Veröffentlichungsreihe des Internationalen Instituts für Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
PROBLEMS OF A SOCIETY-ORIENTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY -
THE HUMANIZATION OF WORK PROGRAM AT THE CROSSROADS
by F r i e d e r N a s c h o ld
IIVG/dp/80-213
Publication series of ' the International Institute for Comparative Social Research - SP II
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Steinplatz 2, D 1000 Berlin 12 030/313 40 81
ABSTRACT
In this article, the author examines the concept of a society oriented research and development policy in the Federal
Republic in the light of the socio-political perspectives and practical implementation. The program on "humanization of working life" is shown to be part of an overall strategy of "modernization of the economy."
This concept and its instruments meet with substantial resistance against implementation especially from private enterprise but also from the state and the trade unions.
Thus, the state program of humanization finds itself more and more at the crossroads. The state is faced with the alternative of adjustment to a management-dominated develop
ment of technology as part of industrial rationalization processes on the one .hand, and the offensive development of a society-oriented public research and development policy with a stronger emphasis on and realization of trade union demands on the other. Elements of a broader concept of
a state humanization program are discussed in the conclusion.
I . Problematique
The ultimate frame of reference for any public, entrepre
neurial, or trade union policy for the development of new products and production processes and, by extension, for the nature of the working and living conditions of the employed population is the ever more international division of labour.
The progression beyond the traditional split between few in
dustrial countries on the one hand and numerous developing countries serving as raw materials suppliers on the other, together with the internationalization of production plant location, processes which took place towards the sixties at the latest, have provoked a qualitative change in the mar
ginal conditions of the use and accumulation of capital and imposed a new international division of labour. These modi
fied conditions in the world economy are tending to bring about, inter alia, "crises at the centre" of the former world economy, these being reflected at private enterprise level by stagnating investment rates and the bankruptcy of even moderate
ly large firms, and at state level by control failures and fiscal crises. As such they are threatening to severely affect the life and work of the employed population by the unemploy
ment, occupational degradation, and strain and stress which accompany them. 2 / The international division of labour is
necessitating a structural adaptation on the part of the State, private enterprise, and the trade unions, the responses to
which show a variety of models: the upholding of top economic
*
The author would like to thank Dr. U. Jürgens, M. Nassauer (both of Science Center Berlin) and Dr. G. Peter (Bonn), for their
encouragement and constructive criticism.
2
rankings coupled with, grave neglect of social repercussions (USA, Japan), disengagement from the capitalist world market coupled with emphasis on the qualitative internal develop
ment of the trade unions (cf. public debate and efforts in Great Britain), and society-oriented modernization in an attempt to accelerate the internationalization process and simultaneously cushion social repercussions (Federal Re
public of Germany). This paper seeks to examine in detail this mixed model of social development based on the follow
ing-three principles:
1. Adaptation to the changed world economic conditions should take place by way of a clear modernization strategy for the national economy to be implemented within the frame
work of an integrated State-employers system. A purpose- -epecific and weighty research and technology policy serving
as a sectoral structure policy should induce innovations in products and production processes and investment to maximize productivity, thereby permitting greater economic growth, employment, and income.
2. Social cushioning of this modernization strategy is pro
vided by a primarily research-and-technology-oriented
humanization of work programme which is intended to control the evolution of working conditions (qualification, strain and stress, freedom of disposition, etc.) induced by changes in the production structure.^4 /
3. This strategy calls for systematic and organized parti
cipation and codetermination on the part of the employed population and their representative organizations.
Yet "The nature, scope, and rapidity of technological progress . . . . are determined within the field of force exerted by social, political, and econ
sue of the societal
technological change and of the actual and potential for
mative influence on technology of these directly affected is assuming increasing sociopolitical significance." The workers' parties and the trade union movement are now becoming increasingly aware of the explosiveness of tecn- nological development, and discomfort as regards public promotion of new technologies is growing. Demands for
"society-oriented research and technology" (Vetter), for formative and defensive influence on innovation and invest
ment policy are now being articulated and organized, '^hese are the initial indications of a countermovement among the employed population and their trade union representatives to integrate their power and interest potential into this development strategy. 7/ The trade union movement thus emerges alongside the employers (and the public attempts at mediation) as the second interest/power-specific action system in research and technology policy. Two "social figures"
(E. Heimann) with to some extent conflicting "social ideas"
are thus steadily taking shape in this political arena.
Their contradictions are reflected in their divergent evalua
tion of the significance of research and technology policy in the economic and social restructuralization effort to meet changed world market conditions. They furthermore in
volve divergent and mutually exclusive points of departure for sociopolitical development strategies.
The federal Republic of Germany, a highly industrialized key state with an economic structure which is particularly sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy, has there
fore chosen to pursue— within the prevailing constellation of forces— a strategy which incorporates a combination of
economic modernization, society-oriented structuralization of work, and worker participation into national research , and
Q /
technology policy. —- The points requiring examination are thus the conditions, the power/interest constellations, the
4
processes, and the results of this strategy, with special reference to the extent to which an "economistic" moderni
zation strategy oriented towards world market conditions in fact predominates and that to which society-oriented structuralization elements can he made effective with the support of the trade union movement and state mediation.
The point of departure for this examination is public re
search and technology policy, in particular the public
promotion of new technologies, with special reference being given in this connection to the humanization of work programme and new production technologies.
