National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management

Different hazards have been recorded in Ethiopia. There have been area specific crises caused by different kinds of events/hazards at different times and in varying degree and magnitude.

DPPC (now DPPA) claimed that hydro-meteorological hazards, particularly droughts have remained the leading cause of disaster⁸⁷ and human suffering in Ethiopia in terms of frequency, area coverage and the number of people affected. Flooding has also affected people and their property particularly in the lowland areas (DPPC, 2004).

There were times when disease epidemics also caused serious famine, and migratory pest infestation has been a serious problem in parts of the country; bush fires occurred and depleted forest and wildlife resources; people have been internally displaced due to conflicts of different nature; and in recent years HIV/AIDS has reached to the level of disaster (DPPC, 2004:1).

87 The proclamation for the establishment of “Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC)”

defines disaster as “the development of a situation wherein a segment of the community or the population of a locality cannot any longer meet the need for food and other basic necessities, due to natural and man-made calamities, with its daily life thus falling into crisis which renders it unable to survive without assistance from others” (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:74).

In the Ethiopian context, a host of factors contribute to the vulnerability of individuals, households or communities to frequent disaster risks such as drought related famine, epidemics, flood, landslides, civil strife and mass displacement. In particular, millions of people have been affected by drought-related famines for several decades. Very huge amounts of resources have been deployed in the form of relief, which, of course has saved many lives (DPPC, 2005; FDRE, 2002b).

Based on lessons drawn from past experiences of relief operations for domestic shocks, a shift in policy direction was made with the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) ratified in 1993, which introduced “new approach” on the utilization of relief resources based on prevention and preparedness. The previous Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), whose duties were mainly to manage effects of drought through relief distribution to and rehabilitation of victims of drought and other disasters, has been replaced by Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC) with the objectives of: (i) preventing disasters by way of removing the basic causes of thereof; (ii) building, in advance, the capacity necessary to alleviate the extent of damages that could be caused by disasters; (iii) ensuring the timely arrival of necessary assistance to victims of disaster (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75). The main powers and duties of DPPC are summarized and given in box 3.3 below.

The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM), and its directives have been in place since 1993. The main priority areas of the Policy have been:

i. saving human lives and their livelihoods;

ii. protecting the quality of life in the affected areas from deteriorating on the account of disaster;

iii. ensuring best use of natural resources endowment; and

iv. overcoming the root causes of vulnerability to disaster through provision of relief in the short-term and promoting sustainable development in the longer-term (DPPC, 2005:3).

Box 3.3: Some of the Powers and Duties of DPPC:

i. Prepare a disaster prevention and preparedness national policy; formulate strategy for its application; [….] follow up its implementation; formulate strategies for future disaster prevention by way of studying previous disaster areas.

ii. Administer the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund and the National Food Reserve.

iii. [….] undertake prior studies on the causes of disaster, set up systems for advance warning;

iv. [….] make known the magnitude and extent of a disaster together with measures that should be taken in connection therewith; officially declare any relevant part of the country a disaster area;

v. [….] request and receive any form of assistance from domestic and foreign sources; register all forms of assistance [….] and cause the distribution of same to the people being helped;

vi. Inform the public through the mass media of the type, volume and utilization of assistance received from domestic and foreign sources.

vii. [….] rehabilitate the victims of disaster,

viii. coordinate and supervise relief activeness of NGOs.

Source: (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75-76).

The Policy makes references to all phases of disaster management (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation/recovery). It focuses on multi-sectoral approach and involves all relevant Ministries. The policy entails the ideas of “preparedness”,

“prevention”, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘saving livelihoods’ which were mainly lacking in the previous RRC activities. Prior to the issuance of the policy, relief resources were distributed directly to the drought-affected population on free handout basis. The new approach or policy has discouraged free relief distribution to the able-bodied population with the aim of integrating the relief resources with development works, i.e. “linking relief to development”.

The most important elements of the disaster prevention and management policy are the Early Warning System (EWS) established to monitor and give warning of disasters ahead of time;

the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR); the development of Relief Plan; National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund (NDPPF). These elements form mainly the preparedness aspect of the policy. In recent years, of course, these policy measures have helped largely to avert famine.

