Part I Conclusion: Experimental psychology between two poles 48
6.4 From psychology of will to Lewin’s dynamic holism
“Why does a person behave one way and not another, and what motivates it? – that is the one thing Lewin was thinking and speaking about all the time. . . Once, he took me to a store in order to help choosing a pair of gloves for his wife. And just as he was looking over them a new idea dawned on him. Standing there with a female glove in his hand he immediately started to develop his thought right in front of the astonished saleslady until I intervened –
’Herr Lewin! We really need to buy the gloves and to leave the store’ – ’Oh yeah, right’ – he agreed” [Yaroshevsky and Zeigarnik, 1988, 174].241
237[Michotte and Prüm, 1910, 314].
238See [Michotte and Prüm, 1910, 314ff.], [Michotte and Prüm, 1910, 193, 310-320]. Cf. also [Lindworsky, 1921, 73].
239See more in [Selz, 1924, 37-61], cf. also [Métraux and Herrmann, 1991, 9-13], [Mandler, 2007, 111-114].
240Cf. [Mandler, 2007, 113f.].
241The translation from Russian is mine.
This fragment from Lewin’s everyday life vividly illustrates the qualitative difference between his ap-proach to research and that of all the listed predecessors. Lewin’s did not focus on research on will, or association, or thinking but was interested in thepsychic whole behind human conduct.
Lewin’s approach was significantly nourished through Gestalt expertise of the 1910s and 1920s. There is to say that Gestalt theory as a whole was obviously not compatible with the mechanistic doctrine built on associanism. While Gestalt experiments were for the largest part designed to grasp perceptional and thinking phenomena some efforts to theorize behavior in terms of Gestalt existed, as well. In 1915, in Zur Grundlegung der Wahrnehmungspsychologie, Kurt Koffka attributes behavior to "structured whole processes" in the brain.
“Dem Erleben von Gestalten können wir sofort das Produzieren von Gestalten an die Sei-te sSei-tellen, das Singen oder Spielen von Melodien, das flotSei-te Hinwerfen von Skizzen, das Schreiben u.v.a. [...]; auch hier handelt es sich um einen Akt, einen gestalteten Gesamtpro-zess; die vielen Einzelbewegungen sind nur als Teile dieses sie umfassenden Vorganges zu verstehen, erst als solche empfangen sie ihre Bestimmtheit” [Koffka, 1915, 37].
This Gestalt extension to matters of human action inevitably consolidates the abandonment of research on will as an isolated category and its inclusion into the study of an interconnected system of pro-cesses underlying human conduct. “Dass der Einfluss des Willens ein beschränkter ist, versteht sich sofort, wenn man neben der Abhängigkeit von subjektiven auch die von objektiven Faktoren anerkennt.”
[Koffka, 1915, 55]. The objective factors, Koffka stresses refer to the Gestalt laws, which he believes to be not only directive to perception but also to behavior (without, however, indicating how).
Lewin coined his concept of “action wholes” (Handlungsganzheiten), crucial in his papers since 1926,242 deriving from Koffka’s "structured whole processes". However, his research on psychic processes un-derlying action began with his doctoral thesis (1911–1916). Taking Ach’s claims of 1910 a starting point Lewin verified these in his dissertation work. He re-constructed the experiment in which Ach asked observers to learn lengthy series of meaningless syllables, then instructing them either to reverse or rhyme the syllables. Lewin’s prediction was that they would either take longer to complete the "hetero-geneous" second task or give wrong answers. Yet, the surprising result was that there generally was no "inhibitive delay," and only a few errors. As the predicted effects failed to occur even under optimal conditions, Lewin argued that an underlying psychical construct—an intention introduced through the experimenter’s instruction–was responsible for the subject’s conduct.243 By implying that intention can redirect mental energy Lewin credits his psychic system a first dynamic property.
Lewin voicedtwo methodological points of criticismon the preceding scholarship in the area of will. The first point referred to the atomistic-style study of isolated phenomena. He noted that the psychological concept of will was conceived in a too narrow way to meet the potential research challenge.