After a brief description of the most important phases of the development of research and technology policy in the Federal Republic of Germany which shows the move towards the currently predominant promotion concept, there follows an analysis of the situation of the humanization of work programme between the forces for an economic modernization strategy and a society-oriented, employee-influenced de
velopment model of public research and technology policy.
This will illustrate inter alia the divergent interest and power constellations of the action system which the em
ployers and the trade unions represent, and the system and action limitations of the State in its control and
mediation endeavours. The central thesis seeks to show that, given an increasing sociopolitical polarization of the
relevant power groupings in relation to the humanization programme— and this especially in conjunction with long-term crisis periods— the State can only choose between a defensive reduction of the objectives and implementation strategies
of the programme or an offensive and sustained further development of the programme. The paper will conclude with 3. SUrVSV of xb.9 S 0 C X 0 "00 2. 2_ "f i CS.1 2.20 S "tlS , SO^S — ceptualization elements and implementation strategies of an offensive public humanization policy which draws instru
mental sucoert from the trade union movement.
II. The Phases of Public Research and Technology Policy - Sociopolitical Power Relations in the Federal Re- public of Germany V/ithin the World Market Context The specifically mixed strategy pursued by the Federal Re
public of Germany with regard to a new international division of labour, emerged— in approximate terms— in three phases.
At each period, specific economic crisis adaptation situ
ations and modified politico-ideological power relations had led to a change and development of the prevailing re
search and technology policy in its concepts, Instrumen
tarium, and fundamental assumptions as regards sociopolit
ical interrelations.
The fifties were characterized by the imperative of internal economic reconstruction, the predominance of conservative governments, a weakened trade union movement, and a still incomplete state control capacity. There prevailed a con
cept of an ad hoc research and technology policy which was oriented towards domestic reconstruction requirements.
The promotion concept was based on the deployment of exist
ing technologies and the expansion of scientific institu
tions and infrastructure. The promotion instrumentarium was. oriented towards a largely global approach to financing with emphasis on subsidies and an unequivocal bias in favour
of indirect promotion (tax incentives and grants). The allo
cation of funds took place by way of a pluralistic state distribution system, and investment was restricted within relatively narrow bounds. The silent premises of this pro
motion concept resided in two sociopolitical assumptions
which were considered to be complementary in their respective effects: the assumption of a quasi-autonomous development of innovations and new technologies and the assumption that economic growth was an "automatic" register of an improve-
6
sent in the quality of life of the population. This con
stellation changed in the sixties under the enormous pressure for adaptation in economic development. At external level this was the result of the same changed
•world market conditions which were also faulted for having triggered off the 1966/67 economic crisis. At internal level, this pressure was intensified by the predominance of the conservative parties and the rise of the social democratic labour party. Other factors which likewise exerted pressure were firstly the increas
ing strength and sensitivity of the trade unions, es
pecially as regards questions of employment and income development, characteristics which became evident with the first steps towards a policy of protection against rationalization, and, secondly, the increasing "dualiza- tion" of the national economy: the emergence of oligo
polistic enterprises accentuated the polarization between these and small and medium enterprise. A tightly inte
grated system grew up in the field of research and tech
nology policy between a strengthened state apparatus with its broader responsibilities and the above-mentioned
economic blocks. The public promotion concept was ac
cordingly designed to foster in particular the development of growth industries and growth-promoting programmes.
The keywords "imitation" and "closing the technology gap"
(with particular reference to the world leader, the USA), served as the basis for the initiation or expansion of the four classical promotion programmes: nuclear energy, aero
nautical and space technology, SDP, and marine research.
This promotion concept designed to make good the deficit in growth industries vis-a-vis international standards was
sarium: it took the an aonrooriate instrumei
- • S- ^,11/ ~
a.ietic concent — oi se<
jacxeo. up c.
:orm of a "realis^
policy based on informative
;ure
i n d i c a t i v e o n ; ita
and focussed on both the removal of critical obstacles and on growth promotion— especially in the field of research and development policy— -by way of global and primarily indirect promotion measures. This.concept of structure policy was compounded by a management-oriented infrastructure policy to buoy up endangered branches of the economy by way of temporally and financially re
stricted measures. The allocation of resources took place via public coordination committees working with close
attention to coordination with the entrepreneurial clientele.
The transfer of innovation was supposed to be effected as a spin-off from competition. The new basis of this promotion concept resided in a recognition of the value of public orientation data for technological development.
Predominantly autonomous market regulation had now ceded its place to a policy of public investment incentives.
Moreover, the identification of concrete development diffi—
culties and the experience of disturbances in the economic system resulting from adaptation to the world market had begun to raise doubts as to the value of the premise that economic growth equals improved quality of life. The in
creasingly intricate nexus between the federal German market and the world market led in the seventies to a comprehen
sive and intensified pressure for the adaptation of nume
rous branches to the new international division of labour, and the pressure stepped up again in the wake of the
1975/74 economic crisis. Employers saw themselves faced with more restrictive competition which called for an im
provement in the quality and flexibility of their products and earlier delivery dates even for small and special
lines and initially increased their costs. Comprehensive rationalization of both technology and labour organization in almost all fields, together with the establishment of
8
in-firm research and development departments, were seen as strategies which would curb cost development. Their repercussions, apart from a diminution of the interna
tional competitiveness of numerous firms, included a
massive decline in employment and a slowdown in the progress being made as regards income, qualifications, and strain and stress among employees.
