Summing up the f indings for this ten-year period of regime negotia-tions, key characteristics of the evolving EU foreign climate policy can be extracted. Its inf luencing strategy yielded overall limited impact, with two signif icant exceptions.
The Union’s inf luence attempts were initially based on diplomatic tools again during this period: it argued with the help of substantive reform pro-posals in the beginning, and engaged in bargaining only towards the end of negotiation processes (e.g. at COP 6bis and 7). Just like during the Kyoto Protocol talks, the Union began the negotiations on the Protocol’s opera-tionalization with a very inf lexible position, insisting on certain conditions sine qua non at COP 6, which ultimately forced it to give in to virtually all demands by the Umbrella Group in order to ensure its overarching aim (rapid enactment of the Protocol) at COP 6bis and COP 7. Following the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process in 2001, how-ever, the Union did slowly begin to alter its inf luencing strategy. It stepped up its diplomatic efforts to convince others to pursue the ratif ication of the treaty even without the United States. Later, to force ratif ication, the EU employed, for the f irst time in the history of its participation in the cli-mate regime, explicitly and successfully economic tools and issue-linkage with topics outside the climate realm in order to convince Russia of joining the club. After this ratif ication, it broadened and diversif ied its strategy to adapt it to the proliferation of new fora (G-8+5, APP) and bilateral partner-ships (US-India etc.). This approach provided not only the opportunity to forge hands-on technological cooperation, but also to develop a common understanding and institutionalize dialogues on climate change. In address-ing developaddress-ing countries, the EU thus explicitly employed more than “just”
soft diplomatic tools, using economic incentives targeted towards what it perceived to be the demands of its interlocutors as a basis for the partner-ships. It was hoped that such a pragmatic and wide-reaching (both in a the-matic and geographical sense) outreach would also make up for the Union’s damaged reputation in the developing countries after its very demanding attitude of the years 2002 and 2003. Even if no immediate impact could be detected during this period, the f irst contours of a much transformed for-eign policy strategy helped position the EU for the post-2012 talks and in a long-term perspective (Schunz 2009). The major, once again more formal inf luence attempt during this period came, however, with the Commission proposal of early 2007, endorsed by the European Council. Its significance would show not so much at COP 13, but certainly during the talks thereafter.
EU inf luence could be discerned at two of the f ive key turning points during this period. During the debates on the operationalization of the
Protocol in the period 1998–2001, the Union exerted inf luence imme-diately after the US withdrawal with regard to the pursuit of talks under the UN, when it used a broad diplomacy approach to argue for the fur-ther continuation of the regime. During the period 2002–2004, the Union inf luenced the Russian decision to ratify the Protocol in order to guar-antee the development of the UN regime. In this instance, bargaining through issue-linkage was the causal mechanism that helped the EU to exert inf luence.
All in all, when it comes to the extent and type(s) of EU inf luence during the analysed transitional period of the UN climate regime, the fol-lowing observations can thus be made. While the Union had virtually no leverage over the substance of decisions during this period, it did – by contributing to the survival of the regime – manage to protect the emis-sions reduction target it had decisively helped to negotiate in Kyoto. As the rules around this target (supplementarity, sinks) were watered down in the Marrakech Accords and the US (with its -7% target) had withdrawn from the Protocol, the Union’s overall inf luence on this item was, how-ever, at best medium: the continuity regarding the target was assured for those who ratif ied the Kyoto Protocol (degree of legal bindingness), but the EU’s degree of goal attainment was only partial. By contrast, it had no impact on the interpretation of the CBDR principle. Beyond assessing EU inf luence on the substance of the climate regime via these two cen-tral issues, the empirical analysis for this period strongly suggests a non- negligible EU inf luence over where (in which fora) and how (by what rules) the climate regime is developed – namely within the UN system, by the rules of multilateralism and with respect for what had previously been negotiated. This inf luence on the structural parameters of global climate negotiations can be characterized as high and rather enduring. Altogether, its inf luence on the operationalization of the Protocol and on the transi-tion towards a new regime reform process must therefore be interpreted as medium, just like for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
Tentative explanations of EU inf luence were provided in the various sub-sections of this chapter and can be drawn together here to highlight some of the main changes since the Kyoto Protocol talks. While the ex-ternal environment gradually became less favourable for an exercise of inf luence by the EU, internal changes in terms of foreign policy mak-ing and implementation constituted potential improvements bound to en-hance its cen-hances for inf luencing the climate regime. During this period, the immediate impact of the former tended to outplay the potential of the latter. As far as the external environment is concerned, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process in March 2001 altered the negotiation context in manifold ways. F irst, in a context of bargaining, it gave each of the major individual members of the Umbrella Group veto
power on issues concerning the operationalization of the Kyoto Protocol for COPs 6bis and 7, since all of them were needed for a ratif ication of the Protocol. Second, as the US dropped out as demandeur, it became eas-ier for the G-77/China to defend its achievements of the past and f ight off any discussions about broadening commitments. Third, in a medium-term perspective, the US preferences for uni-, bi- and small multilateral action (e.g. partnerships with India, the APP) led to a fragmentation of the ne-gotiations within (Convention vs. KP tracks) and outside (G-8, APP) the UN regime context. Under these conditions, the chances for EU inf luence decreased because (i) the heterogeneity of preferences further increased, (ii) the number of players (US, Australia) and fora increased; and (iii) some powerful players (US, G-77/China) refused to cooperate under the rules of the (reformed) regime. Partially in reaction to this changing envi-ronment, but also to its own weak performances at some of the f irst seven COPs and in anticipation of enlargement, the EU made internal changes, attempting to improve its actor capacity to enhance its chances for greater inf luence on the global scene. Both the inclusion of the Commission in the Troika and the introduction of the lead negotiator system were bound to have positive effects on its performance. Further, the EU adapted its inf luencing strategy by widening the scope of its inf luencing targets and employing a broader range of tools. Russian ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrated that this change already bore fruit, suggesting that improved foreign policy implementation can enhance the chances of ex-erting inf luence. By contrast, within the UN framework, the EU’s formal diplomatic strategy was not eff icient, as it was unable to identify enough issue-linkages to allow for bargaining when it came to its desire to ad-vance the regime.