To specify the context in which the concepts of inf luence and inf luence attempts are applied in this study, this section embeds them into (pre-)theoretical considerations on (i) the EU, derived from EU for-eign policy analysis, and (ii) on global climate policy, derived essen-tially from regime theory. Theories serve two key purposes here: f irst, enabling the transition from description to explanation by aiding in the selection of key explanatory variables of EU inf luence; second, helping to reduce the scope of the study via the selection of core units of analysis in the chosen case.
Inf luence and Inf luence Attempts Seen Through the Lens of EU Foreign Policy Analysis
Two closely linked debates from the literature on EU foreign policy analysis are of interest for the purposes of this study. A look into the de-bate on whether and under what conditions the EU can be a global actor helps to settle the important question of what EU foreign policy is, while yielding insights into the internal preconditions for EU external activity and impact. A second debate on the EU’s capacities as a global actor helps to pre-specify its tools for exerting inf luence.
Bearing the def inition of EU foreign policy as area of politics that aims at inf luencing its external environment in mind, and since the EU is a composite actor involving supranational institutions and mem-ber states, it is equally important to be clear about what European Union foreign policy exactly entails. It is here considered as the sum of foreign policies conducted by genuine EU actors (the European Commission, the Council Presidency, the High Representative – HR) or EU member states if they act explicitly on behalf of the EU or in line with its values and interests. If the Union can thus possess a for-eign policy in its own right, it does not always appear as the same type of actor to its interlocutors. In some arenas it is represented by the Commission, in other contexts by the Presidency of the Council (or, since the Lisbon Treaty, the HR or the President of the European Council), and in still other fora the representation may change over time or depending on the issue.
Scholars have repeatedly attempted to specify the EU’s capac-ity to act in its own right on the global scene (Carlsnaes 2007: 549).
The concept of “actorness”, as elaborated by Caporaso/Jupille (1998;
drawing on Sjöstedt 1977) can be regarded as the most sophisticated of these attempts (Ginsberg 2001: 45–46). It conceives of the EU’s capacity to act globally in terms of four categories (Caporaso/Jupille 1998): recognition (the EU’s acceptance by others), authority (the EU’s legal competence to act externally), autonomy (the EU’s institu-tional distinctiveness/independence from its members) and cohesion (the degree to which the EU is able to formulate internally consist-ent policy preferences). Recognition excepted, all categories point to signif icant internal conditions the EU has to fulf il to be capable of exerting inf luence. Parting from an interdisciplinary (legal/political science) critique of “actorness”, Schunz et al. (2012) developed an analytical framework that employs the more comprehensive concept of “actor capacity” to discuss the legal and foreign policy components of the EU’s capacity to act externally. For them, EU actor capacity depends essentially on (i) the existence of legal competence to act in
EU primary law,8 (ii) the de jure and de facto external representation arrangements (who speaks on behalf of the EU?; to what extent does it act independently from the member states?) as well as (iii) eff icient internal decision-making and coordination processes9 among member states and between these and the EU institutions. Moreover, actor ca-pacity relies on the existence of (iv) relevant treaty objectives and common policy goals. F inally, the availability of (v) foreign policy tools, which form the basis for EU inf luence attempts, is an often ne-glected, signif icant component of the Union’s capacity to act.
When it comes to these EU foreign policy tools, a small group of authors has attempted to come up with a classif ication (Smith 2003: 52–68; White 2001: 53–57; Ginsberg 2001: 49–50). The arguably most detailed elabora-tion stems from Karen Smith, who identif ies both economic and diplomatic instruments (2003: 52–68). In the economic sphere, she distinguishes be-tween positive (carrots) and negative (sticks) measures (Smith 2003: 60;
Ginsberg 2001: 50). The EU can exert inf luence positively by, inter alia, concluding trade, cooperation or association agreements, reducing tariffs or providing aid. In negative terms, the EU can impose embargos or boycotts, delay or suspend agreements, increase tariffs, reduce aid etc. Smith refers to these latter tools also as “coercion” (2003: 22). In the diplomatic sphere, she identif ies a range of EU instruments like issuing démarches or declarations, visiting other countries, imposing diplomatic sanctions, offering EU mem-bership etc. (Smith 2003: 61). Smith’s catalogue provides a useful starting point for specifying EU inf luence attempts, and can also be applied to EU foreign climate policy. Table 2 gives an overview of possible EU inf luence attempts, linking conceptual considerations on inf luence attempts made ear-lier to the concrete EU foreign policy literature. The table essentially dis-tinguishes between inf luencing through the causal mechanisms of arguing (persuasion) and bargaining. While it is highly unlikely that the EU will re-sort to coercive means in a global environmental policy context, coercion is listed as a third possible causal mechanism. Taking these categories into ac-count, Smith’s catalogue needs to be adapted in two respects. F irst, her dis-cussion of negative economic measures omits that such instruments cannot only be employed coercively, i.e. actually used to the detriment of the EU’s interlocutors (thus “inf licting punishment” in Holsti’s terms (1995)), but can
8 The EU’s participation in a multilateral forum regularly depends, moreover, on an overture created by international law. Via such a provision, the Union can be granted a legal status (e.g. full member, full participant) in UN bodies, endowing it with speak-ing and votspeak-ing rights. This aspect of the legal preconditions for EU external actions is addressed in the analysis, where this is relevant.