At political level, a strategic reversal in the form of a new social democratic government and a strengthening of the political status of the trade unions had led to a new political and ideological power relation. The sociopolitical constellation of the seventies did not bring about a funda
mental change in research and technology policy; it did, however, bring about a further development of research and technology policy which concretized its future orientation.^/
The political objectives of the new government made refer
ence to "technology and modernization policy being located in a field of tension between the interests of employees and employers."1^/ In terms of the promotion concept, this associated two elements: a comprehensive modernization of
the national economy should actively promote "new technologies, a move which implied innovations, rationalization measures, and the expansion of key technologies in previously ne
glected fields of strategic importance which could ulti
mately gain a leading position on the world market. In
line with the explicit objective of social democratic policy to "deploy research findings more effectively to accomplish tasks in the social field, research and technology
policy was to be viewed as a global policy and not simply as a repair policy based on social criteria for Qualitative and differentiated growth."“— This socially oriented moder
nization policy in the form of a purpose-specific active structure policy operating via technology and research pro
motion was instrumentalized with greater oublic control
capacity in this field: provision was made for the trade unions to participate at national, regional, and local level, and
for the priorities in research policy to he determined by way of a centrally initiated technology dialogue with the representatives of both management and labour.1-^ This was supplemented by a considerable increase in appropriations, especially those to the new priority promotion areas. The predominant principles on which allocation was based were priority to programme and structure promotion and priority to direct allocation (up to full promotion), these being accompanied by complementary endeavours to pursue a strict public consultancy and regulation policy. The transposition of findings from research and technology was entrusted
less and less to the market and normative legislation; it was to take place at enterprise and inter-enterprise level via innovation consultancy agencies established especially for small and medium industry, by the process of technology transfer, arid by trade union participation.
This social democratic development model of a "humane growth path" (Hauff) is based on the following three premises:
1. The negative aspects of industrial growth and the tech
nical civilization have to date not represented essen
tial and unavoidable side-effects of technology but are instead the consequences firstly of endeavours to guarantee microeconomic profitability in a competitive situation and secondly of "the pressure to maximize turnover without respecting social costs.
2. An active research and technology policy which takes the form of a future-oriented structure policy with the
twofold orientation towards world productivity standards and the social needs of the working population is able
to break such a vicious circle. There exists "no un-
3
resolvable contradiction between productivity and io /
the humanization of life and work."
. An alliance of sociopolitical power and interests can develop an active public research and tech
nology policy which enjoys autonomy vis-a-vis pre
vailing entrepreneurial strategies and world economy conditions, ^uch policy is able to regulate the em
ployment niveau according to sociopolitical criteria by way of a society-oriented modernization policy. —20/
The preconditions and success prospects of the social democratic theory and practice incorporated in this
development model of a mixed modernization strategy will be examined below in the light of examples from the New Technologies Programme.
ill. The Humanization of Work Programme: The Economic Modernization Strategy of the State or a Society-
oriented Development Model of Public Research and Technology Policy
The public debate on the interrelations between economic growth, technical development, productivity increases, and the life and work of the employed population, a debate which was opened in the mid-sixties and intensified by sub
sequent visions of economic crisis, provoked a greater problem awareness as regards the opportunities for and dangers to social development. This new awareness was
particularly noticeable at four levels. Industrial workers showed a greater sensitivity towards the dangers of tech
nological progress and changed their behavioural patterns and expectations accordingly. Trade unions exerted greater pressure in favour of a comprehensive improvement of socia
working conditions. The State began to pursue a qualitative and differentiated growth policy. Entrepreneurs found them
selves confronted with numerous problems in the fields of technology, work organization, and personnel management in their strategies to modernize operations.
Within the framework of its reform policy, the social-lib
eral government endeavoured to cushion and resist the in
creasing social, economic, and political dangers by mak
ing the structuralization of working conditions a public duty and a part of modernization strategy in general and of a technology-oriented structure policy in particular.
The political authorities based their action on the follow- ing assumptions and intentions. 23/The negative effects of economic and technological development are not necessari
ly the side-effects of economic modernization per se but the expression of its private-enterprise form. An improve
ment of working conditions is not necessarily a side-effect of an improvement in productivity. The increase in social problems "is drawing humanization of work into the centre of the sociopolitical demands being articulated by trade unions and Social Democrats. The adaptation of working conditions to the ...needs of the individual (is not) only to be pursued as a means of maintaining economic per
formance capacity" but instead represents "a central and fundamental value in a social and democratic constitutional state."2-^/ There exists no "unresolvable contradiction" (Hauff) between productivity increase and humanization of work.
One important condition of this programme is "that tech
nological development should bring about an alert and more democratic decision-making and opinion-forming process."“^ / Accordingly, the humanisation of work programme adopted in 1974 was the first research and technology action programme
12
to be oriented towards society and the specific require
ments of the employed population. In conjunction with a productivity-oriented modernization strategy, the programme developed a ’’broad approach" (Altmann/Düll) to the improve
ment of working conditions. The principal objectives were the abolition of intolerable conditions by the establish
ment of protective data and minimum standards, and an improvement in the quality of working conditions (quali
fications, work organization, freedom of disposition, em
ployment status). The promotion instrumentarium mainly
comprised direct, operation-specific and programme-accompany ing research and development measures implemented in the first instance in the firm affected and to an increas
ing extent at branch level. One important aspect was that the traditional transfer of research and technology policy by way of the market, normative regulations, and the trans
fer of knowledge, was expanded to -include information and documentation systems and broad-based training programmes, and to emphasize the value of contracts and agreements
concluded between labour and management. The central characteristic of the programme nevertheless remains its systematic organization of the participation open to the workers concerned and their interest representations, in
recognition of the fact that awareness and interest on the part of the personnel and their representatives coupled with real codetermination opportunities are decisive pre
requisites for the success of the programme.