“Die Elementenforschung will wissen, welche selbständigen Elemente es gibt, aus denen sich das Psychische zusammensetzt, also z. B. mit welchen Gefühlsmomenten man als Minimum auskommt, und ob der Willensakt ein besonderes, selbständiges, nicht ’zurück-führbares’ Element darstellt, ein Erlebnis ’sui generis’. Auch in den Arbeiten von Ach und Michotte und Prüm, denen wir den entscheidenden Anstoß für die moderne experimentelle Willenspsychologie verdanken, spielt diese Frage nach der Selbständigkeit des Willensaktes als Erlebniselement und die Feststellung seiner besonderen Natur eine in gewissem Sinne beherrschende Rolle. Das zweite Hauptcharakteristikum der Elementenforschung besteht in der isolierten, stückhaften Behandlung dieser in möglichster Reinheit und Selbständigkeit darzustellenden Elemente. Wohl sieht man Zusammenhänge. Aber man behandelt ihre Teile zu sehr als eine Und-Summe aus Stücken), statt, wie es in der Regel adäquat ist, als unselb-ständige Elemente umfassenderer Ganzheiten, die als solche das Schicksal ihrer Quasiteile bestimmen” [Lewin, 1926b, 302].
242Cf. [Lewin, 1926b, 305, 307, 311, 115f.].
243See [Lewin, 1917, 212-47].
First, in contrast to his predecessor, Lewin argued that will is embedded into an interrelated system of other psychic phenomena. It cannot be isolated or studied as an independent phenomenon. The concept of will is not even exactly defined and depends on its context.
“Eine der Grundeinsichten dieser Untersuchungen ist es, dass man endgültig darauf verzich-ten muss, ’den Willen’ als ein einheitliches psychisches Faktum und Forschungsgebiet z. B.
dem ’Verstand’, dem ’Trieb’, dem ’Gedächtnis’ prinzipiell gegenüberzustellen und von ihnen abzugrenzen. Mit dem Terminus ’Willen’ pflegen vielmehr sachlich sehr verschieden gelager-te Fakgelager-ten und Probleme bezeichnet zu werden: z. B. Entscheidung; Vornahme; Selbstbeherr-schung; Abgrenzung gegen die Umwelt; Konzentration; Ausdauer; einheitlicher oder unhar-monischer, einfacher oder differenzierter Aufbau der Willensziele; Art, Umfang und Struktur der Handlungsganzheit u. a. m. Jedenfalls werden etwaige spätere Ableitungen aus weni-gen konstituierenden Momenten zu ganz anderen Gruppierunweni-gen führen als zur Einordnung in eine einheitliche Klasse: ’Willensvorgänge’ [. . . ] Ich möchte mich daher in den folgenden Beispielen nicht auf ein allzu enges Gebiet beschränken” [Lewin, 1929].244
As stated, will can be related to completely different psychological phenomena, such as decisions, intentions, self control, concentration, persistence, action wholes etc. From the Gestalt perspective it is obvious that the implications vary with the context. Thus, Lewin suggested to revise the conceptual construct behind the concept of will. Given that will is related to all other elements it has to be studied not as isolated entity but with respect to this intertwining. Consequently, the conceptual system designed by Lewin implied the transition to an extended research area of human conduct, i.e. psychology of action.245
Second, Lewin’s other critical interference referred to the purely phenomenological methodsemployed in the foregoing research on will. To respond to this challenge he intended to devote his research to the reconstruction ofcovered processes and the uncovering of “genetic” or “causal-dynamic” properties of the mind.
“Vor allem aber darf man [. . . ] nicht erwarten, daß phänotypisch gleichartige Gebilde oder Prozesse auch kausal-dynamisch, d. h. ihren Ursachen und Wirkungen nach, gleichwer-tig sind. Vielmehr hat die Physik und neuerdings die Biologie gezeigt, daß phänotypische Gleichartigkeit mit kausal-dynamischer Ungleichwertigkeit und andererseits starke phänoty-pische Verschiedenheit mit enger Verwandtschaft in kausal-dynamischer Hinsicht Hand in Hand gehen können” [Lewin, 1926b, 308].
To this end, a series of specific experiments was conducted by his students (see III).
While the preexisting approaches relied on a rather simple “mechanistic” model Lewin suggested that psychology needed new “dynamic concepts of wholeness” (dynamische Ganzheitsbegriffe) to overcome its difficulties. A new conceptual system composed of composed of interrelated concepts (à la Cassirer) needed to be provided. A model of psychological reasoning was supposed to underly this. Lewin discussed variations of the processes underlying human conduct in his publications throughout his entire German career years. Yet, he made a first substantial attempt to provide such asystem in tension in 1926.
