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Forward

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Dr. Jürgen Renn, Director of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, who supported my pre-doctoral research from the early ideation, through all of its ups and downs until the final line of the disputatio at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Beyond that, the Institute enabled my research project by granting me a PhD scholarship and providing a fruitful work environment, while the well-organized MPIWG library offered me the opportunity to assemble the majority of the material for this book.

I am obliged to Professor Dr. Mitchell Ash for his commentaries and insights from his vast knowledge in the history of psychology, as well as for being part of my PhD committee de- spite the geographical distance. I would like to also thank Dr. Alexandre Métraux for advising me on questions related to Lewin’s philosophy of science.

Moreover, I am highly indebted to Dr. Massimilano Badino for his scholarly advice, but even more so for his friendship and moral support whenever I needed it. In addition to that, he en- couraged and prepared me to present my work in a variety of international conferences. I warmly thank my co-fellows, soon-to-be Dr. Sascha Freyberg and Dr. Sebastian Zacharias for being good friends during the joint work on our dissertations. Besides that, Sascha’s ad- vice was crucial in reconstructing the many historical and intellectual facets of the Weimar academic culture while Sebastian helped to stringently organize and structure my text.

Further acknowledgements go to the sadly deceased Dr. Peter Damerow, who stayed late after hours and took me out for lunch to discuss the progress on my thesis. I am grateful to Dr. Matteo Valleriani, Dr. Matthias Schemmel and Dr. Pietro Omodeo for delivering valuable commentaries and suggestions during the writing-up of my dissertation.

Beyond that, I am most indebted to my numerous friends – albeit I wouldn’t want to press them into a long meaningless list but rather to thank them personally – for being there for me in good and in bad times, sharing cookies and tea, at times commenting on pieces of my thought and supporting me with their positive words and attitudes. Last but not least, I thank my dear husband, Tal Schechter, for saving the dissertation after a computer breakdown and helping with the final editing.

Finally, it is my parents, who taught me the value of knowledge and education from the infant age on, thereby laying the groundwork for the entirety of my academic achievements.

The bottom line: The years spent on the PhD have made me stronger, taught me to deal with disappointments, loss of energy and self-confidence, and at the end of the day always, al- ways pick myself up and continue striving for my goals. Finally, and most importantly, this arduous path of my doctorate taught me how important it is in life to choose the right goals and to carefully pick your battles.

Anna Perlina

Contents

Introduction 4

0.1 Between two poles: Psychology as an academic discipline . . . 4

0.2 Kurt Lewin and the challenges of his experimental program . . . 5

0.3 Theoretical framework, state of research and contribution of this work . . . 6

0.4 Methodological note . . . 11

0.5 Main sources . . . 12

0.6 Contexts of Lewin’s psychological work . . . 13

0.7 Structure of the work . . . 14

I Experimental psychology between two poles 16

1.2 The first experimental laboratory: Wundt in Leipzig . . . 19

1.3 Measurement of higher mental functions: Hermann Ebbinghaus in Breslau and Halle . . 21

1.4 Psychology as an exact science: Georg Elias Müller in Göttingen . . . 22

1.5 A mediation attempt: Carl Stumpf in Berlin . . . 23

1.6 Revival of introspection: The Würzburg School . . . 24

1.7 Early experimental styles in summary . . . 25

2 Defining psychology’s territory (1910–1933) 28 2.1 Psychology’s struggle for existence:Lehrstuhlstreit . . . 28

2.2 The functional commitment: Psychology as aNaturwissenschaft . . . 30

3 The whole and the parts: Gestalt in Weimar Germany 32 3.1 Gestalt psychology coming of age . . . 33

3.2 Principles of Gestalt . . . 36

3.3 Stumpf’s heritage in the Gestalt theory: Continuity and discontinuity . . . 39

3.4 Institutional standing of the Gestalt school . . . 41

3.5 Interdisciplinary ambitions . . . 43

3.6 Hopes and disappointments in the socio-political arena . . . 45

Part I Conclusion: Experimental psychology between two poles 48

II Interdisciplinary roots of Lewin’s theory of human conduct 50

4.2 Lewin in the early role conflict between epistemology and experimentation (1911–1921) . 52 4.2.1 The doctorate: Stick to experimentation! . . . 53

4.2.2 TheHabilitation: In no man’s land . . . . 54

4.3 Lewin and the (other) Gestalt psychologists (1922–1934) . . . 56

4.3.1 Lewin’s niche . . . 56

4.3.2 The contradictions . . . 58

5 Constitution of new concepts in Lewin’s pragmatic philosophy of science 60

5.1 Cassirer’s impact . . . 61

5.2 Main traits of Lewin’s comparative theory of science . . . 63

5.3 Phenomenological vs. conditional-genetic concepts . . . 64

5.4 Rule vs. law . . . 65

5.5 Experiment and the construction of psychological types . . . 66

5.6 Experiment and the revelation of the “ideal” case . . . 67

5.7 Challenges of Lewin’s philosophy of science . . . 69

6 Towards a dynamic psychology of human conduct 71 6.1 Associanist psychology . . . 71

6.2 Early experimental psychology of will . . . 72

6.3 Replacing images through processes . . . 74

6.4 From psychology of will to Lewin’s dynamic holism . . . 74

6.5 Comparative summary and implications . . . 78

7 Natural-scientific analogies in psychology of human conduct 81 7.1 The place of natural-scientific concepts in the psychological theory . . . 81

7.2 Lewin’s dynamic model of psychic processes . . . 83

7.3 The field concept . . . 85

7.4 The field in Gestalt and in Lewin’s psychology of human conduct . . . 87

Part II Conclusion Interdisciplinary roots of Lewin’s theory of human conduct 93

III Berlin Experimental Program 95

8.2 Types of experiments . . . 100

8.2.1 Perception . . . 100

8.2.2 Quantifiable invariant relations . . . 101

8.2.3 Psycho-physiological Gestalt correlates . . . 102

8.3 Experimental principles . . . 103

8.4 Implications of the Gestalt experiments . . . 104

8.5 “One long discussion”: Lewin’s student circle in Berlin . . . 105

8.6 Lewin’s experiments on human conduct . . . 107

8.6.1 Experiment as a social situation . . . 108

8.6.2 Deception methods . . . 108

8.6.3 Experimenting with different hierarchies . . . 109

8.6.4 Open research design, context-dependent conduct and preprogrammed interactivity110 8.6.5 Qualitative vs. quantitative research . . . 111

