FS DI 92-201
Trends of political support in the Federal Republic of Germany
Dieter Fuchs
Berlin, Februar 1992
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D-1000 Berlin 30,
Telefon: (030) 25 49 1-0
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
tion can either refer to the basic structure of the regime or just to the democratic process which is taking place within the frame of that structure. Empirical analyses in the Fede
ral Republic of Germany have shown that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed for the population aggregate, even in the more restricted variant. Albeit, a clear below average satisfaction with the democratic process can be perceived for the postmaterialist left.
That is the section of the population where, for theoretical reasons, this was to be expected. It is to be assumed that the extent of that below average satisfaction and its further development rather depends on the informal rules of the game of the democratic process as such than on the institutional structure of the representative democracy.
Zusammenfassung
Bezugspunkt der Analyse ist die Hypothese einer Herausforderung der repräsentativen Demokratie durch eine zunehmende Unzufriedenheit der Staatsbürger. Diese Unzufrie
denheit kann sich entweder auf die grundlegende Struktur dieses Regimes beziehen oder lediglich auf die demokratischen Prozesse, die im Rahmen dieser Struktur stattfin
den. Empirische Analysen für die Bundesrepublik zeigen, daß sich diese Hypothese im Bevölkerungsaggregat auch für die eingeschränktere Variante nicht bestätigen läßt.
Allerdings kann für die postmaterialistische Linke eine eindeutig unterdurchschnittliche Zufriedenheit mit dem demokratischen Prozeß festgestellt werden, bei derjenigen Bevölkerungsgruppe also, bei der das aus theoretischen Gründen auch am ehesten erwartbar war. Das Ausmaß dieser unterdurchschnittlichen Zufriedenheit und ihrer weiteren Entwicklung hängt vermutlich eher von den informellen Spielregeln des demokratischen Prozesses selber ab als von der institutioneilen Struktur der repräsenta
tiven Demokratie.
1. Introduction
For various reasons, doubts as to the stability of the political system of the Federal Re
public of Germany have been expressed throughout its existence. These doubts were initially based on the fact that the Federal Republic was founded only a few years after the end of the National Socialist dictatorship. The data published by Merritt/Merritt (1970, 1980) show that this initial skepticism was quite justified. Democratic instituti
ons were introduced with the passing of the Grundgesetz in May of 1949, but on the part of the citizens one could assume at best a passive acceptance of these new instituti
ons. From the perspective of establishing a stable democracy, the decisive problem was therefore to get the citizens to accept the legitimacy of the new democratic institutions.
According to the available data, this problem could be considered as solved by the beginning of the 1970s at the latest with the establishment of a legitimate political system (Conradt 1980; Fuchs 1989).
The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany has, however, been confronted with a new category of problems since about the middle of the 1970s. These problems affected all Western industrial societies, they were thus no longer specific to the Federal Republic. They were theoretically formulated in various crisis hypotheses, like the crisis of democracy (e. g. Crozier et al. 1975), the governability crisis (e. g. Rose 1979) and the legitimacy crisis (e. g. Habermas 1973). In the end, the crisis of democracy and the governability crisis also deal with the question of legitimacy (Rose 1979, p. 31). The crisis hypotheses were formulated on the basis of very different theoretical approaches.
As Offe (1979) emphasized, however, there was a remarkable correspondence between neo-conservative and social-critical positions in the diagnosis of the problem. An infla
tionary expansion of and increase in the citizens' demands on their state with a simulta
neous scarcity of governmental resources and a decreasing authority of political autho
rities must - according to the crisis diagnoses - lead to the erosion of support for the political system. The decline in economic development following the energy crisis and the fiscal problems in almost all Western democracies seemed to be a clear confirma
tion of the pessimistic diagnoses. The data collected since the middle of the 1970s could not validate this expectation, however, at least for the Federal Republic of Germany.
There is no empirical evidence of a decline in the basic satisfaction of the citizens in the Federal Republic of Germany with their political system (Kaase 1979, 1985; Gabriel 1986; Fuchs 1989; Westle 1989; Berg-Schlosser 1990). This empirical fact has, after a considerable period of time, also influenced the theoretical controversies with the result
that the talk of a fundamental crisis of the political system in the Federal Republic of Germany has largely ceased.
