Conflict Management and Resolution

As it is true in all societies, different sorts of disputes and conflicts occur in Afar community.

These include inter and intra-clan disputes over clan land or other resources (pasture and watering points) and conflict with non-Afar migrants and neighbouring ethnic groups (Issa, Oromo, Amhara, Argoba, Tigre). Though there is some degree of tolerance to accommodate each other, conflicts between clans over scarce resources, and disputes over or claims on territories are common among the pastoral Afar (Yacob et al., 2000: 16). In this connection, the Afar say, “We love each other, but we will quarrel with each other, if it comes to land. It means there is no compromise over clan land.” (Getachew, 2001a:62).

In Afar community most inter and intra clan conflicts and disputes are settled by their traditional authorities: elders, clan leaders, Fimaa and religious leaders. The pastoral Afar have their own customary law (Ada/maada) which is effective in conflict management and resolution. As stated above the Afar are organized into clans, each with clan leader, Fimaa-abba, and group of elders (Daar-edola). At each level these leaders manage the internal affairs including conflict management and resolution. They organize assembly to handle disputes according to the Afar customary law (Maada) through which disputes within and between clans are settled. The Islamic law (Sharia) is also used alongside the Afar customary law. In relation to this, Sheikhs are important in assisting the traditional authorities, especially when conflicting parties need to swear on Quran and to seal the case with pronouncing Fatiha (i.e. the completion of litigation). The Sheikhs work along with clan leaders and elders in settling disputes in addition to teaching and prayers services in their community. Let us closely look at how the pastoral Afar handle ordinary and severe cases through their customary laws.

The pastoral Afar apply their customary law to adjudicate criminal acts and ordinary cases. In pastoral Afar crime is a collective responsibility of the clan to which a culprit or offender belongs. The responsibility for any criminal act is not restricted to the party committing the crime. It includes the lineage of the criminal in particular and his clan in general. The closer one lies in a clan bond to the criminal, the greater the portion of responsibility that falls on him (Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in Voelkner, 1974: iv in annex-b).

A given case is often processed in an Afar tribunal. A council of elders can be summoned at clan or lineage level to see a case or one’s grievance brought to the attention of elders.

Jamaluddin (1973) described the procedure for an ordinary case as follows:

… the plaintiff brings his grievance to the attention of the elders. The elders construct Maro. Maro is a session to be held in a circle-like manner under a tree shade. Maro consists of plaintiffs, defendants, jury and observers. Once a Maro is set, the Makaban gives the first right of speech to the plaintiff. But before doing this

the elders ask both parties to name guarantors (Habi) who are asked to bring Lekeaysso¹²². Both the plaintiff and the defendant have the right to speak in person or through an advocate according to their wishes. The plaintiff then addresses his speech to one of the persons in Maro and spells out details of his case. Then the defendant answers the charges levelled at him by the plaintiff. If it seems necessary, both parties are once again given the right of rebuttal. Then the Makaban asks someone among the Maro to give a short resume of what was said by the plaintiffs and the defendants. After all this remains to Makaban to investigate the argument put forward by both sides and decide. Then recourse is made to the Maada (customary law) to find out a fitting punishment (Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in Voelkner, 1974: vi, in annex-b).

Jamaluddin (1973) stated that unless it is for Billu (case involving murder); the process for the rest of Mable (litigation) is the same. But punishment (compensation) differs from case to case. The case of Billu does not require Mable but there are certain ways in which Ama (reconciliation) is conducted. Hence, the procedure for murder case is described below:

…when a member of a clan kills somebody from another clan; two courses are open to the former. The clan members can either leave the area immediately and appeal to other clans to act as a go-between and help them make peace with the concerned clan, or they can stand their ground and let the bereaved clan take vengeance upon the killer, but prepare to defend themselves if the clan exceeds the rule of vengeance. If vengeance is not taken immediately, the other clans in the area try to reconcile (Ama) the two clans by the payment of Diat (compensation for murder). If this is accepted by the bereaved clan, a general meeting of the clans in the area is called. The clan of the killer is called upon to provide Sepa - a sort of Lekeaysso for the Makaban. The two clans are then stationed at separate places for the purpose of facilitating mediation. The Billu is judged according to the Maada. After this, members of the murderer’s clan disarmed including sticks and wearing garments in a loose manner are taken over to where the bereaved clan is stationed. They follow the Makaban in single file repeating after him Yalial Habai Nel Rasa (forgive and forget) to members of the bereaved clan who remain seated during the whole process. After this the Makaban pronounces the Fataha and that seals the case (Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in Voelkner, 1974: vi-vii in annex-b).