The humanization programme briefly described above thus distinguishes itself clearly from former conservative technological, economic, and social development models.
Yet it incorporates a compromise between a number of
27/
some extern' :onz ±: .ng social torees ana s which lends its theory and practice a csr
ambivalence. Even if the research and development policy of many firms is becoming increasingly dependent on direct or indirect public support, "nothing can hide the fact that technology is primarily developed and applied firstly within the framework of a power of control exercized by
the employers and secondly in their economic interest.
...And no further reflection on public technology policy should neglect the fact that it must pass by way of the enterprise if it is to be effective.'^®/ Technological progress, public research and technology policy, and, by extension, the humanization of work programme "are situated within a field of forces exerted by social, political, and
economic interesf'^-S/» the most important being the employers under pressure to adapt to the new international division
of labour, the politico-administrative system (in this case the research and technology administration), and- the workers and their organizations.
In the sociopolitical issue as to who should decide on tech
nological development^S^ny allegation that decision is largely dependent on the intentions of policy-makers con
stitutes an underestimation of the strength and driving force of economic power relations. ^-1/ The ambivalence inherent in the programme implies a number of wearisome social po
sition struggles as regards its objectives and control
centres. Its substantive objectives render the humanization concept victim to a tug-of-war between a "false name for an intensified rationalization"^-^/ and a society-oriented structuralization of the working world by way of research and technology. Viewed from the social control centres of humanization policy, the (simplified) choice is as follows:
is technology development to adopt the shape of a headless charger, largely neglecting social repercussions,'’^/ or are potential technological developments to be publicly ar
14
ticulated and subjected to a democratic opinion-forming
There now follows a brief analysis of the intentions and implementation conditions of the humanization programme within the contemporary social power context, and an
examination of its social repercussions.
The focal point of the humanization efforts being pursued by the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology are direct firm-specific research and technology measures. It is
above all in complex projects (extensive automatization projects coupled with a reorganization of labour in entire departments or firms) that the current complex mixture of innovation-oriented economic modernization, a more humane structuralization of work,and participation on the part of the affected workers and their interest organizations, can be realistically examined. Since systematic, empirical survey data are not yet available, the following assumptions can be based only on generally accessible expertises, interim project reports and other literature, personal experience, and the extrapolation of current trends. They can there
fore claim to be nothing more than provisional, trend-iden
tifying hypotheses; but they .may nevertheless serve to illustrate the basic aspects of public humanization of work policy in complex projects. The firms examined were
for the main part engaged in electronics, mechanical en
gineering, and textiles, branches which are all faced with serious structural problems as a consequence of the growing keenness of international competition. The production cost competition of cheap-labour countries in mass production, the innovation race between the most highly industrialized countries, the labour market situation, and personnel de
ployment procedures, innovations in work organization, and
flexible production processes are all characteristics of the problem situation. One of the current adaptation strategies designed to counter these structural problems is the introduction of product and process innovations involving comprehensive rationalization. The essential elements of such adaptation strategies, alongside the
development, of "intelligent" products, include the develop
ment of flexible, highly automated, computer-based opera- tionaldisposition, and production precesses. In conjunction with greater flexibility in terms of personnel policy and
the organization of work, these are ultimately designed to orient overall operations towards extensive horizontal and vertical integration. Typical results of such strate
gies include a jump in productivity, greater flexibility as regards personnel and plant, earlier delivery dates, and better quality products.
Assuming an unspecified degree of acuity as regards the self-interests of the firm (i.e. after strategic weighing up of the benefit of financial support for modernization projects and the importance of public stipulations as regards more humane working conditions and the participa.- tion process), the firm submits on its own initiative an application for financial support from the public humani
zation of work programme. Activization of state promotion thus depends to a large extent on the managerial propensity for calculation action. An application which fulfils these three global promotion criteria is then processed as
follows: 1) examination and assessment by a committee of experts and representatives of management and labour;
2) approval and processing of the application by the compe
tent department of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology and the project carrier; 3) determination of the substantive objectives as regards technology and the
structure of work; 4) formal approval by the works council
16
of the applicant firm and initiation of the approval pro
cedure as regards the information and counselling of the workers affected on all phases of the project and, where applicable, implementation of training measures; 5)imple
mentation of the project according to a predetermined schedule and in the form of a research and development project characterized by dialogue and consensus between all those concerned; 6) after successful completion of the project, endeavours towards a generalization of the mocel, and active transfer, dissemination, and counselling via a number of media.
Within the context of the forces and interests of enter
prise reality, however, the publicly supported innovation process normally shows a number of more or less serious departures from— and even blatant reversals of— the public promotion concept. The public allocation authorities and the impressive number of promotion instruments determining and regulating matters relating to time schedule, content, personnel, and organization appear in fact to have sur
prisingly little effect. The explanation for this situa
tion could be the globality and partial contradictoriness of the central objectives of the programme and the corres
pondingly large number of realization methodologies, which render impact control a difficult, if not impossible,task.
Relatively often, the participation provisions are either directly undermined or are observed merely as a formality.
A further frequently employed tactic is the delayed in
clusion of humanization criteria, these being considered only after the project has reached an advanced stage of development so that they can be subjected to very narrow
p r o f i t a b i l i t yr criteria and the framewor circumstantial
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enterprise thus more often resembles a permanent building up and breaking down of coalitions.
