Key Actors Other than the EU
Besides the EU, three core blocs were involved in the negotiations on a protocol to the UNFCCC: developing countries traditionally cooper-ated under the G-77/China umbrella; JUSCANZ (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), which later became JUSSCANNZ (with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland), had formed a new negotiating group of non-EU industrialized countries after the UNFCCC negotia-tions; f inally, the countries in economic transition, including Russia, co-operated to defend their special interests in the talks.
JUS(S)CA(N)NZ,1 an “unnatural alliance” for some, emerged gradu-ally as a counterpart to the EU during these negotiations. It united coun-tries for whom emissions reductions were, for a variety of reasons, less politically desirable and arguably less easily achievable than for the EU (Grubb et al. 1999: 34). Central to this group’s behaviour throughout the talks was the position of the US and, in the f inal stages, of the Japanese hosts of the decisive COP 3. These two countries also represented the largest GHG emitters in absolute terms within the coalition.
1 For reasons of coherence, the acronym JUSSCANNZ, although this may not always be entirely accurate, will be used throughout this chapter.
In the early 1990s, the United States was by far the most important carbon dioxide emitter in the world. Its share of the total CO2 emissions of all industrialized countries in 1990 lay at 36% (UNFCCC 1997e:
60).2 As the world’s largest coal producer and second largest producer of oil and gas, the US had become used to a “low-price energy culture”, making it highly dependent on the use of fossil fuels (Grubb et al. 1999:
31). This dependence outweighed the threat perception about climate change, which was expected – at the time – to manifest itself above all through extreme weather events in some regions of the country (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 18–19). Consequently, climate change was thus predominantly framed in economic terms (Damro/Mendez 2003; Baker 2006). The political system of the US facilitates an economic fram-ing of the subject, since Congress plays a signif icant, indirect role in the def inition of negotiation positions for international treaty-making processes. The US Constitution states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur” (Art. II, section 2). As a result, “it is Congress, not the executive branch or the President, that has the f inal say over U.S. environmental policy, both at home and abroad” (Paarlburg 1997: 149). By consequence, the US State Department, formally in charge of the negotiations, acts de facto under manifold restrictions from the legislator (Harris 2001: 19–22).
The US Congress, in turn, is traditionally open for input from vari-ous lobby groupings. Both members of the Hvari-ouse of Representatives and Senators defended very diverse interests regarding climate change during the period analysed in this chapter, most of which have to do with the short-term economic well-being of their constituencies. While party aff iliation at times determined their stance on climate policies – with Republicans generally more hostile towards environmental legis-lation, and Democrats more inclined to take action on green issues – no clear-cut division between the different camps can be discerned (Harris 2001: 20). Quite a number of Democratic Senators from coal- producing states tended to prioritize the economic concerns of their voters over measures to reduce GHG emissions in the 1990s. Further, big business arguably played an important part in shaping positions in this period (Harrison 2000: 92–93). After mid-term elections in 1994, the Clinton and Gore administration that had originally been positively inclined toward climate action saw itself confronted with a Congress domi-nated by Republicans – and sceptics among fellow Democrats – who
2 The numbers cited here are 1990 f igures, taken from the f irst national GHG reports.
They have been chosen to allow for comparability and because they provided the basis on which the various parties formulated their preferences and negotiation positions at that time (UNFCCC 1997e: 60).
believed that climate policies represented a threat to economic growth and “American jobs” (Bryner 2000: 124). This would have a consider-able impact on the US negotiation position. Prior to the Berlin COP, this position was outlined in the October 1993 Climate Change Action Plan, which called for a stabilization of GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, covering four gases (CO2, methane, N2O, HFC) (Clinton/
Gore 1993: f igure 2). This stance was further specif ied in the 1994 Climate Action Report: for the US, the negotiations were to determine
“a new ‘aim’ that would provide specif ic guidance for international commitments beyond the year 2000” (Department of State 1994: 193).
Further, the climate regime was to display a number of characteris-tics, including being f lexible (which meant, in essence, cost-effective), comprehensive and equitable, i.e. “engaging all countries in the global effort while recognizing differences in national circumstances and ca-pabilities” (Department of State 1994: 193). This position would evolve only slightly over the course of the negotiations.
Similar to the US, Japan, with 8.5% of the total emissions of all industrialized countries, did not at the time expect to be subject to many negative consequences of climate change (UNFCCC 1997e: 60).
