Hazardous Waste in The Netherlands: Dutch Policies from a Local Perspective

NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT PERMISSION O F THE AUTHORS

HAZARDOUS WASTE IN THE NETHERLANDS

DUTCH POLICIES FROM A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

J.C.M.van Ei jndhoven D.Hortensius

C.Nauta G.H.E.Nieuwdorp

C.W.Worrel1

Contribution prepared by The Werkgroep Chemie e n Samenleving D e p a r t m e n t of Chemistry

University of U t r e c h t Padualaan 8

D e Uithof-Utrecht The Netherlands

Collaborative Papers r e p o r t work which h a s n o t been performed solely at t h e International Institute f o r Applied Systems Analysis a n d which h a s received only limited revieuw. Views o r opinions expressed herein d o not necessarily r e p r e s e n t those of t h e Institute, i t s National Member Organizations, o r o t h e r organizations supporting t h e work.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS,

2361 Laxenburg, Austria

FOREWORD

T h i s paper i s a r e s u l t o f c o l l a b o r a t i o n between t h e authors and t h e I I A S A p r o j e c t on r i s k assessment i n hazardous waste management. I t was p a r t o f a m u l t i p l e c o l l a b o r a t i o n i'n t h e Netherlands. The I I A S A p r o j e c t compared i n s t i t u t i o n a l approaches t o r e g u l a t i o n o f hazardous wastes i n several c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e USA, UK, FRG, A u s t r i a and Hungary. I n l i n e w i t h previous I I A S A r i s k research, i t focussed i n p a r t i c u l a r upon

t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between t h e forms o f r i s k a n a l y s i s , t h e t e c h n i c a l r e g u l a t o r y instruments employed (such as hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ) , and t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l processes o f r e g u l a t i o n i n those c o u n t r i e s .

The i n f l u e n c e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l processes upon t e c h n i c a l knowledge used i n r e g u l a t i o n has been i n c r e a s i n g l y recognized. However, i t has y e t t o be adequately systematized i n comparative r e s e a r c h on d i f f e r e n t r e g u l a - t o r y systems. I n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s cannot be e a s i l y t r a n s p l a n t e d from one c u l t u r e t o another. Nevertheless, through t h e normal f l u x o f p o l i c y ,

i n s t i t u t i o n a l development s l o w l y occurs anyway, i n more o r l e s s ad hoc f a s h i o n . Comparative i n s i g h t can h e l p t o d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n i n more d e l i b e r a t e and c o n s t r u c t i v e ways.

I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s work i s o f importance f o r c u r r e n t attempts t o develop e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l regimes o f hazardous waste management, v i a harmoniza- t i o n o f n a t i o n a l approaches. The I I A S A work demonstrates t h e 1 im i t a t i o n s of approaches dependent upon t e c h n i c a l harmonization a1 one. The present paper shows how p e r v a s i v e and complex a r e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r c e s which shape t e c h n i c a l p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s i n d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c a l ways, even w i t h i n n a t i o n a l sys tems

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The I I A S A p r o j e c t was w r i t t e n up as a s e r i e s of Working Papers pub1 ished i n May 1984. I n r e v i s e d f o r m i t w i l l be published as a book i n 1986 and w i l l i n c l u d e a chapter on t h e Netherlands drawn p a r t l y f r o m t h e present paper.

Ted Munn

Head o f Environment Program

ABSTRACT

This paper i s about risk m a n a g e m e n t and environmental policy. Conventional approaches t o risk management (Wynne et al., IIASA Working Papers on Hazardous Waste Management) t e n d t o assume t h a t risk i s a technical phenomenon, and t h a t successful risk management involves t h e elaboration and use of precise technical a n a l y t i c models and regulatory instruments.

The a i m of this work i s t o show t h a t this general approach i s unrealistic.

Firstly, i t i s shown t h a t d i f f e r e n t perceptions and definitions of policy issues shape legislative and regulatory agendas in ways which m e a n t h a t environmental management and specific definitions of risk problems a r e only a (varying) p a r t of t h e broader agendas and concerns of i n t e r a c t i n g groups.

Secondly, i t i s shown t h a t e v e n a f t e r apparently precise regulations have been established, t h e process of implementation e f f e c t i v e l y continues t h e negotiation of t h e basic a g e n d a of issues as defined by d i f f e r e n t interests.

This i s shown t o be t h e case at national and local levels. The family of Dutch case studies presented supports t h e argument of t h e IIASA hazardous w a s t e papers, t h a t e f f e c t i v e regulatory instruments c a n only be identified in t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e institutional realities of regulatory decision making and a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m s of technical knowledge. These v a r y f r o m o n e regulatory s y s t e m t o another, making technical harmonisation e x t r e m e l y problematic.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction 3

2. C h e m i c a l Waste 7

Industrial Planning for Hazardous Waste T r e a t m e n t and Disposal 7

The EMK case 9

Enforcement of Environmental Legislation with respect t o EMK 15

Booy C l e a n 17

Concluding R e m a r k s 1 9

3. Soil C l e a n Up

Financing Soil Clean Up Selection of Pollution C a s e s

Antagonism b e t w e e n Local Government and Residents T h e Volgermeerpolder

T h e Griftpark T h e Merwedepolder Expertise

Toxicological Evaluation of t h e Pollution Situation Summary and Discussion

4. Conclusions

I. Introduction

Institutional realities, including p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , s h a p e policy agendas, problem definitions, t h e s e t t i n g and use of t e c h n i c a l n o r m s a n d t h e way u n c e r t a i n t i e s a r e m a n a g e d in t h e field of risk m a n a g e m e n t a n d hazardous wastes. Dirven h a s given a n a c c o u n t of t h e institutional processes which a f f e c t e d t h e formulation a n d implementation of regulations in t h e D u t c h C h e m i c a l Waste Act, t h e main regulatory f r a m e w o r k f o r c u r r e n t w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t , and t h e Soil C l e a n U p (interim) Act, t h e r e g u l a t o r y f r a m e w o r k f o r dealing w i t h w a s t e s f r o m t h e past. His a c c o u n t focussed mainly upon t h e c e n t r a l government level. To c o m p l e t e his a n a l y t i c a l picture, however, r e q u i r e s a t t e n t i o n to local processes, especially at t h e level of t h e municipality.

Municipalities, as well as provinces, a r e t e r r i t o r i a l l y dispersed ² a u t h o r i t i e s having t h e i r own political identity; t h e y a r e a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e i r own houses of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , t h e municipal a n d provincial councils respectively. In t h e s i t u a t i o n s w e consider in t h i s paper w e a l s o e n c o u n t e r so c a l l e d functionally d e c e n t r a l i z e d authorities, of which t h e w a t e r a u t h o r i t i e s (waterschappen e n (hoog-)heemraadschappen) a r e i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e s 3

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T h e e x e c u t i o n of q u i t e a number of environmental acts has b e e n d e l e g a t e d to lower authorities, especially provinces. Measures c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e Nuisance Act, a n act d a t i n g f r o m 1875 a n d intended t o r e d u c e nuisance caused by industrial a c t i v i t y , a r e t a k e n by t h e municipalities. But if a n industrial f a c i l i t y c r o s s e s municipal boundaries, o r if o t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l legislation i s involved, provincial states c o o r d i n a t e licencing procedures. T h e Soil C l e a n U p (interim) Act has g r a n t e d e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o t h e provincial level; however, in t h i s case t h e financial a u t h o r i t y i s in t h e hands of t h e c e n t r a l government. Such a p a r t i a l division o f - a u t h o r i t y strongly influences t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of regulations.

