To facilitate the explanation of EU inf luence, two sets of assump-tions were made when designing the analytical framework for this study:
causal mechanisms underlying the exercise of inf luence (bargaining, ar-guing), and potential variables that may qualify as conditions enabling or restraining EU inf luence were identif ied. Two analytical strategies can be employed that capitalize on these assumptions: pattern-matching and explanation-building (see Chapter 1).
The story of the negotiations indicates that their decisive f inal stages must be considered as a relatively unequivocal example of classical bar-gaining (Rowlands 2001), especially regarding the crucial issues of tar-gets and responsibilities. For one, the outcome, a “package deal” linking numerous issues, represented a compromise par excellence: in simplif ied terms, the acceptance of targets by the US depended on other parties’ pre-paredness to integrate f lexible mechanisms into the treaty regime, while the approval of the latter by the G-77/China was conditional on the ex-clusion of new commitments for developing countries. A preference for bargaining was also visible in the approach to the negotiations taken by the Chair, who repeatedly emphasized that “nothing is agreed until eve-rything is” (ENB 1997k: 6), and in most parties’ tendency to “backload”
proposals (Depledge 2005: 171). F inally, no key party changed its beliefs or preferences on the key issues during the negotiations, with the excep-tion of the US on the legal bindingness of targets at COP 2, arguably un-der the impression of new scientif ic f indings. Parties only modif ied their
behaviour to allow for an agreement at the very last stage. This conf irms the above assumption that the EU’s exercise of inf luence must have been bargaining-based. In other words, the causal mechanism that led others to alter their behaviour and move into the Union’s direction on the targets was bargaining rather than persuasion. The questions that remain are how and why this causal mechanism was brought to bear on the issue of targets, and not, or to a much lesser extent, on other issues. The EU’s inf luencing strategy must have met with favourable conditions in this respect, while it proved to be less suited to the negotiation context (or the discussed issues themselves) on other agenda items. In search for the scope conditions that triggered the causal mechanism, all variables identif ied in Chapter 1 are brief ly considered: the global context and signif icant events, the issue of climate change, the internal dynamics of the regime, including actors’
beliefs and preferences, positions, capacities and their interaction.
No signif icant external events were detected during this time phase that could have or did impact the climate negotiation arena. By contrast, advances in the scientif ic f indings on the issue of climate change in the second IPCC report of late 1995 marked the negotiations in the spring and summer of 1996, enhancing the willingness of parties to consider legally binding targets. As for the regime dynamics, the fact that negotiations were mostly based on a bargaining rationale made interests and strategic behaviour central to the f inal outcome. This makes it necessary to re-consider the evolution of the interests (and their formation), strategies and capacities of the major actors throughout the negotiations. For the US, the intricate internal institutional set-up and the highly conditional support of the Senate for an engagement in global climate talks made it extremely diff icult to def ine a position in the f irst place. Nonetheless, once it had def ined its stance, it managed to behave strategically on the basis of in-terests that were predominantly economically motivated: any acceptance of climate mitigation policies was to avoid putting US competitiveness at risk. Its overall clout in the negotiations was guaranteed above all by the fact that it had remained the largest emitter on the planet. Japan had com-parable internal problems. The turf wars between environmentally and economically minded ministries were ultimately settled through an inter-vention by the foreign ministry and the Prime Minister, based on general foreign policy considerations rather than economic or environmental con-cerns. Its clout in the talks was primarily a result of its function as a host country of the decisive COP. As such, it assumed the role of a facilitator, trying to balance the two extreme positions on targets and regulatory ap-proaches. The G-77/China, despite all its heterogeneity, derived its force from its unity during key moments and on crucial issues in the negotia-tions. It remained a very defensive actor on many points, protecting its own achievements of the past (Art. 3 UNFCCC) and demanding further
developed country action. F inally, if the EU possessed actor capacity dur-ing this period, it varied in function of its internal decision-makdur-ing and coordination processes. As a result of its at times dysfunctional “climate policy-making machinery” and its insuff icient preparedness for the f inal bargaining round, extensive internal coordination was necessary, hamper-ing greater outreach activities and a more strategic approach (not only) at the Kyoto COP (Yamin 2000: 61). In contrast to the US, which had diff iculties def ining a position, but was more effective once it had one, the EU possessed elaborate positions quite early, but was rather inf lexible in the actual talks. These positions and actions were, to a larger extent than in the case of the US and Japan, motivated by environmental and, on the issue of responsibilities, equity concerns (Interviews EU, US rep-resentatives 17, 5; Van Schaik/Schunz 2012). In its approach towards the target, it acted on the basis of the precautionary principle, and made the strategic choice to adopt a position that would force other industrialized countries to react in order to come to a fairly ambitious overall target with every Annex I party on board. In its strategy regarding developing country commitments, it regularly let moral concerns prevail and did not insist on a more active implication of advanced non-Annex I countries in mitigation policies. When these incommensurable approaches and inter-ests clashed in a negotiation context necessitating decision by consensus, only strategic interaction and a package deal could be the outcome. The sole point of convergence of all (major) actors in the negotiations, at least after COP 2, concerned the necessity, in light of the political pressure that had built up, to agree on a new treaty with legally binding commitments.
Capitalizing on this agreement, the necessary space for overcoming dif-ferences by extensive concession-making opened up during the f inal days of the talks.
This review of the potential explanatory factors of EU inf luence on the climate regime during the studied period thus points to a mixture of in-ternal and exin-ternal scope conditions enabling the EU’s inf luence through bargaining, while also highlighting several restraining factors.
Turning to the enabling conditions f irst, the Union’s own strategic ap-proach around the issue of targets was certainly helpful: on this issue, it positioned itself proactively, managed to gain support from the G-77/
China (and civil society actors), and remained f irm until the f inal days of the talks. Moreover, it was able to organize its foreign policy implemen-tation around this position, with a very engaged member state (the UK) taking the lead as key representative in the f inal stages of the negotia-tions. External factors that enabled its inf luence were arguably the goal-specif ic preference convergence between major actors (an outcome had to be achieved at COP 3 under the pressure of global public opinion), a level playing f ield among them, and the strong preferences of other key actors
for approaches that the Union had refused from the start of the talks (like the notion of f lexibility and differentiation), which opened pathways for mutual concessions. In these circumstances, its inf luence attempts were able to trigger “bargaining” as the causal mechanism leading to change in the behaviour of other players.
By contrast, the f indings also allow for identifying several hindrances to the EU’s capacity of exerting inf luence. Regarding internal factors, the negotiations on the issue of responsibilities indicated the need for internal coordination in the face of conf licting preferences among member states on strategic (as opposed to substantial) choices. As a result of this and a clear lack of “political will” of the member states, the Union’s foreign policy implementation was rather limited and ambiguous on key issues (Yamin 2000; Sjöstedt 1998: 238–239). Concerning external determinants of the Union’s inf luence, the latter was considerably restrained by other actors’ power and their capacities to convert this power into inf luence.
These, in turn, depended to a large extent on the internal institutional set-up, interest and belief constellations within third countries and nego-tiating coalitions. In some cases, as with the G-77/China on the issue of responsibilities or with the US on the issue of f lexible mechanisms, the relative power of these actors – rooted in material and immaterial ca-pacities including emission prof iles (for the US) and the capacity to build coalitions (for the G-77/China) – was so signif icant that they created an uneven playing f ield, to the detriment of the EU. As a result, these actors’
negotiation positions absolutely had to be accommodated to ensure the overall aim of reaching an agreement.