The country’s rationale for undertaking signif icant efforts to conserve energy as early as the 1960s had been based on economic rather than environmental considerations: both the Japanese government and its business community feared the increased economic competition from other Asian countries, and thought it necessary to embark on economic modernization towards greater energy eff iciency (Schröder 2001: 40–
41). The general attitude towards the issue of climate change in Japan can therefore be characterized as a mixture of “impact-skepticism” and
“techno-optimism” (Fermann 1993: 292). This general stance on cli-mate change was translated into a negotiation position through lengthy and conf lict-ridden discussions between the Environmental Agency, responsible for environmental policies and more ambitious with re-gard to a reduction target, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in charge of energy policies and protector of Japanese economic interests (Matsumura 2000: 11–16; Kameyama 2004: 72–
73). In the early phase of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Japan would thus further defend the previously adopted position of promoting a sta-bilization of CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 (AGBM 1995b:
35). By contrast, it did not have a clear stance on the differentiation of commitments and potential efforts to be undertaken by developing countries. This position evolved considerably when the country em-braced the issue of climate change to raise its foreign policy prof ile by proposing to host COP 3 (Kameyama 2004; Schröder 2001: 43;
Matsumura 2000).
For the other JUSSCANNZ members, the domestic circumstances were quite diverse. While Canada and Australia, with 3.3% and 2.1%
of the total CO2 emissions of Annex I countries in 1990 respectively, had conditions regarding energy production and consumption that were similar to those of the US, New Zealand (0.2%), Norway (0.3%) and Switzerland (0.3% of total industrialized countries’ emissions in 1990) all possessed a fairly high share of renewable energy sources in their domes-tic energy production (UNFCCC 1997e: 60; Grubb et al. 1999: 33–34).
Despite the resulting interest differences and diverging perceptions of the problem, the f ive countries advocated fairly similar positions on the issue of targets, calling for indicative emission reduction objectives (Andresen/
Butenschon 2001: 339–340; ENB 1995c: 1, 2, 1995f: 2). Their stances on the issue of differentiation were less clear.
Although the heterogeneity of the G-77/China – regarding attitudes, preferences and negotiation positions – had further increased over the years, the group chose to continue to cooperate for a variety of reasons (Grubb et al. 1999: 35; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 24). F irst and foremost, a major unifying factor for this coalition was its members’ high vulner-ability to the manifold facets of climatic alterations, intensif ied through an often striking incapacity to adequately react to these problems. Out of “a tradition of Third World solidarity”, they therefore decided to cooperate (Rajan 1997: 265). Moreover, many of the smaller countries of this group faced the challenge of lacking the administrative and dip-lomatic capacities to prepare and follow up on the climate negotiations by themselves (Gupta 2000). To gain more diplomatic weight, these countries depended thus on an alliance with resourceful parties such as India, China or Brazil. For the latter, being able to speak on behalf of such a large group of countries also implied a strategic advantage. F in-ally, the vast majority of countries in this group shared the same vision regarding questions of equity and their right to develop (Rajan 1997).
Despite these reasons for cooperation, differences within the G-77/
China concerned, f irstly, the cleavage between the emerging and the least developed countries. The key actors in this group were generally the largest countries, China and India. Altogether, they had a fairly lim-ited share of global emissions at that time, which were, however, pro-jected to rise steeply in the medium-term future (IPCC 1995a: 37; ENB 1995h: 2). Both countries were also beginning to be affected by climate change in the form of extreme weather events (droughts, f loods). This explains why each of them had started to take actions to reduce their energy intensity (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 28). Their key positions in the re-gime discussions were clear: encouraging developed countries to adopt more adequate GHG reduction commitments under a follow-up agree-ment to the Convention, while refusing any obligations for themselves.
