SOIL CLEAN U P - Hazardous Waste in The Netherlands: Dutch Policies from a Local Perspective

In t h e introduction, w e described how government d e a l t with t h e f i r s t big soil pollution c a s e in t h e Netherlands at Lekkerkerk. T h e r e t h e sudden e m e r g e n c e of a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o public health n e c e s s i t a t e d a risk-management approach. Lekkerkerk c a n be s e e n as t h e rallying point f o r f u t u r e environmental action. T h e developing risk-managment approach, however, did n o t and c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e uniquely how a n issue c a n e f f e c t i v e l y be d e a l t with by t h e d i f f e r e n t institutions involved. Because issues a r e viewed differently at d i f f e r e n t institutional levels, regulations f r o m t h e national government will n o t always be implemented a s intended.

This was especially t r u e with r e s p e c t t o t h e soil pollution issue which suddenly a n d unexpectedly gained s t a t u s o n t h e politcal agenda, t h e r e b y g e n e r a t i n g institutional u n c e r t a i n t y o n a l l levels.

The extensive a n d d e t a i l e d regulations which w e r e promulgated by t h e Ministry of Public Health a n d Housing, Physical Planning a n d Environment (VROM) h a v e t o be s e e n in t h e light of t h e s e uncertainties. T h e regulations g o beyond t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act. In w h a t follows, w e f o c u s f i r s t o n t h o s e regulations which h a v e had a s t r o n g i m p a c t o n t h e handling of soil pollution problems at t h e local level, a n d thus o n t h e way c e n t r a l government regulations influence a c t i v i t i e s of local institutions. A f t e r t h a t w e analyze t h r e e cases in which antagonism a r o s e b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t institutions at t h e local level.

The i t e m s discussed h e r e a r e t h e financing of t h e c l e a n u p o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e selection of pollution cases serious enough t o be t a k e n up.

1. Financing c l e a n up

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The a m o u n t of money s p e n t o n soil c l e a n up in t h e Netherlands i s largely d e t e r m i n e d by c e n t r a l government, which c o n t r i b u t e s t o operations t h a t h a v e been approved in a ministerial procedure described below (2). T h e municipality contributes a threshold a m o u n t of money (depending upon t h e number of residents of t h e municipality) plus 10% of t h e remaining clean-up

costs. Central government provides t h e remaining 90%. This may result in a high financial burden for any single municipality. The provinces, on t h e o t h e r hand, have a major p a r t of t h e preparatory and executive policy, but have a negligible contribution in financing soil clean up (see also Dirven) (33).

Industry does not routinely contribute according t o t h i s procedure, but central government may if i t has evidence hold individual industries responsible for specific soil pollution cases. However, under Dutch law such responsibility i s difficult t o prove and results in long procedures with uncertain results (34).

One consequence of t h i s threshold procedure i s t h a t larger municipalities will pay f o r most o r all of t h e initial (investigation) costs, without any guarantee t h a t a clean-up will be implemented. Indeed, provincial and c e n t r a l government decide whether and how clean-up measures a r e undertaken. At t h e municipal level, t h e money needed f o r clean-up activities has t o be reserved at t h e c o s t of o t h e r activities, since in general no additional income is gained. But this is only o n e aspect of t h e financial implications of soil clean up f o r Dutch municipalities. If, for instance, a n a r e a i s designated f o r f u t u r e housing, soil pollution investigations not only cost money, but they also result in serious delays, leading t o costs such as penalties t o estate development corporations, loss of payments by c e n t r a l government intended t o support t h e building activities, loss of t h e chance t o build a certain group of houses (which is especially important f o r quickly growing municipalities). It is, therefore, not surprising t h a t Dutch municipalities view soil pollution as a problem with strong and negative financial dimensions, which influence t h e i r management approach. The institutional pressures encourage them t o recognize pollution cases ( t o allay local groups) but t h e n t o minimize t h e risks and necessary t r e a t m e n t (to minimize costs). t h e sum of t h e s e pressures t e n d s towards symbolic policy action only.

2. Selection of pollution cases

The selection of pollution cases f o r clean-up i s performed in t w o stages.

The first is t h e assessment of t h e specific case against a set of criteria, which include t h e (intended) function of t h e a r e a , t h e local pollution situation and t h e n a t u r e and concentration of pollutants. Corresponding with t h e risk-management approach, t h e s e c r i t e r i a w e r e intended t o assess t h e risk of a specific case t o public health o r t o t h e environment.

Consideration f o r clean up is r e s t r i c t e d t o those cases where d i r e c t c o n t a c t

between man (or t h e environment) a n d t h e pollution i s considered possible.

The concept of a ' l o c a l p o l l u t i o n s i t u a t i o n ' includes d i f f e r e n t local f a c t o r s important f o r t h e possible spreading of polluting compounds t o t h e surroundings. The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of and types of polluting compounds a r e measured against q u a n t i t a t i v e norms: t h e so-called test f r a m e w o r k (351, (see a l s o Dirven. Of t h e t h r e e c r i t e r i a , t h e test framework o f f e r s t h e most c l e a r c u t criterion t o d e c i d e o n t h e seriousness of a case a n d i t , t h e r e f o r e , deserves s o m e elaboration.

