EU Inf luence on the Consolidation of the Global Climate Regime
COP 7 in Marrakech (29 October–10 November 2001) had the deli- deli-cate task of translating the Bonn Agreement, a package of draft decisions,
into legal language. Despite existing political compromises on almost all issues, the conference turned out to be more politicized than expected:
where the EU considered it as a f inal formal step towards concluding the BAPA and operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol, some Umbrella Group members, especially Japan, Russia and Australia, sought further gains for their positions, while the US took “little overt part” (Schneider/Wagner 2002: 3; ENB 2001b: 14–15). Talks focused on three outstanding issues from the BAPA (ENB 2001b; Dessai et al. 2003: 194–195; Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 109–113): compliance, the main left over from COP 6bis, and the two topics that had broken the deal at COP 6: sinks and f lexible mechanisms. Regarding the issue of compliance, outstanding problems could be resolved at expert level in a package deal between the EU and the G-77/China on the one hand and the Umbrella Group on the other hand (ENB 2001b: 15, 6–8). The decision f inally adopted foresaw a comparatively strong mechanism, which ref lected EU preferences, no-tably with regard to its major institutional novelty, a two-branch compli-ance committee (ENB 2001b: 15; for an in-depth discussion: Schneider/
Wagner 2002: 10; Dessai/Schipper 2003: 151–152). The other two issues were not resolved until the last two days of the COP when parties decided on very technical issues related to LULUCF reporting and the eligibil-ity criteria for participation in the f lexible mechanisms (ENB 2001b: 15;
Dessai et al. 2003: 194). On these items, the EU gave in to various de-mands of the Umbrella Group (Dessai/Schipper 2003: 151; Schneider/
Wagner 2002: 6–10). Ultimately, the COP reached its overarching aim:
the Marrakech Accords, a package of 245 pages of decisions adopted on 10 November 2001, ended the BAPA process (UNFCCC 2001b).
The Outcome: the Marrakech Accords – Clearing the Way for Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
Exactly three years of negotiations had been necessary to detail the rules of the reformed climate regime. Although this time period was not per se concerned with regime development regarding its core pillars,7 talks were essential for the continuity of the climate regime under the UN
7 The major exception was the described debate about developing country commitments at COP 4.
umbrella, and thus also for the EU’s objectives on the further evolution of the regime. In this regard, the Marrakech Accords proved crucial for clearing the path for ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol. A critical reading could characterize these Accords as the “Marrakech dilution of the wa-tered down Bonn agreement to the fatally f lawed Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC” (Dessai et al. 2003: 194). More nuanced interpretations, by contrast, regarded the compromises on some of the crunch issues as nec-essary steps in the development of a regime that had to provide enough incentives for all actors to participate, even keeping the door open for the US to eventually re-join the club (ENB 2001b: 16). To enable such a catch-all agreement, the “EU and the G-77/China had been compelled to concede to many of the demands of key Umbrella Group countries” in the “Marrakech bazaar”, but also beforehand at COP 6bis (ENB 2001b:
15; Dessai et al. 2003: 193). With the exception of the compliance sys-tem, “unique in the world of environmental law” because of its level of detail with regard to both institutional set-up and penalties (Dessai/
Schipper 2003: 151; UNFCCC 2001b: point L.), many key decisions in the Marrakech Accords ref lected thus the preferences of the non-EU in-dustrialized countries for greater cost-effectiveness – to the detriment of environmental integrity. This is particularly the case regarding the use of sinks, with the inclusion of all land management activities (Dessai/
Schipper 2003: 151; UNFCCC 2001b: point K.), and the modalities of the f lexible mechanisms. On this issue, supplementarity, so important to the EU, had become an “almost meaningless item within the Accords”
(Schneider/Wagner 2002: 5–9; UNFCCC 2001b: point J.; Dessai et al.
2003: 195).
The EU’s Inf luence on the Negotiations Leading to the Marrakech Accords
A brief assessment of the EU’s inf luence during the talks that led to the Marrakech Accords, based primarily on testimonies of observers, al-lows for maintaining the longitudinal perspective of the study. To that end, the Union’s main inf luence attempts and their effects at major turn-ing points are assessed, before tentatively explainturn-ing its inf luence.