J.M.C.Dirven, f i r s t p a r t of t h e Netherlands case study.

We use t h i s t e r m to d e n o t e d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n without c o m p l e t e d e l e g a t i o n of financial authority.

In s o m e cases provinces and w a t e r a u t h o r i t y c o i n c i d e (e.g. in t h e province of ~ t r e c h t ) . A w a t e r s c h a p i s in c h a r g e of t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of dikes, roads, bridges and t h e navigability of canals.

03

According t o t h e conventional view of implementation, c e n t r a l regulations enforced at local levels with varying degrees of competence, vigour, resources, information, etc., and thus varying levels of a c t u a l enforcement.

Implementation c a n be improved by improving t h e s e factors. More recently, however, authors (such a s Diver (1)) have shown t h a t divergent institutional realities and rationalities prevail at t h e c e n t r a l and local levels. The respective p a r t s of t h e overall regulatory s y s t e m s a r e responding t o different signals, constraints and imposed objectives within t h e i r institutional environments. Optimising their regulatory function means very different and not necessarily mutually consistent things at t h e d i f f e r e n t institutional levels.

Understanding implementation at t h e local level i s t h e r e f o r e crucial f o r understanding risk management and regulation. Those a f f e c t e d by t h e enforcement of a n act view t h e act from widely differing perspectives. For them i t i s a new f a c t o r of variable negotiability in dealing with problems already o n their agendas. They have t o f i t t h e new f e a t u r e s brought about by t h e legislation into t h e way they routinely deal with problems. It i s a new resource o r constraint introduced into t h e situation. Decision analysts and o t h e r students of policy processes tend t o view policy problem definitions as given e n t i t i e s even in t h e environmental field. But as will become apparent from this paper, all problem definitions a r e socially shaped, t h e r e f o r e in flux and contingent. C e n t r a l policy activities a r e only o n e of t h e f a c t o r s influencing local problem definitions and agendas.

A new act i s in t h i s sense no starting point: i t comes i n t o being in a n already existing s t r u c t u r e of legal, social and institutional behaviour.

Problems t h a t a r e being d e a l t with c a n change by i t , b u t will usually not disappear by t h e new regulation. Yet,

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new legislation does add t o institutional uncertainty; additional experience may be needed t o handle t h e f e a t u r e s brought about by t h e new rules.

It i s not only t h e 'implementation phase1 of a new act t h a t is viewed differently at different levels in society. In addition, t h e way t h e problem is defined at t h e c e n t r a l level may not resemble t h e problem as seen by residents o r local authorties. As Dirven has described from a c e n t r a l viewpoint t h e chemical waste issue has been viewed primarily as a problem

industrial s t r u c t u r e a n d m a n a g e m e n t , whereas in t h e soil clean-up d e b a t e a risk m a n a g e m e n t viewpoint was forced upon c e n t r a l government. But from t h e local viewpoint t h e risk management perspective was dominant in t h e issue of c h e m i c a l w a s t e as well as soil clean-up. This was largely due t o t h e close i n t e r a c t i o n of local authorities with concerned residents.

By describing s e v e r a l cases in t h i s paper w e show t h e ways in which local municipalities i n t e r a c t with c e n t r a l and provincial governments, a n d local groups, in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of hazardous w a s t e management.

With r e s p e c t t o t h e C h e m i c a l Waste Act, t h e main Dutch c o n c e r n s at t h e c e n t r a l governmental level r e l a t e t o t h e problem of establishing a hazardous w a s t e T r e a t m e n t a n d Disposal (T ^& D) infrastructure. Therefore, t h e risk assessment dimensions of t h i s issue have been r a t h e r a b s t r a c t a n d technical (e.g. t o d o with t h e overall w a s t e classification s y s t e m , see Dirven). At t h e local level, however, t h e risk dimensions of t h e hazardous w a s t e problem prevail, a s c a n b e s e e n by t h e local disturbance caused by industrial plans t o establish a national w a s t e disposal site; and by t h e a c t i v i t i e s of some national companies.

The s c a r c i t y of hazardous w a s t e T & D facilities h a v e c r e a t e d regulatory problems at t h e local level as i s shown by t h e EMKIUniser a n d Booy Clean cases. In t h e s e cases local authorities, confronted with t h e environmental and h e a l t h risks caused by w a s t e t r e a t m e n t firms, worked in c o n f l i c t with regional and c e n t r a l government by trying t o impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on those firms.

In a number of soil pollution cases, however, t h e s i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e different. The d i f f e r e n c e s a r e in t h r e e areas:

I. In t h e case of hazardous w a s t e T & D, t h e w a s t e management approach of c e n t r a l government was obstructed by a risk management

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approach of l o c a l government, but in t h e issue of soil pollution a risk management a p p r o a c h s e e m s t o b e t h e overriding viewpoint o n all levels.

2. With r e s p e c t t o hazardous waste, local c i t i z e n s showed n o divergence from t h e local government viewpoint, whereas in soil pollution cases t h e r e was m u c h m o r e antagonism between local government and residents.

3. Concerning hazardous waste T r e a t m e n t and Disposal, t h e most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r t h e government has t o deal with is industry, whereas in t h e soil pollution issue industry successfully managed t o avoid t h e financial burden.

These differences c a n be explained by t h e history of t h e soil pollution issue in t h e Netherlands a n d t h e characteristics of soil pollution as a problem.

The issue of soil pollution arose almost overnight, a n d unexpected, when t h e pollution at Lekkerkerk was acknowledged by minister Ginjaar. The Chemical Waste Act and i t s consequences f o r m e d p a r t of a n ongoing r q l a t o r y debate. Before Lekkerkerk became a n issue in 1980, s o m e c a s e s of soil pollution w e r e known, but a p a r t from t h e local residents and local and provincial a u t h o r i t i e s directly involved a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s e cases was scant.

In Lekkerkerk a housing development was built o n a landfill of chemical w a s t e and household refuse. In 1980, t h e possibility t h a t t h e inhabitants of t h e houses w e r e exposed t o t h e chemical w a s t e was recognized. Government decided t o r e m o v e t h e polluted soil. The c l e a n up operation was performed within half a y e a r at tremendous c o s t (almost 200 million Dutch guilders, o r 80 million US dollars). The Lekkerkerk incident remained in t h e public a t t e n t i o n f o r o v e r a y e a r and thus t h e soil pollution issue was associated strongly with public health. In this respect i t is comparable t o t h e Vac incident in Hungary (see E. Kiss, IIASA Hungary c a s e study). The publicity around Lekkerkerk a l e r t e d t h e public t o t h e general issue of soil pollution, a t t r a c t i n g public a t t e n t i o n t o o t h e r cases. It stimulated t h e Ministry t o organize a national inventory of suspected soil pollution cases. From this inventory i t was concluded t h a t i t would be financially impossible t o deal with o t h e r cases as thorougly as Lekkerkerk.

An extensive procedurc was laid down in t h e d r a f t of t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act t o ratiohalize t h e approach of soil pollution cases and t o a d a p t i t t o financial resources. O t h e r soil pollution cases already in progress w e r e f o r c e d i n t o this procedure e v e n before t h e A c t was enacted.

