During the post-Rio period, and while awaiting the ratif ication and en-try into force of the treaty, the notion of “prompt start” had gained ground:
between 1992 and the f irst conference of the parties in March 1995, six further meetings of the INC were held in order to deal as quickly as possible with issues related to the operationalization of the regime and to prepare for the review of the “adequacy of commitments” stipulated in Art. 4.2(d) UNFCCC (Bodansky 1994: 34). Although discussions during this period did not per se focus on the two key issues of targets and responsibilities, the further development of the treaty-based regime was evoked at several INC meetings, albeit without any substantial results. This section therefore pro-vides only a brief trace of these taks in search of EU inf luence (attempts).
In the EU, the ratif ication process was used to hold discussions on how the stabilization target of Art. 4(2) UNFCCC could be fulf illed. Talks soon stalled over the question of whether the Union should adopt a carbon diox-ide and energy “eco-tax” (Lescher 2000: 69; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 60–61).
Proponents of this measure (above all the Commission, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium) tried to make the joint ratif ication of the UNFCCC conditional on the adoption of such a tax, but did not succeed against other EU members, especially the UK, which was most strongly opposed to the idea of common European taxation (Lescher 2000: 69, 72). While the ratif ication of the UNFCCC was f inally achieved in February 1994 (Council 1994a), the tax never came (Pallemaerts 2004: 43; Haigh 1996). Instead, the EU adopted an “essentially symbolic” package of measures aimed at the promotion of energy eff iciency (SAVE programme) and renewable energies (ALTENER programme) as well as a decision to create a monitoring mechanism for GHG emissions in the EU (Pallemaerts 2004: 43–44). At the same time, no substan-tial advances were made regarding the def inition of a common EU position on further GHG reductions. To better deal with internal struggles about this issue, the Environment Council created, in October 1994, an ad hoc working group of national climate experts. The group was charged with mediating between EU members in order to prepare the Union’s negotiation position for COP 1, effectively taking, at least to some extent, the right of initiative out of the hands of the Commission (Lescher 2000: 72).7 Although the creation of this group did not immediately result in a substantial common position for COP 1 (Schumer 1996), it did represent a major institutional innovation:
the permanent institutionalization of a forum for exchanges between member states on issues related to global climate policy. In the global arena, although the UNFCCC was not yet in force, the EC was already treated as a party to the Convention. A regional economic integration organisation (REIO) clause inserted in Art. 22 UNFCCC, endowed it with all the rights of a full member to the INC (Lescher 2000: 73). In practice, the Council Presidency would exercise these rights on behalf of the Union, representing it in all fora.
Turning to the global debates, sessions 6 to 8 of the INC (7–10 December 1992, Geneva; 15–20 March 1993, New York; 16–27 August 1993, Geneva) started slowly, dealing with practical issues related to the operationalization of the regime. Much time was spent on consul-tations regarding the modalities of technology transfer and the f inan-cial mechanisms, without any signif icant advances (INC 1992, 1993a, 1993b). Among the most interesting decisions taken during these ses-sions was the election of a new President and Bureau. At INC 7, the Argentinean Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who would later play a decisive role during the Kyoto Protocol talks, took over from Jean Ripert. Further, the landscape of negotiation blocs changed when the OECD countries split
7 The novelties of the Treaty of Maastricht, in force since late 1993, and their conse-quences for the Union’s foreign climate policy are discussed in the relevant section of Chapter 3 on the EU’s role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
into two groups: the EU-12(/15 from 1995 on) and the newly formed JUSCANZ (Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) coalition.
It was only during the f inal three sessions of the Committee (7–
18 February 1994, Geneva; 22 August–2 September 1994, Geneva;
6–17 February 1995, New York) that Working Group 1 on “commitments”
actually took up topics related to a further development of the climate regime, when it started discussing the “adequacy of commitments”, as stipulated in the Convention (Oberthür 1994: 299). At INC 10, Germany, the designated host of the f irst conference of the parties, introduced a paper with “elements of a protocol for [consideration at] COP 1”, which stated, inter alia, that Annex I parties should reduce their CO2 emissions
“by the year (x) (…) by (y) %”; the paper was, however, not discussed at this session (Oberthür 1994: 299). Instead, parties could only generally agree on the necessity of pursuing further emissions reduction efforts, without specifying in what framework such efforts should be carried out, leaving commentators to compare the slow pace of the talks to the f irst INC sessions in 1991 (Oberthür 1994: 299, 302–303).
Shortly after INC 10, the time window for substantive proposals for a new protocol or agreement to be discussed at COP 1 was effectively closed.
Although the Convention was not yet ratif ied, parties operated under the assumption that proposals for any new legal agreement would have to be submitted six months before its (potential) adoption, as stipulated by the so-called “six-month rule” of Art. 17.2 UNFCCC. Before this deadline in late September 1994, only two parties provided written submissions that fulf illed the rule. The f irst comprehensive proposal had been introduced by AOSIS. It suggested the adoption of a protocol to the Convention, whose Article 3 would introduce “targets for greenhouse gas reductions” requiring that “each Annex I country shall reduce its 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide by at least 20 percent by the year 2005” (INC 1994a). Non-Annex I parties could make commitments on a voluntary basis (INC 1994a: Art. 3.3).
A couple of days later, referencing the AOSIS proposal and target, Germany presented a more formal version of its “elements paper”, sketching out some key components for a future framework convention. The German submis-sion re-stated the stabilization target for carbon dioxide emissubmis-sions by the year 2000 (at 1990 levels) and called for a reduction thereafter (INC 1994b: I.1).
The precise scope of reductions as well as the target year were, however, not specif ied (INC 1994b: I.1). Some parties, like the Netherlands or Denmark, supported the Toronto target of 20% CO2 reductions by the year 2005, linking thus the EU’s to the AOSIS approach, while such numbers were completely unacceptable for other OECD countries, notably the US (Victor/Salt 1994:
28; Lescher 2000: 75). INC 11 continued talks on this agenda item and held, as the Chair’s report notes, “fruitful and constructive, but not fully conclusive discussions”, which ultimately ended without decisions (INC 1995: 50).