According t o t h e test f r a m e w o r k , t h r e e values (A, B, a n d C ) a r e assigned t o approximately f i f t y compounds and compound families. The A-values supposedly r e f l e c t e i t h e r t h e natural occurrence o r t h e d e t e c t i o n limit in Dutch soils. B- a n d C-values appear t o be derived f r o m t h e A-value by simple multiplication. The toxicological and physiochemical p a r a m e t e r s w e r e also considered (361, but how p r e c i s d y remains unclear. Therefore, t h e scientific basis of t h e test framework i s s c a n t , but in view of t h e f r a g m e n t a r y knowledge a b o u t consequences of soil pollution t o man and environment i t i s doubtful t h a t any b e t t e r based norms could h a v e been produced (37). The t e x t accompanying t h e test framework i s very t e n t a t i v e about t h e reported values (35).

Despite i t s shallow s c i e n t i f i c grounding, t h e t e s t framework i s t h e basis f o r t h e policy of t h e d i f f e r e n t governmental institutions. Those cases where pollutants occur above C-level a r e t o be considered f o r c l e a n up, a n d c l e a n u p operations should be a i m e d at reducing concentrations t o A-level. The norms o f f e r a simple and precise way t o d e t e r m i n e whether a specific case should be considered. The test framework appears t o h a v e been a c c e p t e d without reservations by r e s i d e n t s and environmental i n t e r e s t groups in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o persuade government officials t o t a k e a c t i o n o n a soil pollution problem

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The t h r e e c r i t e r i a , a n d especially t h e test framework, h a v e been powerful instruments in reducing institutional uncertainty in soil pollution cases.

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However, t h e number of pollution cases requiring clean-up according t o t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s s o g r e a t t h a t t h e money needed f o r clean-up e x c e e d s t h e amount of money m a d e available. Therefore a n extensive priority s e t t i n g procedure was s e t up by t h e Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning a n d Environmental Control (VROM). This priority s e t t i n g procedure was partly specified in t h e Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act a n d m a d e priority s e t t i n g

primarily a provincial issue 1

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'The provinces play a key r o l e in Dutch environmental policy a n d regulation.

Without exception, e a c h province had t a k e n s o m e measures regarding soil pollution at t h e t i m e t h e ministerial procedure was proposed. Initially t h e priority s e t t i n g procedure was unclear, a n d for t h i s reason t h e procedure a n d i t s results d i f f e r s o m e w h a t between provinces. Y e t , a l l provinces assign a high priority t o t h o s e cases where drinking w a t e r i s t h r e a t h e n e d (see page 28 of t h i s paper). In s o m e provinces planned housing a r e a s r e c e i v e high priority (38). This is understandable s i n c e municipalities a r e obliged t o inform t h e province of soil pollution, and m o s t housing a r e a s a r e investigated before c o n s t r u c t i o n begins.

Before investigations o r c l e a n u p measures a r e t a k e n t h e provincial c l e a n u p programmes a r e subjected t o a t i m e consuming checking procedure at t h e ministry. This does n o t a p p e a r t o change t h e provincial priorities significantly. This procedure is, however, t i m e consuming, a n d provinces claim i t i s causing serious delays in pursuing soil pollution cases. In a r e c e n t evaluation of t h e Soil Clean u p operation t h i s complaint h a s been acknowledged a n d t h e m i n i s t e r h a s promised t o s t o p preliminary checking of cases where l i t t l e money i s involved (39).

T h e application of t h e c r i t e r i a a n d t h e priority s e t t i n g a n d checking procedures c a n b e s e e n as f o r m a l thresholds in t h e decision procedure o n soil clean up. Another i m p o r t a n t threshold t o a c t u a l c l e a n u p i s t h e availability of t e c h n i c a l facilities. All techniques available in 1981 originated f r o m t h e civil engineering f i e l d a n d could only be used f o r t e m p o r a r y isolation. This problem was recognised e a r l y by t h e ministerial s t a f f and t w o solutions w e r e planned.

Firstly, a l l provinces had t o provide t e m p o r a r y s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s f o r soil t h a t could n o t b e sanitized. The problems t h e provinces experienced in s e t t i n g u p t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s w e r e very similar t o t h o s e t h e ministry e n c o u n t e r e d in trying t o i m p l e m e n t t h e Hoffman plan 2

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According t o t h e Soil C l e a n u p (interim) Act (51) t h e provincial Aldermen h a v e t o d r a w up a yearly c l e a n up program. t h i s program should include a priority classification of a l l known cases of soil pollution in t h e province in question.

These problems included a s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e f r o m local government a n d t h e public (see also ~ i r v e n ) .

The s e c o n d r o u t e w a s t o i n t r o d u c e incentives f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of soil c l e a n u p techniques. Because of t h e pressure t o p u t t e c h n i q u e s i n t o use quickly, a t t e n t i o n t o o t h e r environmental domains (air a n d w a t e r ) h a s d e c r e a s e d . As a r e s u l t , people living in t h e vicinity of a soil c l e a n u p f a c i l i t y o b j e c t v e h e m e n t l y t o t h e resulting a i r o r w a t e r pollution.

