The epistemic cycle: On the constitution and evolution of knowledge systems

Against the background of our historical case, a major focus of the present work is the transformation of the theoretical body of knowledge over time. The dissertation tackled the question: How did Lewin’s and his colleagues’ empirical work bring about the development of a new system of knowledge? I elaborated in detail the complex process of the formation and evolution of bodies of shared knowledge, including different stages and mechanisms of this process. As a result, the present work delivers a systematic reconstruction of the process in which new knowledge is constituted. I shall outline the different stages and components of this process, in the following referred to asepistemic cycle.

The model in figure 25 on page 178 graphically reflects the main steps of the knowledge flow. The model was built on the basis of the examined historical case and reflects the way innovative knowledge structures emerged. As shown, the specific mode of interplay between experiment and theory is decisive to the transformation of the theoretical body of knowledge. Trying to give the model a universal shape, I would like to place it at the disposal of other historians and social scientists interested in the analysis of epistemic processes.

12.2.1 Function of the network as a research function

The epistemic cycle starts with its central agent, Lewin’s Berlin circle. As discussed, this circle was equally a community of interest sharing whole knowledge and experience package. Ludwik Fleck once described similar scientific communities as "thought collectives” (Denkkollektive) unified by commitments to common "styles of thinking” (Denkstile).⁵¹⁷ In the case of the BEP the two main functions of the re-search collective were a simultaneous multi-directional exploration of the new domain and a combination of different types of (and often interdisciplinary) know-hows.⁵¹⁸ We shall turn our attention to the object of transformation. Lewin’s group made it its task to build up a theoretical framework apt to deal with increasingly more complex psychological processes, on the one hand, and equally developing experi-mental methodology to gain new insights, on the other hand. The members of the group were studying concrete cases from the perspective of a broad theoretical framework in order to extend and revise this throughout their studies. We shall elaborate on this.

12.2.2 Sources of knowledge

A starting point indesigning the new body of theoretical knowledgefor psychology of human conduct was the learning from “disciplinary experience” historically accumulated in other disciplines. As shown, Lewin tried to apply developmental principles observed in historically more mature disciplines. A source of inspiration was the organization of theoretical knowledge in physics (Chapter 5). In practice, digging into the experience ambit of other disciplines (studied through the prism of the neo-Kantianist approach) gave

517Cf. [Fleck, 1994, espec. chap. 4].

518In today’s academia, too, several research networks take on a similar strategy, i.e. a joint multi-directional exploration of ideas in a shared field. Cross-disciplinary groups enable exchange by bringing together expertise from different fields. In this way, new knowledge emerges at the interface of different areas of expertise.

Lewin’s circle a wholenormative set of design rules for psychology ((a) in fig. 25), and helped to define more precisely the key notions of the psychological discipline, such as “psychological phenomenon” and

“psychological law” (see more in Table 2 on page 69).

The constitution and evolution of the TFT as a knowledge system heavily relied on continuities with its sources (discussed specifically in Chapters 6, 7, 10). As was shown, three types of knowledge sources were tapped in the context of the BEP, which resulted in Lewin’s psychology of human conduct.

These comprise (1) knowledge appropriated directly from disciplines other than psychology, (2) the output of earlier research in experimental psychology and (3) experience-based knowledge from the BEP itself (see fig. 25). Concerning the first type—knowledge appropriated from other disciplines—we have to further distinguish between a directive set of rules originating from philosophy and interdisciplinary patterns that were appropriated in the topological field theory. These resources were operationalized in different ways.

1. Knowledge appropriated directly from disciplines other than psychology: To deal with the growing and increasingly complex psychological processes, Lewin appropriated and integrated parts of different psychological theories (Chapter 6) as well asthought patternsof diverse origins. Therefore the theoretical framework of the experimental program is build on Gestalt theory as well as on experience collected in such domains as the early psychology of will, physics, biology, physiology and mathematical topology. We have shown that the mathematical imaginary inspired Lewin’s topological psychology as, for instance, the physical field model inspired the psychological model of the field. Concepts of the TFT were built viafunctional abstraction ((b) in fig. 25). Analogies with concepts that indicated a dynamic process in physics were made, e.g. “energy flows”, “distribution of forces” and “tendency towards an equilibrium”. (For instance, Chapter 7 was explicitly devoted to the shaping of natural scientific analo-gies for psychology.) The “materiality” of spatial constructs was borrowed from biology. Different types of processes were possible in different material environments. Accordingly, “softness” and “robustness”

of spatial structures were employed to build up a particular milieu, in which psychic events take place following a set of implicit rules. Different “levels of psychic reality” were attributed differing material prop-erties. Representation of knowledge entities via images and/or equations are further types of functional abstractions (Chapter 10). Importantly, every conceptual layer kept a specific analytical function that was akin to the function of the set of concepts in the original discipline.

2. Knowledge assembled earlier in experimental psychology: Here the BEP foremostly relied on the experimental studies of volition, described in chapter 6, as well as on preceding Gestalt psychological research (Chapter 3 and 8).