Lewin’ssystem in tensionencompasses a set of functionally interlinked concepts. In order to give a con-clusive overview, we re-modeled the system of functionally interlinked concepts as it was documented by Lewin by 1926 by (s. fig. 9). (Quasi-)need and intention stand at the beginning of Lewin’s basic process chain. Further, he identifies three basic scenarios how an intention may be carried out. (3a) Any intention includes a valence but also a structuring and steering mechanism. Lewin argues that the intention is generally dissolved as soon as the intended activity (Vornahmehandlung) can be executed.
(3b) If an opportunity to accomplish the intended activity is not given, a replacement of the intended ac-tivity through a “substitute acac-tivity” (Ersatzhandlung) may occur – i.e., “redirection” of the initial intention
244Quoted from a talk given by Lewin in 1928, at the 3d General Medical Congress for Psychotherapy in Baden-Baden.
245See [Lewin, 1926b, 302], [Lewin, 1929]. Cf. also [Gundlach, 1987, 82].
towards a new (quasi-)need. (3c) What happens if a need cannot be satisfied immediately and cannot be redirected either? In this case the valence inherent to the intention will probably not be fully discharged through the interruption of the intention or its extension over a long period of time.246 Whether the action is finally accomplished or not depends on the appearing opportunities.247
Figure 9: Reconstruction: Mental system composed of psychological concepts [after Lewin 1926]
Thus, Lewin’s process model exhibited new seminal characteristics. As one sees, compared to pre-ceding theories, Lewin first uncovered additional basic mechanisms underlying behavior; he, second, framed these into concepts, and third, he interlinked these concepts in a functional way. Building the process chain for the first time allowed for a descriptive analysis of the whole mental process. But also each key concepts was trusted with a particular function that was not just adopted from former research but newly defined as result of new experimental investigations. The two new seminal concepts Lewin introduced to his process chain are:quasi-need andintention.
Need and quasi-need: In 1926, Lewin introduces the concept of “quasi-need” (Quasibedürfnis) as anal-ogy to Sigmund Freud, who had claimed earlier that needs initiate and steer human conduct. Lewin suggests that while needs are generated by instincts and steer subconscious human behavior, quasi-needs execute the same function for any willful, i.e. “controlled”, action. As such quasi-quasi-needs possess the same level of “psychic reality” as “genuine needs”. This means that both genuine needs and quasi-needs can equally generateintentions.248
Intention: Intention (VorsatzorVornahme) is a key concept of Lewin’s model of the mind. While previous models preferably assume a direct link between the stimulus and the ensuing action or thought with the concept of intention Lewin introduces an intermediate stage between these. He calls the carrying out intentionsvoluntary action(Willenshandlung). Performing an act of volition does not categorically imply an intention, though.
246Lewin touches upon this problem in his very first publication,Kriegslandschaft(1917): A man, who wrote a letter to a friend the day before, will perceive a random mailbox in the street in a completely different way than at any other day when he has no such letter in his pocket. Even if hundreds of other actions and thoughts take place in between the finishing of the letter and the moment when the man perceives the mailbox, the original intention will rekindle in this very moment. Cf. [Lewin, 1982d].
247[Lewin, 1982d], [Lewin, 1926c, 338f., 355, 381, 383]
248Cf. [Lewin, 1926b, Lewin, 1926c].
“In einem Gespräch z. B. geht der Antwort auf eine Frage oder dem sonstigen Hin und Her der Rede nur ganz selten ein besonderer Vornahmeakt voraus, im wesentlichen nur dann, wenn man lügen oder etwas verbergen will. Trotzdem wird man die Reden, die Fragen und Antworten dort, wo ein Vornahmeakt fehlt, keineswegs immer triebhaft nennen kön-nen, sondern wird ihnen durchaus den Charakter des Willentlichen zu billigen müssen. Das gleiche gilt von sehr vielen Handlungen des täglichen Lebens, etwa Berufshandlungen, die nicht automatisiert sind, und die man ebenfalls nicht als unbeherrschte, triebhafte Handlun-gen bezeichnen kann, obschon ihnen kein besonderer Vornahmeakt vorausgeganHandlun-gen ist”
[Lewin, 1926c, 376].
Direction and valence: Since Ebbinghaus experimental psychologists felt that to determine how an impulse will manifest itself on the psychic level one needs to specify its “direction” and “intensity”. In Lewin’s process model, the intensity of an impulse, i.e. “valence” (Aufforderungscharakter), and its direction become properties of the intention (cf. ebd.).