Together with other major actors in this bloc (e.g. Mexico, Brazil), they thus advocated above all equity and development concerns (Grubb et al. 1999: 36). In spite of this point of convergence, least developed countries had more basic demands. Often already victims of climate change, a problem to which they had contributed little, they argued not only for developed countries to take up their responsibilities to miti-gate climate change, but also requested help in their own f ight against the consequences of climatic variations (IPCC 1995a: 37). Second, the G-77/China group was split along another line: the coalition of small island states (AOSIS), directly threatened by climate change and thus among those who advocated most urgently the swift adoption of ambi-tious measures, stood in stark opposition to the oil-producing countries (OPEC) (Grubb et al. 1999: 36). OPEC feared that strict carbon reduc-tion measures would threaten their major source of income and there-fore tried to slow talks down. Not surprisingly, the negotiation positions of the two groups prior to COP 1 could thus hardly have been more different. In the protocol proposal that AOSIS had presented in 1994, it had called for reductions by developed countries in the range of 20%
by 2005 and opposed obligatory commitments for developing countries (INC 1994a). By contrast, OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, basically advo-cated that climate science was too inconclusive to be discussing further measures at all (Grubb et al. 1999: 35–36).
Turning to a third group of players in the negotiations, the ex-Soviet Union and its former sphere of inf luence in Eastern Europe had under-gone dramatic changes since the very f irst talks on climate change. The economies in this region had been extremely energy-intensive, and their collapse left countries like Russia or Ukraine with a much-improved re-cord regarding GHG emissions. As a country with enormous fossil fuel reserves and with a largely indifferent attitude toward potential impacts of climate change – with some voices in the internal debate even arguing that global warming might have positive impacts on parts of the coun-try – Russia was not necessarily in favour of negotiating a protocol with targets for itself. Although it f irst did not have a clear position on the new negotiation process (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 23), this would change when it realized that it could use its “hot air” (the emissions saved since 1990, when it had 17% of the global total CO2 emissions) and sell it to other countries (UNFCCC 1997e: 60). Both Russia and the Ukraine would then begin to join the JUSSCANNZ group in its call for targets coupled to greater f lexibility (Grubb et al. 1999: 34–35). By contrast, countries from Eastern Europe that hoped to join the EU were gradually moving towards the Union’s stance on climate policies, which they would eventually have to take over as part of the latter’s environmental acquis (Oberthür/Ott:
23–24; Grubb et al. 1999: 34–35).
The European Union: Actor Capacity, Negotiation Positions and their Foundations
The Union’s positions on the issue of climate change have to be un-derstood against the background of its unique character as a multi-state entity. In 1995, Sweden, F inland and Austria joined the EU, further augmenting the diversity of approaches to climate policies among its then 15 members (Skjaerseth 1994). While all member states, with the exception of the UK, were net energy importers at the time, not all of them shared the same feeling of responsibility towards the global envi-ronment (Grubb et al. 1999: 30). Countries of the North, including the three new member states, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK, were generally more concerned about climate change as an environ-mental problem, while the “cohesion countries” (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland) showed greater interest in their economic development (Lacasta 2008: 5; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007: 36–40). This divergence was inten-sif ied through the different emissions (and energy production) patterns across Europe: Germany and the UK had a fairly high share of the EU-15 total CO2 emissions (roughly 29% and 17% respectively in 1994), while Italy’s (13%) and, notably France’s (11%) emissions were comparatively low. Differences existed also between smaller countries of comparable population size, like, for instance, Belgium (3.8% in 1994, i.e. 11.6 t of CO2 per capita) and Portugal (1.5% in 1994, i.e. 4.5 t of CO2 per capita) (EEA 1997: 25–26).
Despite the resulting low degree of interest and preference homo-geneity between the North and South of Europe at that time (Delreux 2008: 147–148; Skjaerseth 1994), the EU had since the late 1980s man-aged to establish a common approach which perceived climate change not only as an environmental, but also as an economic issue, framing it as an opportunity for modernization of economic structures in line with the precautionary principle and sustainable development considerations (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 445–450; Baker 2006; Damro/Mendez 2003:
79). While expected climate change impacts in Europe may have played only a minor role in the def inition of this approach, the general idea that the EU’s 24% share of the total CO2 emissions of industrialized countries in 1990 could be reduced, had a more notable impact (UNFCCC 1997e:
60). In addition to its adherence to the precautionary principle, the EU had also identif ied a “vested interest” in reducing its energy consumption to become more independent from its suppliers and enhance its competi-tiveness (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 15). F inally, the EU’s belief in and support for multilateralism and international law played a role in determining its willingness of pursuing globally concerted solutions to the problem (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 448).