The end of the legitimacy discussion does not, however, mean the end of crisis specula
tion. This speculation has, now, shifted to less dramatic aspects. It no longer concerns the political system as a whole, but only its input structures and the processes through which the input structures are managed. Thus the development of a sector of non-insti- tutionalized political activity in the form of an expansion of unconventional political actions and the emergence and stabilization of the new social movements is interpreted by many social scientists as a crisis of representative democracy. In contrast to the cri
sis of legitimacy hypothesis there was a great deal of correspondence between more theoretical analyses (e. g. Guggenberger 1984; Kielmansegg 1985; Offe 1985; Rödel et al. 1989; Roth 1989; Wiesendahl 1991) and more empirical analyses (e. g. Conradt 1981; Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1989; Dalton/Küchler 1990). The reasons for this crisis are primarily seen in the inability of representative and institutionalized political forms to deal with new issue priorities and an increased desire for citizen participation. The solutions to this crisis which have been discussed refer less to a replacement of repre
sentative institutions with direct democratic institutions than to a more or less stable institutionalization of direct democratic elements within the representative structure of political mediation. To this extent it is more a challenge to representative democracy than a crisis, as the basic institutions of this form of political order are not being funda
mentally questioned. The old "democratic question" of how to enable as many people as possible to participate in exercising political power is being posed anew (Rödel et al.
1989) and this in the sense of a transformation from elite controlled to elite challenging political forms (Inglehart 1989) and not in the sense of dissolving the difference bet
ween citizens and political authorities or between "civil society" and the "state".
Whether the boundary between "civil society" and the "state" which has been drawn relatively sharply up to now will become more porous in the long run - despite a formally maintained functional differentiation - and therefore the basic function of poli
tics can in actuality be changed indirectly (Offe 1985; Held 1987; Dogan 1988; Keane 1988; Roth 1991) is another question which can not, at least currently, be empirically analysed.
Connected with the hypothesis of a challenge to representative democracy is the as
sumption that the citizens are dissatisfied with the responsiveness of representatively organized politics practiced by established collective actors in view of new issue priori
ties and an increased desire for citizen participation. This dissatisfaction would only
represent a challenge to representative democracy if it went beyond a criticism of indi
vidual issues and were generalized to a fundamental dissatisfaction with the entire democratic process.1 In the following analysis we will empirically clarify whether and to what extent an increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic process actually has emerged among the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany in the last 15 years.
The empirical analysis will be carried out both for the aggregate of all respondents as well as for the subgroup which could be theoretically expected to show an increased dissatisfaction. In this respect we will be referring to Inglehart's theory of "cultural change" (1989) which identifies the postmaterialists at the ideological level as the societal groups which, on the one hand, have developed new issue priorities and an increased desire for citizen participation and, on the other hand, have the skills neces
sary to effectively articulate their concerns and interests.
We base our analysis above all on the indicator of the Eurobarometer surveys of the
"satisfaction with the way democracy works", which have been carried out continuously since the middle of the 1970s. The exact formulation of the question is: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?" In our opinion, this indicator is a usable instrument for measuring a generalized attitude toward the political process. As there is no consensus in the academic discussion how to assess this indicator we will attempt to clarify its conceptual status before carrying out the empirical analysis. As an analytic framework, we use a taxonomy of political support obtained through a critical discus
sion of Easton's original concept (1965, 1975).
2. Concept and operationalization of political support
2.1 Concept
Most empirical analyses of political support based on the Eurobarometer indicator use Easton’s concept of political support as a theoretical framework. The most important analytical differentiation made by this concept is between diffuse and specific support.
Diffuse and specific support are two different modes of orientation with respect to the objects of the political system (authorities, regime, community). Although both of
1 In the framework of the empirical analysis (Chapter 3.1) further arguments will be introduced which could also support the hypothesis of an increase in dissatisfaction with the political process, independent from changed issue priorities and increased desires to participate.
