Challenges of Lewin’s philosophy of science

Aristotelian Galilean

1. Type of system Classifying system based on phenomenological relations

Constructive system based on a group of genetically interrelated concepts be treated as one field and governed through the same system of laws

(a) Law = rule. Laws do not embrace all individual cases

(b) Laws are based upon

historico-geographic experience and statistical frequency

(c) Laws are used in order to discover the essence of things and the cause behind all occurrence

(a) Law=rule. All states and events are lawful

(b) Determination of laws equals the construction of a conditional-genetic event-type

(c) Laws allow to predict individual cases

Table 2: Aristotelian versus Galilean modes of thought

As was explained, Lewin’s philosophical approach is determined by two particular properties , i.e. (a) the extension of philosophical theory to the matters of applied psychology and (b) the close convergence of the theory of science and its applicability to experimental research. Accordingly, Lewin’s philosophy of science strives to meet the following challenges.

(1) First, it is not merely an attempt to develop an analytical view of the historical development of science but is primarily concerned with the vision of its future challenges.

(2) Second, it is above all driven by Lewin’s interest in themodus operandi of a scientists working in experimental psychology: How can the contemporary psychologist stimulate and optimize the further development of his discipline? As we have seen, Lewin appropriated Cassirer’s view on a series of philosophical problems without challenging their quintessence by means of critical analysis. However, it would be wrong to attribute this to a lax or negligent attitude from Lewin’s side. He extended Cassirer’s approach to the practice of experimental research and challenged its substance through its application.

Cassirer’s theory was useful and worked as part of his own interdisciplinary endeavor that was the most significant issue for his pragmatic philosophical system.

(3) Third, as was outlined, psychology was rooted in a philosophical tradition that had little experience with experimentation as well as with the formal treatment of data. Contrarily to this tradition, and us-ing natural science as a prototype, Lewin’s programmatic goal was to translate the relations between psychological concepts into concrete formal units related to each other. These relations – as he was convinced – could be determined by means of scientific laws. Lewin’s struggle for systematization and a formal framing of the structure and functioning of the human mind was certainly a pioneering effort that emerged out of his philosophical studies.

Summing up, the close convergence of the theory of science and its application to experimental re-search is a central pillar of Lewin’s methodological approach. As a consequence, he points out the

concern that most frequently the “pure” philosopher does not have the required know-how to get the right insights about science while the natural scientist often does not master epistemic and analytical techniques. Lewin’s own approach suggests a complementary division of responsibilities as research strategy. The philosopher of science is charged with the analysis of the condition and principles of a sci-entific discipline, as well as with the formulation of laws inherent to this discipline. In contrast, the natural scientist is supposed to approach the specification of scientific laws from the other side, i.e. by means of experimentation and the systematization of his empirical findings in form of a conditional-genetic system of concepts. An optimum is constituted by a multidisciplinary scientist who can combine both functions, such as Lewin himself.

6 Towards a dynamic psychology of human conduct

By the end of the 1910s, a shared doctrine of human conduct did not yet exist. A handful of German-speaking scholars were busy approaching the experimental research on human conduct through the exploration of human will. They worked separately rather than in a joint effort. The associanist psy-chologist, such as H. Ebbinghaus and E.G. Müller, seeked to explain behavioral patterns. Yet, both treated behavior as a consequence of unreflected inner processes and largely disregarded volition as a determining factor. Pioneering work in the theory and experimentation on volition was carried out simultaneously by Ach in Germany (1905, 1910) and by Michotte and Plüm at the Catholic University of Leuven (1910/1911). With the theorists of volition, Otto Selz (1913) and Johannes Lindworsky (1918) the essential picture would be completed.²³⁰

Kurt Lewin likewise approached the domain of human conduct starting from experimental investigations on will. In 1926, he formulated the theoretical framework of his psychology of human conduct in the two papersÜber die Struktur der SeeleandVorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. These key publications represent his first substantial effort to apply his philosophical manifesto to the reality of psychological research. In this chapter we discuss the constitution of Lewin’s early psychology of human conduct. In its substance this includes two different ways of dealing with mental phenomena: On the one side, Lewin derived principles from his philosophical agenda and the principles of Gestalt organization, on the other side, his psychology of human conduct relies on research experience assembled in experimental psychology priorly to Lewin. The chapter closely looks at the psychological roots of Lewin’s psychology of action in the associanist psychology and psychology of volition. We further focus on Lewin’s work of 1926 and discuss how he combined this psychological knowhow with the principles of research drawn from Gestalt (Chapter 3) and from philosophy of science (Chapter 5).