The Afar customary law (maada) embraces eight basic principles. They are the essence, the types of crime, the responsibility, the category of crime, the punishment, the varieties of bodily injuries, the compensation, and the execution. Fines for each category of criminal acts and a standard compensation for each category of body injuries are prescribed in the Afar community (for details of each see Voelkner, 1974: vi-vii, in annex-b).

The Afar traditional rules stipulate the number of animals to be paid as fine or compensation for killings or other offences. Compensation and fines are often paid in the form of animals.

For instance in the study community kidnapping a girl (one’s Absuma) ¹²³ involves a fine of 12 cattle, raping 36 cattle, marrying a widow without the permission of the legitimate heir 36

122 Lekeaysso is an amount collectable from plaintiff and defendant and payable to the jury for conducting the litigation.

123 According to the institution of cross-cousin marriage and levirate institution, each girl and widow has a legitimate husband and heir respectively. Marriage and inheritance outside of the prescriptions of these institutions involve punishment. If not handled by elders when individuals violate these rules, it may lead to conflicts between offenders and legitimate claimants.

cattle¹²⁴. Blood compensation paid for the victim’s family is 55 cattle per person killed, and compensation paid for wounded person varies from 12-30 cattle depending on the seriousness of the injury. Relatives and clan members together have to help pay the compensations. This practice gives the whole clan an interest in preventing violence, because all clan members must help pay the fine if one of their relatives or members is found guilty.

Generally in Afar pastoral community conflicts can take place at three levels: intra-clan, inter-clan and inter-ethnic. The causes may include claims on or access to resource (land, grazing, and watering points), animal theft, adultery, raids and counter raids, insults, etc. Intra-clan and inter-clan conflicts are often resolved according to the socio-political structure, depending on the level of conflict. Disputes, which arise between neighbourhoods or individuals related by kinship or marriage, are handled by relatives, neighbours and friends of disputants. These mediators act on the basis of social obligations. They cool down emotions, investigate causes and resolve disputes.

Conflicts that cannot be managed by the extended family leader (Dahla Abba) will be passed on to the sub-clan or clan level chief (Makabantu). Serious disputes are often managed by the council of clan elders (Mabilo) summoned by the clan chief (Makabantu). Likewise inter-clan conflicts/serious disputes like homicide, stealing, and heavy physical injury are often managed by elders council (Mabilo) consisting of the respective clan leaders (Makabantu) of the disputants. Therefore, on the basis of these principles the Afar traditional authorities apply customary rules in handling murder and ordinary cases in their respective local communities.

The Afar also use various institutions or mechanisms to settle conflicts/disagreements that can arise with their neighbouring communities. For instance in northern part of the Afar Region where the Ab’ala Afar interface with Tigray community, the institution called Gereb is used to resolve any disputes which may arise between them. Gereb court is established by elders of both sides to try and resolve disputes (Kelemework, 2002). Likewise elders and religious leaders attempt to resolve disputes between the Afar and neighbouring Oromos.

Afar-Issa conflicts used to be settled through the initiative of elders. First three women tying sheep’s flesh onto their neck are sent to the victim’s group to show sympathy and the need for a peace deal. Peace deal is inferred if the women delegates come back adding another three women from the victim’s side. Subsequently elders would do the same and negotiation is made. Then a compensation of 55 cattle per person killed is paid to the victims. Peace deal is usually wrapped up with cultural ceremonies and religious rituals (Yirgalem, 2001). Over the past decades, however, Afar and Issa traditional conflict management systems are disrupted with the changing context of conflicts. The traditional systems of conflict management are overwhelmed by external factors and incapable with the changing context of the conflict. The

124 The fine for the act of adducting a widow involves paying more cattle. This is because a widow may have children and wealth in which case only a close relative to the children has to take responsibility for them and their resources. Thus the legitimate right to inherit a widow is vested only on the brother or close relative of the deceased. The community strongly disapproves remarrying of a widow to an outsider who has no blood relation to the deceased. The logic behind this is that an outsider misuses children’s resource and does not properly nurture them. Moreover, the resource of the deceased is often viewed as communal property of the extended family (i.e. his brothers, sisters and uncles). Thus an outsider is not allowed to get access to the deceased’s resources through marrying the widow.

traditional animal raiding which both parties involve have taken new dimensions due to historical and socio-political processes taking place in the countries of the Horn of Africa.