Easton's support forms are totally different, some authors (Schmitt 1983, p. 356;
Schüttemeier 1986, pp. 100f.; Merkl 1988, p. 29) consider the Eurobarometer indicator to be an operationalization of specific support and others (Franz 1985, p. 67; Gabriel 1986, p. 283; Weil 1989, p. 690; Widmaier 1990, p. 230) see it as an operationalization of diffuse support. Each of these contradictory classifications of the indicator can be supported by arguments from Easton. The confusion thus can therefore be traced back less to an inadequate construct-indicator reflection than to conceptual weak points in Easton's work.2
Distinguishing between diffuse and specific support has at least theoretically a strategic importance for the persistence of a political system. While specific support is based on the citizens' satisfaction with the realization of their demands through the actions of political authorities, diffuse support is, in contrast, a "reservoir of favourable altitudes or good will" (Easton 1975, p. 444). This reservoir makes it possible for an individual to even have a generalized attachment to the political system even if he or she is dissatis
fied with the actual performance of the political authorities. As performance-related dissatisfaction is unavoidable, simply due to the scarce resources which political sy
stems have to fulfil demands, generating and sustaining diffuse support is decisive for the maintenance of the political system. Easton convincingly pointed out the functional importance of distinguishing between diffuse and specific support. It is our opinion that he was less convincing in defining and distinguishing between these two modes of sup
port.3 Analogous to the functional importance of the distinction, the fact that diffuse support is independent from the output and performance of the political authorities is an essential criterion for differentiating this support mode from specific support. The clearness of this distinguishing criterion is, however, weakened in two ways. First, specific support is not only applied to the incumbent authorities, but also extended to the authoritative institutions4 (Easton 1975, p. 439). Second, by making trust - along
2 A detailed presentation of Easton's concept can be found in Fuchs (1989). A critical discussion of this concept is also carried out in Gabriel (1986) and Westle (1989).
3 We will be basing our discussion of Easton's concept of political support on the 1975 version, which was revised somewhat compared to the 1965 version.
4 In this manner Easton implicitly fulfils the plausible assumption that the citizens can
not only hold the current incumbents responsible for perceived output deficits, but can also generalize their dissatisfaction to the institutions. This assumption cannot actually be integrated into the framework of his concept, though. It would mean, for example, that specific support can also be applied to the regime. This would, however, contradict the definition of specific support. Easton's attempt at resolving this inconsistency by, in contrast to earlier procedures, separating institutions from the regime and adding them to the authorities (Easton 1975, p. 438), is, in our opinion, problematic because it elimi-
with legitimacy - a subdimension of diffuse support Easton also introduces a reference to performance and output to the extent that trust is defined as the subjective
"probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about" (Easton 1975, p. 447). This means that a clear assignment of the perfor
mance criterion becomes blurred, both in regard to the object and the mode of support:
diffuse support includes performance-related support, and performance-related support also exists with respect to the regime.
In regard to classifying trust as a subdimension of support, Easton (1975, p. 448) deals with the problem of distinguishing between it and specific support itself. His solution is based first on the fact that he considers trust, in contrast to specific support, as a gene
ralized output reference: "Such attachment may be a product of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and performance over a long period of time" (Easton 1975, p. 446) and second primarily on the fact that this generalized performance refe
rence is only seen as the source of the emergence of trust as diffuse support which then becomes detached from this source again (Easton 1975, pp. 446, 448). Only with this dissociation from its source does trust correspond to the definition of diffuse support, whose primary meaning is seen in the fact that it refers to "evaluations of what an object is or represents - to the general meaning it has for a person - not of what it does"
(Easton 1975, p. 444). This dissociation from the source is therefore a logical implica
tion of the definition of diffuse support. The problem is then, however, to distinguish the two subdimensions of diffuse support on the basis of this definition, when diffuse support means an assessment of the object for "its own sake" or "what it is or repre
sents". What does this "primary meaning" of diffuse support signify? In essence, Easton only defines this negatively ("not what it does") or indirectly, using the sources of the two subdimensions of diffuse support. But while he considers the sources as sources and then separates them again from the resulting attitudes, the question of the exact meaning of diffuse support remains an open one.* 5 Diffuse support is literally diffuse in the sense of having an uncertain contents. We believe that there are too many concep
tual inconsistencies, both in the definitions of diffuse and specific support as well as in their mutual delimitation, for an attempt at modifying the two support modes to be suc-
nates the important analytic distinction which he himself frequently emphasizes bet
ween incumbents of offices and the offices themselves.
5 This can also not be answered by the appeal to properties of diffuse support like
"durable" and "basic" to the extent that these are properties of a predefined attitude ("diffuse support", so defined can be expected to display the following properties...";
Easton 1975, p. 444).
cessful.6 For this reason we suggest replacing Easton's modes of support and finding another form for defining the individual forms of support.