In conclusion, w e c a n distinguish t h r e e i m p o r t a n t thresholds which influence w h e t h e r a c t i o n i s t a k e n o n a s p e c i f i c soil pollution case. T h e f i r s t i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c r i t e r i a t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a case will be considered o r not. T h e second i s t h e priority s e t t i n g p r o c e d u r e performed by t h e provincial s t a f f , a n d t h e third i s t h e availability of t e m p o r a r y s t o r a g e facilities. Accordingly, a pollution case having t h e g r e a t e s t c h a n c e of being d e a l t w i t h a d e q u a t e l y i s o n e t h a t involves a s m a l l a m o u n t of polluted soil, i s s i t u a t e d in t h e vicinity of a ( f u t u r e ) housing o r a w a t e r supply a r e a , a n d i s s i t e d in a province w h e r e t h e a u t h o r i t i e s h a v e provided t e m p o r a r y s t o r a g e facilities. This m a y n o t be t h e m o s t c r i t i c a l c a s e f r o m a risk m a n a g e m e n t p e r s p e c t i v e nor typical of t h o s e c a s e s t h a t h a v e m a d e soil pollution a political issue. T h e f o r m a l r a t i o n a l i t y of t h e origgnal regulations a n d t h e a c t u a l r a t i o n a l i t i e s of implementation, a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t .

Antagonism b e t w e e n l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d r e s i d e n t s

The w a y i n which t h e Ministry c r y s t a l i z e d t h e soil c l e a n procedures i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e problem w a s perceived as t h e m a n a g i n g of risk t o public h e a l t h a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . From t h e way t h e p r o c e d u r e s a r e i m p l e m e n t e d w e c a n see t h a t t h e t h r e a t t o public h e a l t h h a s b e c o m e t h e f o r e m o s t issue, w h e r e a s t h e t h r e a t t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t h a s f a l l e n i n t o t h e background. T h e p e r c e p t i o n of s o i l pollution as a t h r e a t t o public h e a l t h s e e m s t o b e f a i r l y g e n e r a l in t h e Netherlands, but e v e n t h i s p e r c e p t i o n p e r m i t s widely d i f f e r e n t priorities, a c c o r d i n g t o s e v e r a l organisational f a c t o r s .

T h e p e r c e p t i o n of soil pollution by b o t h t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e municipalities h a s b e e n influenced strongly by t h e established financial s t r u c t u r e . O n c e a case e m e r g e s o n t h e political a g e n d a , t h e municipalities c a n n o t e a s i l y i n f l u e n c e i t f o r m a l l y a n d a t t h a t point t h e y lose a c e r t a i n

control over their budget. Though t h i s loss of control i s undesirable t h e issue on t h e official political agenda is t h e t h r e a t t o public health and only arguments in those t e r m s c a n be ventilated publicly. As a result t h e municipal government welcomes optimistic interpretations of t h e available information regarding public health consequences and downplays t h e importance of inherent uncertainties in d a t a , if t h e s e d o not show evidence of immediate risks.

The opposite may be e x p e c t e d of t h e local population. Soil pollution means a health t h r e a t of unknown dimensions which might lead t h e public t o demand

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' a w o r s t c a s e ' approach t o evaluating uncertain data. Seen in this perspective, i t is remarkable t h a t in most of t h e soil pollution c a s e s t h e local population appeared not t o be overly concerned. Even in those cases where people live o n such s i t e s they r e a c t e d only mildly t o t h e national soil pollution upheaval. For instance, in Gouderak, where w a s t e from t h e Shell aldrinldieldrin plant (at Pernis) was dumped in t h e fifties, t h e residents w e r e reluctant t o do anything about it. Yet, in c e r t a i n cases (like t h e t h r e e we describe Volgermeerpolder, Griftpark and Merwedepolder), t h e r e was a large public reaction.

There i s no simple and obvious reason why public concern arose in t h e c a s e s mentioned and n o t in o t h e r cases. A general f e a t u r e of t h e c a s e s considered i s a history of distrust dating back t o t h e t i m e before soil pollution was a n issue. Once t h e public became concerned, s o m e f e a t u r e s c a n be identified t h a t appear t o keep t h i s concern growing. These f e a t u r e s a r e not necessarily specific t o soil pollution, but may be recognized in o t h e r confrontations between local authorities and residents.

Though t h e arguments specific a r e about soil pollution, t h e y may b e masking more general conflicts between t h e residents a n d t h e public authorities. Another general f e a t u r e of t h e s e cases i s t h e lack of experience in handling this t y p e of problem on t h e p a r t of all t h e parties concerned.

Official bodies w e r e plagued by institutional uncertainties: no well known procedure exist t o deal with e i t h e r political o r technical aspects. It is natural t h a t t h e s e officials tried t o avoid routes of a c t i o n which t h r e w them into y e t more uncertainty.

As noted above, t h e soil pollution issue in t h e Netherlands i s d e a l t with primarily as a risk-management problem. In s o m e cases, very rigourous procedures existed for example, to reduce risks r e l a t e d t o drinking w a t e r supply. The history of Lekkerkerk illustrates this point. It was not until t h e

drinking w a t e r a p p e a r e d t o c o n t a i n pollutants t h a t t h e environmental i n s p e c t o r a t e t o o k a c t i o n b y ordering e m e r g e n c y rationing of drinking w a t e r . Two w e e k s l a t e r t h e regional public h e a l t h inspector considered t h i s a c t i o n inadequate, and i t w a s d e c i d e d t o e v a c u a t e t h e a r e a .