9 Decision-making refers to the def inition of the EU’s negotiation positions, while nal coordination depicts the processes of consultation among EU actors during inter-national negotiations on the basis of such positions.
also have the status of threats (“threatening punishment”, Holsti 1995). In the latter case, if sanctions are only invoked as a possibility, this activity falls under the broader category of bargaining. Second, diplomatic tools cannot only be used in a bargaining context, but also as means of persuasion. For data collection and analysis purposes, use is above all made of the second to last column (EU foreign policy instruments) of Table 2. How this can be done in a climate policy context is illustrated in the last column.
The EU’s capacity to act and its capacities as a global actor constitute potentially important preconditions for its exercise of influence in global affairs, which are duly analysed in this study.
Table 2: How the EU Can Exert Inf luence – EU Foreign Policy Acts Acts of
Acts of
EU Inf luence and Inf luence Attempts in the Global Climate Regime Context
From the perspective of the global level of analysis, regime theory can help to single out, f irst, possible explanatory factors of EU inf luence and, second, the study’s key units of analysis regarding major constitutive features of the global climate regime.
Regime theory has long been applied to the analysis of international cooperation, notably in the f ield of global environmental politics, in which several regimes – such as the UN climate regime – co-exist (Young 1994).
Three main strands of regime theory can be distinguished (see Hasenclever et al. 1996 for an overview): (i) a neo-realist power strand that draws either on hegemonic stability theory or emphasizes the relational power (capaci-ties) of various actors as important explanatory factor for the creation of regimes (Krasner 1991; Keohane 1984); (ii) a constructivist knowledge/
ideas strand that focuses on the role that ideas, identities or communicative action play in the formation and maintenance of regimes (Kratochwil 1989;
Müller 1994); and (iii) a – mainstream – neo-liberal institutionalist interest strand, which operates on the assumption that regimes allow states – as rational agents seeking gains – to materialize common interests (Keohane 1989; Young 1989a). While the majority of institutionalist scholars holds that regimes are negotiated by fully rational state actors behaving strategi-cally on the basis of f ixed preferences, and that regimes are formed and persist when and as long as they “increase the welfare of their creators”
(Keohane 1984: 80), Young (1989b; 1993) has contested this rigid view of states as pure utility maximizers and of bargaining as only distributive.
He argues that rationality is always bounded, which makes it necessary for states to transcend pure self-interest and cooperate with the aim of expand-ing the overall collective benef its of all negotiatexpand-ing parties (Young 1994:
126–127). His approach has therefore been interpreted as a basis for build-ing bridges to constructivist approaches (Risse 2002: 614).
While some of the potential determinants of EU inf luence – related to its own actor capacity – have been identif ied above, theories of regime formation and change can be crucial sources of additional explanatory factors for its inf luence on a global regime. By def inition, EU inf luence on the climate regime will involve modif ications in this regime, which is why insights about regime change can inform the design of the analytical framework for this study.
The tendency in much of the literature has been to rely on singular explanations: either power or ideas or interests have been regarded as the main driving factors behind regimes and their change, where all three may actually play a part (Young 1989b: 353; 1993: 435). Young sug-gests that regime transformation can result from any or a combination of
changes in the political, economic or social contexts, in the inner dynam-ics of a regime, or in the issue(s) a regime deals with (1989a: 95–96). The study therefore relies on basic premises of his institutionalist approach with regard to bounded rationality, but enhances these further with in-sights of the constructivist strand, notably concerning communicative action in processes of regime formation and change. Further, the study also shares assumptions with Krasner’s view that power, understood in material and non-material terms, determines who is involved in inter-state cooperation and by which rules this cooperation functions (Krasner 1991:
340). Purely rational choice and hegemonic stability accounts of regime creation/change are not retained.
Concretely, several potential explanatory factors of regime change and, by extension, of an actor’s inf luence in an evolving regime con-text are identif ied. Exogeneous factors can be very diverse and related to, for instance, alterations in the socio-economic (e.g. a sudden global f inancial crisis) or political (e.g. an armed conf lict in an important stra-tegic theatre) environment that create a demand for or put pressure on a specif ic regime. Changes in the issue can come in the form of new scientif ic knowledge about the natural environment that, for instance, increases the urgency with which an environmental problem has to be treated through international cooperation. Factors related to the inner dynamics of a regime concern above all transformed patterns of interac-tion between actors. Following Krasner (1991), power asymmetries can play a role, as changes in the capacities of actors may also alter the way they interact. Further, domestically motivated preference changes that lead to altered strategic behaviour of actors can equally be of importance (Keohane 1989). F inally, changing perceptions and beliefs can deter-mine any actor’s activities and change the interaction between actors within a regime (Goldstein/Keohane 1993). By consequence, all these modif ications in the internal dynamics of a regime can lead to changes in its set-up.