The concept of political support suggested here consists of two elements. First, a taxo
nomy of political support to analytically define the different forms of support (Fuchs 1989). Second, a hypothesis to explain the emergence of generalized attitudes toward the political system. The taxonomy of political support is obtained by systematically crossing the objects and modes of support, each defined independent of the others. For the objects of support we will follow Easton's (1965, pp. 171-219) differentiation of authorities, regime and community which he identified in the framework of his systems theory. For the modes of support, we will, for the reasons outlined above, replace the differentiation between diffuse and specific with fundamental orientations toward an object, a construct which Parsons obtained in the framework of his theory of action.
According to Parsons (1951, p. 7) the evaluative orientation decides what an object means for a person or an actor in a situation. The concrete meaning is dependent on which standards an actor uses to evaluate the objects or which type of evaluative rela
tion he or she establishes to the object. Parsons (1951, pp. 58f) distinguishes three fun
damental and universal modes of evaluative orientation toward an object: the expres
sive, the instrumental and the moral. The expressive orientation is primarily concerned with a direct gratification through the object, the instrumental orientation with maximi
zing benefits, and the moral orientation with the use of norms or evaluative standards which are deprived of subjective desirability and which have an "ought" character. The three modes of orientation to an object are thus based on the use of differing evaluative standards. These can be presented in the following questions:
1. Can I identify myself with the object? (or: does the object please me?) [expressive orientation]
2. What do I get from the object? (or: what use is the object to me?) [instrumental orientation]
6 On the basis of her critique of Easton's concept Westle (1989) suggested a solution which is intrinsic to Easton as she supplemented the modes "diffuse" and "specific"
with combination of both, i.e. diffuse-specific and specific-diffuse. The prerequisite for such a solution would be that both modes be defined clearly and one-dimensionally. If this is not the case, then the inconsistencies will only be increased. This solution also destroys one of the main points of Easton's concept: a gap or threshold between diffuse and specific support.
3. Does the object correspond to my own norms? (or: does the object act with moral integrity?) [moral orientation].
On the basis of Parsons' modes of orientation and Easton's objects of orientation we arrive at the taxonomy of political support presented in figure 1.
F ig u re 1: T a x o n o m y o f p o litic a l s u p p o rt
A ttitu d e o b je c ts
Community Regime Authorities
Expressive
IDENTIFICATION with the community
Identification with the
regime
Identification with the authorities
M o d es of
a ttitu d e s Moral
Legitimacy of the community
LEGITIMACY of the regime
Legitimacy of the authorities
Instrumental
Effectiveness of the community
Effectiveness of the regime
EFFECTIVENESS of the authorities
According to Parsons (1951, pp. 47f) all three modes of orientation normally exist in the relation between actor and object. Correspondingly, in the taxonomy all of the spaces in the table are filled in. For theoretical reasons we have highlighted the relatively do
minant forms of political support with regard to the individual object categories of the political system (see Fuchs 1989, p. 27).
The taxonomy helps to identify the different forms of political support. The question is now posed as to how these forms of support could be constituted as attitudes of citizens.
To answer this question we turn to the assumption of learning theory that attitudes toward an object emerge through generalizations of experiences with this object (Fishbein/Ajzen 1975). Easton (1975, p. 446) also refers implicitly to this hypothesis in his description of the sources of trust as a dimension of diffuse support: "... on the basis of their own experiences, members may also adjudge the worth of supporting these objects ... even though the orientations derive from responses to particular output in
itially ... they become transformed into generalized attitudes toward the authorities or other political objects." To the extent that the learning theory hypothesis refers to the
Constitution of attitudes at all, we do not, like Easton, limit this hypothesis to the instrumental evaluative dimension, but also apply it to the moral and expressive dimen
sions. Our application of the learning theory hypothesis differs from Easton's, however, primarily in the fact that the basis of generalization for the generalized attitude does not disappear, but is preserved in a certain manner.7 We want to explain this briefly using the moral mode of orientation in respect to political objects. The starting point for the generalization process is experience with individual actions of incumbent authorities which are made on the basis of moral evaluative standards (The use of evaluative stan
dards is the precondition for the possibility of experience, experience without evaluation only exists in borderline cases). Such an action can, for example, be seen as "just"8 and, correspondingly, rated positively. The first level of generalization has been attained when a series of actions by an incumbent authority is rated as "just" and this is then applied to the performance as a whole, i.e. the perceived actions of this actor as such would generally correspond to the norm of justice. If individuals have such experiences with different incumbent authorities over a longer period of time, then this could be generalized to form the attitude that the actions of the authorities as a whole would cor
respond to their personal norms. The further levels of generalization follow the same logic. From the perspective of the persistence of the political system the further ge
neralization at the regime level is of decisive importance. The regime is characterized by its structure which could be expressed as a "regularized pattern of behaviour and expectations" (Easton 1965, p. 266). These regularized patterns, on the other hand, can be differentiated into formal and informal patterns (Easton 1965, p. 193). The informal patterns are the rules of the game which regulate the interactions and actions of the players (Weil 1989, p. 686), i.e. they refer to the structures which directly govern the political process. These informal patterns can only be acquired by the citizens through experience with interactions and actions of the political actors, i.e. in the generalization hierarchy they are between the authorities and the formal structure of the regime. This formal structure is defined by the constitution in most Western democracies.