In general, n o p r o c e d u r e s e x i s t to d e a l w i t h soil pollution. Local government, t h e r e f o r e s h a p e s t h e problem a n d i t s handling in a d h o c fashion. As will be i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e following c a s e , l o c a l government a c t i o n s a r e driven by m o r e general a i m s like pacifying t h e resident, avoiding n e g a t i v e publicity, a n d avoiding unknown financial obligations.

T h e Volgermeerpolder 1

T h e Volgermeerpolder i s a r e f u s e t i p belonging t o t h e municipality of Amsterdam. Besides being t h e main user of t h e tip, t h e municipality had t h e legal d u t y of controlling t h e license f o r t h e t i p under t h e Nuisance Act. Already b e f o r e 1960 people d e m a n d e d closure of t h e t i p b e c a u s e of t h e s t e n c h i t produced. The d e m a n d w a s ignored. When in t h e spring of 1980 b a r r e l s containing w a s t e originating f r o m Philips Duphar w e r e s e e n o n t h e s i t e (so s h o r t l y a f t e r 'Lekkerkerk') a n o f f i c i a l working group w a s set u p t o coordinate r e s e a r c h o n t h e consequences. On April 29, 1980, t h e municipality of A m s t e r d a m issued a press r e p o r t s t a t i n g t h a t 100 to 200 b a r r e l s had been found f i l l e d with p l y - c h l o r b e n z e n e s (4 1). As a consequence of t h i s press r e p o r t , a m e m o r a n d u m w a s w r i t t e n b y a biochemist a n d resident of Broek in Waterland, a s m a l l municipality n e a r t h e s i t e of t h e pollution. In t h i s m e m o a t t e n t i o n w a s called t o t h e f a c t t h a t , s i n c e t h e barrels o r i g i n a t e d f r o m t h e Philips Duphar, s i t e w h e r e in 1963 a plant producing 2,4,5-T had exploded, i t m i g h t b e t h e c a s e t h a t t h e Philips Duphar w a s t e c o n t a i n s 2,3,7,8-TCDD (commonly r e f e r r e d t o a s dioxin) (40). I m m e d i a t e l y following t h i s m e m o t h e municipality of Broek in Waterland issued a press r e p o r t in which i t a s k e d t h e municipality of A m s t e r d a m t o be given b e t t e r . i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e existing s i t u a t i o n a n d f o r m o r e r e s e a r c h to b e c o n d u c t e d o n t h e possible dispersion of t o x i c w a s t e (they did n o t r e q u e s t a n investigation of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e barrels). T h e municipality a l s o d e m a n d e d admission as a m e m b e r of t h e o f f i c i a l working group. This d e m a n d w a s acknowledged.

Details of t h e h i s t o r i c a l p a r t ( f i r s t half of t h e c a s e study) h a v e mainly been t a k e n f r o m t w o reports: o n e by M. Hisschemoller (40) a n d a n o t h e r by a n A m s t e r d a m project group (41).

The number of barrels at t h e t i p was e s t i m a t e d t o be around

would likely h a v e had m o r e difficulties in closing down t h e t i p in t h e a b s e n c e of public unrest, at s t a k e in t h i s badly defined decision problem w a s t h e a u t h o r i t y of g o v e r n m e n t a l institutions.

T h e r e i s a n o t h e r parallel w i t h Lekkerkerk, namely t h e supposed presence of a carcinogen. In Lekkerkerk, b e n z e n e was f i r s t measured i n t h e s p a c e s under t h e houses; y e t , t h e r e had been a previous investigation in which no b e n z e n e had been shown. T h e r e f o r e t h e technical working g r o u p in c h a r g e r e q u e s t e d r e s e a r c h by independent expertise. In t w o s u c h reviews n o b e n z e n e w a s shown. T h e r e s u l t s of t h e s e m o r e reassuring reviews, however, w e r e n o t known t o minister Ginjaar when i t was decided t o e v a c u a t e t h e r e s i d e n t s a n d t o c l e a n u p t h e Lekkerkerk West a r e a .

T h e Lekkerkerk e x p e r i e n c e m a y have influenced t h e way in which a similar i s s u e w a s a p p r o a c h e d in t h e Volgermeerpolder. Whereas t h e a m o u n t s of most of t h e measured pollutants w e n t a l m o s t uncontested, t h e p r e s e n c e a n d a m o u n t s of dioxin, which is considered t o be a p o t e n t carcinogen, w a s a very controversial issue. Hisschemoller, who has studied t h e history of t h e Volgermeerpolder in d e t a i l , concluded t h a t t h e municipality of A m s t e r d a m showed s e l e c t i v e c a u t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e dioxin pollution. T w i c e t h e G o v e r n m e n t a l I n s t i t u t e f o r Public Health (RIV) in Bilthoven w a s asked t o c o n f i r m t h e p r e s e n c e of dioxin, but only n e g a t i v e r e s u l t s w e r e published.

This l e d t o a a p r e s s r e p o r t s t a t i n g t h a t no dioxin had been m e a s u r e d in w a t e r a n d sludge. Indeed, RIV had not been a b l e t o m e a s u r e dioxin in sludge. But a w e e k b e f o r e t h e press r e p o r t was issued a dioxin f i n d by t h e Laboratory f o r t h e Environment of t h e University of A m s t e r d a m had been r e p o r t e d t o t h e Aldermen, by t h e C e n t r a l Municipal Laboratory f o r t h e Environment of t h e C i t y of Amsterdam (Gemeentelijk C e n t r a a l Milieu-laboratorium, GCM). And GCM was undoubtely i m p l i c a t e d i n f r a m i n g t h e press report.