On the other hand elements for prevention, especially for addressing the main causes of disasters or livelihood protection are not clearly worked out in the policy implementation process. In relation to Ethiopian famine policy during the 20^th century, some authors argue that “government self-interest and a disinterest in prospects of people led to untimely and insufficient responses and policies” (Stephen, 2004:109 quoting Mesfin Woldemariam, 1986).

On the other hand DPPC claims that its policy was formulated in a systematic fashion involving:

i. Analysis of drought and famine situation over the 20 years prior to the policy, which revealed that food aid increasing; beneficiary number increasing;

dependency increasing; local production falling; and then the government was forced to ask itself - what next?

ii. Formulation of policy that introduced “linking relief to development” as key mechanism of preparedness.

iii. Implementation of the policy through the various modalities (e.g. EGS) (Sharp et al., 2003:4 in annex 1).

Yet in its report for the world conference on disaster reduction (held in Kobe-Hyogo, Japan in January 2005), DPPC described its challenge in relation to policy implementation in the following terms:

…. implementation of the NPDPM in its full sense, particularly in addressing the root causes of food shortage still remains a key challenge. In spite of the intensive familiarization of the policy and the associated training programmes, some of the policy components are not yet fully put into practice. Out of the many preparedness modalities/strategies stated in the Policy Directives, the establishment of seed reserve, the livestock preservation strategy, the initiation of Relief Plan at Woreda level and the allocation of resources based on Relief Plan as well as the declaration of disaster using decentralized EWS information are examples of strategies that are not adequately realized (DPPC, 2005:3-4).

It is clear that for the past three to four decades the number of people affected by droughts and famines has increased and many have been forced to rely on food aid every year. At the same time relief agencies have had to increase relief supplies to be distributed either for free or in exchange for beneficiary labour participation in communal works. Therefore, what the national policy on disaster prevention has brought is to discourage free food distribution to all able-bodied beneficiaries and to establish a modality on how to disperse relief resource to the needy. Accordingly the policy envisaged Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) whereby able-bodied beneficiaries get access to food by participating in EGS activities; and free food distribution (gratuitous relief) to those who are unable to work on EGS either due to health problems and age or due to any other physical disability. The basic assumption, as stated above, was to use relief resources for development activities too, i.e. ‘linking relief resources to development’.

Therefore, in this case it can be said that there is no major departure in the policy implementation to address the root causes of increasing vulnerability to famine disaster in recent decades. In fact the two seemingly new elements include the discouraging of free food distribution and the introduction of EGS to undertake some development works. However, using relief resources for EGS activities is not as such new innovative approach⁸⁸. It is similar to that of previous food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes which were applied since the 1984-85 famine. Various agencies (e.g. World Food Programme and various NGOs) have implemented such programmes in the past three decades. Even some experts consulted in the highland areas commented that EGS is just like as “an old wine in a new bottle”.

In fact DPPC acknowledged that addressing the root cause of food crisis still remains a key challenge (DPPC, 2005). It has faced constraints in implementing its disaster prevention or risk reduction strategies.⁸⁹ This is attributed to a ‘capacity problem’⁹⁰ mainly at Woreda level, lack of legislation to enforce the implementation of the Policy and to fill other gaps in the national policy. Major stakeholders particularly key line departments do not seem to accept the main policy strategy - the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) - a mechanism to ‘link relief to development’ as part of their mandates. The link between responsibility, authority and accountability is not clearly understood and observed, which became an impediment to the policy implementation. This calls for policy revision taking into account the lessons learnt during the past implementation periods (DPPC, 2004).

88 Some case studies, of course, indicated that EGS programmes showed improvements in beneficiary targeting by minimizing errors of inclusion and exclusion which were the major problems of previous FFW/CFW programmes (Ali, 2000).

89 Some of these strategies include EGS; establishment of seed reserve; livestock preservation strategy, Relief Plan at Woreda level; and declaration of disaster using decentralized EWS information.

