On the basis of these conceptual-theoretical parameters of the study, the f inal step in the composition of the analytical framework consists in outlining the contours of the methodology applied to analyse and deter-mine EU inf luence in a global regime context. “Measuring” inf luence essentially requires determining the causal relationship between an inf luence-wielder A’s activities and an observed change in the behaviour, beliefs or preferences of actors B, C, D… in complex political contexts.
Three “classical approaches” to inf luence analysis have regularly been identif ied: positional, reputation and process analysis (Betsill/Correll 2008; Arts/Verschuren 1999: 414). The arguably most developed tool for the assessment of political inf luence in complex global negotiation contexts combines process and reputation-based methods by effectively triangulating three perspectives (Arts/Verschuren 1999: 416–419): (i) the Ego-perspective, i.e. the self-perception of the inf luence-wielder E about its impact; (ii) the Alter-perspective, which assesses the view that other players have of E’s performance; and (iii) the Researcher’s analysis, which allows through the study of E’s goal achievement for correcting potential misperceptions (“EAR” method).
The approach to inf luence analysis employed in this work reverses the logic of the EAR instrument by holding the researcher’s process analysis central and by using the perceptions of the object being studied (EU) and of others (non-EU negotiators, observers) to corroborate f indings.11 Process-tracing generally involves the attempt “to identify the interven-ing causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (Bennett/George 2005: 206–207). In this work, process analysis
10 It should be noted that the two issues are not clear-cut, but, in practice, often linked to others, such as questions on the precise modalities of emissions reduction and, espe-cially, f inance and technology transfer, which may become central to reaching agree-ment on the core pillars of the regime. While focussing on the two issues helps to limit the scope of the analysis, other issues are, if necessary, touched upon.
11 See Schunz (2010: chapt. 4) for a detailed explanation of the method.
can be considered as narration in search for patterns (Gysen et al. 2006).
Narratives not only provide a concise account of social events as they unfold, but are also deeply causal in nature because “any explanation resides in its accounting for temporality and sequence” (Somers 1998:
771). Employing such a narrative approach to process analysis allows for a contextualized analysis of a foreign policy actor’s inf luence attempts and their effects over time by identifying whether the necessary condi-tions for ascertaining inf luence are fulf illed. The method yields plausibil-ity rather than probabilplausibil-ity statements about inf luence (Huberts 1994: 39;
Gysen et al. 2006: 108; Arts/Verschuren 1999: 422). These statements are solidif ied through a reputation-based variant of inf luence analysis in-volving perceptions of EU foreign policy-makers and of non-EU climate negotiators and observers.
To allow also for data collection triangulation, a combination of three techniques is employed in this study: document analysis, semi-structured interviews and indirect or direct observation. F irst, the study relies on 32 qualitative interviews with EU, EU member states, third states and civil society representatives.12 Second, it draws heavily on document analysis of primary sources including UN,13 EU, EU member state and third coun-try off icial and unoff icial negotiation documents (position papers, ne-gotiation syntheses, press releases etc.). Further sources, mainly used to interpret these documents, are news media, NGO, research institute and think tank coverages of the climate negotiations. A major tool for keep-ing track of these negotiations are the Earth Negotiation Bulletins (ENB), which provide in-depth accounts of the UN climate talks.14 F inally, the study benef its from indirect (via webcast) and direct, non-participatory observation of UN climate talks.15
In practical terms, the process analysis follows a f ive-step approach that is applied to each of the time periods analysed in Chapters 2 (1991–
1995), 3 (1995–1997), 4 (1998–2007), 5 (2007–2009) and 6 (2010–2012), with a special emphasis on the periods leading to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and of Copenhagen Accord (2009).16
12 See Annex I for an overview. To guarantee anonymity, interviewees’ names remain conf idential. Moreover, each interview was attributed a random number so as to render any identif iable link between a specif ic interview(ee) and a given observation impos-sible. The transcriptions of the interviews are on f ile with the author.
13 Archival research was carried out at the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn between 9 and 11 February 2009.
14 See http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm.
15 The author attended, as party delegate, the UN negotiation sessions in Bonn (8–12 June 2009) and Barcelona (2–6 Nov. 2009) as well as COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen (8–19 Dec. 2009).
16 Chapter 2 (Historical Foundations) relies to a larger extent on secondary literature.
Step 1 covers an analysis of the global context involving a brief screen-ing for (i) major scientif ic advances on climate change and (ii) important events in global climate politics outside the UN arena and other, per se unrelated major events that may impact on climate policies.
Step 2 serves to identify the EU’s and other key actors’ negotiation positions and strategies regarding the two issues of emissions reduction targets and responsibilities prior to the analysed time period. Instead of analysing how the EU attempts to inf luence all actors within the regime, the study focuses on key players from the three main coalitions that have – besides the EU – been identif ied as signif icant throughout the history of the climate regime (Betsill 2005: 108; Yamin/Depledge 2004: 30–59):
(i) from JUS(S)CAN(N)Z (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, with Switzerland and Norway joining during the mid-1990s, and Iceland), which became the “Umbrella Group” later, it focuses on the two major emitters US and Japan; (ii) from the more heterogeneous G-77/
China bloc, the analysis focuses on China and India and two signif icant sub-groupings: the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Alliance of (42) Small Island States (AOSIS); (iii) Russia and other countries in economic transition are also considered.17 The en-quiry starts out with examining EU activities vis-à-vis these key actors and countries,18 taking into account f luctuations within and across coalitions.