In t h i s way government hoped t o e s c a p e t h e financial burden which would be imposed by dealing -with o t h e r cases as Lekkerkerk had been handled. It was f e l t t h a t in Lekkerkerk t o o much money had been spent with t o o l i t t l e knowledge of t h e pollu . a n risks.

I t was t h e shock of Lekkerkerk t h a t prompted a d i f f e r e n t history f o r t h e c r e a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act in relation t o t h e Chemical Waste Act. The sudden e m e r g e n c e of a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o public h e a l t h occasioned a risk management approach. After this approach had been established in t h e case of Lekkerkerk, i t remained

t h e s t a r t i n g point f o r a c t i o n in soil pollution situations, e v e n if less rigorous. s t a n d a r d s of risk reduction w e r e applied.

2. CHEMICAL WASTE

In t h e case of soil pollution a c l e a r c u t local incident, Lekkerkerk, c a n be s e e n as t h e s t a r t i n g point f o r general anxiety, followed by legislation and t h e soil c l e a n u p operation.

No such single incident c a n be t r a c e d as a s t a r t i n g point f o r chemical w a s t e legislation. This legislation resulted f r o m t h e slowly growing anxiety about d a m a g e c a u s e d by hazardous w a s t e t o t h e public a n d t h e environment if uncontrolled, resulting in t h e provisional C h e m i c a l Waste A c t in 1973 1

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On t h e c e n t r a l level t h e hazardous w a s t e problem w a s s e e n as a problem of establishing a new industrial organizational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . The main f e a t u r e of t h e C h e m i c a l Waste Act was t o provide f o r a n organizational framework within which chemical w a s t e would b e r e m o v e d effectively. The Act did n o t give a n y directives of how chemical w a s t e should be t r e a t e d , but f o r prohibition of disposal on land (see ~ i r v e n ) . The establishment of t h e necessary t r e a t m e n t a n d disposal facilities w a s l e f t t o industry.

Industrial Planning f o r Hazardous Waste T r e a t m e n t a n d Disposal

The industry w a s t h u s confronted with t h e hazardous w a s t e problem m o r e clearly t h a n before. The amount of w a s t e s needing handling grew d u e t o t h e g r o w t h of (chemical) industries a n d t o t h e tightening u p of discharge regulations (for example, t h e required w a t e r purification s y s t e m s produce w a s t e sludges with l a r g e amounts of t o x i c substances).

Also a number of f o r m e r conventional r o u t e s of disposing of industrial w a s t e b e c a m e less viable (ocean dumping) o r w e r e forbidden (dumping on land), t h u s forcing industry t o act. They did so, f o r instance, by trying t o

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influence t h e f i n a l f o r m of t h e Chemical Waste A c t , e.g. by negotiating t h e s t a n d a r d s f o r defining which w a s t e i s considered t o be c h e m i c a l o r not. In t h i s r e s p e c t t h e y found t h e Ministry of Economic Affairs t o be a n ally.

The C h e m i c a l Waste Bill was s e n t t o parliament in 1973 but w a s n o t e n a c t e d until 1979.

But t h e y a l s o t r i e d t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e situation t h a t would result as soon as t h e act was enforced. From industry's perspective t h e r e was o n e essential c o r n e r s t o n e missing if they w e r e t o comply with t h e act, namely a n opportunity t o d u m p chemicals o n a controlled site.

A number of l a r g e chemical f i r m s like Akzo, Unilever a n d Dow Chemical founded Induval. Induval began in 1973, without any publicity, t o develop a plan f o r a controlled chemical dumping site. The dump w a s intended t o deal with t h o s e chemicals f o r which t h e r e w e r e n o e f f e c t i v e and environmentally a c c e p t a b l e methods of processing.

The plan contained a technical elaboration of t h e dumping ground which was supplemented in 1976 with "a confidential investigation" of four possible dumping s i t e s in t h e province of North Brabant. C o n t a c t was m a d e with t h e Ministries of Economic Affairs and Public Health and Environment which gave t h e go a h e a d f o r t h e plan t o be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e County Aldermen (2).

The plan, however, had been leaked t o t h e environmental Foundation, Nature a n d Environment, which strongly opposed t h e i d e a of a dumping ground. From t h e i r perspective such a dumping ground could lead t o serious pollution of t h e soil and t h e groundwater and t h e primary industrial a i m should be t o prevent t h e production of c h e m i c a l w a s t e (3).

Nature and Environment thought t h a t industry was generally unwilling t o look f o r I1clean t e c h n ~ l o g i e s ~ ~ and good processing methods.

The leak c r e a t e d substantial opposition in North Brabant; t h e four favoured c i t i e s r e j e c t e d plans f o r such a d u m p in t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . In a discussion with t h e County Aldermen, of North Brabant t h e ministers of Economic Affairs and Health and Environmental Protection said t h a t t h e Induval plan was consistent with t h e national Chemical Waste Act.

Industry was t o develop initiatives t o s t o r e o r process c h e m i c a l w a s t e

The ministers announced, however, t h a t t h e y would review t h e plans of Induval. In 1977, a m e e t i n g t o o k place between t h e ministers and Induval w h e r e a list of chemicals was drawn u p t h a t could be considered f o r storing and s o m e t e c h n i c a l changes in t h e blueprints of t h e dumps w e r e m a d e (4,5). In August 1977 Induval presented t h e second version of t h e plan in which t h e e x a c t s p o t of t h e possible dumping ground was kept

open ( 6 ) . C e n t r a l government supported t h e plan because t h e y thought i t i m p e r a t i v e f o r t h e functioning of t h e Chemical Waste Act (5). The plan was presented t o t h e provinces of Overijssel, Gelderland, North Brabant and Limburg, all of which unanimously r e j e c t e d (7). The reasons given w e r e insufficient g u a r a n t e e a g a i n s t leakage, insufficient description of wastes, and insufficient investigation of o t h e r processing a l t e r n a t i v e s (8). Because of t h e a d a m a n t rejection by t h e provinces, t h e Induval plan was abandoned.

The rise and f a l l of t h e Induval plan clarified t h e views t a k e n by t h e d i f f e r e n t groups with r e s p e c t t o hazardous w a s t e t r e a t m e n t and disposal facilities. Industry w a s striving f o r t h e undisturbed conduct of business in a cost e f f e c t i v e way a n d independent from landfill f a c i l i t i e s in foreign countries. C e n t r a l government supported t h e Induval initiative because i t f i t t e d with a c o o p e r a t i v e approach t o t h e hazardous w a s t e problem ( " t h e i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e - a p p r o a c h " ) . Local and regional authorities, as well as environmental groups, w e r e primarily concerned about t h e environmental risks and t h u s adopted a risk-management framework. They put e m p h a s i s o n reprocessing of w a s t e s a n d viewed landfill as t h e l a s t r e s o r t solution.

As discussed above, discussion on t h e establishment of hazardous w a s t e t r e a t m e n t a n d disposal facilities began in t h e e a r l y 70's. Negotiations at a c e n t r a l level h a v e continued in t h e 80's and t h e r e a r e as y e t n o facilities in operation.