90 In fact, presenting a “capacity problem” in defending “policy implementation failures” is a common reaction of the government concerning all its policies. On the other hand other sources attributed largely the policy failures to other key issues, for instance (i) Absence of proper diagnosis of problems (lack of clear linkage between analysis and policy choice). Details of problem analysis and the operationalization of the conceptual framework have major weaknesses. Therefore, in terms of the development of government policies, there is a general lack of systematic problem diagnosis/identification in Ethiopia (Teshome, 2002: 5 cited in Haan et al., 2006:12; Sharp et al., 2003:4 in annex 1); (ii) Resistance to reviewing/revising policy (e.g. land, education, NPDPM policies); absence of operational manuals/guidelines for policy implementation; and lack of consistency across sectors (Sharp et al., 2003:4 in annex 1)

Of course the proclamation for establishment of DPPC indicated the need to “undertake prior studies on the causes of disaster and set up systems for advance warning”, and to “enhance capacity to alleviate the damages” (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75-76). However, it has limited the objectives of studies to a setting up of systems for advance warning and that of

“enhancing capacity to lessen damages.” Though, these objectives worth consideration, the Policy and its Directives have not clearly envisaged a framework for understanding factors or causes that increasingly put people in vulnerability situations.⁹¹ In other words it is to say making distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity and addressing the issues accordingly.

Indeed at project level there was an attempt made under the project named “Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities (SERA)” to undertake studies aimed at understanding the extent and nature of vulnerabilities to disasters. The project had two main objectives: (i) to develop vulnerability profiles of drought prone areas and design relevant response packages to enhance capacity; (ii) to conduct vulnerability researches to understand the root causes of disasters (famine, severe food crisis, epidemics). In general the study had three components:

i. Preparing vulnerability profiles for districts (Woredas) prone to chronic food shortages.

ii. Undertaking research on selected topics to investigate the factors that render communities vulnerable.

iii. Designing response packages to the vulnerable communities.

The study also had a purpose of improving early warning systems and implementation of food security programmes; helping effective use of food resources and targeting vulnerable population and reducing their vulnerability to shocks.

A pilot study covering 16 Woredas in four regions was completed. With regard to research agendas, the first was a study on “Vulnerability to Epidemics, Prevention and Preparedness”

that was carried out by Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI). It addressed the major epidemics in the country, their severity and geographic distribution as well as prevention and preparedness mechanisms. The other research topic, “Analysis of Drought Forecasting Capability in Ethiopia” was undertaken by the National Meteorological Service Agency (NMSA). It was expected to contribute to the understanding of drought monitoring and forecasting methods in the country. The research topics related to “flood hazard” and “population pressure and carrying capacity” were not undertaken at all, due to lack of commitment and institutional problems on the part of partner agencies designated to undertake these topics.

The SERA project was the first attempt made to understand disaster in terms of “vulnerability research”. It was intended to understand the types of disaster risks and their root causes. The intention was to analyze broader vulnerability factors rather than only risks/events/ and their symptoms. Unfortunately the project did not progress with its initial objective, and finally it

91 In fact some experts from DPPC state that “addressing vulnerability is a development issue that mainly falls under the mandates of other sector ministries which have a direct responsibilities for development activities”

(personal communication).

ended up in being a “capacity building endeavour” which, as the usual routines of DPPC, focuses on enhancing EW systems of Regions. This happened mainly when international agendas (e.g. household food security, capacity building, poverty reduction, good governance) have become modus operand.⁹² In relation to this Lautze et al., (2003:20) noted that “leading humanitarian agencies in Ethiopia theorize famine as the outcome of food shortages leading to starvation. Termed a ‘food first bias’, and this has been the prevailing model of famine theory in Ethiopia since the 1970s. This concept has influenced the policies, institutions and processes of humanitarian responses in Ethiopia”.

Although the vulnerability concept included in the national disaster prevention policy reflected the government’s initial reshaping of its ideology and position to show consistency with global concepts and a commitment to Ethiopian people, the policy prescriptions envisaged for addressing the basic causes of disaster have not yet been addressed adequately in process of implementation. In fact some sources (e.g. Maxwell, 2002) noted that the Ethiopian EWS is successful in alarming and putting some standing preparedness components in place (food grain reserve, public works-based safety nets). Since the catastrophic famines of the mid 1980s, the humanitarian communities (including the Government of Ethiopia as well as donors, the UN and NGOs) have invested heavily in institutional improvements for famine prevention in Ethiopia (Maxwell, 2002). DPPC also claims that “though drought-induced food shortage is still recurring, it has not reached to the level of famine since the ratification of the Policy and this is a success in relation to the short-term objective” (DPPC, 2005:3)⁹³.