There is no evident coherent pattern of EU inf luence attempts that can be extracted from the discussion of this time period. The Union was active as a defender of the idea of prompt operationalization of the Kyoto Protocol, as part of its broader objectives related to regime de-velopment, but rather passive regarding the concrete substance of talks at COPs 4 and 5, balancing between the developing countries and the Umbrella Group (Tangen 1999; Ott 1998). Gradually, it would def ine, in a similar vein as during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, a very de-tailed position and submit proposals on all key issues, with emphasis on
sinks, compliance, and, importantly, the supplementarity of the f lexible mechanisms (Torvanger 2001). This position tended, however, in another parallel to the period 1995–1997, to be quite inf lexible: at COP 6, the EU was unprepared to make concessions to the US, thus contributing to the failure of the talks (Ott 2001a: 285; Grubb/Yamin 2001). It was only in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the process, that it altered both its position and behaviour. Not only did the EU engage in more wide-reaching diplomatic activities, but it also displayed, under pressure, greater willingness to compromise with the Umbrella Group.8
Three relevant turning points can be identif ied during this period. The f irst one touched upon the maintenance of the norm, the other two on the modalities of its implementation.
Turning point 1, the US withdrawal from the process, came after a f irst major failure in the history of climate negotiations (COP 6). It led to a partial convergence of preferences among the remaining key actors, who agreed that the operationalization and ratif ication process of the Protocol should be pursued. The EU may claim credit for having actively – and successfully – led the way to forge this consensus on further regime devel-opment both rhetorically and by proactively searching the dialogue through sustained diplomatic efforts (and thus fulf illing four necessary conditions for inf luence: purposive behaviour, interaction, temporal sequence, goal attainment). It is however diff icult to assess the degree of auto-causation of the other players. The remaining Umbrella Group members probably realized that the US withdrawal would enable them to impose the terms of the agreement. This made a participation in the regime even more ap-pealing to them, as they could seek symbolic (gain international prof ile, e.g. Japan) and material benef its (via f lexible mechanisms, e.g. Russia).
Counterfactual reasoning may help to decide whether the condition “ab-sence of auto-causation” was, at least partially, fulf illed: had the EU not
“led the way”, would the other Umbrella Group members have behaved the way they did? Probably not, as they might have been too concerned about their relations with the US (e.g. for Japan, Grubb 2001). It did take the clear signals from the economic heavyweight EU to convince them to pursue with the negotiations at that stage. In the f inal analysis, it can therefore be plausibly argued that the Union did exert a – medium – degree
8 Quite a few studies that have examined the Union’s external climate activities from a leadership perspective have actually focused precisely on its performance after the 2001 withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process to attrib-ute the EU an avant-garde role in the climate regime (see, for instance, Grubb 2001;
Gupta/Ringius 2001; Oberthür/Roche-Kelly 2008). An inf luence analysis perspective demonstrates that its alleged leadership came at a high cost: by making numerous concessions to the other Umbrella Group members, the EU effectively gave up its environmental integrity concerns in order to ensure the continuity of the regime.
of inf luence at this major turning point: without its commitment to the multilateral climate regime, the latter may have slipped into a longer crisis, and the commitments embodied in Article 3.1 and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol might never have gained any signif icance whatsoever. EU impact thus ensured the maintenance of the norm.
The second and third turning points in Bonn (COP 6bis) and Marrakech (COP 7) concerned f inal decisions on various concrete technical issues regarding the modalities surrounding the issue of emissions reduction targets. Had these discussions failed completely, the norm on which the EU had been so inf luential in Kyoto would never have come into force.