T h e RIV ( ~ i j k s i n s t i t u u t v o o r d e ~ o l k s g e z o n d h e i d ) w a s t h e l a r g e s t single r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u t e of t h e D u t c h government a n d h a d t h e s t a t u s of a s e p a r a t e d i r e c t o r a t e g e n e r a l at t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Public Health.

On J a n u a r y 1 1984 RIV w a s merged with t w o o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u t e s IVA ( l n s t i t u u t v o o r Af v a l s t o f f e n o n d e r z o e k ) a n d RID ( ~ i j k s i n s t i t u u t v o o r d e ~ r i n k w a t e r v o o r z i e n i n g ) i n t o RIVM ( R i j k s i n t i t u u t v o o r V o l k s g e z o n d h e i d e n M i l i e u z a k e n , g o v e r n m e n t a l i n s t i t u t e f o r p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l a f f a i r s). Accordingly i t s o f f i c i a l field of r e s e a r c h has b e e n broadened w i t h e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e s e a r c h .

In t h e spring of 1981 t h e presence of dioxin was no longer

present did not constitute a toxic intake.

Uncertainty played a c e n t r a l role in t h e d e b a t e , as was made explicit by Copius Peereboom. He based his conclusion t h a t t h e situation was not safe on t h e earlier r e p o r t issued by RIV, in which a level of 1 3 pg was held t o be acceptable. Because t h e new r e p o r t had not yet been published, Copius Peereboom concluded t h a t no scientific forum existed t o endorse t h e new conclusions drawn by RIV. He emphasized t h e inconclusiveness of t h e situation, and concluded t h a t f o r this reason t h e municipality of Amsterdam could not hold t h a t no danger t o public health existed, whereas on t h e o t h e r hand Heida persistently s t a t e d t h a t t h e s a m e could be safely assumed.

The question of t h e dioxin norm, and t h e associated risk f o r public health, was highly topical until t h e publication of t h e second RIV r e p o r t in 1982 and t h e termination of t h e execution of t h e Lepelplan. Activities around t h e Volgermeerpolder then fell away, since all parties agreed t h a t a definitive solution f o r t h e pollution i~ t h e Volgermeerpolder could not be e x p e c t e d in t h e short run

.

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Science1 in t h e Policy Arena

In a soil pollution case like t h e Volgermeerpolder i t i s t a k e n t o be important t o d e t e r m i n e whether or not t h e r e 'is' a risk t o public health.

For t h e Amsterdam authorities ' n o risk1 meant t h a t no a c t i o n had t o be taken; whereas t h e e x i s t e n c e of a risk meant extensive a c t i o n with severe financial consequences. It also meant admission of i t s own inadequacy with respect t o t h e control of t h e refuse tip. For t h e s e reasons, i t i s not surprising t h a t t h e Amsterdam authorities tried t o prove t h a t no risk existed, whereas t h e residents tried t o show t h e opposite. These parties, respectively, argued a

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b e s t 1 and a

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w o r s t ' case f o r t h e situation at hand. In this a r e n a , t h e t w o reports by RIV played a crucial role, and, therefore, i t i s worth examining why t h e s e reports c a m e t o such different conclusions.

1 Winsemius, Minister of VROM s t a t e d in a n interview t h a t with t h e present financial possibilities, clean up of t h e refuse t i p would be delayed f o r f i v e t o t e n years (47). The BC sympathized with t h e financial problems, but expected t h a t industry (in this case Duphar) could be obliged t o pay p a r t of t h e clean up c o s t s (42). The government plans t o require Duphar t o pay. In addition, t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e national environmental movement with respect t o t h e Volgermeerpolder have diminished t o virtually z e r o (48).

The f i r s t r e p o r t r e a c t e d t o press publications on a number of c a n c e r s in Kootwijk (a s m a l l village surrounded by forest), allegedly c a u s e d by occasional exposure t o t h e herbicide 2,4,5-T, polluted with dioxin. RIV concluded in t h i s r a t h e r hastily w r i t t e n r e p o r t (441, t h a t occasional exposure t o 2,4,5-T could not be t h e c a u s e of cancer. In reaching t h i s conclusion, t h e a u t h o r s evaluated t h e carcinogenity of both 2,4,5-T and dioxin, concluding f r o m t h r e e review a r t i c l e s t h a t dioxin could act as a mutagenic substance and, t h e r e f o r e , should be considered a carcinogen. Even when t h i s cautious s t a n d was t a k e n i t could be concluded t h a t n o c a n c e r risk was present in Kootwijk, because of t h e very low concentrations of dioxin c a l c u l a t e d f o r t h e situation. It addressed a s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of t h e Volgermeerpolder, w h e r e t h e e s t i m a t e d dioxin i n t a k e was of t h e s a m e o r d e r of m a g n i t u d e as t h e a c c e p t a b l e intake, a n d f o r t h i s reason t h e a u t h o r s w e r e asked t o reassess t h e risk of dioxin (49). As mentioned above, a t t h a t t i m e t h e permanent advisory c o m m i t t e e of t h e Ministry of Public Health had proposed t o divide carcinogenic compounds i n t o t w o c a t e g o r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o whether t h e y w e r e considered t o be a c o m p l e t e c a r c i n o g e n o r a promotor only, and t o use d i f f e r e n t normsetting procedures f o r both.

