in Milan (1–12 December 2003) had originally been planned as the f irst conference after the ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol, to be

held in parallel to MOP 1. Pending ratif ication by Russia transformed it into technical talks under a veil of uncertainty, which, according to observers, provoked a non-negligible lack of motivation (Fodella 2004:

24). The talks were concerned with further consideration of the CDM, modalities of sinks and the funding mechanisms (Dessai et al. 2005;

Fodella 2004: 25). Showing signs of its oft-remarked “bunker men-tality”, the EU’s tough stance on the latter issue hampered the search for compromises with the G-77/China bloc (Dessai et al. 2005: 111;

Interview EU representative 20). Further regime development was clear-ly not among the key concerns, even though opportunities for debating long-term issues did open up, notably in the framework of discussions of the TAR. The EU’s attempts to raise this issue, presented less force-fully than in New Delhi, encountered “G-77/China’s strong resistance to adopting a COP decision on the TAR, and in fact to discussing anything beyond procedures for further consideration of this issue” (ENB 2003:

17). This was interpreted as a “clear ref lection of the group’s determina-tion not to allow negotiadetermina-tions to head anywhere close to the issue of de-veloping countries’ future commitments” (ENB 2003: 17; Fodella 2004:

25). The decision on this issue prompted the elaboration of an uncontro-versial – and equally vague – technical work programme (ENB 2003:

4). Other major decisions touched upon the guiding principles for the Special Climate Change Fund as well as the Least Developing Countries Fund and the modalities of LULUCF (UNFCCC 2003). Altogether, COP 9 thus conf irmed the tendencies observed for its predecessor: techni-cal progress, but paralysis regarding the further development of the

regime – and a smouldering conf lict around the latter between the EU, supported at times by some Umbrella Group members, and the G-77/

China, sometimes in liaison with the US (Dessai et al. 2005: 119–121;

Interview EU representative 20).

Between COP 9 and COP 10, reinforced diplomatic efforts were un-dertaken, notably by the EU, to ensure Russian ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol. Without going into the details of the debate in Russia, the role of the EU in encouraging this ratif ication should be highlighted (for insight-ful discussions, see European Parliament 2003; Douma 2006). In the face of a range of Russian concerns about the Protocol, among them the fear of being alienated from the US,¹³ the EU repeatedly made moves to ensure the country’s support by strengthening bilateral ties. An extension of the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was to serve this purpose, but also to clear the path for a Russian membership bid to the World Trade Organization, which the EU promised to support (Douma 2006: 61; Buchner/Dall’Olio 2005). The f inal hurdles for the extension of the PCA were taken at the EU-Russia summit of May 2004, followed a few months later by the ratif ication of the Protocol in the Duma (Douma 2006: 61–62). Without giving in to all Russian demands (Douma 2006), the EU had thus, for the f irst time in a climate negotiation context, suc-cessfully employed economic tools, using the PCA reform and the prom-ise of support for WTO membership as incentives for Russia to become a party to the Protocol.

Reportedly, the EU did not overtly celebrate this success at COP 10 (6–18 December 2004, Buenos Aires), but immediately turned its atten-tion towards the future (Ott et al. 2005: 84). In terms of regime develop-ment, it would become a key player in an intriguing debate developed around an issue introduced by the Argentinean Presidency. At the begin-ning of the session, the latter had suggested holding two seminars in the course of 2005 to exchange views on negotiations about the post-2012 period (Ott et al. 2005: 85–86; ENB 2004b: 2). This proposal was op-posed by the US and by the majority of the G-77/China, either fearful of debates about their own emission reduction targets (China, India) or con-cerned with slowing down regime development altogether (OPEC). The EU, supported by AOSIS, thus found itself in the role of the only major

13 Although President Putin, among others, had promised Russian ratif ication of the Protocol several times, notably at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the Duma pondered its approval of the treaty for a long time (Douma 2006: 54).

Besides a desire to remain on good terms with the US, many Russians did not believe in the benef its of reducing emissions or contested the science (European Parliament 2003). By contrast, they saw an opportunity to exploit the ratif ication of the Protocol to shape the relationship with the EU to its advantage, accede to the WTO, and improve its overall international standing (European Parliament 2003).

defender of Argentina’s proposal (Ott et al. 2005: 85). The compromise that was agreed during the f inal night of talks was to hold one seminar for the purpose of information exchange that would be “without prejudice to any future negotiations, commitments, processes and frameworks” (ENB 2004a: 1). Other decisions require no further discussion here, as they were mainly technical, relating, e.g., to adaptation, LULUCF and CDM (ENB 2004a). The fact that even a comparatively innocent issue like the organisation of a seminar would spark extensive debates set the tone for the talks that would follow at the f irst joint session of the COP and the MOP (ENB 2004a: 15).

