The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee met f ive times be-tween February 1991 and June 1992 to conclude a deal on the UNFCCC.
The f ive-step analysis focuses on the negotiation process regarding the two key issues, major turning points in this process as well as its outcome, highlighting EU inf luence attempts and their effects.
The Context: Major Developments in Global Politics and Climate Science
The negotiations were kicked off in a unique context. Scientif ically, the 1990 F irst IPCC report highlighted that the existence of the green-house effect and its anthropogenic causes were now undisputed, and that unprecedented global temperature rise by about 0.3°C per decade could be expected for the 21st century, while pointing also to existing uncer-tainties due to an incomplete understanding of sources, sinks, clouds and oceans (IPCC 1990). Politically, the fall of the Iron Curtain had altered the global balance of power and made cooperation within the UN on this truly global issue appear more likely. Beyond the UN arena, the 1989 Paris G-7 meeting had already advocated an “umbrella convention on climate change” (cited in Bodansky 1993: 466), an aim that was reiterated a year later in Houston (Sebenius 1991: 111). F inally, a momentum for action on climate change had built over several years, with public pres-sure mounting especially in industrialized countries due to a growth in extreme weather events (Bodansky 2001: 27).
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime and their Positions The negotiations would essentially oppose two major negotiating blocs:3 the developing world, gathered under the G-77 and China um-brella, and the members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A brief overview of the main positions on the two studied issues (reduction targets and CBDR principle) is followed by a discussion of the EU’s actor capacity.
3 Another group was composed of the ex-Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia. This group arguably did not play a big role in these talks: while Russia often sided with the US, the other countries tended to support EU positions (Paterson/Grubb 1992: 304).
By 1991, with the exception of the US and Turkey, all OECD coun-tries had not only formulated an emissions stabilization target, but also clarif ied their more general approach to these negotiations (Gupta 1998:
182; Sebenius 1991: 111). Generally, the industrialized countries accepted to lead the way in the talks and on possible commitments (Bodansky 1993:
478). Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but also most non-EU European countries were in support of the approach chosen for the ozone regime, i.e.
the adoption of quantif ied emission reduction targets and timetables. They had mostly declared that they would be prepared to stabilize their emis-sions at 1988 or 1990 levels by the year 2000 (for an overview: Paterson/
Grubb 1992: 301; Dasgupta 1994: 134–135). A smaller group of countries, including the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, opposed such a rigid ap-proach. Sceptical of international regulation, the US argued against the precautionary principle and for further research and national approaches to climate change (Bodansky 2001: 28–29; Paterson/Grubb 1992: 302, 304).
F inally, Japan opted for an ambiguous “best efforts” approach (Paterson/
Grubb 1992: 303).
At the same time, developing countries were collectively arguing for the differentiation of commitments in line with the “main responsibility”
principle evoked in earlier international climate conferences, and for tech-nological and f inancial aid by the industrialized countries to help the poor in their f ight against climate change (Bodansky 2001: 30, 1993: 479–480;
Paterson/Grubb 1992: 300). Generally, countries of the G-77/China bloc were thus not willing to consider emissions reduction efforts for them-selves. Big differences existed, however, regarding the concerns about climate change: while the group of small island states (AOSIS) called for immediate action, OPEC countries questioned the science and the need for reducing emissions altogether (Paterson/Grubb 1992: 299–300;
Bodansky 1993: 480–481).
When examining the European Union’s actor capacity and position before the onset of the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, a f irst ob-servation is that it had addressed the issue of climate change fairly swiftly, and had, despite the internal divergences described above, come to a com-mon position as early as 1990 (Wettestad 2000: 28; Skjaerseth 1994: 27).
Its general position was characterized by the desire for a legally binding, comprehensive international agreement which would enshrine the obliga-tion of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. On the quesobliga-tion of responsibilities, the EU acknowledged the responsibility of industrialized countries, without specifying what, if anything, it expected from develop-ing countries.
While ref ining its position for the international negotiations, the EU also began sketching out the contours of an internal climate policy (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 57–59). In 1991, the Commission made a proposal
for a climate package relying on four core pillars: measures to improve energy eff iciency and promote the development of renewable energy sources (programmes SAVE and ALTERNER), a combined carbon and energy tax, and the set-up of a monitoring programme for greenhouse gas emissions (Wettestad 2000). It took until 1993 to f inalize talks on this package: while the tax never materialized, due to opposition notably by the UK, the other proposals were gradually adopted (Jordan/Rayner 2010; Haigh 1996). The lengthy talks on these measures also implied that the Union had to try to defend, during the global negotiations, an external position not underpinned by common internal policies.