Y e t , approximately 1 million tons of chemical w a s t e s g e n e r a t e d e a c h y e a r had t o be handled in s o m e way (10). In part, i t w a s t r e a t e d by t h e w a s t e producing f i r m s themselves, o r stored o n t h e i r premises 1 ; in p a r t , i t was e x p o r t e d t o foreign countries, dumped legally o r illegally, o r handled by f i r m s specialized in t r e a t i n g wastes.

We h a v e t o b e a r in mind t h a t s t o r a g e of w a s t e s o n t h e premises of t h e f i r m t h a t produced i t i s n o t regulated by t h e C h e m i c a l Waste Act. Such

storage i s only subordinate t o regulations within the Nuisance kt.

It was this l a s t category of f i r m s t h a t fulfilled a n important role in t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a p p r o a c h t o t h e hazardous w a s t e problem. C e n t r a l government viewed these firms as t h e beginning of a crucial network t r e a t i n g all kinds of wastes and, therefore, was willing t o o f f e r support. But, some of these waste t r e a t m e n t firms caused s e v e r e nuisance at t h e local level. Problems arose because local authorities pursued a risk management policy t h a t was at odds with t h e policy of regional and national authorities which support waste t r e a t m e n t firms.

The EMK case

This case study focusses o n t h e history of t h e w a s t e t r e a t m e n t firm EMK in Krimpen a a n d e IJssel from 1970 t o 1980. In t h e l a t e 70's EMK became a daughter company of Uniser, t h e biggest waste t r e a t m e n t firm in t h e Netherlands.

In 1981, a major scandal a r o s e in t h e Netherlands concerning t h e way in which chemical wastes were processed by Uniser. Many laws had been infringed. Uniser had drained and dumped wastes illegally throughout t h e Netherlands. There was also a large-scale selling of hazardous wastes as oil and, a f t e r mixing with coal, a s solid fuel. This scandal led up t o prosecution of t h e t o p management of Uniser, t h e biggest environmental c o u r t case in Dutch history.

At t h e request of members of parliament a c o m m i t t e e was set u p by t h e Under Secretary of Health and Environmental Protection t o undertake a n inquiry i n t o t h e conduct of Uniser and EMK. The r e p o r t of this C o m m i t t e e Hellinga was t h e main source of material for t h e historical details below (I I).

In 1970, t h e Exploitatie Maatschappij Krimpen Ltd. (EMK) was founded. It was located on t h e former s i t e of t h e Chemical Industry Uithoorn Ltd., (CINDU) in Krimpen a a n d e IJssel.

The ClNDU had been processing t a r and t a r products under a 1965 Nuisance Act licence. EMK presented itself a s a merchandizing company of oils and fats. In EMK vocabulary, however, t h e word merchandizing included regenerating, reconditioning and processing of t h e f a t s and oils as well.

Since EMK took over t h e s i t e and premises t h e ClNDU Nuisance Act licence was passed o n t o EMK. This licence formally covered t h e EMK activities (provided EMK stuck t o t h e t e r m s of t h e licence).

From t h e beginning t h e r e were complaints about severe stench from EMk and following a DCMR ( t h e R i j n m o n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n t r o l b o d y ) r e p o r t on t h e bad situation on t h e premises of EMK, t h e Court of Mayor and Aldermen of Krimpen took action in August 1970. They requested t h a t EMK apply f o r a new Nuisance Act licence f o r their e n t i r e organisation since, according t o t h e DCMR, t h e old CINDU licence did not cover all t h e activities of EMK. Repeatedly EMK did not f i l e a complete application. Following a number of deadlines from t h e municipality, a s well a s t h e t h r e a t of closing down EMK, a complete application was submitted in August 1971. During this year t h e r e w e r e continuing complaints about stench nuisance. The old CINDU licence did not cover t h e processing of stench raising compounds; yet, t h e r e w e r e several deliveries of t h e stench-raising compound Resinformer a t t h e EMK site. In November, 1970, a ship carrying approximately 530 tons of Resinformer sank a t t h e EMK embankment. The municipality repeatedly threatened t o close down (part o f ) t h e EMK organisation if i t did not stop t h e processing of stench-raising compounds. However, in September 1971, barrels with such compounds were still being stored on t h e EMK site.

From t h e summer of 1971 onwards several individuals and institutions reported t o t h e Krimpen authorities t h e deplorable situation a t EMK. In a confidential r e p o r t of DCMR i t was s t a t e d t h a t "A v a s t p a r t of t h e s i t e i s c o v e r e d w i t h a t a r - l i k e s u b s t a n c e . A n e a r b y d i t c h i s n e a r l y f i l l e d w i t h t h e s a m e k i n d o f s u b s t a n c e . S i n c e a p i p e f r o m o n e of t h e t a n k s e m p t i e s i n t o t h e d i t c h o n e g e t s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e s t a t e of t h e d i t c h i s n o t b e i n g i m p r o v e d

...

O n e c a n s t a t e t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y e v e r y r e g u l a t i o n i s b e i n g v i o l a t e d " . (12)

In s p i t e of this devastating report of DCMR t h e Court of Mayor and Aldermen did not t a k e any real a c t i o n except t o increase inspection of t h e EMK in close co-operation with t h e Korps Controleurs Gevaarlijke Stoffen and t h e C e n t r a l e Meld e n Regelkamer Rijnmond ( t h e Control body f o r hazardous substances, and t h e C e n t r a l report and adjustment (regulation) off ice Rijnmond, respectively).

In November 1971, EMK was installed a number of storagetanks, in s p i t e of s t a t e m e n t s by t h e municipality t h a t they were not t o put tanks into use without t h e necessary building and Nuisance Act licences. In reaction t h e Krimpen municipality, with t h e help of t h e police, stopped t h i s activity

of EMK and prohibited t h e use of t h e tanks. In response a n EMK d i r e c t o r announced t h a t h e would ask o t h e r government agencies t o intervene. Employees f r o m t h e Regional Environmental Inspectorate and t h e Rijnmond a u t h o r i t y asked t h e municipality of Krimpen asking w h e t h e r such e x t r e m e m e a s u r e s w e r e necessary, emphasizing t h e i m p o r t a n c e of industrial removal, discharge and processing of chemical w a s t e a n d w a s t e oils.

At t h i s t i m e (1971), t h e municipality had been waiting s e v e r a l months f o r t h e Ministry of Health and Environmental P r o t e c t i o n t o respond t o a n o t h e r problem apparently c r e a t e d by Ministry:

allocation of p a r t of EMK's s i t e f o r s t o r a g e of barrels of hazardous w a s t e f o r o c e a n dumping.

The f a c t t h a t a n answer from t h e Ministry failed t o c o m e , combined with pressure f r o m t h e Inspectorate o v e r s t o p p a g e of EMK's t a n k installation m a d e t h e Krimpen municipality f e e l abandoned by higher authorities. They expressed t h i s feeling during exchanges with t h e Inspectorate, which a g r e e d t o k e e p in t o u c h o n t h e EMK case.

It s t i l took s o m e t i m e b e f o r e t h e Ministry responded, a n d t h e n very generally. A p a r t f r o m t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e y did n o t approve a s t o r a g e s i t e , t h e y responded t h a t i t was advisable t o supervise private e n t e r p r i s e in t h e field of waste; t h e Regional Inspectorate should advise t h e m in t h e s e m a t t e r s .