A crucial change in t h e second RIV r e p o r t i s t h a t t h e m u t a g e n i c i t y of dioxin is e v a l u a t e d differently. Whereas t h e f i r s t r e p o r t cautiously concludes t h a t mutagenity of dioxin c a n n o t be excluded, t h e second o n e reevaluates t h e d a t a and now concludes in t h e n e g a t i v e (51). Being n o mutagen, dioxin i s n o t a c o m p l e t e carcinogen and f a l l s i n t o a n o t h e r normsetting regime, in which a threshold level e x i s t s under which t h e r e i s no t o x i c e f f e c t . Using a n a r b i t r a r i l y chosen s a f e t y f a c t o r of 250 t h e norm of 240 pg i s set. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t both t h e original v a l u e of

1 3 pg a n d t h e new value of 240 pg w e r e c a l c u l a t e d by using t h e s a m e set of experimental d a t a namely t h e results of only o n e a n i m a l experiment by Kociba et al. (50). The changed i n t e g r a t i o n was occasioned by a supposedly d i f f e r e n t cancer-inducing mechanism, which, in turn, was occasioned by a re-evaluation of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , w h e r e several e x p e r i m e n t s w e r e e v a l u a t e d slightly differently (51). As a r e s u l t , t h e t e n t a t i v e positive conclusion o n t h e mutagenity of dioxin f r o m t h e f i r s t r e p o r t was reversed t o a n e g a t i v e conclusion in t h e second r e p o r t . It is, however, n o t only t h e re-evaluation of t h e m u t a g e n i c i t y which must be s e e n as r e l e v a n t f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e in results, b u t a l s o t h e f a c t t h a t i t b e c a m e r e l e v a n t t o put t h e question w h e t h e r a compound i s a carcinogen of a c e r t a i n t y p e , instead of simply carcinogenic. T h e w a y t h e t w o norms f o r dioxin w e r e established i s a c l e a r e x a m p l e of t h e

w a y ' s c i e n c e ' c a n be r e i n t e r p r e t e d depending o n t h e r e l e v a n t problem a n d problem f r a m e . It i s worth emphasizing t h a t t h e t i m e s at which both n o r m s w e r e p u t forward w e r e less t h a n t h r e e m o n t h s a p a r t , a n d b y t h e s a m e institution. Therefore, t h e d i f f e r e n c e s c a n n o t be explained by c h a n g e d e v a l u a t i o n c r i t e r i a of t h e s c i e n t i s t s in question, nor by a d i f f e r e n t d a t a set.

R a t h e r t h e y a r e explained by t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r which n o r m s had t o be suggested (see also Brian Wynne, c h a p t e r 3). In t h i s case, risk-management policies c r i t i c a l l y influence t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s c i e n t i f i c risk assessment d a t a , t h e r e b y throwing i n t o question t h e generally a c c e p t e d paradigm, t h a t risk a s s e s s m e n t a n d risk-management a r e independent

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s c i e n t i f i c l a n d

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p o l i c y ' acitivities.

Although t h e soil pollution issue in t h e Netherlands c o m e s o n t h e political a g e n d a as a risk m a n a g e m e n t problem, as w e h a v e shown f r o m t h e Lekkerkerk a n d Volgermeer cases, t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t risk m a n a g e m e n t i s t h e c e n t r a l issue f o r e a c h of t h e participating groups o r bodies. I t only m e a n s t h a t risk for public h e a l t h is a c c e p t e d as t h e political issue for which a c t i o n by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s c a n b e justified.

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R i s k 1 , t h e n i s t h e acknowledged issue if n o t t h e r e a l issue underlying a c t i o n , as will be s e e n , f o r e x a m p l e , by t h e group of r e s i d e n t s in t h e G r i f t p a r k case, described below.

T h e G r i f t park (52)

A soil pollution problem a r o s e o n t h e G r i f t P a r k in May 1980, well b e f o r e t h e e n a c t m e n t of t h e Soil C l e a n Up (interim) Act. Four y e a r s l a t e r , i t w a s s t i l l receiving p r e s s coverage. T h e s t r o n g involvement of t h e local population in t h i s soil polution case c a n , in p a r t , b e explained by a c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s d a t i n g f u r t h e r back t h a n May, 1980.

T h e G r i f t park lies in a n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y neighbourhood in t h e c i t y of U t r e c h t a n d i s owned b y t h e municipality. T h e s i t e w a s formerly used as a n occasional rubbish d u m p a n d as a n industrial site. T h e municipal g a s works a n d a printing company had been l o c a t e d o n i t . Since t h e e a r l y 6 0 ' s t h e a r e a had been n e g l e c t e d a n d t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e neighbourhood had begun t o use i t as a park a n d a r e c r e a t i o n ground f o r children.

In March 1971 t h e c i t y council decided t h a t t h e s i t e would be used instead f o r residential building a n d f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e municipal w a s t e r e m o v a l d e p a r t m e n t . T h e r e s i d e n t s o b j e c t e d t o t h e proximity of t h e d e p a r t m e n t a n d r e s e n t e d t h e loss of t h e i r g r e e n a r e a a n d as a r e s u l t t h e council reversed i t s decision i n April 1973. T h e s i t e ,

s t i l l a wasteland, w a s formally opened t o t h e public;

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . We witnessed a similar s i t u a t i o n in t h e Volgermeer case.