Shortly before the f irst INC session, on 4 February 1991, the Council decided unanimously to give the Commission the mandate to negotiate a Convention on climate change (Brambilla 2004: 165). As the European Community did not possess a legal status in the INC, it would, howev-er, de facto be represented through the Council Presidency,4 which also made efforts to coordinate activities among all member states, arguably achieving a certain degree of uniform representation of the EU’s posi-tions (Brambilla 2004: 165). Commission representatives did however reportedly also actively participate in the INC process, and – according to some analysts – equally played a signif icant role in promoting the unity and consistent representation over the course of the various presidencies (Jachtenfuchs 1996: 114–116). Despite these coordination efforts, each EU member also had its own representation (see Barrett 1991: 187, foot-note 18). In the absence of a clear common negotiation strategy, the EU’s joint action would therefore often be of an ad hoc nature. It was only at the Rio summit itself that the EC was then granted the status of “full par-ticipant” through a UNGA decision, which gave it the right to attend and speak, but no rights to vote or be elected (Schumer 1996). For the summit, the Council mandated the Commission to represent the EC’s interests in all areas of exclusive competences, while it kept issues of shared compe-tence to itself (Brambilla 2004: 165–167).
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
The f irst two sessions of the INC (4–14 February 1991, Chantilly, Virginia; 19–28 June 1991, Geneva) were mostly dedicated to procedural matters, such as the appointment of Jean Ripert (France) as INC Chair, and the creation of two working groups (WG). WG 1 was to deal with commit-ments both in terms of concrete emissions reductions and in terms of f inance and technology transfer, whereas WG 2 had the task of preparing the legal and institutional mechanisms that would form the backbone of the future
4 In 1991, Luxembourg and the Netherlands held the Council Presidency, followed by Portugal in the f irst half of 1992.
convention (INC 1991a: 23; Paterson 1996: 51–56). Further, parties began to state initial positions. Draft proposals were circulated by the US, Australia, Germany and the UK (Bodansky 1993: footnotes 205 and 206). The US proposal, an “inaction plan” according to critics, underscored its opposition to quantif ied targets and timetables, and proposed instead a range of national policies covering all GHGs (Paterson 1996: 54). Most other proposals in-cluded clearly def ined targets and timetables. On the issue of differentiation, while China and India insisted, on behalf of the G-77/China, on industri-alized countries’ responsibilities, the US called for contributions from de-veloping countries in accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities (Dasgupta 1994: 133). By contrast, other OECD countries and the EU were more willing to accept the “main responsibility” principle.
Substantial talks began only in the second week of INC 2. WG 1, which – due to its mandate on commitments – is of most interest here, discussed inter alia a Japanese proposal on “pledge and review”, a con-cept that foresaw voluntary national mitigation actions to be reviewed internationally and received support from the UK and France (Bodansky 1993: 486). Further, a compromise formula on a phased “comprehensive approach” was proposed by the UK and the US. Bridging the gap be-tween those favouring a hard target and the US “no target” position, it introduced the ideas of using credits for GHG cuts (beyond solely carbon dioxide) and sinks, i.e. processes or activities which remove GHGs from the atmosphere such as forest or land management (Brenton 1994: 188;
Bodansky 1993: 486). In both cases, the majority of EU members and the Commission were opposed to the proposals (Dasgupta 1994: 136–137).
INC 3 (9–20 September 1991, Nairobi) saw no substantial advances in either of the WGs. Only at the very end of the session a mandate was given to the co-chairs of the two groups for preparing coherent negotiat-ing texts (INC 1991b). At INC 4 (9–20 December 1991, Geneva), “states tended to reiterate their previously enunciated positions, reintroducing proposals and language that had been omitted from the co-chairs’ drafts”
(Bodansky 1993: 488). The main event of this session was a break-up of the G-77/China bloc over the def inition of a common position on com-mitments (Bodansky 1993: 488–489). While a group of 44 countries led by China and India reiterated the stance already taken beforehand (leaving the question of industrialized countries’ emissions targets open), AOSIS proposed that developed countries stabilize their carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 1995 and reduce them thereafter (Paterson 1996: 58). At the end of the session, delegates decided to combine the ne-gotiating texts of both WGs into one “Consolidated Working Document”.