Bringing the EU-related and regime-related potential explanatory fac-tors together, the causes of EU inf luence in the case of the global climate regime must thus above all be searched in (i) the context, (ii) the issue(s) under negotiation, and (iii) the internal dynamics of this regime (the ideas, interests, capacities (power) of the – state – actors and how they interact in the regime, including the EU and its actor capacity and activities). In other words, when assessing the EU’s inf luence on the outcome of a re-gime process, all these items come into consideration as possible enabling or restraining factors of this inf luence.
Selecting possible explanatory factors of EU inf luence in a global re-gime context is one thing, reducing the scope of the analysis of the specif ic instance of EU foreign policy in the global climate regime another. In this
respect, Krasner’s (1983: 2) often employed “consensus def inition” of a regime can be of use (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 179):
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area (…). Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior def ined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specif ic prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective action.
This broad def inition is helpful “as a guide for empirical stud-ies” because it identif ies various constitutive dimensions of a regime (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 180). Following Aggarwal’s suggestion for a ref ined terminology, which distinguishes between the rules and deci-sion-making procedures on the one hand and “the principles and norms underlying the development of a regime [which] can be termed a ‘meta-regime’” on the other hand (1985: 18), one can argue that the princi-ples and norms constitute the core of any regime and stand hierarchically above rules and decision-making procedures on implementation. For an analysis of the ever more complex negotiations within the global climate regime, this implies that emphasis can be placed not on the many issues concerning the operationalization of the regime (the rules in Krasner’s def inition), but on the essential political discussions on issues related to its key principles and norms. Decisions on these elements will deter-mine the course that regime development will take. Climate politics can thus essentially be regarded as a struggle over the content of what – in line with Aggarwal’s def inition – can be referred to as the climate meta- regime. This climate meta-regime consists, for the time being, of several key principles and a number of norms, i.e. rights and obligations for cer-tain groups of parties. The most signif icant principles are the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary prin-ciple and the prinprin-ciple of equity, formally enshrined in Article 3 of the UNFCCC (Betsill 2005; Oberthür/Ott 1999). The equity principle implies that all actors in the regime should be treated equally. It is subject to dif-ferent interpretations depending on whether it is applied to mitigation, adaptation, decision-making or participation in the regime (Metz 2000).
The precautionary principle says, according to the Convention itself, that
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientif ic certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures” (Art. 3.3 UNFCCC). F inally, the principle of common but dif-ferentiated responsibilities comprises the notion of a common responsibil-ity of all states for the protection of the environment, but takes account of differences in both past and present contributions to environmental degra-dation and in the capacities to combat environmental problems (Rajamani 2000; Harris 2000: 226–228). The core norm is at the same time the aim
of the entire regime: “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments (…) is to achieve (…) stabilization of green-house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Art. 2 UNFCCC). It can be considered as a norm – a “standard of behavior”
(Krasner 1983: 2) – because it obliges, if not in a legally binding then at least in a moral sense, those who ratify the Convention to work towards
“achieving” a stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
This requires a specif ic form of behaviour aimed at reducing emissions.
The exact denotation of both the principles and the rights/obligations is subject to regular (re-)negotiation. Different interpretations of the prin-ciples compete, and the determination of the “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” as well as the necessary actions to achieve this are also constantly contested.
Collective decision-making is therefore needed to determine what they mean in a particular context. If the constitutive dimensions of the climate meta-regime represent thus the essence of global climate politics, this implies that impact on the global climate regime by and large passes by inf luence on the meta-regime. Following this logic, two embedded units of analysis for the case study can be selected:
1. The CBDR principle: it can be seen as a true “belief of rectitude”
in the Krasnerian sense, as it incorporates a vision of the historical repartition of responsibility for environmental degradation in the world. The core question that it raises is a deeply political one, namely “who will do what?” in the regime. The principle has to be repeatedly f illed with concrete meaning and becomes thus a key object of inf luence attempts.
2. The core norm (in the sense of obligation) of the regime embodied in the stabilisation objective (Art. 2 UNFCCC): f illing this norm with meaning necessitates a def inition of the emissions limit need-ed to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the cli-mate. This central choice of global climate policy is, in turn, deeply linked to a political decision on the nature (binding?/voluntary?) and calculation (per country or per capita emissions?/base year?
etc.) of emissions reductions. While the targets and timetables for individual parties to the Convention and its Protocol could be in-terpreted as rules of a regime (Downie 2005: 66–67), the broader choice on whether obligations are binding or not (and for whom) and the concrete question of the aggregate amplitude they take, based on the individual repartition of the burden among parties, are more than what Krasner calls “pre-/proscriptions”. They have to be considered as the fundamental norms of the climate meta-regime.
Given the centrality and highly political nature of the two items, inf luence on decisions on the inclusiveness and on the scope of the re-gime will enable actors to obtain leverage over other parties’ emissions.
Such inf luence is thus crucial for any actor that desires to impact climate regime development. It is therefore assumed that the results of a study of the EU’s inf luence concerning these two issues allows for statements about its inf luence on the entire regime.10