In t h e G r i f t p a r k case, in J u n e t h e CWU discovered a t h i c k layer of c o a l t a r , which w a s l a t e r shown t o h a v e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of t o x i c a n d carcinogenic compounds (aromates). The C i t y Council, t h e n , conceded t o t h e c l a i m s of t h e Gif c o m m i t t e e a b o u t t h e public h e a l t h risk of t h e s i t e , a n d t h e s i t e w a s f e n c e d in. The no-risk a r g u m e n t c e a s e d being a n issue b e t w e e n t h e municipality a n d t h e a c t i o n group.

However, t h e a c t i o n g r o u p realized, e a r l y on, t h a t t h e soil pollution posed a serious barrier t o t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e f o r m e r plans f o r t h e a r e a . This perception p e r v a d e d a l l f u r t h e r a c t i o n s of t h e Gif c o m m i t t e e .

A f t e r t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e pollution s i t u a t i o n a s such, t h e municipality was c o n f r o n t e d with serious uncertainty: t h e r e w a s n o legal f r a m e w o r k , n o a c c e p t e d division of responsibilities f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n , n o known a n d f e a s i b l e way t o c l e a n u p t h e pollution, a n d n o indication of w h a t t h e costs would be a n d who should pay f o r them. Significantly t h e a b s e n c e of a test f r a m e w o r k t o assess t h e e x t e n t of t h e pollution at d i f f e r e n t spots o n t h e s i t e does n o t a p p e a r t o h a v e been a b a r r i e r f o r f u r t h e r action; probably t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s t h e n known w e r e above a n y value c r i t i c a l f o r action.

F u r t h e r investigations w e r e i n i t i a t e d t o assess t h e e x t e n t of t h e pollution o n t h e s i t e , in l a t i t u d e as well as in depth.

T h e behavioural u n c e r t a i n t i e s mentioned c a n be held responsible f o r t h e slow progress as d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h e following:

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only in June, 1981, did i t b e c o m e c l e a r t h a t c e n t r a l government would pay f o r a substantial a m o u n t of t h e costs of t h e c l e a n u p operation;

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only in t h e a u t u m n of 1981 ( a f t e r in May of t h e s a m e year t h e d r a f t Soil C l e a n Up (interim) A c t h a d been published) did civil s e r v a n t s of t h e province begin deliberations w i t h plausible c l e a n u p firms. ^.

( ~ o t e t h a t provincial a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e responsible f o r deciding b e t w e e n c l e a n u p possibilities a n d f o r supervising c l e a n up operations).

In t h e m e a n t i m e t h e Gif c o m m i t t e e w a s fully o c c u p i e d ensuring t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s t r u c t u r e plan a n d pressing

t h e authorities t o speed up t h e decision process. New

on clean a r e a s of t h e site.

layer, i.e. t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s t r u c t u r e plan (57).

Interestingly t h e municipality a p p e a r s at t h e m o m e n t t o be o n t h e s i d e of t h e residents, perhaps b e c a u s e of financial i n t e r e s t s , b u t possibly a l s o b e c a u s e institutionally a municipality h a s l i t t l e c o n c e r n f o r g r e a t e r d e p t h groundwater quality, but d o e s h a v e a n i n t e r e s t in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a politically popular park.

W e see t h a t t h e a c t u a l c o n c e r n s of a group involved in a soil pollution case m a y c h a n g e considerably following e x t e r n a l shocks a n d surprises.

Although t h e generally a c c e p t e d issue i s public h e a l t h which may s t a y formally c e n t r a l , t h e r e a l issues at hand might diverge. For t h e r e s i d e n t s around t h e G r i f t p a r k t h e availability of t h e park f o r neighbourhood a c i t i v i t i e s s e e m s t o be t h e c r u c i a l point. T h e municipality i s o n t h e s i d e of t h e neighbourhood as long as t h i s s t a n d i s financially feasible. Provincial a u t h o r i t i e s a r e mostly c o n c e r n e d with t h e risk t o t h e groundwater.

In t h e Merwedepolder case discussed below, w e see t h e s a m e s h i f t f r o m t h e official issue of public h e a l t h to o t h e r underlying issues. An i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of t h e Merwedepolder case i s t h a t t h e local a c t i o n group (VAVM) had a c h a r a c t e r which w a s in s o m e ways distinctly d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e Gif c o m m i t t e e .

The Merwede polder

T h e Merwedepolder i s a residential a r e a of Dordrecht, a middle sized t o w n n e a r t h e l a r g e s t Dutch p e t r o c h e m i c a l a r e a . When t h e municipality planned t h i s residential a r e a during t h e sixties s e v e r a l s e c t i o n s of t h e Merwedepolder w e r e exploited as landfills. This e x p l o i t a t i o n was at t h a t t i m e under municipal responsibility a n d w a s only partly licensed under t h e Nuisance Act. These landfills w e r e filled with household ref use, harbour sludge, c h e m i c a l w a s t e , etc. Dumping ended in 1971. In 1974, residential building began, a n d in 1975, t h e whole a r e a w a s a middle-class housing d i s t r i c t (58). Almost f r o m t h e t i m e t h e inhabitants moved i n t o t h e houses t h e r e w e r e c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t s t e n c h a n d h e a l t h problems. T h e r e w e r e also c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t c o n s t r u c t i o n shortcomings of t h e houses, thought t o be c a u s e d by sagging of utility pipes. The c o m p l a i n t s l a s t e d , y e t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r e s i d e n t s w e r e n e v e r t a k e n seriously: ' y o u a r e living o n a dumping ground t h a t always stinkst (59).