8.6.6 Exemplary experimental design: Dembo’s study of anger . . . 112

8.6.7 Lewin’s experiments in context . . . 112

9 Development of Lewin’s conceptual system: A roadmap 114 9.1 The analytical challenge of Lewin’s experiments . . . 117

9.2 Resumption of interrupted activities . . . 118

9.3 Level of aspiration . . . 120

9.4 Substitution . . . 123

9.5 Material properties of the field . . . 124

9.6 Topological extensions towards person-environment-interaction . . . 130

9.7 From experiment to concept formation . . . 131

10 The analytical challenge of topology 134

10.1 From geometry to psychology . . . 134

10.2 The analytical procedure: Abstraction, representation, topological space . . . 136

10.3 Extensions of topological psychology: Distance and direction . . . 141

10.4 Functions of the topological representations . . . 142

10.5 A tool for social research . . . 143

10.6 Lewin’s brand in critical discussion . . . 145

Part III Conclusion: Berlin Experimental Program 148

IV Work results and epilogue 155

11.2 Local trends and Gestalt challenges in North America . . . 157

11.3 Lewin in Iowa: Socio-psychological experiments and the evolution of style . . . 160

11.4 Experiments in the field . . . 163

11.5 Extension and limits of the topological field theory . . . 165

11.6 Creating an infrastructure for applied social research . . . 167

11.7 Conclusion: Towards an applied social psychology . . . 169

12 Lewin’s legacy and keys to innovation 171 12.1 Lewin’s core achievements in the historical context . . . 171

12.1.1 Between two poles . . . 171

12.1.2 Key achievements of Lewin’s circle’s German work . . . 173

12.1.3 The network and the academic milieu . . . 175

12.1.4 The aftermath . . . 175

12.2 The epistemic cycle: On the constitution and evolution of knowledge systems . . . 176

12.2.1 Function of the network as a research function . . . 176

12.2.2 Sources of knowledge . . . 176

12.2.3 Shift of emphasis: Circulation of knowledge between theory and experiment . . . . 179

12.2.4 Multi-stage process supervision . . . 180

12.2.5 Maturation of the body of knowledge over time . . . 181

12.3 The disappearing footprints: From a river to rivulets . . . 181

12.3.1 North American reception . . . 182

12.3.2 German and East-European reception . . . 184

Appendix 187

A BEP: works, participants, experimental periods 187

B List of Abbreviations 191

C List of Figures 192

D List of Tables 192

References 193

Introduction

This dissertation represents a historical reconstruction of the development and transformation of Ger- man experimental psychology between the emergence of the first experimental laboratory in 1879 and itsGleichschaltungby the Nazi regime in the 1930s. It traces the evolution of the conceptual as well as the experimental framework of psychology over the course of these years following three generations of experimental research. Hereby, the work attempts to grasp how early experimental psychology ne- gotiated its place between the humanities and the natural sciences. The project’s major focus lies in the period between 1922 and 1936, in which Kurt Lewin’s Berlin Experimental Program on Action and Emotions took place. The work specifically investigates the process of constitution of Lewin’s field the- ory, a system of concepts coined by Lewin in order to study psychological processes underlying human conduct. The dissertation shows how Lewin’s concepts emerged out of interdisciplinary sources, and how experimental practices in psychology triggered the emergence of new knowledge. Eventually, it is shown how the investigated historical case of Gestalt psychology in Berlin fits into and plays a decisive role in the long-term development of experimental psychology.

0.1 Between two poles: Psychology as an academic discipline

At present, we live in an age of interdisciplinary research fields. Promising research is conducted in dis- ciplines as diverse as biochemistry, neuroscience, organizational informatics, meteorology, psycholin- guistics and the epistemic history of science. Pioneers of such emerging cross-border disciplines have both the appropriate expertise accumulated in their “parental” disciplines as well as the ability to de- marcate their own territory. They have to prove the novelty and usefulness of their cross-disciplinary approach in order to eventually achieve scholarly and social acceptance. These academic challenges are today as relevant as they can be.

If one looks back at the period of the emergence of experimental psychology in the late 19th century, one finds obvious parallels with present day’s development of any new discipline. What now seems a firmly established academic field needed to develop and establish shared concepts, methodological procedures, and negotiate its own academic space over 100 years. Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founding fathers of experimental psychology, thought that psychology should become the foundational discipline for the human sciences.¹Instead, two rather different but related things happened. Psychology became a core discipline that took up a special place among the sciences. It was encircled by methodological orientations derived from the physical and physiological sciences, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, treated problems extending into the social and human sciences. In today’s German universities we often find psychology in a department on its own, not immediately allied either with the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), cultural studies (Kulturwissenschaften), nor with the department of science (Naturwissenschaften). One will notice, however, that in different countries the concept of the discipline as well as its academic identity varies. For instance while North American psychology tends to be part of neuroscience (relying as firmly as possible on precision-oriented methodology), psychology in the Russian-speaking countries and in Japan is conceptually and methodologically much more strongly integrated into the framework of the humanities. On this scale, German psychology is today situated in the middle. The reasons for this state of affairs can be found in the long-term history of psychology.

Having historical evidence at hand, this work will trace and review core patterns of the early constitution of psychology in Germany in order to gain insights not only about the past but also about the present and possible future of cross-border knowledge domains or disciplines like experimental psychology.

The history of experimental psychology is that of a “dual allegiance” and the negotiation between the humanities and natural sciences. These negotiations, however, have never been as intense as in the first

1Cf. [Wundt, 1908b].

few decades of the emergence and establishment of the discipline, i.e. the period treated in the present dissertation. From 1879 to 1930s is the time span when German-language psychology most intensively negotiated, defined and sub-structured its own space, a space between other disciplines. The present work attempts to follow the pathway in which the early experimental psychology in Germany defined its territory at the socio-academic, conceptual and experimental level. We particularly delineate the institutional controversy between philosophers-theorists and experimentalists that persisted over this whole period. We discuss the research styles practiced by various pioneering experimentalists, who had little in common aside from their shared belief that mental life could and should be explored in a controlled set up, as well as their expectation to gain measurable and reproducible results. We outline how functional requirements of World War I boosted the fast growth of applied psychology in Europe, and stimulated a significant methodological turn towards the “mechanistic” and statistics-based research styles. Eventually, we thematize the postwar spread of humanistic psychology, such as holism. In the 1920s and 1930s, a particular case of holism was represented by Gestalt, a psychology concerned with the analysis of conscious human experience and structures along which this was organized. The effort to combine scientific and philosophical in-depth expertise in the Gestalt approach to psychological research is the starting point of this historical study of Kurt Lewin’s research program in Berlin.

0.2 Kurt Lewin and the challenges of his experimental program

In today’s psychological textbooks Kurt Lewin is most often referred to as the father of social psychology, which found a particularly broad audience in the course of his American career. Nevertheless, the theo- retical substructure that allowed for the exploration of socio-psychological reality, was elaborated much earlier, in Lewin’s work in Berlin. The present dissertation focusses on the formation of this theoreti- cal substructure retrospectively referred to as “field theory” (or, when pointing to one of its extensions,

“topological psychology”, “dynamic theory” or “vector psychology”).