3. Experiment as knowledge trigger: The experiments of the BEP aimed at thegeneration of specific psychic activity. In Section 8.6 we have demonstrated that the semi-spontaneous interactive character of experiments was essential to the empirical practice of Lewin’s Berlin group. It was specified how experiments trigger the revision of knowledge. We have discovered that by conceiving his experiments as social situations, Lewin rendered to the proband the freedom to co-shape the development of the experiment. In the created “quasi-social” settings, Lewin’s disciples were experimenting with types of hierarchies, at times creating a comradely atmosphere, and at times bossing the proband around or provoking this to act out. They provoked out different variations of anger (Dembo’s study), or variations of children’s play (Sloisberg’s research). Such research designs allowed for a large variety of sponta-neously constituted experimental scenarios, which frequently led to surprising insights. Those insights, in turn delivered the basis for new questions that animated further research. One may add that Lewin’s later experiments granted its subjects an even bigger autonomy by including much of the real life

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Figure 25: Epistemic cycle 1: Constitution of the knowledge system

tion (instead of, for instance, creating an artificial setting in the laboratory). As already emphasized by practitioners and theorists of science, such as Ludwig Fleck:

“Wäre ein Forschungsexperiment klar, so wäre es überhaupt unnötig: denn um ein Experi-ment klar zu gestalten, muß man sein Ergebnis von vorneherein wissen, sonst kann man es nicht begrenzen und zielbewußt machen. Je reicher an Unbekanntem, je neuer ein For-schungsgebiet ist, um so unklarer sind die Experimente. Ist ein Gebiet bereits so ausgear-beitet, daß die Schlußmöglichkeiten auf Existenz oder Nichtexistenz, eventuell auf quantita-tives Feststellen begrenzt sind, so werden die Experimente immer klarer, sie sind aber nicht mehr selbständig, da sie vom System früherer Experimente und Entscheidungen geschleppt werden [. . . ]. Jenes System wird dann zu einem selbstverständlichen savoir vivre,dessen Anwendung und Wirkung man sich nicht einmal bewußt wird [Fleck, 1994, 114].⁵¹⁹

Similarly as described by Fleck, Lewin’s experimental design includes substantial explorative or inventive features. According to Fleck and Lewin, an open exploratory research design is optimal to gain new knowledge in a little explored field. Friedrich Steinle, whose primarily analyzed experiments in the history of physics, suggests that explorative experiments (in physics and other sciences) possess similar traits.

These typically look for “regularities” rather than proof; the stock of knowledge at the outset of the experiment is mostly limited and “unstable” while, in turn, the epistemic expectations are high; also the procedures are guided by rather unspecific, hence flexible, methodological guidelines and involve auxiliary means that cannot be too confiding.⁵²⁰ Thus, it seems that the explorative features we identified in Lewin’s experimental style are of a universal nature; these have proven to be applicable in very different experimental settings in different historical periods and academic environments.

519“Once a field has been sufficiently worked over [...] the experiments will become increasingly better defined. But they will no longer be independent, because they are carried along by a system of earlier experiments and decisions, which is generally the situation in physics and chemistry today. Such a system will then become self-evident know-how itself. We will no longer be aware of its appIication and effect.” The translation is mine.

520See [Steinle, 2005a, 521-528] and [Steinle, 2005b, chapter 7].

In sum, the semi-structured explorative style of experiments allowed for a maximum of new impulses.

As a result, over the years, the group assembled a vast reservoir of conceptual patterns that could be put together just as construction bricks, depending on the psychological situation that was to be built up.

12.2.3 Shift of emphasis: Circulation of knowledge between theory and experiment

The experimental program started off with knowledge collected foremostly from external sources. The emphasis of the research program then increasingly shifted to the interplay of theory and experiment, their mutual adjustment and extension. Experienced-based insights enriched and transformed the shared knowledge reservoir throughout the course of the BEP (Part III). These were collected and re-viewed in student experiments (Chapter 9). Mechanisms of there-organization of knowledge patterns were identified in the present work; we further zoom into the details of the interplay between experiment and theory (illustrated in fig. 26).

Figure 26: Epistemic cycle 2: Interplay between experiment and theory

Once an experiment is conducted, the researcher employs the accumulated reservoir of conceptual patterns to map a particular mental process or situation (as shown in the preceding slide). One of the two following scenarios seem possible in this case: either (2a) the knowledge items at hand suffice to conveniently grasp this process or situation as a whole or (2b) an incomplete or inconsistent model, that cannot grasp the whole process or situation, emerges in the first step. In principle, this leads to two parallel scenarios or possible cycles. In the small cycle, 1–2a–4–1, knowledge is verified and stabilized through the experiment. As a consequence, the knowledge framework is not revised, but confirmed (s.

figure 26).

