledge 2006: 18). Reunited in a high-level informal meeting, members of the three groups deliberated during the last two days of the conference on the design of future regime reform talks (ENB 2005b: 14). In a report-edly dramatic move, the US walked out of this group when the discus-sions came – in their view – too close to considering new commitments for Annex I parties (Müller 2006: 12; Depledge 2006: 18; Germanwatch 2006:
5). The other parties, led by the EU, Japan, and major developing coun-tries (China, India), pursued their debate and decided to draft a plan for a dialogue on long-term action under the UNFCCC (Germanwatch 2006: 5;
ENB 2005b: 14). After the UK had used its special relationship to bring the US back to the table the next (and last) day (Müller 2006: 12), US negotia-tors had only minor changes to make to this plan (Germanwatch 2006: 5).16 The resultant structure for further regime development discussions was three-fold (Bausch/Mehling 2006; Depledge 2006; Germanwatch 2006:
4–6; ENB 2005b: 14): the COP decided to begin a “Dialogue” under the Convention, which would serve the purpose of exchanging views about an enhanced implementation of the UNFCCC in a “non-binding” manner
“not open[ing] any negotiations” (UNFCCC 2005a: 2–3; Wittneben et al.
2006: 17–18; ENB 2005b: 14). Up to four workshops were scheduled until COP 13. Under Article 3.9 KP, the MOP decided to initiate talks on commitments for Annex I parties and created an open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG-KP) (UNFCCC 2005b: 1; Wittneben et al. 2006:
16–17; ENB 2005b: 14). The group was to complete its work in time to avoid a gap between the f irst and a second commitment period of the Protocol. F inally, to the disappointment of the EU and Japan, a decision on the Article 9 review was postponed: parties were invited to submit views on this item (Depledge 2006: 18).
Against the background of the increased attention given to the topic of climate change in 2006, COP 12/MOP 2 in Nairobi (6–17 November 2006) apparently had a sobering effect. Observers remarked a lacking sense of urgency – with talks proceeding at “an almost surrealistic slow pace” – and the usual tendency to backload, resulting in little progress (Sterk et al. 2007: 139–140; Okereke et al. 2007: 32–33, 40–41). Apart from adaptation, which occupied a central place on the agenda, with the adoption of an ambitious “Nairobi Work Programme” (Okereke et al.
16 The US had apparently hoped to present the Asia-Pacif ic Partnership as an alternative track to the UN regime. China, India and Japan chose, however, to stick with the UN as the prime arena to discuss climate change (Germanwatch 2006: 5).
2007: 3–10; UNFCCC 2006a; ENB 2006: 19), talks on regime develop-ment received the most attention. They were held under the two tracks created to that end at COP 11/MOP 1, with some parties, notably the EU, trying to extend them to a third forum.
Under the AWG-KP of Article 3.9 KP, which had met once before – in May 2006 – to elaborate a future plan of work (ENB 2006: 2), the EU and several other parties (Switzerland, Canada) again tried to construct a link with the discussions on Article 9 KP (ENB 2006: 11). Further, the Union and Australia declared that action only by Annex I countries would not suff ice to mitigate climate change in a future regime arrangement (ENB 2006: 11). The EU in particular also attempted to insert its own tempera-ture guideline, a reference to keeping global temperatempera-ture increase below 2°C, into the negotiation texts, while arguing for a debate on a long-term vision of halving emissions by 2050 (Sterk et al. 2007: 141). In the face of G-77/China opposition, the AWG-KP did not reach agreement on these issues, nor on a specif ic timeline for its proceedings. Only very general conclusions were adopted, emphasizing the need for industrialised coun-tries to lead and the future targets to be based on scientif ic analyses (ENB 2006: 11; Okereke et al. 2007: 14–15). An extended work programme was also endorsed: in 2007, parties were to proceed with analyses of miti-gation potentials, followed by discussions on issues of means and actual reduction objectives for Annex I parties (UNFCCC 2006b; Sterk et al.
2007: 141). The second forum for regime development, the Convention Dialogue, was arranged as a series of workshops, focusing on broader topics. Workshop number two was conducted at COP 12, but did not yield any substantial advances beyond the exchange of views (ENB 2006: 4;
Okereke et al. 2007: 15). Observers remarked a certain loss of momentum of the talks under this track (ENB 2006; Sterk et al. 2007: 142). A third opportunity to discuss the future of the climate regime was still available under Article 9 KP, which stipulated a periodic review of the Protocol:
the EU tried, once again, to gain a prof ile as the champion of a thorough and comprehensive review, while the G-77/China attempted to limit the assessment of advances to this MOP, arguing that Article 9 KP foresaw a
“review”, not a “revision” of the Protocol (ENB 2006: 11; Okereke et al.
2007: 16; Sterk et al. 2007: 142). The debates did not end with any sub-stantial reconsideration of the Protocol, but rather a compromise agree-ment on procedure: a new, comprehensive review process was scheduled for MOP 4 in 2008 (Sterk et al. 2007: 142). The G-77/China obtained an assurance that this review would not lead to new commitments for any party (UNFCCC 2006c). In sum, while “the focus of COP 12 and COP/
MOP 2 was undoubtedly on the future – of the Protocol, the Convention, and longer-term action to combat climate change” – (ENB 2006: 19), not much was actually achieved in terms of regime development.
After the sobering effect of the Nairobi COP/MOP, the year 2007 would witness a remarkable build-up of political momentum towards COP 13/MOP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, within and beyond the UN arena. To illustrate both the extension of the negotiations into non-UN bodies and the EU’s expanding foreign climate policy activities, a comprehensive story of this transition year toward a period of intense post-2012 talks, discussed in the next chapter, is presented here.
In January 2007, the EU was the f irst major actor in the global cli-mate arena to advance its conception of a post-2012 agreement when the Commission proposed the start of a negotiation process toward a
In January 2007, the EU was the f irst major actor in the global cli-mate arena to advance its conception of a post-2012 agreement when the Commission proposed the start of a negotiation process toward a