Step 3 provides for the crucial narrative of the global regime negotia-tions, with a focus on the EU’s inf luence attempts. Emphasis is placed on tracing the negotiations conducted in the framework of COPs/MOPs and of preparatory sessions such as meetings of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The analysis transcends the UN framework to look into other global climate fora, where relevant. Following a discussion of the outcome of a given negotiation period, patterns are extracted to allow for a classif ication of EU inf luence attempts and for answering the f irst research question of how the EU tried to inf luence the climate regime.
With step 4, the study determines whether the EU actually exerted inf luence on the two issues under examination, thus answering the sec-ond research question. This necessitates a closer look at both the outcome and the story of the climate talks for the purpose of identifying turning
17 Russia and the Ukraine over time joined the Umbrella Group. At the same time, Switzerland has left this negotiation bloc and formed a coalition with Mexico, South Korea and Liechtenstein, referred to as the Environmental Integrity Group.
18 To further strengthen the choice of these actors, it has to be noted that they have all f igured among the six greatest emitters of greenhouse gases in absolute terms in recent years. For 2007, China led this ranking with 24% of global GHG emissions, followed by the US (22%), the EU (12%), India (8%), Russia (6%) and Japan (PBL 2008).
points, i.e. points in time at which a relevant number of actors collectively decides to move from one negotiation phase to the next or to take a f inal decision on an item (Chasek 2001: 44–49; 150). A turning point can be observed when (i) several actors change their behaviour, converging at least to some extent into one direction, and/or (ii) proposals are elimi-nated from a negotiation process so that only a small number of options is maintained. Typically, such turning points can be observed at transitions between phases during a negotiation process, e.g. when actors move from the initial positioning phase to negotiations on precursor texts (Depledge 2005; Chasek 2001).
Table 3: Establishing EU Inf luence – Constitutive Dimensions Constitutive dimensions of
Interaction Can an interaction between the EU and the other
parties on this item be observed? YES or NO
Purposive
Behaviour Did the EU want to change other actors’ behaviour,
preferences or beliefs on this item? YES or NO
Temporal
sequence Did the EU approach the other parties f irst? YES or NO Goal
attainment
Did other parties change their behaviour, preferences or beliefs in the direction of the EU? Does the outcome of this item under negotiation ref lect (at least in part) EU aims?
YES or NO
Absence of auto-causation
Can the change in other actors’ behaviour, preferences or beliefs be attributed (at least in part) to the EU, i.e. was it not the result of auto-causation in the other actors or of another factor that has to be considered more important than the Union’s intervention?
YES or NO
Note: The dichotomy suggested by the YES/NO assessment per criterion is not so clear-cut, but requires interpretation. Its credibility relies on the empirical evidence provided.
At these points, in-depth narrative and conditional causal analyses become possible, allowing for establishing the share of EU inf luence.
For one, it becomes possible to eliminate actors that can logically not have been inf luential: if their position was not in line with the outcome at a turning point t1 and only changed afterwards, they cannot have been inf luential; if their position was, however, completely or partially in con-cordance with the decision taken at a turning point t1, they may have been (at least partially) inf luential (Huberts 1994: 41–43; 57–59). If the EU re-mains among those who were potentially inf luential, it can be determined whether it actually exerted inf luence or not by checking whether the con-stitutive dimensions (necessary conditions) of inf luence are fulf illed (see
Table 3 for a visualization of this analysis). Concretely, this can be done by answering the following questions: has there been an interaction with other(s) in which the EU approached these other(s) f irst (interaction, tem-poral sequence)? With its (inter)actions, did the EU want to alter other actors’ behaviour, preferences of beliefs on the analysed subject matter (purposive behaviour)? Has the EU attained its goals (at least partially and more than it would have without its actions) (Huberts 1994), i.e. have others changed behaviour, preferences or beliefs in the direction of the Union and/or does the overall outcome ref lect EU aims? Can the change be attributed to the EU, i.e. was it not the result of auto-causation in the other actors or of another factor that has to be considered more important than the Union’s intervention (counterfactual analysis)?
Besides establishing inf luence, the causal narrative also provides in-put into step 5, which serves to answer the third research question by plausibly explaining the EU’s inf luence. To strengthen and extend the explanations already inherent in the narrative, two pathways are taken:
pattern-matching and explanation-building (Yin 2003). Pattern-matching relies on the two sets of assumptions made in this chapter. On the one hand, two causal mechanisms may be at play in an instance of EU inf luence-wielding (bargaining or arguing) and the process-trace will show whether the EU’s inf luence attempts and inf luence are based on the one or the other. On the other hand, explanatory factors that might account for the EU’s inf luence on the climate regime (context, issue, regime dynamics, EU actor capacity and activities) can be taken as a basis for identifying the scope conditions under which these causal mechanisms are triggered (and EU inf luence becomes thus possible). Further explanatory factors may emerge from the empirical analysis and can serve to compose a denser account. By bringing these into the picture, the analysis transitions from the moderately deductive logic of pattern-matching to the inductive logic of explanation-building. While this type of explanation will round off the analysis of each time period, Chapter 7 composes a more general account on the basis of a cross-time comparison enabled by the longitudi-nal character of the study.