These examples are not intended to represent a "chronique scandaleuse" of state programmes and entrepreneurial
power of control. They are rather more an indication of the fact that a reform programme developed by a given political power constellation which clashes with the circumstantial forces of development in the world economy and with the autonomous interest system of entrepreneurial authority will necessarily ultimately aim at a gradual modification
of that power of control and thereby inevitably become in
volved in interest and power conflicts. This fact illustrates the limitations of state control if authoritative support from relevant sociopolitical groups is insufficiently forth
coming.
There follows a brief examination of three typical examples of interest, power, and implementation problems in the
humanization of work programme and their sociopolitical aspects. This will in turn serve as the basis for a pro
visional assessment of the impact of the programme during the relatively short period it has been in force.
1. Entrepreneurial power of control, world economic con
ditions, and state humanization strategy: the ambi
valence of humanization measures in the light of the rationalization strategies of management
Although, according to official policy, there does exist a certain ambivalence between the individual political objectives of the humanization programme, there exists
"no unresolvable contradiction" (Hauff).This impreciseness of the global objective of the programme in practice
leads to a situation at enterprise level in which the humane
structuralization of- working conditions is to a large extent dependent on the prevailing economic, political, and ideological power relationship, and in which even the reverse of the desired effect may he obtained.
"or example, a changed competitive situation on the world market caused a complex enterprise^-^^to plan a
comprehensive reorganization at considerable cost within the framework of the "production techniques" provisions of the humanization of work promotion programme. The objectives of the firm's management were firstly the maintenance/improvement of the market position it had previously held in- its field of production by means of an extensive scheme to rationalize the. production process in conjunction with the adoption of a humane structurali
zation of work, and secondly the establishment of a new market for a "humane" product via this production inno
vation. On the basis of a number of strategic consider
ations, not least of that of the high investment made in research and development, the management decided in favour of a comprehensive rationalization and innovation policy which provided,firstly,for the development of a highly automated flexible production system with automated
handling equipment, NO processing units, and OiTC, secondly, for the elimination of the traditional Tayldr- istic division of labour by means of greater flexibility in work organization, this in conjunction with some hori
zontal and vertical work enrichment, and, thirdly and
ultimately, for the reduction of physical strain and stress by the adoption of automated handling equipment and
automated material flow.
This project might have been of public technology policy.
s"tisg 9s , ini'O"r'ov©Q.
considered as a model project It combined innovative moder-
greater worker participation in an apparently optimal
manner. It was anticipated that this project would produce genuine and generalizable results. It was to introduce highly rationalized and humane product and production inno
vation capable of competing at international level, a
number of improvements in working conditions (more flexible work organization, work enrichment, upgraded qualifications), a reduction of physical strain, and still unspecified effects on psychical and mental strain. General expert opinion
was that this technological innovation conformed with the relevant norms.
The humanization measures actually taken were of limited scope and were characterized by the defence of entre
preneurial interests. Most were aimed at the removal of obstacles in the new, more flexible production process and at ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. They
therefore tended to contribute towards even greater profi
tability . Yet the more profound interests of the workers directly or indirectly affected were neglected. An inno
vation policy of this kind enabled the management to gain
”a qualitatively diverse and more penetrating control of the production process” ; it "undermined the worker's control over the workplace and could, by extension, even undermine the power of the interest representation groups. ”^-ä/ A second fundamental humanization interest . of the workers was like
wise ignored, namely, the employment/redundancy effect of such rationalization innovations.^2/ Although it can be assumed that in this case the enormous increase in productiv
ity will not lead to any redundancies, it is likely that the employment rate will remain below the growth rate of the enterprise. More important, however, is the fact that the employment effects of this enterprise are externalized to its small and medium competitors within the branch (or
20
even abroad), with the probable consequence of massive incursions into their workforces and considerably less favourable working conditions. The manufacture of newly developed products on the basis of highly automatized production processes cannot compensate the redundancies caused in other firms.
The humanization elements in this project thus proved to be a "false name for an ultimately greater rationalization"
(Hauff), with grave neglect of the control effect and employment effect as an "integral part of technology and modernization policy" (Helfert) within the firm. This reversal of humanisation in two fundamental workers'
interest fields is undoubtedly only to some extent attrib
utable to a lack of perspicacity or sensitivity on the part of the public authorities, the personnel, and their representative organisations. Alternative development paths for the enterprise were not even given consideration. These might have been an innovation strategy with a less ac
centuated increase in productivity; a broad-based humani
zation approach as regards qualification, organization of labour, strain and stress, and, above all, the control capacity of the personnel; countersteering against re
dundancy effects; and the introduction of minimum standards as regards working conditions coupled with a branch concept within the framework of an active sectoral and regional
structure policy.
2. "System and action limitations"5-§/of public humanization strategy
The power of control enjoyed by private enterprise as regards innovation, together with the pressure exerted by world
market conditions, confines public humanization policy within almost insurmountable system limitations. Nevertheless, the
de facto action limitations within the contemporary- political power constellation are not so restrictive as not to leave considerable scope for the development
of a humanization of work programme. An accurate assess
ment of the limitations and possibilities of a humane structuralization of work presupposes an examination based on enterprise experience of the strategies of
public humanization policy to further exploit and expand its scope of activity beyond the contemporary activity
and system limitations. The point at issue is therefore the potential implementability of public humanization policy within the context of "the field of forces exerted by social, political, and economic interests" (Hauff).