Nevertheless this is not the whole of the matter when it comes to disaster prevention. The Ethiopian tradition to disaster prevention, in its long history, did not address the root causes of disasters. “The underlying orthodoxy in Ethiopia has been explained as a ‘food-first bias’

linked to the use of ‘food availability decline’ model for food security analysis” (Lautze et al., 2003:20), and “this has its roots in the prevailing understanding of food security in the 1970s and early 1980s” (Haan et al., 2006:15). Still another researcher (Maxwell, 2002) also noted that the underlying famine processes were not adequately addressed by prevention mechanisms in Ethiopia. In this case Maxwell has this to say:

Much of famine preparedness in Ethiopia […] focuses on famines as events - specific episodes that put people at risk of starvation - rather than as processes that over time lead to either an improvement or a deterioration of people’s livelihoods.

Despite the improvements made in famine preparedness […] in many parts of the

92 In Ethiopia global discourses on EW, famine, and food security had influenced the government policies. For instance Stephen (2004:106-108) investigated how food aid discussion is framed in Ethiopia and how food insecurity is homogenized in order to fit within the prevailing socio-political setting. She found out that the information processing for EW was shaped by different interpretations paired to particular worldviews about food security and famine, and by the disjuncture between locally situated food insecurity and national decision making.

93 Despite DPPC’s claim, however, some studies labeled the crises of 1999-2000 (Maxwell, 2002:53) and 2002-2003 (Degefa, 2005:123) as famines that occurred after the introduction of a new National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management. The 2002-2003 famine affected even localities which previously had no famine record. Pastoralists were the most affected segments of the population during the 2002-2003 famine (Degefa, 2005:126).

country, including those most hard hit by the crisis, people were steadily losing assets - and thus their ability to cope with the shocks that led to the crisis - all through the 1990s (Maxwell, 2002:52).

Moreover the existing EWS and assessments have gaps too in terms of area coverage and issues to be considered. In relation to this Maxwell also observed it as follows:

While lack of information is probably not to blame for the crisis of 1999–2000, several lessons about information systems can be drawn. One is that, in addition to the standard early warning information collected, the humanitarian community ought to pay much closer attention to assets and to the coping capacity of vulnerable populations. The underlying process of destitution in rural Ethiopia was known, but was not widely incorporated into early warning analysis before the crisis. Second, early warning systems developed for agricultural areas probably require greater adaptation before being used in pastoral areas (Maxwell, 2002:52-53).

Retrospectively even it was not because of lack of information or warning that the tragedies of 1973-74 and 1984-85 famines occurred in the country. There were ample evidences even in the then RRC documents and provincial offices that such tragedy could occur. Therefore, it was not because of lack of prior warning or information that those famines took the lives of thousands of people. It was because of the Imperial and the Derg regimes’ and even international donors’ inactions or delays that led to those disasters⁹⁴. Even currently it is not fair to attribute averting famine only to DPPA⁹⁵ early warning system, given the proliferation of a dozen of NGOs engaged in food crisis monitoring and relief assistance more than any time in the country’s history. In relation to this Mesfin (1991:5) states that, “starvation has not disappeared. But thanks to a multitude of NGOs who closely monitor the situation, starvation has not been allowed to develop into famine since 1984-85”. Therefore, the knotty or crux of the matter is to address vulnerability which is in fact political as some writers put it (Bender, 1999 cited in Heijimans, 2004). And it requires political change and commitment more than channeling relief aid and public relation to prevent famine.

Retrospectively even it was not because of lack of information or warning that the tragedies of 1973-74 and 1984-85 famines occurred in the country. There were ample evidences even in the then RRC documents and provincial offices that such tragedy could occur. Therefore, it was not because of lack of prior warning or information that those famines took the lives of thousands of people. It was because of the Imperial and the Derg regimes’ and even international donors’ inactions or delays that led to those disasters⁹⁴. Even currently it is not fair to attribute averting famine only to DPPA⁹⁵ early warning system, given the proliferation of a dozen of NGOs engaged in food crisis monitoring and relief assistance more than any time in the country’s history. In relation to this Mesfin (1991:5) states that, “starvation has not disappeared. But thanks to a multitude of NGOs who closely monitor the situation, starvation has not been allowed to develop into famine since 1984-85”. Therefore, the knotty or crux of the matter is to address vulnerability which is in fact political as some writers put it (Bender, 1999 cited in Heijimans, 2004). And it requires political change and commitment more than channeling relief aid and public relation to prevent famine.