T h e conflict b e t w e e n c e n t r a l and regional government a n d t h e Krimpen local a u t h o r i t y r e f l e c t e d t h e government's overriding concern t o maintain a n industrial i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r hazardous w a s t e t r e a t m e n t . This i s a l s o r e f l e c t e d in t h e emphasis of t h e Chemical Waste A c t o n encouraging a n d c r e a t i n g such a n infrastructure. The a l r e a d y f r a g i l e a t t r a c t i o n f o r p r i v a t e investments i n t o w a s t e management would be f u r t h e r jeopardized by increased regulatory constraints, o n t h i s new industrial sector.

T h e Regional I n s p e c t o r a t e was concerned with t h e dumping of container rubbish, frequently containing industrial a n d c h e m i c a l waste, in t h e surroundings of Krimpen, a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n of EMK prevented, at l e a s t in p a r t , t h e illegal dumping of chemical waste. This m a y explain t h e dismissive a t t i t u d e of t h e Inspectorate.

Temporary closure of EMK

A f t e r t h e above mentioned incident, t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e municipality w e r e intensified. Although t h e r e w a s a daily inspection of t h e EMK s i t e by a n employee, i t was n o t very e f f e c t i v e since, as b e c a m e evident l a t e r , t h e Nuisance Act l i c e n c e conditions w e r e unknown t o t h i s controlling employee.

Y e t substances s t o r e d o n t h e EMK s i t e w e r e regularly sampled and analyzed, which resulted o n c e in t h e s p o t t i n g of a n infringment of t h e Nuisance Act.

In t h e continuing procedure f o r a new Nuisance Act licence, t h e municipality adviser concluded t h a t t h e EMK application still did not m e e t t h e requirements. The municipality decided not t o grant EMK a new licence and t o wait f o r a n opportunity t o shut down EMK. That opportunity arose when analyses showed t h a t EMK stored substances not covered by their Nuisance Act licence. Consequently, in 1972 t h e municipality ordered t h e immediate closing down of EMK, siting risks t o life f o r t h e neighbourhood.

The EMK lodged a n appeal with t h e Crown and instituted a law suit against t h e municipality. This led t o a s e t t l e m e n t by a g r e e m e n t , suggested by t h e judge. The compromise a g r e e m e n t between EMK and t h e municipality held t h a t t h e old Nuisance Act licence from 1965 would remain valid with t h e addition of a number of new conditions limiting t h e kind of substances allowed t o be stored and processed. It was also agreed t h a t EMK would submit a new application f o r a licence.

In t h e following years t h e most important incident was t h e so-called Papendrecht a f f a i r in t h e beginning of 1977. It appeared t h a t EMK had buried a number of barrels containing arsenic substances on a dumping s i t e in Papendrecht. The EMK director was prosecuted, and fined and sentenced t o a suspended imprisonment. The director subsequently resigned from t h e Dutch Advisory C o m m i t t e e on used oil, a s t a t u t o r y advisory o f f i c e of t h e Minister of Health and Environmental Protection.

After long delays a new Nuisance Act licence t o EMK was finally granted in August 1977. The Rijnmond authorities assumed responsibility f o r t h e Nuisance Act t o assure b e t t e r coordination of environmental protection o n t h e regional level.

EMK again appealed t h e conditions of t h e licence.

In 1977, EMK announced a t r a n s f e r of i t s activities t o Moerdijk. At t h e s a m e t i m e t h e Rijnmond a u t h o r i t y agreed t o a step-by-step renovation of EMK. EMK then repeatedly prolonged deadlines t o t h e point when they announced in 1980 t h e closure of a l l activities in Krimpen. It had k c o m e evident t h a t f o r them doing business within t h e f r a m e of t h e Nuisance Act was impossible.

Meantime complaints continued about s t e n c h nuisance. Numerous infringements of t h e Nuisance Act w e r e observed, a n d r e c o r d e d in a so-called I f b l a c k f i l e l ' (complaint book) by t h e environmental protection a g e n c y of Ri jnmond (I 3).

When dismantling o n t h e EMK s i t e began, a t r u e c a t a s t r o p h e b e c a m e apparent. The ground turned o u t t o be very heavily polluted with oil a n d a r o m a t i c a n d phenolic compounds. Also enormous amounts of c h e m i c a l w a s t e w e r e found o n t h e s i t e in t a n k s a n d storagecellars as well as in a moored boat (14). Thus, t h e f i r s t Dutch T & D facility turned into o n e of t h e worst soil pollution cases in Dutch history.

Continuing EMK within t h e Uniser company

A f t e r abandoning i t s s i t e in Krimpen, t h e illegal a c t i v i t i e s of EMK continued o n t h e industrial s i t e of Moerdijk. In 1976, EMK had established t h e RTM ( ~ e c y c l e Terminal ~ o e r d i j k ) in a joint v e n t u r e with Drisolco, a f i r m handling chemical wastes.

These t h r e e firms, EMK, RTM, and Drisolco, w e r e placed under t h e holding company, Uniser Holding Ltd., at t h e e n d of 1977.

This combination c r e a t e d t h e image of t h e w a s t e processing company in t h e Netherlands, which c o u l d o f f e r a n i n t e g r a l s e r v i c e (16). The w a s t e flow from numerous (chemical) companies t o Uniser grew, a n d in 1979 i t received a n d processed s o m e 100.000 t o n s of waste.

In c o m m e r c i a l publications (15) Uniser advertised a division of labour between i t s companies: EMK was responsible f o r t r a n s p o r t , Drisolco f o r s t o r a g e , a n d RTM f o r processing w a s t e oils a n d chemical wastes. But t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e d s o g r e a t l y t h a t t h e public prosecutor in t h e c o u r t c a s e a g a i n s t t h e Uniser r e f e r r e d t o i t as "a g r e a t f a k e s h o w u (17). Uniser was t h e cloak masking such illegal a c t i v i t i e s as discharging, dumping a n d selling of wastes.

In 1980, a suspicious l e a k from a s t o r a g e t a n k e r hired by Drisolco was investigated, which led eventually t o t h e a r r e s t of t h e Uniser m a n a g e m e n t in August 198 1. The ensuing c o u r t c a s e resulted i n - t h e imprisonment of t h e suspects f o r periods of 7 months t o 2 / years.

Enforcement of environmental legislation with r e s p e c t t o EMK

In Krimpen full a t t e n t i o n was given by the municipality t o the e n f o r c a n t t h e Nuisance Act. O t h e r regulations, such as t h e Act o n t h e Pollution S u r f a c e w a t e r a n d t h e Provincial Regulation o n C h e m i c a l Waste, did n o t play a part.

The a i m of t h e Nuisance Act i s t o prevent " d a n g e r , d a m a g e o r n u i s a n c e b y i n s t a l l a t i o n s t t t o t h e i r surroundings. This Act, d a t i n g f r o m 1875, i s considered t o be t h e oldest environmental law in t h e Netherlands, although i t w a s n o t primarily intended t o be a n environmental act. The Nuisance A c t states t h a t installations mentioned in t h e Nuisance O r d e r ( ~ i n d e r w e t besluit) m a y n o t be o p e r a t e d o r be e x t e n d e d o r modified without a licence. This i s normally g r a n t e d o n r e q u e s t b y t h e municipality in which a f i r m i s established. In most cases t h e l i c e n c e contains conditions prescribing in d e t a i l t h e kind of a c t i v i t i e s p e r m i t t e d within t h e f i r m a n d t h e measures t o be t a k e n by t h e l i c e n c e e t o diminish danger, d a m a g e o r nuisance t o t h e surroundings.