A detailed historical case study was conducted to provide detailed insights contributing to the under- standing of the history of science. To this end we have selected a protagonist, who was critically involved in the interdisciplinary milieu which psychology grew from. Making use of the interdisciplinary impact he succeeded to develop an individual theoretical and experimental approach: Kurt Lewin (1890–1947).

The nucleus of our investigation lies in in-depth analysis of Lewin’s work in the period between 1921 and 1936. In this time span Lewin held a position as Hans Rupp’s assistant, and later on got an As- sociate Professorship at the Psychological Institute of Berlin (until 1932/33), then headed by Wolfgang Köhler. During this whole period Lewin was working under the auspices of the then-flourishing Gestalt school of psychology, one of the most influential psychological schools of the interwar period. Together with his disciples he implemented a Research Program on Action and Emotions (Untersuchungen zu Handlungs- und Affektpsychologie), which laid the pathway towards the new field of the psychology of human conduct.

While Lewin’s research program took place in the middle of the above-mentioned controversy on the nature and place of experimental psychology Lewin had to face its boundaries and exploit its advantages both on the socio-academic and epistemic level. When Lewin started his investigations, neither a unified psychological theory, nor a shared conceptual or methodological framework had yet existed. Instead, a few scholars in laboratories scattered throughout the country tackled particular problems then attributed to psychology (e.g. related to memory, will or perception) by means of experimentation. In other words, at a time when psychology lacked an integrated theoretical system, Lewin emphasized the need and suggested a way to develop such a system, termed “field theory”.

The field theory is a “conceptualizationof behavior [in terms of] an attempt to describe the essential here-and-now situation (field) in which a person participates. It assumes that if one fully understood a person’s ’situation’ (in the broadest meaning of this term), one would fully

understand his behavior. Hence, the goal of field theory is to be able to describe fields with systematic concepts in such a precise way that a given person’s behavior follows logically from the relationship between the person and the dynamics and structure of his concrete situation”.²

Therefore the "field theory can hardly be called a theory in the usual sense. [It] is probably best charac- terized as a method: namely, a method of analyzing causal relations and of building scientific constructs"

[Lewin, 1942a, 45].

Against this background, the seminal questions of the present dissertation focuses on problems related to Lewin’s German work and in a wider sense his pathway towards a new branch of psychology. These questions are:

What innovation did Kurt Lewin contribute to contemporary psychology? How did Lewin’s and his colleagues’ empirical work bring about the development of a new system of knowledge?

What role does Kurt Lewin’s contribution, in particular his early professional experience in Germany, play in the history of experimental psychology as an academic discipline?

0.3 Theoretical framework, state of research and contribution of this work

Historical epistemology

This dissertation is motivated by a methodological approach in the history of science calledhistorical epistemology, a specific version of which results from a collaborative research effort centered at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. A recent overview article by Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm identifies three versions of contemporary historical epistemologies developed in the works of Lorraine Daston, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Jürgen Renn (and in various associated studies).³

“Historical epistemology may be viewed as a branch of the history of science, namely one that looks at (a) the histories of epistemic concepts (e.g., observation, rationality, probability) or (b) the histories of the objects of scientific inquiry (e.g., heredity, life, gravity) or (c) the dynamics of scientific developments, as they can be extracted from an analysis of scientific texts or practices” [Sturm and Feest, 2008, 3].⁴

The present work is inspired by the last approach. For this reason, further on we refer to the theoretical framework put forward by Jürgen Renn. This approach exhibits several specific features. First, even when dealing with specific historical events the intention behind it is the explaining of general structures and repeating patterns. Second, the historical approach draws on the idea of a certain continuity of historical events closely linked with the shared accumulation of knowledge (rather than widely indepen- dent historical epochs determined by different knowledge and thinking structures). Third, the approach emphasizes the necessity to reflect both the social and the cognitive structures of knowledge; the lat- ter being manifested in “external representations”, i.e. tools, language and other symbolic systems. If applied to long-term historical processes,historical epistemology leads to the view that large changes of (scientific) knowledge systems are not primarily a result of outstanding individual achievements by a few geniuses but rather emerge in certain socio-historical constellations as a result of an accumulation of practical experience and its abstract interpretation. Their framework is always constructed within a certain socio-historical context. In other words, the inventive capacity of individual scholars is to a large extent nourished by knowledge and beliefs they consciously or unconsciously share with a group of

2This nice definition originates from an early systematic study of selected contributions from Lewin’s Berlin group, [de Rivera, 1976, 3, emphasis original].

3One will certainly find other concepts ofhistorical epistemology. See for instance [Canguilhem, 1988].

4Cf. also [Feest and Sturm, 2011].

contemporaries.⁵ Shifts in knowledge systems (inter alia, conceptual systems) over time are historical transformations. The emergence and institutionalization of novel knowledge systems involve social and cognitive factors, as well as the accumulation of a certain type of experience.⁶ From this perspective, we investigate how the interplay of various intellectual, biographical and social contexts nourished the inventive process in the case of Lewin’s psychological research in Berlin.

Lewin’s Berlin work for the English reader

Research publications devoted to the work of Kurt Lewin are too numerous to be referred to in detail.

More than a hundred monographs, research articles and commentaries particularly concerned with the historiography of Lewin’s work are listed in the bibliography of this dissertation alone. Additionally, since the 1950s references to Lewin became a standard part of most of international handbooks and textbooks on psychology as well as in university curricula. A variety of semi-popular and semi-accurate images of Lewin’s contribution to modern psychology has been published. Yet, despite this abundance of research literature, one will have difficulties to find even a handful of research contributions mainly focusing on the German-language sources originating from the years 1911 to 1936, as does this work. In contrast to the absolute majority of existing research literature, this dissertation is explicitly concerned with Lewin’s German work conducted foremostly in Berlin. The two studies–-Die experimentelle Willenspsychologie Kurt Lewins(1966) by Josef Schwermer andDas Frühwerk Kurt Lewins(1998) by Simone Wittmann—to my knowledge, represent the only earlier attempts to understand Lewin’s German theoretical work as a whole.⁷ However, these contributions are written in German. The sources which the present dissertation draws on have not been entirely translated into English (or any other language) until now. A couple of unpublished dissertations by students of Lewin’s may still rest in the archives. Considering that the present dissertation is the first work to offer an extended critical analysis of Lewin’s and his groups’

German-language work in English we hope to offer a source-based and detailed discussion on these German sources to English-speaking scholars.

Roots and constitution of Lewin’s field theory

Concepts represent knowledge units around which we center the present investigation. They are fun- damental elements of the mental system by which we structure our perception of the world. Compared to theories, they are implicitly embedded into the argumentation and therefore often escape the re- searcher’s attention.⁸ Also in the history of psychology conceptual transformations play a role that can hardly be overestimated. As emphasized by historian Kurt Danziger, “the coming of modern psychology was associated with a revolutionary restructuring of the network of categories employed in the concep- tualization of human experience and conduct” [Danziger, 1997, 36]. Against this backdrop, the present dissertation particularly explores the constitution of a conceptual system for a psychology of human conduct by Kurt Lewin and his closest colleagues. Rather than presenting a fully fledged theory Lewin builds on experimental studies and meta-theoretical organization principle to progressively elaborate his own conceptual system or network.