The Outcome: the Ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol

The outcomes of these three years of further regime negotiations were rather meagre. Besides technical progress, mostly concerning the crunch issues of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords (mecha-nisms, sinks, funding), the major advancement in terms of immediate re-gime development was the Russian ratif ication of the Protocol, which allowed for its entry into force on 16 February 2005. F inally, COP 10 saw the timid beginnings of a post-2012 regime dialogue, a topic which would occupy negotiators in the period to come.

The EU’s Inf luence on the Ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol In search of EU inf luence attempts, the most striking feature of EU foreign policy activity within the climate regime throughout this period was its desire to quickly move ahead with regime development. In Delhi, it alienated many parties, notably the majority of developing countries, when it made proposals for considerations of wider post-2012 mitigation efforts at a time when the G-77/China was more interested in addressing development concerns. As a result of the EU’s impatience, a climate of mistrust formed between many G-77 countries and the Union (Ott 2003:

8). Rather than, at least strategically, responding to some of these coun-tries’ concerns, the EU let its own agenda prevail, testifying once again to an often fairly self-centred approach and def icient outreach (Najam et al.

2003; Ott 2003: 8). This tendency continued into COP 9, although the EU did temper its impatience somewhat, realizing that the many technical is-sues related to the operationalization of the funding mechanisms were of crucial importance to the G-77/China (Dessai et al. 2005: 111, 119–121).

In the period that followed the Milan conference, its main inf luence at-tempts lay outside the direct regime context. In an unprecedented move, the Union managed to use economic tools, linking climate change to is-sues originally unrelated to environmental politics in order to inf luence Russia. F inally, back in the UN arena, the EU turned again towards the future of the regime at COP 10, pursuing its own agenda in spite of a

lacking international mandate to start post-2012 talks (Ott et al. 2005:

90). Continuing patterns from the two previous COPs,¹⁴ it alienated both the G-77/China and the US with this approach, creating a particular chal-lenge for the period that followed: if it wanted to advance the regime talks, the Union would need to convince the major developing countries, whose emissions were rising steeply, just as much as the major industrial-ized emitter (Dessai et al. 2003: 201; Ott et al. 2005: 90–91). Balancing between these two players would therefore represent the major task for the future (Biermann 2005).

The only key event and a turning point of sorts with regard to the development of the climate regime during the analysed period was the Russian Kyoto Protocol ratif ication, crucial to the successful completion of a reform process begun ten years earlier at COP 1 in Berlin. Although it was ultimately the decision of a sovereign country, the EU did exert medi-um inf luence over Russia’s choice: it approached the Russians with con-crete proposals that were openly linked to the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process (purposive behaviour, interaction, temporal sequence). These proposals and subsequent agreements allowed the Union to attain its aim (ratif ication of the Protocol). F inally, even though the Russians may have decided to ratify the Protocol without the Union’s interference, the likeli-hood that the incentives provided by the EU were essential for it to decide the way it did is high (partial absence of auto-causation) (Douma 2006, who cites observations by Russian politicians supporting this interpreta-tion). The EU was thus able to set forth its role as a decisive player when it came to ensuring the continuity of the multilateral regime. Concerning the attempts to initiate post-2012 talks, it booked, however, together with AOSIS, only a very limited success against an opposition of developing countries and non-Kyoto ratif iers (US, Australia) at COP 10.

Without engaging in wide-reaching explanatory efforts of its inf luence, the case of Russian ratif ication demonstrated that (i) the EU generally has more foreign policy instruments at its disposal in a climate policy context than it had been willing to employ before that, and that (ii) these tools, used for bargaining, hold the capacity to enhance the Union’s chances for exerting inf luence. By contrast, its impatience and insensitivity towards other partners’ interests, a recurring pattern, at times strongly alienated third parties. What may appear as an attempt at leading carries thus, in fact, the risk of isolating the EU in the climate arena, limiting its prospects for exercising inf luence.

14 Ott et al. (2005: 90) note an interesting parallel between the EU’s constant desire of developing the climate regime and its own evolution as an entity (and foreign poli-cy actor) with a range of treaty reforms in a relatively short time span: 1987 Single European Act, 1993 Maastricht, 1999 Amsterdam, 2001 Nice, 2009 Lisbon.

Towards a Post-2012 Regime: Loose Talks