Until 1979 t h e Nuisance Act contained only o n e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e sanction:

closure of t h e f i r m , preceded by a warning of proposed closure. T h e l a t t e r i s n o t necessary in case of danger t o l i f e o r unbearable nuisance t o surroundings. Closure of t h e f i r m is prescribed imperatively if a f i r m i s in operation without o r in violation of a licence.

At f i r s t sight t h e Nuisance Act i s a well prepared law providing f o r t h e necessary p r o t e c t i o n of surroundings a g a i n s t industrial activities. Despite t h i s act, however, s e v e r e nuisance and pollution could n o t be e f f e c t i v e l y prevented in Krimpen. The reason a p p e a r e d t o be t h e weak a t t i t u d e of t h e local a u t h o r i t i e s , y e t in r e a l i t y t h e y w e r e n o t supported by higher level authorities in enforcing t h e Nuisance Act. On t h e c o n t r a r y , when t h e municipality w a s r e s o l u t e , it was repremanded by higher a u t h o r i t i e s

Indeed leniency in enforcing t h e Nuisance Act w a s sanctioned in o f f i c i a l guidelines f r o m t h e Ministry. In a c i r c u l a r ' f r o m t h e Ministry of Social Affairs in 1960 i t is s t a t e d :

"...

i t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e m e a s u r e o f c l o s u r e b e u s e d i m m e d i a t e l y a g a i n s t f i r m s w h i c h a r e f o u n d o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t a l i c e n c e o r i n v i o l a t i o n w i t h a g r a n t e d l i c e n c e ( 1 8 ) " .

Such guidelines c a n l e a d t o a "symbolic enforcement" of t h e Nuisance Act, a n d o n e must k e e p t h i s in mind when judging t h e e v e n t s in Krimpen. The Krimpen municipality had given EMK considerable t i m e (a y e a r ) t o submit a n application f o r a n e w Nuisance Act licence. In addition t h e y did n o t close EMK down i m m e d i a t e l y when i t was found t o be infringing t h e law.

This w a s in a c c o r d a n c e with official guidelines of t h e c e n t r a l government.

The consequence w a s t h a t local authorities w e r e kept o n a s t r i n g by a f i r m managing t o obtain r e s p i t e t i m e and again, which s e e m s t o h a v e been t h e case in Krimpen. Although, t h e authorities c a n , in t h e o r y maintain t h e initiative, for i n s t a n c e , by sending a warning of proposed c l o s u r e (a possibility t h a t w a s n o t used by t h e authorities in rimp pen). When t h e y did close t h e EMK in May 1972 t h e y risked being held responsible f o r t h e c o s t s if i t could b e shown t h a t prompt closure was not justified.

A f t e r t h e Rijnmond a u t h o r i t i e s took over t h e responsibility f r o m Krimpen, t h e Nuisance Act w a s not enforced m o r e tightly. In f a c t , t h e pollution did not cease until EMK itself decided t o t a k e r e f u g e in Moerdijk. It c a n be concluded t h a t t h e Nuisance Act was n o t a n e f f e c t i v e t o o l in controlling t h e a c t i v i t i e s of EMK.

O n e i m p o r t a n t question i s why t h e Act o n t h e Pollution of S u r f a c e w a t e r was n o t invoked with EMK. The damaging r e p o r t of t h e DCMR in 1971 gave reason enough t o suspect EMK of severely polluting t h e s u r f a c e w a t e r (12). The Act, however, w a s r a t h e r new, a n d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s had had l i t t l e e x p e r i e n c e in i t s implementation.

The EMK s u b m i t t e d a n application f o r a discharging l i c e n c e in D e c e m b e r 1974 t h a t w a s n o t g r a n t e d until March 1979. The procedure w a s t i m e consuming b e c a u s e t h e RIZA ( ~ a t i o n a l Institute f o r Purification of W a s t e Water) r e a c t e d very slowly in drawing u p d r a f t conditions f o r t h e EMK licence. A year a f t e r granting, t h e l i c e n c e w a s withdrawn because EMK closed i t s operations in Krimpen.

Thus, t h e Act o n t h e Pollution of S u r f a c e w a t e r did n o t play a p a r t , f o r procedural reasons. But as will b e c o m e c l e a r from t h e b o y C l e a n discussed below, e n f o r c e m e n t of environmental legislation may a l s o b e inhibited when d i f f e r e n t responsible a u t h o r i t i e s a t t a c h d i f f e r e n t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e availability of technological facilities.

Booy Clean

Booy Clean i s l o c a t e d in R o t t e r d a m harbour. The f i r m i s c l e a n s tanks a n d c o l l e c t s c a r g o r e m n a n t s a n d slobs (remnants mixed with washing w a t e r ) f r o m ships a n d land installations (1 9).

In 1970, local newspapers began reporting complaints f r o m neighbours and environmental i n t e r e s t groups about s t e n c h and illegal discharges (20). In 1973, a n environmental group introduced a law s u i t against Booy Clean, during which a f o r m e r employee of Booy C l e a n d e c l a r e d t h a t " p o i s o n , o i l a n d c h e m i c a l s w e r e r e g u l a r l y d i s c h a r g e d i n t h e O u d e Maas". The judge a c q u i t t e d Booy C l e a n o n grounds t h a t

" t h e r e w a s n o c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s o f t h e w i t n e s s e s w e r e b a s e d o n f a c t s o b s e r v e d (21). At t h a t t i m e Booy C l e a n did n o t have a Nuisance Act l i c e n c e because i t was n o t subject t o t h e Nuisance Order, only t o t h e Harbour Regulations (22). In t h e t w o y e a r period, 197 1-1973 harbour inspectors had presented s o m e t w e n t y w a r r a n t s a g a i n s t Booy C l e a n f o r infringing t h e regulations (23). A 1983 r e p o r t prepared by R o t t e r d a m a u t h o r i t i e s mentioned t h a t river police alone presented sixty warrants, c i t i n g a m o n g o t h e r things, infringement of t h e C h e m i c a l Waste Act a n d t h e Act o n t h e Pollution of Surface w a t e r (24). It c a n be concluded t h a t t h e civil s e r v a n t s in R o t t e r d a m did know of pollution caused by Booy Clean.

Following e n a c t m e n t of t h e Act o n t h e Pollution of Surface w a t e r , Booy C l e a n was a " f i c t i v e l i c e n c e e " because i t discharged before t h e e n f o r c e m e n t . Booy C l e a n s u b m i t t e d a n application f o r a discharging l i c e n c e in November 1979, which w a s granted in September 1980 under s e v e r a l conditions. These conditions presented restrictions o n t h e substances t o be discharged a n d required a reconstruction plan including a n a p p r o p r i a t e purification ins tallation by t h e beginning of 1984.

A f t e r t h e plan w a s s u b m i t t e d in March 1980, deliberations with Rijkswaterstaat ( t h e G o v e r n m e n t a l W a t e r ~ g e n c y ) began.