From various historical examples we know that conceptual shifts tend to disappear from the historical picture, or to be reconstructed as the "discovery of facts".⁹ The Polish immunologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck further clarified:

5See [Renn, 1994], [Renn et al., 2001], [Renn, 2006], [Damerow and Lefevre, 1994], [Damerow et al., 2004], [Damerow and Renn, 2012], [Schemmel, 2008].

6Cf. the historiographical framework developed by the research cluster644 Transformations of Antiquity,particularly the section

“Was ist und was will Transformationsforschung?” [Böhme et al., 2007, 10f.].

7See [Schwermer, 1966] and [Wittmann, 1998].

8Amongst others cf. [Steinle, 2005b, 530].

9Cf. [Fleck, 1994, 114].

“If after years we were to look back upon a field we have worked in, we could no longer see or understand the difficulties present in that creative work [. . . ]. But how could it be any different? We can no longer express the previously incomplete thoughts with these now finished concepts” (Fleck 1935).¹⁰

Therefore, the particular interest of this dissertation does not lie in the analysis of a conceptual system at a presumably fixed moment of time but in grasping its change over time.¹¹

Kurt Lewin’s German work offers rich material for a study of the constitution of new conceptual systems in modern history of science. The present dissertation reflects his intellectual pathway. Through a dynamic and explorative approach Lewin increasingly refines his conceptual system. Our work follows this transformation. We reconstruct the knowledge in psychology of will that was accessible to Lewin’s predecessors at the turn of the 20th century. Using this as a starting point, the dissertation delivers a comprehensive analysis of the way Lewin re-shaped the framework of his experimental program. We shall demonstrate how this drew on various roots, such as Gestalt theory, his epistemic agenda, as well as experience collected in the early psychology of will and accumulated in physics, biology and physiology. Moreover, we will take into account social impact factors such as encounters of the Weimar academic culture as well as the structure of research at the Psychological Institute of Berlin.

Research studying the same period of Lewin’s career mainly focussed on different aspects but delivered inspiring impulses to the present investigation. In Die experimentelle Willenspsychologie Kurt Lewins (1966) Schwermer discusses Lewin’s psychology of will of the years 1916 to 1931, looking systemati- cally and accurately at a variety of concepts that are part of Lewin’s theory of action (Handlungslehre).

For its contextualization he applies the prism of Lewin’s philosophy of science, and introduces further influences in contemporary philosophy and psychology, however, abstaining from explicit historical or epistemological contextualizations. InDas Frühwerk Kurt Lewins(1998) Wittmann searches for socio- psychological aspects in Lewin’s German work, subdividing this into two blocks, i.e. his field concept and philosophy of science. To my knowledge hers is the only extensive work focussing on the field concept in Lewin’s German work.¹²While Wittmann’s monograph gives a rather detailed account on the philosophy-related contexts of Lewin’s work, including Ernst Cassirer’s and Hans Reichenbach’s influ- ence, it is limited to rather general characteristics of his field concept: Only a few selected concepts—e.g.

defiance (Trotz) and the life space or field—are discussed.

The research perspective adopted in this dissertation is new, as shall be explained at the following few pages. First, the work shows that Lewin’s quest for a novel, unified psychology of human conduct started in the academic “no man’s land” between an epistemic and a scientific view of psychology that at the time had no institutional niche. He experienced difficulties defending the research that he conducted in this period as his experimental investigations were obviously inspired by ideas originating from philosophy of science. The Gestalt school of psychology finally offered a convenient niche for his interdisciplinary research. The socio-academic background of Lewin’s work is taken into account while studying his intellectual decisions.

Second, we reconstruct Lewin’s conceptual system (that will be later framed as “field theory”) as it existed by 1926, and trace its conceptual roots back to its interdisciplinary origins. On the basis of this case study we demonstrate that the preexisting approaches to psychology of will relied on a rather simple “mechanistic” model while the psychology of human conduct developed by Lewin was based on a complex fine-grained distinction of mechanisms underlying behavior. Lewin struggled to frame each of these mechanisms into concepts as specifically as possible and to interconnect these concepts in a

10“Blickt man nach Jahren auf ein selbst bearbeitetes Gebiet zurück, so sieht und versteht man die Nöte der Schöpferarbeit nicht mehr, man rationalisiert, schematisiert den Entwicklungsweg der Arbeit: man transmittiert die Ergebnisse in die Absichten.

Wie könnte es auch anders sein? Man besitzt jetzt fertige Begriffe, mit denen unfertige Gedanken nicht mehr ausgedrückt werden können” [Fleck, 1994, 114].

11Cf. [Steinle, 2005b, 531].

12A short and comprehensive German-language introduction to the field theory (in Lewin’s German and American oeuvre) can be found in the fourth volume of theKurt-Lewin-Werkausgabe;cf. [Graumann, 1982].

“dynamic” way. In order to explain the transformation a stepwise approach was chosen, i.e. contributions by Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), Georg Elias Müller (1850–1934), Narziss Ach (1871–1946), Albert Michotte (1881–1965), Lewin and some of Lewin’s students will be sketched and related to each other. Eventually, we will show that Lewin’s transformation of the mechanistic into a dynamic model of psychic processes was closely interrelated with the transformation of the conceptual system.

Third, both Gestalt psychology and Lewin’s field psychology employed theoretical and experimental pat- terns borrowed from different disciplines. This dissertation analyzes how Lewin integrated selected in- terdisciplinary, for instance physical and topological, patterns into one sophisticated system of concepts, and made this instrumental for research on mind and behavior. We demonstrate that by appropriating interdisciplinary theoretical and experimental elements Lewin preserved the “functional” links between the extracted concepts. He thus did nothing less than adoptthought patterns¹³constituted in other disci- plines. Thus, the in-depth study of Lewin’s work enable us to observe the integration and reorganization of diverse interdisciplinary principles within psychology.

Against this background, our work suggests an innovative approach to the study of early experimental psychology in general and Kurt Lewin’s work in particular. Applying an idea suggested as part of Renn’s historical epistemology we focus on the intellectual organization of scientific knowledge, e.g. by iden- tifying the thought patternsshared by different branches of knowledge. In the course of this work we track their restructuring in new knowledge systems. We show that in contrast to formerly existing theo- retical frameworks Lewin’s field theory was able to integrate elements of various preceding theories and psychological subsystems. In this way, the historical example of Kurt Lewin’s work offers rich material for the analysis of the way in which conceptual change, particular experimental and social practices are altogether decisive for the evolvement of a discipline.