Numerous wearisome negotiations and the experience gained over recent years have crystallized a series of important characteristics of humanization projects at enterprise level which are also typical of the programme at interna
tional level.Of special importance is the association of three partial goals— technological innovation, humane structuralization of work, and worker participation. A further characteristic is the interdisciplinary basis of research and development policy, the emphasis on its model character, and on the generalizability of the project in place of a quest for the highest possible figures. The participation aspect in its numerous forms is a fundamental characteristic of projects at enter
prise level. Attempts are often made to supplement the obligatory approval of the project by the works council with the conclusion of additional agreements specifying in detail the information, consultation, and participa
tion procedures to operate between employers, research groups, and personnel/works council. Some projects have been accompanied by an agreement stipulating minimum re
22
quirements as regards personnel policy, work organization, technology, and qualification within the context of the project, a procedure which has afforded the personnel and the works council considerable influence possibilities on the innovation and investment policies of the manage
ment. Sometimes the trade unions have succeeded in per
suading their partners to develop new pay grades to ac
company the new technologies and test new pay system models.
One provision of particular importance, perhaps the first step towards influencing entrepreneurial investment policy, affords the staff and the works council the opportunity to undergo training to upgrade their professional skills and their competence in trade union work before and during the project. Such qualification processes are undergone on the basis of "carrier autonomy," i.e. autonomous de
termination of the learning processes, and, by extension, re
lease from the integrated social partner system. This implies that staff, works council, and trade union ad
ministrators at all levels are encouraged to submit pro
posals on their own initiative within the framework of the programme, an opportunity which is of course likewise open to the employers. The attempts to extend enterprise projects to branch level under the control of parity-based management and labour bodies might also prove to be an
important measure. This would permit better control of
the generalization of humanization measures and their various employment effects. Initial endeavours are also being made to regionalize humanization effects— problems of common
interest in the field of humanization are now being examined on an inter-branch basis. Another factor of fundamental
importance is the extension of transfer strategies. Since the traditional mechanisms of the market, statutory stand
ards, and scientific establishments are no longer adequate, new enterprise-specific and interest-specific transfer
crocedures have been developed, in which svstematic trairins
and counselling by professional associations and the tariff parties are the most important aspects.
A significant point in these - all in all - considerable innovations in public humanization policy is the fact that initial steps, albeit of differing importance, have been taken in all its fields. On the other hand it is relatively seldom that the concepts have been fully developed. This
"torso" character of the humanization programme is only to a small extent attributable to the relatively short period during which the programme has been in operation and the manifold friction points in the approval and
implementation procedure betweei the competent departments of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT), the German Research Institute for Aviation and Space Tech
nology (DFVLR), and the project carriers, ^he most
restrictive issue is not even the widespread uncertainty as to the way in which the humanization programme is to be continued, as to the possibilities of extending its cri
teria to cover other BMFT programmes (e.g.EDP programme, production technology programme), or., vice versa, the detachment of the humanization .programme and a decisive reduction of the original criteria^-2/of much greater im
portance. than these issues is the permanently unstable compromise nature of the programme which is itself an indication of unequivocal system and action limitations
within the Contemporary humanization policy revolving around the conflict of objectives evident in everyday operations between productivity and humanization, a conflict which is almost always resolved in favour of entrepreneurial profit considerations. The system limitations of public humaniza
tion policy are particularly evident in the following two fields.
The entrepreneurial innovation a number of phases: initiation
process normally comprises planning, implementation,
24
running-in, and full operation. As regards .the influence opportunities of the personnel and their representatives, it is the design of the plant during the planning phase which is of particular significance: at this stage the general mechanization niveau can he recognized and the project stopped or modified at not too excessive cost.
In all the cases under review, however, a lack of codeter
mination opportunities prevented the interests of. the personnel in more favourable working conditions from being brought to bear in the planning phase— "it is not
surprising that a technological innovation process dominated by capital interests in this way is not alone able to
4? / bring about a genuine improvement of working conditions."
A further system limitation of public research and tech
nology policy is to be found in the transposition process of technological innovation into economic investment.
Although the State is able to exert a certain degree of influence via financial incentives on the innovation attitude of employers— at least as regards the develop
ment of pilot and model plants— it is nevertheless not able to convert technological innovation into economic investment (unless it were to undertake a generous state purchase guarantee). The limitations of state action thus derive from a lack of control over enterprise-specific investment activity.
This is also a structural deficit of the humanization of work programme. It is now being combatted by the establish
ment of "counter-market" transfer mechanisms, i.e. via the political bargaining systems of the tariff partners. "As a research programme the humanization of work programme may well be ina position to develop ideas and solution ap-
" 0 0 2 . S S 0 ö O 13 0 ~b 03 ”b S C 3 t impose specific forms of work structuralization measures,
nor can it include all spheres of work in its measures. In the proposal, implementation, and transfer stages, it is to a large extent dependent on the decisions of management.
A survey of contemporary rationalization measures reveals the danger that finance will be made available for primarily those measures in which humanization is essentially a cost and profitability issue. "4-2/
"Since the principle of freedom of disposition enjoyed by employers is not questioned, the success of public policy is in the last analysis determined by the laws of the market.
