Mechanism Design and Social Choice, summer ’09 Prof. Dr. Benny Moldovanu
Wirtschaftstheorie II Lenn´estr. 37, 53113 Bonn
Konrad Mierendorff Office hours: Monday 11:45 - 12:45 Lenn´estraße 37, 2. Stock mierendorff@uni-bonn.de
Homework Assignment 1
The exercises will be discussed on May, 23.
Please prepare solutions for the exercise session!
1. Nash Bargaining Solution
Show that the Nash Bargaining Solution fN(U) where the number of agents I = 2, satisfies the following properties:
a. Independence of Utility Units and Origins b. Pareto Optimality
c. Symmetry
d. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
2. Show that forI = 2,u=fN(U) is the boundary point ofU thorough which we can draw a tangent line with the property that its midpoint in the positive orthant is precisely the given boundary point u.
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