This was avoided, but the rules around the emission reduction targets were nevertheless severely watered down in a process in which the EU unsuccessfully tried to protect the environmental integrity of the Protocol (purposive behaviour, interaction). As the Umbrella Group exploited its bargaining power to the fullest to gain maximum f lexibility regarding the use of sinks and mechanisms, the Union felt compelled to adapt its previ-ously very rigid position and to give in to almost all demands, with the partial exception of compliance, in order to ensure regime development.9 In failing to reach its objectives, it thus clearly did not fulf il a crucial necessary condition for exerting inf luence (no goal attainment). No ad-ditional EU inf luence over the specif ic contours of the regime is thus dis-cerned at these two turning points. All in all, the EU’s inf luence attempts were oriented towards the long term, and had enduring effects: the Union ensured that the decisions necessary for the Protocol to come into force – and the regime to further develop – were taken. It had, however, little inf luence on their substance.
To account for the EU’s inf luence during this period, endogenous/
actor-related and exogenous variables must again be considered. In terms of actor-related variables, the EU’s actor capacity can be largely taken for granted, but its inf luence attempts and overall foreign policy imple-mentation may partially explain why it did not fare well during most of this period. Observers of COP 6 in The Hague noted its “rather weak performance” as one of the reasons for the conference’s failure, attribut-ing it to “the uncoordinated, reactive and fragmented style of European diplomacy” (Ott 2001a: 285; Grubb/Yamin 2001; Vogler 2005: 840). The key problem seemed to be a profound divergence of preferences regard-ing substantial and strategic policy choices among the member states.10 In
9 This marks a striking parallel to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, where the EU also gave in to demands by the US (and Japan) on almost all items to attain its aims regard-ing the emission reductions target.
10 The “blame game” that the UK negotiators and the French EU Presidency engaged in immediately after COP 6 may be one indicator that apparent problems were rooted in divergent preferences (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274; Dessai et al. 2003: 186–187).
an institutional context requiring unanimity, such differences resulted in slow and cumbersome processes of foreign policy decision-making and coordination as well as suboptimal outreach (Sprinz 2001: 7). As in previ-ous rounds of talks, the EU spent “so much time negotiating with itself, and secondarily focusing on its position vis-à-vis the United States, that very little investment [wa]s made with respect to other countries” and
“little or no account of the realities in the rest of the world” was taken (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274). The resulting inf lexibility was best exemp-lif ied in its stance on the issues of sinks and supplementarity at COP 6, of which – according to Grubb/Yamin (2001: 272) – “many EU mem-bers had known for a year” that they were “unacceptable and probably unworkable” for key third countries. These positions ref lected a lack of strategic thinking on realistic fallback positions that would have enabled the EU to seal a deal as early as COP 6, avoiding the delay and painful experiences of the year that followed. Strikingly, the Union immediately adapted its position and behaviour after the failed COP 6 and the US withdrawal from the Protocol ratif ication process (Grubb 2001: 10), sub-scribing to compromises that would, arguably, “have satisf ied the US in The Hague” (ENB 2001a: 13).11 This adaptation of its position may be regarded as the key positive explanatory factor for its inf luence on the overarching objective of ensuring regime continuity, but it came at high cost regarding its environmental integrity. Turning to the external deter-minants of EU inf luence, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process constituted the most signif icant factor. It considera-bly impaired the Union’s chances of exerting inf luence on the regime. As the entry into force of the Protocol required the ratif ication of 55 parties to the UNFCCC, including Annex I parties representing 55% of the total emissions of all Annex I parties (Art. 25.1 KP), US disengagement meant that virtually all other industrialized actors needed to ratify if the EU was to reach its aim of getting the treaty into force. This provided the bigger members of the Umbrella Group (Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia) with de facto veto power (Dessai et al. 2003: 190, 197; Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 106). Since their diverging preferences were hard to accommodate, the Union had to bow to virtually all their wishes to attain its objectives.
In a context of preference heterogeneity, the structural features of the ne-gotiations thus did not play out to the advantage of the industrialized party who most wanted the due enactment of the Protocol (Yamin/Grubb 2001).
11 The strong focus on the US, displayed at COP 6 (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274), was, how-ever, continued in a different manner thereafter. Indicating how some players within the EU perceived the climate negotiations, the successful ending of the resumed sixth conference, in which the US actually took little active part, prompted EU Environment Commissioner Wallström to comment: “I think something has changed today in the balance of power between the US and the EU” (ENB 2001a: 14)!