The determinant factors for the contemporary state of the humanization of work programme-a collection of initiated yet mainly blocked humanization measures-seem to reside
largely in the "unstable compromise equilibrium" (Poulantzas) characterizing the relations among the most important
sociopolitical forces-in the Federal Republic. Under con
temporary world economic conditions, the prevailing power of control is that of the employer "to develop and apply technology primarily in his own interests."45/ Within this context the reform potential of the Social Democratic party as regards the interests of the broad working population can only represent a weak counterweight or, at best, a cor
rective. Nevertheless, the social democrat-led Federal
Ministry for Research and technology with its long tradition of alliance with the conservative parties and large-scale private enterprise has undergone a considerable transition during the past few years as regards objectives, promotion concepts, and promotion instrumentarium.4-^/ yet the develop
ment and implementation of its first society-oriented re
search and technology programme is'still giving rise to internal bureaucratic conflicts. The attitude of the trade unions themselves, the real sociopolitical counterweight to the employers* power of control, towards the public policy
26
of humane working conditions is thus of decisive importance to the future of the humanization programme.
3. Trade unions and public humanization policy
The working conditions of the employed population represent
ed a central component of trade union policy long before the term "humanization of work" was c o i n e d . T h e i r efforts in this respect had always borne close relation to the most acute dangers and the corresponding trade union tasks,
demands, and strategies at any given time. The heating up of the humanization issue in the early seventies was in line with a shift in the priorities of trade union activities
provoked by the changes in the work situation resulting from technological and organizational developments and the
sociopolitical reform strategies introduced by the Social Democratic Party in 1968. These reform strategies included new promotion concepts in research and technology policy, of which the most significant was the "New Technologies"
programme.
Until that time no active relation had existed between the trade unions and public research and technology policy.
Criticism was directed rather at the only partial infor
mation flow and the minimal influence of the trade unions vis-a-vis the danger of a mere "support industry policy"
(Vetter) leading to modernization-induced job destruction.
With the advent of Mr. Matthofer as Federal Minister for
Research and Technology and the introduction of society-orient ed research and technology programmes, the attitude of
constrained criticism ceded its place to one of constructive criticism, with special attention being paid to the hu
manisation of work programme.4-2/ Although the programme
was approved in general, its processes and procedures and the results of many projects were a subject of controversy.
The principal points of contention were the lack of par
ticipation opportunities, its rationalization effects, and the uncertainty as regards the repercussions of many of the projects. The most grave drawbacks of the programme were considered to be its lack of implementability as a research programme, the redundancies it caused in place of improved working conditions, and the narrow limits of trade union influence. The criticism became even more incisive as trade union humanization demands changed in the wake of economic crisis^thereby becoming more distant from the promotion priorities of the public humanization of work programme. Increasing awareness of the only limited effect of tariff agreements and codetermination in a
crisis situation and of the necessity for effective national economic and employment policies and a linkage between
employment demands and humanization demands had induced a gradual change of opinion as regards the humanization of work programme. The programme was now expected to yield
’’more than just a shift of emphasis," ^-2/Even though initial surveys of humanization projects in industry backed up the sobering conclusion that "the declared ob
jectives of a humanization of working conditions ... have in practice not proceeded from the drawing board and have brought nothing or only very little for those concerned,"
and that "it is essentially rationalization measures which have been promote^" the trade unions (in this case the Metalworkers Union) were "nevertheless of the opinion that the path chosen is the correct path," that "this path
should be pursued," and that "the existing basis would have to be further strengthened." It had been recognized that the programme was not only leading to the few con
crete agreements described above but was also opening up
28
a number of important latent functions for the trade unions:
mobilization of interest in and awareness of humanization problems, democratic control of science and research and their transparency, cooperation and coordination within the trade union movement and among research, management, and labour, and contact with the instruments giving access to the representatives of the Ministry.
This phase of rapprochement was jeopardized by a polarization process. While the Metalworkers Union submitted its first major promotion application within the priority area
"Transfer," there developed among its membership a fear that the exclusion of the new promotion area "Production Technology" from the scope of the humanization of work
programme would jeopardize the programme in that this would imply a potential reduction of trade union participation rights and increased promotion of rationalization measures.
In unequivocal terms the Metalworkers Union stressed the danger that "public technology policy is largely a publicly subsidized job destruction and work degradation policy
Trade union humanization policy and public humanization programme had thus arrived at the "crossroads" (Birkwald).
These various phases in the relations between the trade unions and public research and technology policy are marked by the historically different problem situation in which the federal German trade union movement, tech
nology and productivity, and public policy developed.
Traditionally, the trade union movement had held an
optimistic view as regards the development of productivi
ty, science, and technology: it was not until the recent structural crisis began to take shape that the drawbacks of an uncontrolled development of productivity became evioent
ana codetermination as the two central instruments of the trade union struggle, while the political problems were left to the political parties.
The far-reaching impact of the recent crisis caused the trade unions to change their views to the effect that, since codetermination and qualitative tariff policy had met their limits, effective national economic, employ
ment and structure policies should be recognized as being essential if"technical change and its social implications were to be properly accommodated. T t was also recognized
that during a crisis period grave discrepancies could
emerge between the objectives, demand structure, and imple
mentation strategies of trade union humanization policy and the public humanization programme, discrepancies which would be attributable to the compromising character of
public measures vis-a-vis the power of control exercized by the employers and the lack of trade union counteraction.