7 A further difference from Easton exists in the fact that the emergence of attitudes is seen solely on the basis of experience, whereas for Easton, experience is only one source for the emergence of diffuse support. For him, the other source is socialisation.
In our suggested concept this becomes a determinant of generalization based on experi
ence.
8 A moral mode of orientation is merely one fundamental possibility for the actor-object relation and is practically realized in the use of concrete moral evaluative standards.
The question of what concrete evaluative standards are is dependent on the respective culture. In Western democracies, "justice" and "freedom" are the dominant and gene
rally accepted moral evaluative standards in the area of politics (Rawls 1971; Lane 1979; Pennock 1979).
It should have become clear that the generalization can take place only at the object le
vel and not at the level of (evaluative) modes of orientation. Values as such are not general or specific, but invariant standards which are brought to bear on reality or first constitute it. A generalization process should, in principle, be considered as a conti
nuum, though the object class referred to in this process breaks in the continuum, so that in reality we are dealing more with a generalization hierarchy. We can only determine empirically the degree of differentiation of the citizens' generalization hierarchy and how independent the more generalized attitudes are from the relatively specific ones. In regard to the taxonomy of political support (figure 1) we could, for example, ask how strongly the legitimacy of the regime is determined by the legitimacy of the authorities or the effectiveness of the regime by the effectiveness of the authorities. The question of determining and measuring an attitude should, in our opinion, not be confused with the question of the determinants and consequences of this attitude9, as frequently occurs in empirical analyses of political support. The precondition for the existence of an attitude is, according to attitudinal research, merely the cognition of an object and the capability of at least evaluating the object in a rudimentary form.
2.2 Operationalization
According to the suggested concept of political support, a certain form of support is de
fined by a specific combination of the object and mode of support. The question of which form of support is measured by the Eurobarometer indicator can be determined in regard to these two dimensions. The object named in the formulation of the question (see above) is democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the concept also used in everyday language to refer to the political regime. In a 1978 representative survey in the Federal Republic of Germany, the respondents were to indicate what they conside
red to be the most important characteristics of a democracy. A total of ten characte
ristics were named by more than two thirds of the respondents and these refer exclusi
vely to constitutions and institutional arrangements (Noelle-Neumann/Piel 1983). The concept used in the question is, as such, a suitable stimulus object for recording an atti
tude toward the political regime, more exactly, to its formal structure. The evaluative standard for this object is, however, the functioning of democracy in the Federal Repu
blic of Germany, i.e. the question does not refer to the constitutional norm but to the constitutional reality. Decisive for the constitutional reality are above all the informal 9 Easton (1975, p. 435) had already pointed out the problems of this type of possible confusion.
rules of the game which emerged in the framework of the formal structure through the political actors' patterns of interaction and action. Through this evaluative standard the attitude measured with the Eurobarometer indicator thus refers to the informal structure of the regime, i.e. in the generalization hierarchy it is between the attitudes in respect to the formal structure and those in respect to the authorities.
We attempt to empirically validate this indicator, whose face-validity was asserted on a theoretical basis, by correlating it with measurements which record, on the one hand, the legitimacy of the present government and, on the other hand, the legitimacy of the political system. Both measuring instruments refer relatively clearly to the correspon
ding constructs of the taxonomy which are marked with the same labels (see Fuchs 1989, chapter 3). Both consist of additive indices which are formed by the following questions: is the political system as a whole (the present national government) just and fair and does it protect basic liberties.10
Table 1: Satisfaction with the way democracy works and legitimacy of the present government and the political system
Satisfaction with the way democracy w orks Correlations
(Pearson’s r)
M ufiple regression (Beta-Weights) Legitimacy of the present
national government
.498 .275
Legitimacy of the political system as a whole
.488 .275
Party identification .288 .071
Explained variance - .292
Source: GewaltstutSe (1989)
Note: Legitimacy of the present government and the poSical system are a d d irre nScea.