When in May 1980, t h e municipal e n e r g y board i n s p e c t e d t h e n a t u r a l g a s pipes, t h e s e pipes a p p e a r e d t o b e discoloured at s o m e spots. A t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e Regional Inspection of t h e Environment, t h e groundwater was analyzed. T h e groundwater contained s m a l l q u a n t i t i e s of compounds Itthat d o n o t belong there" ( a r o m a t i c s a n d t e t r a ) .

A special investigation was considered necessary, however, i t

Organisation of t h e a c t i o n

In t h e Merwedepolder case, in c o n t r a s t t o t h e G r i f t p a r k case, w e see a division b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t groups of residents. Whereas in t h e Griftpark case t h e connections of t h e Gif c o m m i t t e e with t h e r e s t of t h e socially mixed neighbourhood w e r e very strong, and measures w e r e t a k e n t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e m e v e n f u r t h e r , t h e very a c t i v e c o m m i t t e e VAVM in a middle c l a s s a r e a alienated itself s o m e w h a t f r o m t h e r e s t of t h e residents.

The VAVM w a n t e d t o mobilize t h e inhabitants, demanding f r o m t h e municipality both a n explanation and a quick solution (61). The VAVM, which w a s s t r u c t u r e d hierachically, was s t a r t e d by s o m e inhabitants of t h e a r e a with seriously sagged houses. These inhabitants f o r m e d t h e board of t h e VAVM which w a s r e p r e s e n t e d in every VAVM working group. The association s t a r t e d t o gain e x p e r t i s e in various fields, p a r t l y from t h e outside, but t o a l a r g e e x t e n t f r o m i t s own m e m b e r s in o r d e r t o support t h e e x p e r t negotiation s t r a t e g y chosen t o approach t h e local goverment (62).

Every c o n t a c t with t h e outside Merwedepolder world w a s t o be conducted via t w o m e m b e r s of t h e VAVM board, which had a s t r o n g influence o n t h e VAVM s t r a t e g y d u e t o i t s a d v a n t a g e in information a n d t h e s t r o n g wish of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s t o f o r m a united front. The board managed, f o r instance, t o delay t h e f o r m a t i o n of a t e n n a n t s group. The i n t e r e s t s of house owners a n d t e n n a n t s w e r e n o t e n t i r e l y t h e s a m e (62).

The alienation of t h e board g a v e rise t o all kinds of e x t r a initiatives of inhabitants t h a t w e r e only r e l u c t a n t l y acknowledged by t h e board. Striking initiatives included t h e refusal t o pay municipal taxes, t o pay r e n t , a n d t h e occupation of t h e Dordrecht C i t y Administration a n d t h e Communal Health Service (62).

In a s e n s e t h i s resembled t h e situation in t h e Volgermeerpolder. T h e r e t h e Burger C o m i t e e (BC) c o n c e n t r a t e d i t s a c t i v i t i e s o n collecting e x p e r t knowledge a n d o n legal actions. More t h a n o n c e i t w a s suggested t h a t t h e BC did n o t k e e p in t o u c h with t h e o t h e r inhabitants I. It has b e e n

A program w a s b r o a d c a s t in which t h e g a p b e t w e e n BC a n d t h e local population was emphasized. It s e e m s t h a t preparation for t h e broadcast itself diminished what g a p existed (41).

suggested (amongst o t h e r s by t h e BC itself) t h a t t h e supposed g a p b e t w e e n BC and o t h e r inhabitants w a s t h e m o t i v e behind t h e municipality of Amsterdam organizing a n i n f o r m a t i o n meeting. At this m e e t i n g t h e a l a r m a m o n g t h e local people a p p e a r e d t o be m u c h g r e a t e r t h a n e i t h e r t h e BC o r t h e municipality of A m s t e r d a m had imagined (41). Y e t , t h e Municipality of Amsterdam still refused t o close t h e t i p e v e n though t h e I n s p e c t o r a t e f o r t h e Environment supported closure. Tension among t h e inhabitants of t h e a r e a r a n s o high t h a t c a b l e s of bridges w e r e c u t several t i m e s t o p r e v e n t b o a t s loaded with r e f u s e t o c o m e n e a r t h e tip. The BC was a g a i n s t such illegal a c t i v i t i e s (40).

An i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e a l l t h r e e cases i s t h a t t h e inhabitants w e r e a b l e t o organize themselves e f f e c t i v e l y . Although t h i s in itself, s e e m s vital, apparently d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of organisations c a n be effective.

In t h e Merwedepolder, a hierarchical organization with a s t r o n g c e n t r a l group was formed, which a l i e n a t e d itself f r o m t h e backbenchers of t h e involved inhabitants. These backbenchers dissented s o m e t i m e s in

Im Dokument Hazardous Waste in The Netherlands: Dutch Policies from a Local Perspective (Seite 26-57)