6.1 Associanist psychology

Psychological doctrine forerunning of psychology of will was psychology of association (Assoziations-psychologie) or the so called “associanism” (see section 1.3). The “constellation theory” by Hermann Ebbinghaus believes that each psychic event is related to other events following in direct chronology through associative links. These links increasingly stabilize in a person’s memory the more repetitions take place. Consequently, during listening or reading each already known concept restores images linked by association with previous experiences. The restored images are in turn linked to other images.

That is why at times the classical psychology of association represents mental events as a “system of diffuse reproductions”.²³¹

However, the diffusion of associative images alone would not suffice to explain mental activity – soon, various associative links would correlate and create conflicts of associations. In addition, the “constel-lation theory” introduces a hierachisation: It is the intensity of the link that determines, which of two correlated tendencies to reproduction will be inhibited and which activated. From the perspective of the associanist psychology, the direction of the associations is determined through a hierarchy that underlies all the existing associative links.²³² As one can see, the associanist model of the mind faced different logical problems. For instance, this system suggests that a right solution to a cognitive problem would be the strongest associated one. An additional paradox is that the more one learns the less one would be actually capable of solving new reasoning problems.

230In a retroactive assessment, the German historian of psychology Horst Grundlach identifies three major routes of development of psychology of will in the post-war German-speaking Europe. One of these is “psychology of determination” (Determinationspsy-chologie), which, following Ach, continued the investigation of functionalities and impact of psychological determination. Another one followed by Lindworsky, [Lindworsky, 1921, 2nd ed.]. The last historical pathway of psychology of will is represented by Kurt Lewin’s confrontation of Ach’s approach. Cf. [Gundlach, 1987, 67-85].

231Cf. [Métraux and Herrmann, 1991, 7f.].

232In the words of the early theorist of will Otto Selz: “Die gesetzmäßige Verdrängung der schwächeren Reproduktionstendenzen durch die jeweils stärkste ist der einzige richtungsbestimmende Faktor im psychischen Geschehen...” [Selz, 1924, 35]

G. E. Müller of the University of Göttingen tried to preserve the associanist approach by introducing the task (Aufgabe) as an additional variable that was to determine which “reproductive tendency” was going to be intensified. In other words, Müller suggested that instead of a widely web-like diffusion of associations a concrete task given to a person steered the association into a specific direction.²³³ Yet, Müller did more than that. He was one of the first scholars to contrast associative and voluntary conduct by attributing it to two different temporal realities.

“Die durch den Einfluss von Zielvorstellungen entstehenden Handlungen oder Verhaltenswei-sen lasVerhaltenswei-sen sich in 2 Hauptarten einteilen, in unmittelbare Willenshandlungen und in willkür-lich vorbereitete Reaktionen. Bei einer unmittelbaren Willenshandlung hat die Zielvorstellung unmittelbar die auf Erreichung des Zieles gerichtete Tätigkeit zur Folge. . . Bei einer willkür-lich vorbereiteten Reaktion besteht das Ziel in dem Eintreten eines bestimmten Verhaltens V gegenüber einer späterhin sich darbietenden Reaktionsgelegenheit R, und die Vorstellung dieses Zieles bewirkt unmittelbar eine bestimmte Verhaltensweise (z. B. die Stiftung einer Assoziation zwischen R und V), infolge deren dann später bei einem wirklichen Auftreten von R ohne weiteres (d. h. ohne nochmaliges Eingreifen der Zielvorstellung) das gewünsch-te Verhalgewünsch-ten V sich einsgewünsch-tellt” [Müller, 1913, 426f.].

Müller distinguished between two types of reaction – “immediate voluntary activity” (unmittelbare Wil-lenshandlung) and “randomly prepared reaction” (willkürlich vorbereitete Reaktion). In the first case intention is directly linked to the idea of its end (Zielvorstellung). For example, a person who is freezing thinks of closing the open window and then implements this idea by closing the window shutter. The performed action is a manifestation of will. By contrast, when dealing with “randomly prepared reactions”

a stimulus causes the idea of its end while the opportunity to implement this is not instantly given. As soon as this opportunity appears an association that “revives” the stimulus and links this to the idea of accomplishment is generated. Thus, Müller identifies the following event sequence: stimulus – iden-tification of the goal – (time period x) – opportunity to implement the goal – association with the goal appears – conduct towards the goal. As a result, Müller’s revised associanism granted will the power of immediate impact on human conduct. Yet, only associative conduct could have an immediate as well as an extended temporal reality.

In sum, the associanists derived their early inferences about selected patterns of conduct from psychol-ogy of memory. They reasoned that if a regularity was inherent to the relationship between stimulus and its mental reproduction one should be able to find similar regular relations between stimuli and response in human conduct. Associanist psychologists studied human conduct from a purely phenomenological angle.