Party idertücatnn is a ten-point scale [1 »bong idenSicabon w # i t i e C D U /C S U or the FDP (government)____ 10 strong identücteion w th the SPO or the Greens (opposBon)J
A more suitable validation would be the correlation of the Eurobarometer indicator with a variable which directly measures the respondent's attitude toward the informal struc- 10 The alternative answers consist of a four stage agreement-disagreement scale. The in
dex therefore had a value range from 2 - 8 (disagree strongly - agree strongly).
ture of the regime. As this does not exist, we had to be satisfied with the two variables described, which in the generalization hierarchy are above and below the attitude to be measured with the Eurobarometer indicator. As a control variable, we have additionally included the extent of the respondents' identification with a government or opposition party, as this variable is frequently used to validate attitudes toward the regime. Accor
ding to the multiple regression analysis (see table 1), the legitimacy of the system and government have approximately the same effect on the Eurobarometer indicator, while the correlation with party identification which was determined at the bivariate level disappeared. The two variables with a significant influence on the dependent variable explain 29% of the variance, a share which is quite considerable in survey research. We consider this result to be a successful validation of the indicator as a measuring instru
ment for a generalized attitude toward the political system on the legitimacy dimension.
More precisely: the Eurobarometer indicator measures an attitude toward the legiti
macy of the informal structure of the regime, i.e. the structure which characterizes the democratic process and thus constitutes the reality of democracy.
3. Trends of political support in the aggregate
3.1 Description11
The new social movements could achieve considerable success in mobilizing for collective actions since about the middle of the 1970s.11 12 This can be interpreted as a manifest expression of the fact that a larger number of citizens have become dissatisfied with the way in which established politics has dealt with (or failed to deal with) certain issues and problems.13 The time series of political support which we analyze begin shortly after these first mass mobilizations in the context of the new social movements.
If the following assumptions hold true, that
11 We would like to thank the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for generously providing us with data.
12 For example, the antinuclear movement was for the first time able to expand a re
gional protest (Whyl) to a nationwide mass movement in the years 1974/75 (Roth 1985, p. 51; Rucht 1988, pp. 158ff.).
13 We cannot determine a priori how large a "larger number" is. We assume, however, that the mobilization success of the new social movements is based on a mobilization potential which, even with a rigid determination, would amount to at least one third of the people in the Federal Republic of Germany (Fuchs/Rucht 1992). If we also include the sympathisers then we end up with two thirds of the citizens being positively dispo
sed toward the new social movements.
1. a larger number of citizens is dissatisfied with the manner in which new issue priorities and an increased desire for citizen participation are dealt with by esta
blished politics;
2. these new issue priorities and increased participation desires were nurtured or created by fundamental processes of social and cultural change (i.e. value change and cogni
tive mobilization);
3. this dissatisfaction has become generalized to encompass the entire political process and
4. this generalized dissatisfaction with the political process can only be reduced by means of structural reforms - reforms like the institutionalization of direct democratic forms of political participation,
then we would have to expect a more or less marked linear trend toward an increase in dissatisfaction with the democratic political process which starts at the point of time we mentioned.
The same expectation arises from another theoretical perspective. On an abstract level, social differentiation can be considered as the basic characteristic of modern societies and that means, at the same time, an increased differentiation of articulated and orga
nized interests. Widmaier (1988, p. 143) poses the question of how political systems can preserve their legitimacy under these conditions. His conclusion is that the legitimation problem can only be solved by structural reforms "that enable political institutions to accommodate a broad spectrum of differentiated interests and to form political decisi
ons based on a high degree of consensus" (Widmaier 1988, p. 157).
In the abstract context of modernization theory we can put forward a further argument for a continual trend toward an increase in the dissatisfaction with the political process.
Almond and Powell (1978, pp. 12f) differentiate two basic dimensions of the political system: structure and culture. They see the process of secularization to be the funda
mental characteristic of cultural modernization. According to the theory (Almond and Powell 1978, pp. 46ff) this process of secularization has the consequence that the tradi
tional standards of legitimacy are weakened and the dependence of the legitimation of the political system on its performance increases. At the same time, the individuals' ability and readiness to criticize increases due to this same process of secularization.