Experiments and the formation of a new body of knowledge

Compared to the impressive amount of critical research on scientific theories, experimental procedures belong to the rather under-explored topics of the history of science. Yet, investigating the specific area of experimental psychology the present dissertation obviously cannot downplay nor ignore the dimension of empirical research. Given that the transition to experimental research represented a trigger mecha- nism in the foundation of the discipline, a close analytical look at the experimental procedures seems indispensable. A particular challenge for such an investigation consists in a striking paradox: Experi- ments, even those shaping theory, always rely on a theoretical and conceptual background themselves.

What kind ofinventive functionmay we then speak of when referring to experiments? Without having the space for an extended overview on experimental research we tackle the presented historical analysis with the help of recent contributions to the history of theory of experimental research, such as Christoph Meinel’s anthologyInstrument – Experiment: Historische Studien(2000).¹⁴

The chosen historical case study represents a vivid example of a dichotomy between theory and em- pirical research. How could such a theoretically versed experimentation be helpful to the constitution of an emerging domain? More specifically, this work discusses how Lewin’s and his colleagues exper- imental work brought about the formation of an extensive knowledge system between early 1920s and 1936. At present, we find the analysis of Lewin’s experimental procedures barely explored from this perspective. As the experimental program conducted under Lewin in the 1920s and the early 1930s constituted a joint collaborative effort with his student circle a few contributions focus specifically on the analysis of the demography and social dynamics of Lewin’s circle.¹⁵ However, these do not specifically

13We shall systematically introduce the notionthought patternsto denote ideas characteristic of a particular discipline that are incorporated in discipline-specific concepts. In the present work we show how such ideas and concept are adopted in Lewin’s psychological theory.

14See [Meinel, 2000, espec. 13-81].

15The essay collectionKurt Lewin – Person, Werk, Umfeld(1992, 2007) discusses a variety of specific aspects of Lewin’s life

deliver an in-depth analysis of the experimental procedures. Aside from this the two monographs by Schwermer’s and Wittmann’s offer compact introductions to Lewin’s experimental style. Field theory as human-science (1976) is rather exceptional study presented by De Rivera. The author gives careful and precise commentaries on Ovsiankina’s, Karsten’s, Schwarz’, Dembo’s and Hoppe’s (five of Lewin’s Berlin disciples) work. Originally intended as a translation into English, the work sticks to a paraphrasing rather than analytical style, while the applied experimental methodology is no more than briefly sketched in the introductory passage. Last but not least, Ash (1995) looks at experiments conducted by Zeigar- nik and Dembo attributing to them a seminal role in the research program. On top of this, most of the existing research focuses on Lewin’s theory without having a close look at the experimental procedures and assumes that Lewin’s solid knowledge of contemporary philosophical and psychological theory re- sults in a strongly theory-driven approach to experimentation. By contrast, the present work intends to fill the existing gap. By looking at the specifics of the experimental procedures we shall explore how Lewin’s experimental program combined deductive and inductive techniques, i.e. integrated knowledge assembled from experience and from meta-reflection.

First, the present study interlinks intrinsic and extrinsic factors relevant to the progress of the empirical work of the Berlin Experimental Program (BEP). This includes the socio-academic micro-culture of the Berlin Psychological Institute, as well as the fineness of the conducted experimental procedures. A variety of stiles and approaches was characteristic of the Gestalt experimental procedures in Berlin, Frankfurt and Giessen. In this framework, Lewin delivered a rather far-reaching extension to the Gestalt style of experimentation. Instead of a strictly controlled experimental scenario standard at the time, he set up methodological guidelines that allowed for context-dependent conduct of both the experimenter and subject. We shall further demonstrate that the Berlin experimental style consisted of an interactive and an in-depth analytical procedure, in which the visualization of concepts played a seminal role.

Thereafter we draw a detailed conceptual “roadmap” from the beginning to the end of the BEP, which shall be of help to follow the undergone epistemic development in the closest and most intimate way.

Throughout this “roadmap” we explore the process of concept formation, which is subdivided in three qualitatively different program stages: constitutive, explorative and maturity stage. We show how the basic conceptual scaffold of Lewin’s “field theory” was expanded through the experimental contributions of his students. Most of these studies concluded with the elaboration of at least one new concept. These concepts extended the preexisting conceptual system block by block building upon one another. We shall further demonstrate that the investigations of Lewin’s students had a twofold relationship with his own research. It is the student circle that applied the analytical system in experimental practice, on the one side. On the other side, Lewin also made use of the students’ experimental findings to gain empirical proof for his own (theoretical) work. Thus, the gradual development of Lewin’s and his students’ theory and experimental agenda obviously emerged from a continuous collaboration.

Additionally, the present dissertation makes an effort to relate Lewin’s theory of science with the experi- mental practice of the BEP. In this respect, most preceding research that struggles with the determina- tion of the nature of Lewin’s theoretical system. As pointed out by Gold, there is wide disagreement on whether Lewin’s theoretical system represents a “meta-theory”, an “applied tool”, or something else.¹⁶ Going further we resolve the problem at hand by differentiating meta-theoretical, operative and descrip- tive components. More specifically, we distinguish three theoretical systems introduced by Lewin—a philosophical, a methodological and a conceptual one; each of those had an individual practical function.

As will be demonstrated, Lewin’s philosophical directives sketch out a set of rules by which the experi-

and work. Two of these, by Sprung and Brauns, are particularly devoted to Lewin’s German work. Sprung makes a valuable contribution to the demographic constitution of Lewin’s network and in particular on the biographies of Lewin’s female students.

In the short articleLewins Berliner ExperimentalprogrammBrauns advocates a revised perspective on the structure of Lewin’s student network, i.e. a network-like rather than chronological understanding of the program. Further relevant research on Lewin’s circle was produced by Ash and Wittmann. Ash (1995) gives an account of all staff members employed at the Berlin Institute under Köhler, while Wittmann (1998) adds four unfinished student works to the picture.

16Cf. [Gold, 1992, espec. 68f.]. Few researcher also tried to identify shares of different theoretical systems in Lewin’s approach.

For instance, Deutsch distinguishes between a “meta-theory” and a “specific field theory”; cf. [Deutsch, 1954].

mental framework has function, methodological principles represent specific guidelines to experimental procedures while the conceptual construct called “field theory” eventually incorporates an analytical tool.

In a very explicit and detailed manner we delineate the way in which Lewin’s field theory, including its ex- tension through a system of representations called “topological psychology”, was applied to the analysis of data collected in the experimental work.

Finally, we shall discuss how the Berlin experimental procedures paved Lewin’s way towards the social dimension of psychology. Various commentators have characterized Lewin with purpose as a “practical theorist” (Alfred Marrow) or a “philosopher-psychologist” (Alexandre Métraux).¹⁷ All in all, the present dissertation, elucidates both sides of the process that allowed Lewin’s experimental program in Berlin to result in the constitution of the new psychological sub-domain. We, thus, bring together the generative impact that the interactive dynamics of Lewin’s circle played in theory formation, on the one side, and the directing and analytical role of the theoretical constructs upon the experimental procedure, on the other side.