Moreover, the crisis-induced new quality of trade union humanization tasks and the corresponding demands had re
vealed a number of infrastructural weaknesses in the trade union movement, including a lack of integration as regards personnel and tasks in associated spheres of action, and personnel bottlenecks in the participation processes within the framework of the humanisation of work programme. Such weaknesses could be overcome only by a broad-based acti- vization of the trade union basis.53a/
In the light of the above facts, the political aspects of the development of trade union experience and public hu
manization policy can be summarized as follows. Grave dis
crepancies in terms of objectives, demand structure and implementation strategies between trade union humanization
30
policy and a public humanization of work programme are more likely to arise during periods of crisis. Public humanization of work policy cannot be substituted for trade union interest representation with the latter's two main instruments, namely tariff policy and codeter
mination. A comprehensive trade union, humanization policy is in turn necessarily dependent on appropriate public economic, employment, and structure policies if the social repercussions of technological change are to be adequate
ly assimilated. On the other hand, "trade union influence on the humanization of work programme in general and on its individual projects in particular is essential if the
research programme is to bring positive results’for the employees and is not to be reversed into a mere rationali
zation programme. A/ This implies, however, that the trade unions, in view of the relative ineffectiveness of their
instrumentarium, have an interest in further strengthen
ing the"existing fundament" (Janzen) of the public hu
manization of work programme in order to gain valuable experience and explore the scope of new strategies. "Even though the federal German trade unions have not yet
squarely faced up to this task ... under contemporary circumstances they are the only possible agents of a policy of this kind."9-^
IV. The Humanization Programme at the Crossroads
Since its adoption in programme form with a provisional orientation towards 1985, the humanization of work programme has become one of the central tasks of politicians in general and of the Social Democratic Party in particular for the next few decades. The call for humanization incorporated two stra
tegic and tactical party-political objectives. In the short tec
the development of a society-oriented research and tech
nology programme tailored to the needs of broad-based working population groups wifh a view to firstly counter
acting the degeneration symptoms being displayed in the representation ratio between the parties, parts of the employed- population, and the representation organizations, and secondly to stabilizing the trophies being brought home from party competitions. In the long term, the programme was to represent an important integral part of a "humane" and "demand-oriented“ reformed sociopolit
ical development model. Society-oriented research and
technology policy was to be one element of a humane growth policy oriented towards job security, improved working • conditions and an active formulation— not "repair" (Hauff)—
of the social repercussions of technological change, this within the framework of a long-term concept of society-build
ing along the lines of "democratic socialism" to promote political and ideological hegemony. These party-political intentions had to be realized under the restrictive, circum
stantial conditions of a heterogeneous political alliance and limited political stability and in the face of entre
preneurial power of control and structural changes in the world economy. ■‘•'his fact implied very significant compro
mises and sacrifices as well as wearisome learning pro
cesses. It also explains the fundamental dilemma of the humanization of work programme, torn as it is between sub
jective intentions and objective restrictions. Its per
manent instability and the fluctuations in the compromise equilibrium affected the programme in all its dimensions and in its implementability: its broad-based approach in conjunction with the contradictoriness of its main objectives and the disproportionality between its aspi
rations and its underinstrumentalized implementaion concept constituted an inbuilt structural ambivalence. Almost all
32
promotion attempts ana projects could be approached only half-heartedly and for the main part had only limited effect and insecure stability. Offensive approaches in the programme implementation were continually paralleled with defensive approaches. The crisis which began in
1973/74 and the concomitant reinforcement of the con- flicts between political forces and acceleration of the ✓
polarization process likewise intensified the discrepancies inbuilt in the humanization programme and particularly in its implementation aspect. They threatened to diminish its objectives, weaken its impact, and even to bring about the reverse of the objectives set for some projects. They furthermore jeopardized its structure as regards organi
zation and personnel. A further decisive development was the evolution of trade union humanization demands, pushed ahead by the pressure of the crisis, in favour of the issues of job security and protection against lower pay scales and loss of earnings. The widening breach between trade union objectives, demands, and implementation strate
gies and the public humanization of work programme gave rise to considerable tension and pressure for the public humanization policy to be adapted to the new circumstances.
At the same time, labour and some parts of the public ad
ministration called for a reduction of the programme to individual work structuralization projects, these being normally oriented towards greater flexibility in personnel policy and an increase in profitability.^-^
In addition, the technology" was proper with the zation criteria The highlighting and requirements
newly developed promotion area "production detached from the humanization programme result that the importance of its humani- and the participation process was diminished
of conflicting sociopolitical demands
■ ultimately led to a polarized situation
and unsteadied the positions of the opposing forces in such a way that the minimum threshold of qualitative impact and implementability on the part of the programme is now seriously endangered. Numerous experts and other observers have maintained that this situation should be countered by one of three strategies: continued botching within the context of a polarized forces field, defensive reduction of the programme, or offensive development of the programme.
Each of these three development possibilities depends to a large degree on party-political considerations within the party system. A continued botching approach would
probably lead to an internal evacuation of the programme’s dynamism and considerable sociopolitical costs on all
sides which would not be compensated by corresponding benefits. A defensive reduction of the programme would almost undoubtedly lead to far-reaching conflicts with the trade unions which, despite all their criticisms,
have recently reaffirmed their support for the programme.$0/
It would considerably endanger the long-term objective of stabilizing the representation relations of the parties and specific electoral strata and corresponding compen
sation in other fields could only be assured at the ex
pense of an extensive reorientation of party strategy.
A reversal to an offensive representation of the programme would undoubtedly lead to considerable conflicts with the
conservative forces and parts of management and would pull against world economic' adaptation forces. On the other hand, an offensive strategy— especially during
a period of crisis— could by way of a sustained society- -oriented reform policy contribute to restoring the alliance
with the trade unions. This would ensure that the programme were properly developed and at the same time bring a
long-term commitment from important sections of the electorate.