INC 5 (18–28 February 1992, New York) was to negotiate on this, heavily bracketed document in order to reach a f inal agreement. Despite a noticeable acceleration of the negotiations, it could, however, not deliver
on this aim. While the G-77 had come to grips with a coherent position, the industrialized countries were still split on the question of commitments.
Almost the entire session was thus spent with intra-OECD talks (Kjellen 1994: 160–161). The US continued to oppose targets and timetables, re-fusing all language about “stabilization”, while the other industrialized players generally agreed on the necessity of targets, but could not settle on their precise shape (Bodansky 1993: 490). Up to this point, the strat-egy of the EU and many OECD countries had been to attempt convincing the US with arguments, with European negotiators believing that it would be “possible to persuade the US of the political feasibility of committing itself” to the EU’s stabilization target (interview with Dutch negotiator Vellinga in ECO, 20 December 1991: 4–5, cited in Paterson 1996: 59).
This approach changed under growing time pressure, when it became evi-dent that a deal could only be made if a compromise with the US would be struck. No agreement could be reached, however, at this session, which forced the Chair to convene another, originally not scheduled meeting.
In the run-up to this ultimate INC session, Chair Ripert gathered the Extended Bureau, a smaller circle of around 24 delegates, the presid-ing off icers of the two WGs and representatives of key countries includ-ing the US, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil, and – from the EU – France, Germany and the Netherlands (Bodansky 1993: footnote 242). At this meeting in Paris (15–17 April 1992), delegates unanimously convinced the Chair to produce a compromise draft for a convention (Borione/Ripert 1994: 88–89). He agreed under the condition that he would not be forced to propose text on the highly sensitive issue of targets and timetables.
Arguably, this Extended Bureau meeting marked therefore a f irst, albeit late, major turning point in these negotiations. The Chair’s agreement to shoulder the indispensable job of eliminating brackets from the text left parties to focus on the politically most sensitive issue: how much GHG reductions would be agreed to (Chasek 2001: 130).
The two weeks in between the Extended Bureau meeting and the reconvened f ifth INC meeting would prove decisive for the adoption of the Convention. Talks were held at the highest political level, for instance between the US President and both Commission President Delors and the German Chancellor Kohl (Lescher 2000: 60–61). A deal regarding the issue of commitments was f inally made between the UK, supported by some EU members, and the US. In late April, UK Environment Secretary Howard visited Washington to negotiate with US State Department off icials on text concerning the objective of the convention. These textual proposals were introduced at the resumed INC 5, and made it virtually unchanged into Art.
4.2(a), (b) of the UNFCCC, discussed below (Bodansky 1993: 491). In the transatlantic negotiations, Howard gave up on the EU targets and timeta-bles approach and agreed with the US on much softer language around the
issue of emission reductions objectives (Cass 2007: 76). The meeting must therefore be regarded as the second major turning point in this process.
The second part of INC 5 (30 April–8 May 1992, New York) marked then the f inal turning point in the negotiations (Chasek 2001: 130–131).
On this occasion, the INC split into three WGs: one on commitments and f inance led by the INC Chair, one on the objective and principles, and one on institutions, dispute settlement and f inal clauses. The INC discussed all elements of the Chair’s draft, and lifted f inal brackets by brokering compromises on the most sensitive issues, notably regarding targets and timetables (Bodansky 1993: 491). While most sections, in-cluding the one on principles (Art. 3 UNFCCC), were quickly accepted by the parties, the UK/US compromise proposal on targets initially came under heavy criticism by the developing countries and EU representa-tives like Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana, who called the text
“completely unacceptable” (Bodansky 1993: footnote 251). Following intense internal consultations in the G-77/China and in the EU, however, both blocs f inally agreed to the text to ensure the overall deal. This latter explicitly excluded commitments for developing countries.
The Outcome: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The f inal product of one and a half years of negotiations was the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, an international treaty signed at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992. Its entry into force, on 21 March 1994, would require the ratif ication of 50 parties.