0.4 Methodological note

The present work is a stepwise diachronic study of change in a system of knowledge as part of the

“maturing” process of a discipline. Therefore following Lewin’s German work in experimental psychology this dissertation combineshistoriographicandanalyticalmethodology. The approach is process-focused (rather than factographic); the genealogical reconstruction of an intellectual process constitutes the core of the work.

A terminological remark

According to the stated methodological framework, we reconstruct Lewin’s theoretical system "layer after layer" with respect to their roots and the order of their introduction into Lewin’s work. Given that the

"field theory" is a retrospectively shaped framework describing Lewin’s theoretical approach (in 1930s and 1940s, and especially as part of the American self-introduction and "image-making"), we choose to avoid employing the terms "field theory" or "field concept" when looking at its germs in Lewin’s German work. For example, discussing the early constitution of the conceptual system in the 1920s, we employ descriptive terms, such as "Lewin’s process model", "early model of psychic activity" and "analytical system" more accurate at that time instead. In Part II of the work we then discuss the "transformation of this model into the field theory". Lewin’s topological theory, which took shape in the middle of the 1930s, is duly analyzed in Part III. Therein, Chapter 9 (entitled, "a roadmap") reconstructs the generative development of Lewin’s conceptual system as a whole while also taking into account his work with the Berlin student group (1923–33). Finally, in Chapter 10 we introduce the term "Topological Field Theory"

(TFT), which refers to Lewin’s attempt to integrate the field-theoretical and topological concept layers (but belongs to the author of this work).

On the reconstruction technique

For the reconstruction we extract and interrelate various patterns of Lewin’s multiple theories and of experimental procedures accomplished by him and his collaborators. The particular challenge of this endeavor is to establish correct links between philosophical ideas, experimental designs and the various interdisciplinary concepts while also paying attention to intrinsic inconsistencies. The vagueness and partial absence of definitions typical of Lewin’s style make the defined task particularly challenging. An

17See [Marrow, 1969] and [Métraux, 1992]; the latter term was also used by Kusch (1995) in another context, cf. [Kusch, 1995a, 160].

additional complexity consists in the high degree of fragmentation of information in Lewin’s overall work.

We strive to put together the diverse fragments of the puzzle to gain evidence about the constitution and transformation of such a complex knowledge system as is an emerging discipline. To give an example, reconstructing the experimental procedures of the BEP we had to interlink fragments originating from the following resources. (a) The general (but rather abstract) directives to experimental procedures have been extracted from Lewin’s philosophical papers (Chapter 5). (b) Commentaries on the analytical treatment of experimental observations could be found in the students’ publications (Section 9.1). (c) The methodological principles of the interactive procedure were borrowed from the students’ dissertations, in which these were explained as far as applied in individual experimental cases (Chapter 8). (d) The most complete outline of the topological tool developed for the analysis of empirical data could be detected in his later psychological publications (Chapter 10). (e) Finally, information pieces from all of these sources were needed to be smartly linked to reconstruct the conceptual development of the whole of Lewin’s Berlin Experimental Program, of which we drew a detailed “roadmap” (Chapter 9).

In addition to the verbal reconstruction, the present dissertation delivers various visualizations of the

“gone lost” links in Lewin’s psychology of human conduct. These are listed in the Appendix B on page 192, where they are marked as “reconstructions”. The conceptual development of the whole experimental program studied in this work is reflected in figure 14 on page 116. Additionally, a variety of tables contrast seminal aspects of the discussed theories and procedures.¹⁸

0.5 Main sources

Lewin’s theory-centered writings, published between 1926 and 1936, and the experimental reports by his students that emerged in about the same period (approximately between 1922 and 1938) represent the seminal sources of this work. These are, on the one hand, the two programmatic papers – Vor- bemerkungen über die psychischen Kräfte und Energien und über die Struktur der SeeleandVorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis (1926), which marked the official kick off of Lewin’s research program on action and the emotions. On the other hand, it is his consolidating and evaluating work –A Dynamic Theory of Personality (1935) and Principles of Topological Psychology (1936) that appeared about ten years later in English, after the author had already settled in the United States. Apart from these four main theoretical works a variety of talks and minor publications of this period is taken into account. They are chronologically listed in Appendix A. A directory of published and unpublished writings that emerged in the course of the Berlin experimental program can be found in the Appendix A. It is important to note that no individual experimental reports from this period have been accomplished single-handedly by Lewin.

Instead, a whole range of detailed experimental protocols and dissertations was produced by his disci- ples, as a rule, as part of their predoctoral research. To grasp the gradual progress of the collaborative research program and to trace mechanisms of the transformation, a range of these are analyzed in Part III. All doctoral studies in experimental psychology conducted under Lewin are taken into account.

Most of Lewin’s philosophical writings were composed between 1919 and 1931. All his major philosoph- ical works from this period are explored in Chapter 5 Thereafter we reflect on the impact that Lewin’s epistemological investigations had on his work in psychology. In 1919, Lewin submitted hisHabilitation paperDer Typus der genetischen Reihen in Physik, organismischer Biologie und Entwicklungsgeschich- tein which he comparatively treated the development of conditional-genetic concepts in physics and bi- ology. With this writing, he introduced a series of works theorizing the nature and challenges of science to which we will further refer as Lewin’s “comparative theory of science”. The 1931 essayDer Übergang von der aristothelischen zur galileischen Denkweise became Lewin’s concluding philosophical writing, in which he integrated most of his views on philosophy of science developed in the preceding years and set up programmatic goals for empirical research in psychology.

18See early psychological schools, Table no. 27; Lewin’s philosophy of science, Table no. 69; principles of early experimental psychology of will and human conduct, Table no. 80.

Further utilized sources are writings by the Gestalt psychologists, mostly, Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka, as well as by different representatives of the early experimental psychology in Germany. They date back to the time span between the 1880s and the 1940s.

The introduced archival materials originate from the Humboldt University Archives (HUA) in Berlin, Ger- many, and the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage / Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (GStA PK) in Berlin. Photographs and illustrations in this disseration were reproduced with the friendly permission of the Adolf-Würth-Zentrum for the History of Psychology at the University of Würzburg, the Berlin State Archive (Landesarchiv Berlin), as well as thanks to the digitalization by the Max Planck Virtual Laboratory.

0.6 Contexts of Lewin’s psychological work

To ensure a proper contextualization of Lewin’s work the present dissertation makes use of a variety of additional publications, which deliver information going beyond the listed sources and research literature.