EU actor capacity is a function of the existence of legal competences for climate change activities, of decision-making and coordination pro-cedures for such activities as well as of external representation arrange-ments, treaty objectives and tools.3 Throughout the studied period, the EU-15 functioned under the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht and in accordance with established practice regarding internal coordina-tion and external representacoordina-tion (Brambilla 2004: 160). In legal terms, the European Community was endowed with the legal personality that allowed it to enter into international treaties (Art. 281 TEC). The EC had then also ratif ied the UNFCCC in 1994 (Council 1994a) and was – through a specif ic regional economic integration organisation (REIO) clause inserted into the Convention (Art. 22 UNFCCC) – allowed to par-ticipate as a full member in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. This implied that it enjoyed the same rights as the other parties regarding such important matters as tabling, speaking and voting. If the EC had to vote, it would do so on behalf of all its members, preventing them from exercis-ing individual votexercis-ing rights (and vice-versa) (Art. 18.2 UNFCCC). From the perspective of international law, its actor capacity was thus undis-puted. From the perspective of European law, its foreign policy activity depended above all on the existence of substantial and procedural compe-tences in primary law, permitting it to exercise its rights within the inter-national climate regime. Substantially, European Community activity on climate change had its treaty basis in Art. 130r TEC, which was a slightly adapted version of the same article in the SEA (Maastricht): “Community policy on the environment shall contribute to the pursuit of the follow-ing objectives: – preservfollow-ing, protectfollow-ing and improvfollow-ing the quality of the environment, (…) promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or world-wide environmental problems.” Paragraph 4 of this Article underscored the fact that environmental protection was not an ex-clusive EC competence:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the competent international organizations. The arrangements for Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with Article 228. The previous sub-paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to con-clude international agreements.
The right of negotiating and concluding international treaties had therefore to be shared between the EC and its member states (Eeckhout
3 EU foreign policy tools were generally discussed in Chapter 1 as part of the question how the EU can exert inf luence. They are further highlighted in the process analysis.
2011: 141). This provision had particular consequences for the procedures that needed to be followed when the EU def ined a negotiation position internally and when it represented that position externally. If Article 130s TEC generally granted the EC member states the right to negotiate interna-tional treaties, it left an opportunity for them to authorize the Commission to conduct these negotiations following the provisions of Article 228 TEC-Maastricht, which represented a codif ication of pre-1993 practice (Brambilla 2004: 160). The decision-making rule that was to be applied depended on the decision-making mode used for internal legislation (Art.
228.1, 2 TEC-Maastricht). In practice, the member states kept, in line with Art. 130r, para. 4 TEC-Maastricht, the right to negotiate to themselves throughout the period analysed in this chapter (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 66). The EU’s international negotiation position was def ined by the Environment Council, deciding by unanimity (Delreux 2008: 151; Groenleer/van Schaik 2007: 985). Positions were prepared by member state representatives in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Change created in the autumn of 1994, which was itself served by an Expert Group on Common and Coordinated Policies (Lescher 2000: 72; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 65–66). Input into the negotiation position came from the Commission, and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament, which formally only had to be consult-ed on Commission proposals (Art. 228, para. 3 TEC-Maastricht; Pinholt 2004). Coordination during the process of position-building was assured by the Council Presidency. For instance, a major coordinating role in the def inition of a numerical emissions reduction target was arguably played by the Dutch Presidency in the f irst half of 1997 (Kanie 2003). Negotiation positions resulting from this complex internal decision-/foreign policy-making process were regularly fairly rigid, leaving narrow margins for manoeuvre to the negotiators. Once such a position had been formulated, the Council Presidency, assisted by its predecessor and successor in the
“EU Troika”, was charged with the task of internal coordination, taking the form of regular exchanges of information and consultation during COPs and, especially, at the very end of the negotiations at COP 3 (Interview EU representative 5). Moreover, the Troika on the whole would represent the position of the EU vis-à-vis third parties in the international negotia-tions (Brambilla 2004).4 All in all, the Union’s negotiators were credited with having managed to ensure the EU’s external coherence, making it
“EU Troika”, was charged with the task of internal coordination, taking the form of regular exchanges of information and consultation during COPs and, especially, at the very end of the negotiations at COP 3 (Interview EU representative 5). Moreover, the Troika on the whole would represent the position of the EU vis-à-vis third parties in the international negotia-tions (Brambilla 2004).4 All in all, the Union’s negotiators were credited with having managed to ensure the EU’s external coherence, making it