In the second case, 1–2b–3–4–5–1, the model obviously lacks a certain pattern that is not yet included into the reservoir of conceptual patterns, a so-called "uncertain variable".⁵²¹ A trial and error approach

521The research challenge is thus comparable with that of an algebraic equation. We earlier discussed that Lewin tried to find

allows for generating different types of "uncertain variables" aiming to leverage the inconsistency. Once an acceptable conceptual pattern is generated (3) and the original model is complemented and restruc-tured (4) the cycle concludes with a new experiment (1). In this case, the function of experiment is the verification of the new “variable” and the new model. The trial and error approach continues until theory and experiment mutually fit. The outcome of the trial and error approach is thus the extension and/or revision of knowledge patterns (5). In sum, every time the big cycle 1–2b–3–4–5–1 is run through, the underlying body of knowledge is extended throughout the inclusion of a new conceptual pattern.

On top of this, by means of the reconstruction of theepistemic cycleunderlying the Berlin experimental program we could identify three relevant motors and mechanisms triggering the emergence of new knowledge. All three suggested triggering mechanisms contribute its share to the transformation of the body of knowledge (see fig. 27). These are: (A) The experiment, that generates new experience;

(B) the TFT, i.e. the applied analytical tool makes the discovery of the inconsistency possible; (C) the researcher’s imagination (i.e. experience-based but flexible abstraction) that allows to generate different types of uncertain variables that could neutralize the inconsistency. A short reflection on the role of the imagination may be added. As was pointed out, Kurt Lewin was looking for characteristics of the higher mental processes. The relevant psychic processes could be neither properly observed, nor have they been conveniently described by Lewin’s colleagues and predecessors. Therefore, apart from the accumulated knowledge, the imaginative capacity of the scholars played a significant role in the discovery process. In case the model at hand was inconsistent with the observed phenomenon (case 2b), the researcher would have to resort to this unusual resource to identify the uncertain variable.

The cognitive faculty we resume under the term “imagination”, in short, implies the relevant capacity to productively combine experience with a case-specific abstraction so that new knowledge patterns can be generated. The extension and adjustment of models generated with the TFT thus rely on the accumulation of experience and the experience-based but loosely detached from it, capacity to think abstractly.

12.2.4 Multi-stage process supervision

In the given historical example we deal with a multi-stage supervision of a research cycle, meaning Lewin’s effort to overview and steer all the stages of the epistemic procedure. We have demonstrated that three theoretical systems were combined in Lewin’s work, i.e. a philosophical, a methodological and a conceptual one. These are different in nature and pursue different practical goals. We have the macro-dimension of Lewin’s philosophical directives, or as Kant puts it, “regulative ideals” (regulative Ideale). The “regulative ideals” focus on the related analytical work without, however, singling out a specific method to be used by the practitioner.⁵²² Philosophy of science formed the epistemic framework of the emerging field theory while the methodological principles represented rather specific directives to experimental procedures. Lewin went at least one step further than other “pure” philosophers of science, for instance Cassirer. In his emploi as experimental practitioner he was busy with implementing his own philosophical agenda.⁵²³ In sum, Lewin oversaw the investigative process at all its stages—the great design, the methodological executive design, experimental implementation, analysis, evaluation and theory building cast in one piece. In the modern economic practice suchlike approach is called supervision and control over a whole product chain. Such an approach may obviously have positive as well as negative implications. Amongst the positive, high consistency of the work and the assurance of a high quality at every step of the way.

mathematical expressions for psychic chains, by transforming these into equations.

522As above noted, that methodological principles of the interactive procedure have been extracted from the students’ disserta-tions where these were rather closely connected to the experimental case at hand while commentaries on the analytical part of the procedure were mostly derived from Lewin’s philosophical papers.

523Our work clarified that in his German career Lewin combined the two researcher profiles of the philosopher and the experi-mental practitioner while in his American years he nearly fully abstained from philosophical research.

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Figure 27: Epistemic cycle 3: Motors of change

12.2.5 Maturation of the body of knowledge over time

Overall, the research program represents a stepwise formation of a reservoir of knowledge organized in the form of a conceptual network. A crucial observation is that the investigated body of shared knowledge matured over the years of theoretical and experimental work (see in particular Chapter 9).

First of all, the maturation of the body of knowledge is reflected in the growth of the entire knowledge reservoir, which is linked with the extension and revision of individual patterns. Beyond the quantity, maturation also touches upon the conceptual precision. We demonstrated how experimental work, supervised by Lewin, added components to the knowledge reservoir and extended this by filling in knowledge gaps. This resulted in the increase of density and the stabilization of the enclosed body of knowledge. This stabilization of conceptual body of the TFT implies that the theoretical structure in question was verified in many different experimental sequences and therefore is less likely to be refuted.

As a consequence, a part of experiments of the later BEP period (maturity stage) did not limit themselves to qualitative investigation but combined this with a quantitative approach (see Section 8.6). In sum, over the course of time, the system accounted for an increasing number of mechanisms and scenarios of psychic processes that were to eventually explore variations of psychic activity by characterizing them with increased precision.

Im Dokument Shaping the field (Seite 180-185)