On Lewin’s biography: In terms of the recollections on Lewin’s life and work in Berlin, the most sub- stantial biography is authored by one of his close American collaborator’s Alfred Marrow, who after Lewin’s death systematically collected recollections from Lewin’s associates, friends and relatives (Mar- row 1969). The work also employs other biographical recollections, i.e. by Lewin’s daughter Miriam Lewin (1992), Lewin-researcher Helmut Lück (2001), as well as by his German and American students and a collaborator of his, namely Lippitt (1947), Zeigarnik (1988), Deutsch (1992), White (1992) and Mahler (1996).

On the Gestalt theory and its protagonists in Germany: For a proper understanding of Lewin’s German work its contextualization vis-à-vis the work of (other) Gestalt psychologists, specifically the leaders of the school Wolfgang Köhler, Max Wertheimer and Kurt Koffka, seems indispensable. Also in this case, our work makes use of a range of witness recollections. In 1986, A. S. Luchins and E. H. Luchins pre- sented a most complete summary of recollection on Max Wertheimer’s life, work and social networks from 1912 to 1929. Wolfgang Metzger, a student of the Gestalt psychological school, wrote the ret- rospectionZur Geschichte der Gestalttheorie in Deutschland (1963). Siegfried Jaeger edited Köhler’s letters to his teacher Hans Geitel from 1907 to 1920 (1988), and published biographical essays on Köh- ler’s life and work in Berlin, i.e. Köhlers Verhältnis zur Philosophie und zu den Naturwissenschaften Anfang der Dreissiger Jahre (1989) and Wolfgang Köhler in Berlin (2003). Brett King together with Max Wertheimer’s son Michael published a monograph on Wertheimer’s life and work,Max Wertheimer and Gestalt Theory (2005). Finally, Franz Heider’s autobiography (1984) presents a colorful and vivid account of the cultural and academic life in Berlin of the Weimar era; it includes reports on Heider’s meetings with Lewin but also with other psychologists like Köhler, Wertheimer, Koffka, Charlotte and Karl Bühler, and William Stern. The most extensive and complete critical account of Gestalt psychology, its protagonists as well as minor contributors, was without doubt provided by Mitchell Ash in a paper (1991) and in his monographGestalt psychology in German culture(1995). These works are employed in several places of this thesis for purposes of contextualization of our case study.¹⁹

On Lewin’s philosophy of science:As will be shown, philosophy of science represents the agenda-setting reference frame of Lewin’s psychological work. The author found the most inspiring, comprehensive and sophisticated reflection on Lewin’s philosophy of science in Alexandre Métraux’s publications in the German language (i.e. Métraux 1981, 1983 and 2007) and (Métraux 1992) in English.

19Further research publications on Gestalt that were useful to this project are e.g. the systematic monograph on the German holismReenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler(1996) by Harrington andWertheimer’s university career in Germany(1989) by Ash.

0.7 Structure of the work

In Part I of the dissertation we reconstruct the establishment stage of German experimental psychology beginning with the foundation of the first laboratory in 1879 in Leipzig. The overall function of Part I is to provide comprehensible contextual information to the case study tackled in the succeeding chapters.

Therein we delineate the interdisciplinary controversy over the nature of psychology taking place on the socio-academic, theoretical and experimental level, and point to the seminal function of the experiment in the constitution of the psychological discipline. In Chapter 1 we discuss the roots of experimental psychology and its struggle for self-positioning between philosophy and the sciences. In Chapter 2 we outline the evolvement of the methodological and conceptual framework of psychology during its struggle for emancipation. Chapter 3 is mainly devoted to the socio-academic set-up of the Berlin Psychological Institute between 1922 and 1933. Therein I present various facets of Gestalt psychology as both a doctrine and an academic network, including its methodological and conceptual agenda.

The overall ambition of Part II is to reconstruct and understand the emergence of an innovative the- oretical system. To this end we look at the emergence of Lewin’s psychology of human conduct first focussing on its state of development by 1926. Thereafter we trace the interdisciplinary roots of Lewin’s theory identifying individual conceptual patterns and their functions within the system. In Chapter 4 we situate Lewin’s early scholarly ambitions within the sketched framework. In Chapter 5 we elaborate key aspects of his philosophical agenda to further demonstrate how these were applied in his research program in experimental psychology. In Chapter 6 I present research conducted in experimental psy- chology of will in the first three decades of the 20th century in the German-speaking Europe. Therein I show how this earlier research nourished the emergence of Kurt Lewin’s basic conceptual system for a psychology of human conduct. Chapter 7 is focused on psychological concepts inspired by science.

We trace back Lewin’s concepts to their physiological and physical prototypes and discuss the function of the “quasi-physical” analogies in Lewin’s field theory. Eventually, we point out the links between field theory and other Gestalt theoretical work.

In Part III of the dissertation I investigate Lewin’s Berlin Experimental Program (BEP) and place this into the broader theoretical and socio-historical context. This Part specifically focuses on the interplay of the experiment and theory. To that end, Chapter 8 is concerned specifically with the style and function of Gestalt experiments. First, we delineate the micro-culture at the Gestalt-psychological institutes of the 1920s and briefly outline the different experimental types and practices encountered there. Thereafter we dedicate attention to the particularity of the student network that developed around Lewin in Berlin and identify specific features of the BEP. The chapter concludes by presenting examples of selected experiments. In Chapter 9 we map the process of concept formation over the whole duration of the BEP.

In a “roadmap” we pin down changes of the experimental style that occurred during the course of the program, as well as elaborate its triggers. Additionally, we discuss how the structure of Lewin’s network conditioned the outcome of this research program. In Chapter 10 we discuss another major extension of Lewin’s field theory introduction of topological concepts inspired by mathematics. Moreover, the Chapter outlines the analytical challenges of Lewin’s psychology as a tool for visualizing the mental situation and the psychic dynamics in or across individuals. We specify the decisive methodological steps that bridged Lewin’s psychology of the individual and his social psychology showing that the transition relied on the research accomplished in Berlin.

Part IV, Epilogue and Conclusions of the present dissertation, consists of two chapters. Chapter 11 is a historical outlook in which I briefly outline the export of Gestalt psychology to North America. After discussing local research trends and general challenges faced by the Gestalt psychologists in the new academic environment, I restrict the narrative to the progression of Lewin’s career in the United States.

The outlook shows how our protagonist was eventually able to develop and institutionalize social psy- chology as a new branch of the psychological discipline by integrating German experience and upcoming American impulses. The final Chapter deals with three topics. First, I summarize the key achievements

of Lewin’s German work against the background of his time. Second, I elaborate on the so-called “epis- temic cycle”, which represents an attempt to refrain from the studied case and build a more universal model of the process of formation and transformation of knowledge. Ultimately, I elucidate Lewin’s legacy by drawing his pathway in the context of the history of psychology. Different receptions and perceptions of Lewin’s life’s achievements are outlined here.

Part I

Experimental psychology between two poles

1 Networks of the pioneers of experimental psychology (1879–

1910)

Large parts of this dissertation deal with the way in which psychology combined and integrated inter- disciplinary elements and negotiated its position in-between humanities and science. This negotiation, however, has never been as intense as in the few decades of the emergence and establishment of the discipline. This introductory chapter concentrates its attention at the period between 1879 and 1910, in which the first experimental laboratories were established. In this period philosophy and physiology had major influence upon the formation of the essential disciplinary features.