Rijkswaterstaat w a s also responsible f o r t h e discharging licence by Booy Clean. During 1981 l i t t l e progress was m a d e in t h e deliberations and Booy C l e a n regularly violated t h e discharging l i c e n c e (1 9).

In August 1981 R i j k s w a t e r s t a a t e v a l u a t e d Booy C l e a n ' s observance of t h e discharging l i c e n c e a n d concluded t h a t t h e situation was deplorable. They coordinated t h e i r e f f o r t s with t h e riverpolice, harbour s e r v i c e a n d t h e DCMR forcing Booy Clean t o observe t h e discharging l i c e n c e and t o i m p l e m e n t t h e reconstruction plan (19).

In reply t o a l e t t e r f r o m R i j k s w a t e r s t a a t , Booy C l e a n denied a n y responsibility f o r t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t s noted by Rijkswaterstaat. In a u t u m n , 1981, t h e w a s t e w a t e r of Booy Clean was regularly inspected and, again, regulated pollutants

w e r e found. A t t h a t t i m e i t was discovered t h a t t h e sludge in Geul harbour, w h e r e b o y C l e a n had been established s i n c e 1976, w a s s e v e r e l y polluted, including chlorinated hydrocarbons f o r which discharg w a s forbidden.

In l a t e 1981 a judicial inquiry w a s i n i t i a t e d o n supposed e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e l i c t s c o m m i t t e d by b o y Clean, including i n f r i n g e m e n t s of t h e C h e m i c a l Waste Act. In March, 1983, t h e d i r e c t o r a n d m a n a g e r of Booy C l e a n w e r e t a k e n i n t o t e m p o r a r y custody o n suspicion of f o r g e r y a n d defrauding.

b o y C l e a n ' s discharging l i c e n c e w a s t h e n withdrawn by t h e Ministry (29). R i j k s w a t e r s t a a t t o o k custody of t h e installations, buildings a n d (private) c a p i t a l of b o y Clean to e n s u r e t h a t t h e f i r m would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e costs of cleaning u p t h e Geul harbour (25).

In t h e s u m m e r of 1984 t h e s e m e a s u r e s w e r e r e v e r s e d by t h e S t a t e Council ( t h e h i g h e s t a p p e a l c o u r t i n t h e etherl lands) (30). According t o t h e S t a t e Council t h e r e w a s l a c k of e v i d e n c e t h a t Booy C l e a n had caused t h e pollution in t h e Geul harbour. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r b o y C l e a n payed half a million guilders to escape f u r t h e r lawsuits and announced t h a t i t would m a k e a c o m e b a c k as a w a s t e t r e a t m e n t f i r m in combination with o t h e r f i r m s (31,321.

A c l o s e look at t h e b o y C l e a n case r e v e a l s a g a i n t h a t g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s h a v e divering i n t e r e s t s and o f t e n very d i f f e r e n t policy perspectives f r o m o f f i c i a l versions.

In a harbour s u c h as R o t t e r d a m , which i s o n e of t h e busiest in t h e world, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a t a n k e r cleaning f i r m like b o y C l e a n i s imperative.

According to t h e R o t t e r d a m a l d e r m a n , v a n d e r Dunnen: " O u r h a r b o u r i s f r e q u e n t e d b y 4 0 . 0 0 0 s e a v e s s e l s e v e r y y e a r , a n d t h e y b r i n g i n e v e r y t h i n g t h a t C o d h a s f o r b i d d e n . S o t h e r e m u s t b e a f i r m t o t r e a t t h e w a s t e s . O t h e r w i s e , t h e s h i p s , w i l l d r a i n t h e i r w a s t e s i n t h e o p e n sea" (26). And a c c o r d i n g t o Noe of t h e R o t t e r d a m harbour agency: " I t i s n i c e , o f c o u r s e , t o h a v e a f i r m a t t i t u d e , b u t a s l o n g a s t h e r e a r e n o o t h e r t r e a t m e n t f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , o n e s h o u l d b e p l i a n t . W e a r e a w a r e o f t h e f a c t t h a t B o o y C l e a n d i s c h a r g e s , b u t t h e r e a r e n o t a l w a y s a 1 t e r n a t i v e s " ( 2 1

1.

T h e prosecution Council was very r e s e r v e d in t a k i n g penal a c t i o n because a c c o r d i n g t o t h e public prosecutor i t w a s possible t h a t t h e f i r m c o u l d b e r e o r g a n i s e d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t i t c o u l d f u l f i l l a u s e f u l f u n c t i o n i n t h e R o t t e r d a m h a r b o u r (20). I t w a s difficult f o r a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l a g e n c y , such as t h e DCMR, t o c o n f r o n t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e powerful harbour agency, which had n o t g r a n t e d a fixed buoy f o r b o y C l e a n ' s f l o a t i n g pontoon. This excluded b o y C l e a n as a f i r m r e g u l a t e d under t h e Nuisance Act, which in t u r n excluded t h e DCMR f r o m t h e pontoon. T h e harbour a g e n c i e s refused t o give a n y

unsalaried a p p o i n t m e n t s t o t h e civil s e r v a n t s of t h e DCMR (271, in o r d e r t o give t h e m controlling powers.

In 1983, a n international convention a i m e d at preventing pollution by ships, t h e Marpolconvention, required t h a t sea harbours o f f e r enough facilities f o r delivery a n d t r e a t m e n t of oil- a n d chemical remnants. As e a r l y as 1981, Booy C l e a n a n d t h r e e o t h e r f i r m s had s t a t e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h i s so-called harbour r e c e i p t facility (19). The c e n t r a l government namely t h e Ministry of T r a f f i c and Public works was e n t h u s i a s t i c s i n c e t h e suggested plan w a s c h e a p e r t h a n similar plans developed by R o t t e r d a m a n d Rijnmond (28). Because of t h i s support from t h e Ministry, Booy C l e a n promised t o grow i n t o a n all-round t r e a t m e n t f i r m f o r c h e m i c a l wastes, d e s p i t e i t s illegal activities. It was n o t until t h e e n d of 1983 t h a t t h e minister l o s t his confidence in b o y Clean. The f i r m would n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e harbour r e c e i p t facilities, a n d i t s discharge licence would b e withdrawn (29).

Concluding r e m a r k s

The EMK a n d b o y C l e a n c a s e s a r e good examples of administrative e n f o r c e m e n t of environmental legislation with r e s p e c t t o w a s t e T & D f i r m s in t h e Netherlands. These cases show how e n f o r c e m e n t c a n be paralyzed when t h e responsible agencies a n d levels of a u t h o r i t y in t h e regulatory s y s t e m have d i f f e r e n t views of t h e problem. E f f e c t i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of regulations requires coordination between d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s y s t e m , a n d t h i s i s normally a problem.

If t h e hazardous w a s t e issue i s s e e n as a problem of industrial-organizational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , t r e a t m e n t f i r m s a r e s e e n as a c o r n e r s t o n e in a national o r local system of w a s t e t r e a t m e n t . In a m o r e risk-management oriented approach, such f i r m s a r e s e e n a s risk g e n e r a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s t h a t must be closely regulated.

These d i f f e r e n t problem definitions d o not directly coincide with t h e division b e t w e e n c e n t r a l a n d local authorities. In t h e Booy C l e a n case, f o r instance, t h e local harbour a u t h o r i t i e s supported t h a t firm. Authorities a r e frequently blind t o problems lying outside t h e i r policy domain a n d t h e i r m a n a g e m e n t of problems i s dominated by i n t e r e s t s r e l a t e d t o t h a t policy.