The Issa’s intrusion into the Afar land has increased over the past decades as a result of the following factors:

• Historically and now the Afar and Issa-Somalis in Djibouti compete for power dominance. The Issa-dominated government in Djibouti favours the Issa-Somalis in Ethiopia. This has an influence on relations between Ethiopian Afar and Issa-Somalis in Ethiopia.

• The proliferation of firearms and the Issas became well-armed. Contraband traders proliferates firearms for sale, and hence this increases the level of conflict and its context. The Issa-Somalis have better access to border livestock trade and contraband trade through Djibouti and Somalia, as their clan groups have political dominance in these two countries. Therefore, the increased involvement of Issas into contraband trade affects Afar-Issa economic and power balances.

• The Ogaden question and related war with Somalia that created inflow or access to various firearms for Issa-Somalis in Ethiopia.

• Lack of substantial support to the Afar from their respective governments, and the tendency to perceive them as separatists with a vision for “one Afar” in the Horn of Africa. One of the political problems in the Horn of Africa is the Afar ethno-centric politics, which aspires for an independent "Afar state" in the Horn sub-region. The Afar who now live in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea have already developed such a political aspiration. Those in Ethiopia clearly want self-determination for all of the Afar peoples. Some of those in Djibouti are struggling against the Issa-dominated regime (Kebede, 2005:2). Thus political conflicts from Djibouti spill over into the territory of Ethiopian Afar.

• Lack of inter-state cooperation to stem border conflicts and promote cross-border trade (Getachew, 2001a). The political and economic marginalization of the Afar in their respective countries makes them hostile to the central governments in the sub-region. These neighbouring states also use the Afar insurgent groups for subversive activities against each other (Kebede, 2005:3-4).

• The current ethnic-based federal system in Ethiopia has added conflict to the long-aged Afar-Issa conflict over boundary, as both sides are involved in border claim and counter claims in order put territories under their respective domains.

In general the Afar have been affected by the political changes and processes which have taken place in Horn countries (i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia). The separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia has split the Afar into two countries. The Djibouti Afar Liberation Movement against the Issa-dominated government in Djibouti had a consequence on the Ethiopian Afar. The Issa-dominated government considered the Ethiopian Afar as having allied with dissidents in the Djibouti. Thus the Djibouti government curtailed the hitherto easy

movement of the Ethiopian Afar into the Djibouti. Moreover, the Ethiopian government is using the Djibouti port and this has influenced the arbitration process since Djibouti is ruled by the Issa-dominated government. In most cases the Afar are losers of the Ethiopian triangular relationship with Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea (Yirgalem, 2001).

As a result of the all these socio-economic and political processes, mistrust and enmity between Afar and Issa has increased in the past three decades. Moreover, the frequency of raiding and killing has increased. Therefore, traditional conflict management systems have overwhelmed by external factors and have been ineffective. Consequently conflict resolution is now taken over by government-sponsored peace committees that comprise community representatives, Afar Regional Government, Somali Regional Government and the Ministry of Federal Affairs. However, this government approach did not bring sustainable peace between Afar and Issa due to the following reasons (Yirgalem, 2001, Yacob et al., 2000):

• The religious and cultural values used to disapprove retaliation and to strengthen negotiation processes between Afar and Issa have been eroded in the past decades due to the factors mentioned above.

• The community representatives (elders) are refraining from meetings feeling insecure.

They are unhappy about poor communication among stakeholders and complain about the attempts of officials to arbitrate than to mediate.

• At grassroots level the communities have lost trust on the committees for not achieving sustainable peace, despite a series of peace conferences sponsored by the Federal Government.

• Absence of development programmes that involve warring groups working cooperatively and without fear of encroachment or displacement from their traditional incumbency.

• The failure of the government to settle the territorial issues by employing fair and equitable method of territorial allocation.

In general, conflicts in the Afar Region take place at three levels: intra-clan, inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts. The first two types of conflicts are still managed by the existing traditional conflict management system. On the other hand inter-ethnic conflicts, especially Afar-Issa conflicts have become very violent and are beyond the capacity of traditional dispute management systems.