This chapter narrates the history of the early institutionalization of German psychology, focussing on the psychological laboratories and the styles of research established by five pioneers of psychology, who from today’s perspective deserve the credit for the decisive contribution to the institutionalization of experimental psychology in Germany. These are Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), Carl Stumpf (1848–

1936), Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), Georg Elias Müller (1850–1934) and Oswald Külpe (1862–

1915). All of these leading advocates of the early experimental psychology held chairs in philosophy departments, while together they introduced a “hybrid” academic role of a philosopher and experimental scientist, or “philosopher-psychologist”.²⁰

1.1 Psychology as a Geisteswissenschaft : Roots of experimental psychology

From 1818 to 1914, there were 22 universities in the German states (excluding Austria). The four typical faculties at each university were those of theology (catholic and/or protestant), law, medicine, and philosophy (arts and sciences). In this system the faculty of philosophy had been conceived as the heart of a philosophically and philologically oriented system of higher education. Embodying the theoretical unity of knowledge, it was to devote itself to pure scholarship and to general education (Bildung), defined as the full development of the student mind, spirit, and character. In practice, since 1810 the faculty of philosophy also carried out the more specific task of preparing teachers for the classical secondary schools. In a way, it thus was a professional faculty in its own right. During the early decades of the 19th century, the faculty of philosophy transcended its initial philological emphasis and teacher-preparatory function. It was eventually to emerge as the most general of the German faculties and by far the largest as well.²¹

Yet, in the course of the 19th century, philosophy’s authority over other disciplines increasingly weak- ened. This was replaced by a variety of “communication communities” (Kommunikationsgemeinschaf- ten) that were centered around separate systems of knowledge and wrapped into increasingly au- tonomous institutional structures, i.e. academic disciplines.²²Methodological progress in physics, chem- istry and physiology not only yield new insights but also brought about a new level of legitimation to exact disciplines while academic philosophy (in particular natural philosophy) was increasingly forced into a marginal position.²³ As the Neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband pointed out:

20The two observations were made my Kusch, see [Kusch, 1995a, chap. 6].

21Cf. [Ringer, 1979, 35]. For an overview discussion of the German academic landscape in the 19th and the early 20th century, including academic politics and the discourses amongst academics, see [Vom Bruch, 2006].

22For an elaborate survey of the emergence of the academic disciplines in the German culture between 1740 and 1890 see [Stichweh, 1984].

23Cf. [Métraux, 1983, 21].

“Der Dualismus der kantischen Weltanschauung spiegelt sich in der Wissenschaft des 19.

Jahrhunderts durch die eigentümliche Spannung des Verhältnisses von Naturwissenschaft und Geisteswissenschaft. Keiner früheren Zeit ist dieser Gegensatz, der auch die großen Systeme des Idealismus beherrschte, in sachlicher und methodischer Bedeutung so geläufig gewesen wie der unsrigen, und diesem Umstände sind eine Anzahl neuer verheißungsvoller Verschiebungen entsprungen” [Windelband et al., 1935, 548].

In the late 19th century, this tension between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft came to a head on the grounds of psychology, which has until then been a fully integrated domain at service of philosophy.²⁴ In this function it enjoyed major acceptance as a doctrine of reasoning useful to make conclusions about the materiality and spirituality of the world and about the nature of the soul. In his 1908 historical retrospective the psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus characterized it as a doctrine of pure meaning and genuine logic.

“Früher stand sie [= die Psychologie] durchweg im Dienste anderer Interessen. Die Kenntnis des Seelenlebens war nicht Selbstzweck, sondern nützliche oder notwendige Vorbereitung, um andere und für höher geltende Zwecke zu erreichen. Für die meisten war sie ein Zweig oder eine Dienerin der Philosophie. Man beschäftigt sich mit ihr, um vor allen Dingen her- auszubringen, wie unsere Erkenntnisse zustande kommen oder wie die Vorstellungen von Dingen der Außenwelt sich bilden, und dies dann wieder, um sogleich metaphysische und ethische Rückschlüsse machen zu können, auf Geistigkeit oder Materialität der Welt, auf das Wesen der Seele, eine vernünftige Lebensführung u. a., oder auch wohl, um über alle die- se Dinge willkommene Bestätigungen anderswoher stammender und bereits feststehender Meinungen zu erhalten. Für andere stehen praktische Zwecke im Vordergrund. Sie treiben Psychologie, weil ihre Lehrsätze dem praktischen Leben nahe liegen und für viele ande- re Wissenschaften von Bedeutung sind, weil sie z. B. ’möglichst deutliche Begriffe von der wahren Sitten verschafft’ oder weil sie den Menschen lehrt, was er aus sich machen kann, was er etwa tun muß, um sein Gedächtnis zu erweitern oder gewandt zu machen usw.”

[Ebbinghaus, 1908, 14f.].

Thus, psychology as a branch of philosophy inherited two main functions. One was to explain the knowledge of the external world; the other was an ethical task inherited from philosophy – to teach about what goals and accomplishments should be. Psychological claims were to be applied to other disciplines (as superior), and were as a matter of course of use to practical life, while empirical psychology was widely identified with the so called “introspection” – an experimental procedure in which the subject had to complete complex tasks and to provide a retrospect account of its cognitive processes during the task accomplishment. In the German philosophical tradition stretching back to Kant and Leibniz, introspection was limited to the knowledge of the phenomenal self, and was subordinate to the method of universal logic.²⁵

At the same time, negotiations between parapsychological and natural scientific ways to obtain insights about the functioning of the human mind gave the psychological discipline another piece of ground.

Towards the end of the 19th century, Europe witnessed the emergence and flourishing of numerous as- sociations, called “societies”, devoted to parapsychological thinking, such as “hypnotism”, “metaphysics”

or “spiritism” along with the swift economic and population growth of that period. Among the biggest so- cieties were the British Phrenological Society (founded in 1886) and the Société Magnétique de France (founded in 1887). The most popular and long lasting amongst those were groups devoted to topics such as occultism, spiritism, and so-called psychic research. They were mostly located in capitals, tolerant of the amateur and usually much engaged in professional politicking. Also the GermanPsychologische Gesellschaft (1887) andGesellschaft für Experimentalpsychologie(1888) were, in fact, spiritist associ- ations. All these societies played a dual role in the development of experimental psychology; they were its precursors and formed part of a movement, which the “new” psychology used as its springboard to build the own identity.²⁶ They also claimed the term "experimental" for themselves and psychologists

24Cf. [Ash, 1985a, 48].

25One will find an elaborated account on the history of introspection in [Danziger, 1980].

26Cf. [Gundlach, 1997, 536f.].