Explicitly called “framework convention” because of its general char-acter, the UNFCCC set the climate regime an ambiguous objective: “to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame suff icient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (Art. 2 UNFCCC). This “declarative goal” did not impose any legally binding obligations on the parties, but would nevertheless acquire signif icance as a general point of reference in climate talks (Bodansky 1993: 451). During the period after the adop-tion of the Convenadop-tion, the objective was interpreted very differently:
some parties (like AOSIS) considered that Article 2 stipulated immedi-ate mitigation action, whereas others believed that it indicimmedi-ated the need for gathering further scientif ic evidence of man-made climate change (Rowbotham 1996: 34; Brambilla 2004: 41).
Central to the treaty and to the climate regime as such are the f ive principles listed in its Article 3: the principle of common but differenti-ated responsibilities, the principle of equity, the precautionary principle, the principle of sustainable development, and the principle of free trade.
These principles were perceived as “interpretation aides” for the treaty by some, whereas others regarded them as “subjective rights” which may grant parties certain privileges (Ott 1996: 65; Bodansky 1993: 501). The relative uncertainty about their status caused controversies which would shape negotiations for decades to come after the Rio summit.
The Convention further def ined various obligations, distinguishing be-tween general and specif ic duties, applicable to different groups of parties.
General obligations for all parties were stipulated in Articles 4.1 (information and data collection requirements), 5 (research and systematic observation), 6 (education, training and public awareness) and 12.1 (reporting). A major distinction between groups of countries was made through Annex I, which lists the OECD countries. According to Articles 4.2(a) and (b), negotiated during the UK/US meeting prior to the decisive INC session, each Annex I party “shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that devel-oped countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in an-thropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention”
(Art. 4.2(a) UNFCCC). Further, in “order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention (…) detailed information on its policies and meas-ures (…), as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases (…) with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases” (Art. 4.2(b) UNFCCC, emphasis added). Interpreted as the “heart of the UNFCCC” at the time of the entry into force of the treaty (Mintzer/Leonard 1994), this article never really acquired any substantial signif icance thereafter due to both the soft formulation of the target and its lack of legal bindingness.
The Convention itself called for a review of the adequacy of the substan-tial provisions of these paragraphs (Art. 4.2(d) UNFCCC). F inally, the treaty included further specif ic obligations for Annex I parties in terms of more wide-reaching reporting duties (Art. 12.2 UNFCCC) and for Annex II parties (Annex I minus economies in transition) regarding the f inan-cial assistance and technology transfer to developing countries (Art. 4.2 UNFCCC) (Depledge 2005: 21).
For the purpose of this study, the discussed obligations for different groups of parties and the principles of Article 3 represent certainly the
most signif icant provisions of the treaty, as they embody the core pil-lars of the climate regime. Other aspects of the UNFCCC nevertheless need to be highlighted. Its Article 7 created the conference of the par-ties as the main decision-making body in the regime. The COP adopts its own rules of procedure. It meets once yearly. Moreover, a secretariat (Art. 8 UNFCCC) and two Subsidiary Bodies were created (Art. 9 and 10 UNFCCC). In terms of procedures, the UNFCCC foresaw consensus or, as a last resort, a “three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting” for the adoption of amendments (Art. 15.3 UNFCCC) and consensus on the adoption of a Protocol (Art. 17) (Pallemaerts/Williams 2006: 36–37). Further, the Convention included provisions on various key issues like the f inancial mechanism (Art. 11) and dispute settlement (Art.
14), whose signif icance has been discussed elsewhere (Yamin/Depledge 2004: chaps. 10, 12). F inally, it is important to mention that the UNFCCC provided for f lexible ways of implementation, as it allowed inter alia for a joint implementation of policies by different parties (Art. 4.1 (a) and (d) UNFCCC).
Assessing and Explaining the EU’s Inf luence Attempts and Inf luence during the Negotiations on the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC laid the formal foundations for the global climate re-gime whose development is analysed in this work. As the deliberations leading up to its adoption provide a f irst insight into the dynamics of global climate talks, they convey signif icant background information for the study of subsequent negotiation rounds. Further, their analysis allows
The UNFCCC laid the formal foundations for the global climate re-gime whose development is analysed in this work. As the deliberations leading up to its adoption provide a f irst insight into the dynamics of global climate talks, they convey signif icant background information for the study of subsequent negotiation rounds. Further, their analysis allows