3. SOIL CLEAN U P

In t h e introduction, w e described how government d e a l t with t h e f i r s t big soil pollution c a s e in t h e Netherlands at Lekkerkerk. T h e r e t h e sudden e m e r g e n c e of a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o public health n e c e s s i t a t e d a risk-management approach. Lekkerkerk c a n be s e e n as t h e rallying point f o r f u t u r e environmental action. T h e developing risk-managment approach, however, did n o t and c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e uniquely how a n issue c a n e f f e c t i v e l y be d e a l t with by t h e d i f f e r e n t institutions involved. Because issues a r e viewed differently at d i f f e r e n t institutional levels, regulations f r o m t h e national government will n o t always be implemented a s intended.

This was especially t r u e with r e s p e c t t o t h e soil pollution issue which suddenly a n d unexpectedly gained s t a t u s o n t h e politcal agenda, t h e r e b y g e n e r a t i n g institutional u n c e r t a i n t y o n a l l levels.

The extensive a n d d e t a i l e d regulations which w e r e promulgated by t h e Ministry of Public Health a n d Housing, Physical Planning a n d Environment (VROM) h a v e t o be s e e n in t h e light of t h e s e uncertainties. T h e regulations g o beyond t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act. In w h a t follows, w e f o c u s f i r s t o n t h o s e regulations which h a v e had a s t r o n g i m p a c t o n t h e handling of soil pollution problems at t h e local level, a n d thus o n t h e way c e n t r a l government regulations influence a c t i v i t i e s of local institutions. A f t e r t h a t w e analyze t h r e e cases in which antagonism a r o s e b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t institutions at t h e local level.

The i t e m s discussed h e r e a r e t h e financing of t h e c l e a n u p o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e selection of pollution cases serious enough t o be t a k e n up.

1. Financing c l e a n up

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The a m o u n t of money s p e n t o n soil c l e a n up in t h e Netherlands i s largely d e t e r m i n e d by c e n t r a l government, which c o n t r i b u t e s t o operations t h a t h a v e been approved in a ministerial procedure described below (2). T h e municipality contributes a threshold a m o u n t of money (depending upon t h e number of residents of t h e municipality) plus 10% of t h e remaining clean-up

costs. Central government provides t h e remaining 90%. This may result in a high financial burden for any single municipality. The provinces, on t h e o t h e r hand, have a major p a r t of t h e preparatory and executive policy, but have a negligible contribution in financing soil clean up (see also Dirven) (33).

Industry does not routinely contribute according t o t h i s procedure, but central government may if i t has evidence hold individual industries responsible for specific soil pollution cases. However, under Dutch law such responsibility i s difficult t o prove and results in long procedures with uncertain results (34).

One consequence of t h i s threshold procedure i s t h a t larger municipalities will pay f o r most o r all of t h e initial (investigation) costs, without any guarantee t h a t a clean-up will be implemented. Indeed, provincial and c e n t r a l government decide whether and how clean-up measures a r e undertaken. At t h e municipal level, t h e money needed f o r clean-up activities has t o be reserved at t h e c o s t of o t h e r activities, since in general no additional income is gained. But this is only o n e aspect of t h e financial implications of soil clean up f o r Dutch municipalities. If, for instance, a n a r e a i s designated f o r f u t u r e housing, soil pollution investigations not only cost money, but they also result in serious delays, leading t o costs such as penalties t o estate development corporations, loss of payments by c e n t r a l government intended t o support t h e building activities, loss of t h e chance t o build a certain group of houses (which is especially important f o r quickly growing municipalities). It is, therefore, not surprising t h a t Dutch municipalities view soil pollution as a problem with strong and negative financial dimensions, which influence t h e i r management approach. The institutional pressures encourage them t o recognize pollution cases ( t o allay local groups) but t h e n t o minimize t h e risks and necessary t r e a t m e n t (to minimize costs). t h e sum of t h e s e pressures t e n d s towards symbolic policy action only.

2. Selection of pollution cases

The selection of pollution cases f o r clean-up i s performed in t w o stages.

The first is t h e assessment of t h e specific case against a set of criteria, which include t h e (intended) function of t h e a r e a , t h e local pollution situation and t h e n a t u r e and concentration of pollutants. Corresponding with t h e risk-management approach, t h e s e c r i t e r i a w e r e intended t o assess t h e risk of a specific case t o public health o r t o t h e environment.

Consideration f o r clean up is r e s t r i c t e d t o those cases where d i r e c t c o n t a c t

between man (or t h e environment) a n d t h e pollution i s considered possible.

The concept of a ' l o c a l p o l l u t i o n s i t u a t i o n ' includes d i f f e r e n t local f a c t o r s important f o r t h e possible spreading of polluting compounds t o t h e surroundings. The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of and types of polluting compounds a r e measured against q u a n t i t a t i v e norms: t h e so-called test f r a m e w o r k (351, (see a l s o Dirven. Of t h e t h r e e c r i t e r i a , t h e test framework o f f e r s t h e most c l e a r c u t criterion t o d e c i d e o n t h e seriousness of a case a n d i t , t h e r e f o r e , deserves s o m e elaboration.

According t o t h e test f r a m e w o r k , t h r e e values (A, B, a n d C ) a r e assigned t o approximately f i f t y compounds and compound families. The A-values supposedly r e f l e c t e i t h e r t h e natural occurrence o r t h e d e t e c t i o n limit in Dutch soils. B- a n d C-values appear t o be derived f r o m t h e A-value by simple multiplication. The toxicological and physiochemical p a r a m e t e r s w e r e also considered (361, but how p r e c i s d y remains unclear. Therefore, t h e scientific basis of t h e test framework i s s c a n t , but in view of t h e f r a g m e n t a r y knowledge a b o u t consequences of soil pollution t o man and environment i t i s doubtful t h a t any b e t t e r based norms could h a v e been produced (37). The t e x t accompanying t h e test framework i s very t e n t a t i v e about t h e reported values (35).

Despite i t s shallow s c i e n t i f i c grounding, t h e t e s t framework i s t h e basis f o r t h e policy of t h e d i f f e r e n t governmental institutions. Those cases where pollutants occur above C-level a r e t o be considered f o r c l e a n up, a n d c l e a n u p operations should be a i m e d at reducing concentrations t o A-level. The norms o f f e r a simple and precise way t o d e t e r m i n e whether a specific case should be considered. The test framework appears t o h a v e been a c c e p t e d without reservations by r e s i d e n t s and environmental i n t e r e s t groups in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o persuade government officials t o t a k e a c t i o n o n a soil pollution problem

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The t h r e e c r i t e r i a , a n d especially t h e test framework, h a v e been powerful instruments in reducing institutional uncertainty in soil pollution cases.

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However, t h e number of pollution cases requiring clean-up according t o t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s s o g r e a t t h a t t h e money needed f o r clean-up e x c e e d s t h e amount of money m a d e available. Therefore a n extensive priority s e t t i n g procedure was s e t up by t h e Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning a n d Environmental Control (VROM). This priority s e t t i n g procedure was partly specified in t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act a n d m a d e priority s e t t i n g