Both aspects taken together would have to lead to a more skeptical attitude toward the
democratic process which is what the performance of the political system is based on in the end.
On the whole, therefore, there is a solid basis for the presumption of a trend toward a decreased satisfaction with the democratic process. We could also assume that this trend should be empirically identifiable at least since the middle of the 1970s. Figures 2a and 2b show time series of satisfaction with democracy14 on the basis of two different indi
cators. The time series of figure 2a is based on the indicator of the Eurobarometer - whose validity for measuring satisfaction with democracy was discussed in the prece
ding chapter - and the time series of figure 2b is based on an indicator of the For
schungsgruppe Wahlen (Mannheim). The latter indicator used the following question:
"What do you think in general about democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, that is, about our political parties and our entire political system? Do you tend more to be very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied?"
Several authors doubt that the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator measures an atti
tude toward the political system (Berger et al. 1984, p. 81; Gabriel 1989a, p. 222;
Westle 1989, p. 158). This is primarily attributed to the stimulus object "parties" which is contained in the question. We basically share this assessment, but attempt to diffe
rentiate further: the indicator does not measure an attitude toward the basic structure of the political system, but to its process and thus refers exactly to the construct in which we are interested in this analysis. Even if the respondents only react to "parties", the stimulus object in the question, this would still be a generalized attitude to those collec
tive actors who, in practice, shape the democratic process. We thus would not be dealing with specific support in Easton's sense, as the object of reference is parties as a whole and not the party or parties which are currently incumbent in authority roles. A precise localization in the hierarchy of generalization discussed in chapter 2 cannot be carried out simply on the basis of the formulation of the question. Limits can be deter
mined however: the indicator does not reach the generalization level of the basic struc
ture of the political system, but it exceeds the level which refers to the current in
cumbents in authority roles. We are assuming a somewhat lower level of generalization when compared to the Eurobarometer indicator due to the stimulus object "parties".
That would mean that concrete political events, moods and experiences would be reflected more strongly than in the Eurobarometer indicator. We will therefore look first of all at the time series shown in figure 2b.
14 In the following we are, for the sake of simplicity, substituting the term "satisfaction with democracy" for "generalized satisfaction with the democratic political process".
Figure 2a: Trend of satisfaction with democracy
Figure 2b: Trend of satisfaction with democracy
This time series (see figure 2b) runs from the second quarter of 1977 to the second quarter of 199115 and refer to those respondents who are rather or very satisfied with democracy. Compared to earlier analyses with the same indicator (Küchler 1985; Fuchs 1987; Widmaier 1988), a pattern becomes clear through the extension of the time series which was previously not readily visible: the satisfaction with democracy apparently followed a cyclic course, that means that longer upward and downward trends alterna
ted over time. The first cycle ended in the fourth quarter of 1979 with a peak in satis
faction with democracy amounting to around 85%. The low point in this cycle is in the third quarter of 1977 (72%). In the second quarter of 1977, the satisfaction with democracy was somewhat greater (77%). In order for the assumption of a cycle to be justified we must assume that with a further extension into the past, the values for satisfaction with democracy would successively increase. That cannot be definitively clarified given the state of the data. This is because the available measurements before April 1977 were made with three instead of four answer categories. Although the results are, accordingly, not directly comparable, the extremely highly value for satisfaction with democracy in May 1976 (around 91%) suggests that this was the approximate peak of the previous cycle and that shortly thereafter the downward trend began which initiated the cycle that lasted until the fourth quarter of 1979. The second cycle which can be determined in our time series extended from the first quarter of 1980 until the first quarter of 1983 and had its low point at the beginning of 1982. The third cycle ran
ged from the second quarter of 1983 to the third quarter of 1986 and the fourth from the fourth quarter of 1986 to the first quarter of 1990. A downward trend appeared to have begun in the second quarter of 1990. Whether this is a further cycle or not can only be determined through further measurements beyond 1991.
The diagnose of a cyclical character for the trend of satisfaction with democracy implies at the same time that the assumption of a linear trend of declining satisfaction with democracy is not confirmed by this time series. Before we look at possible causes of this sequence of cycles we will look at the time series depicted in figure 2a, which is based on the indicator of the Eurobarometer. In this case we can not, or at best only partially, identify a cyclical pattern. Three phases can be distinguished: an upward trend, which starts at the beginning of our time series (end of 1976) and extends until the end of 1979. The peak of satisfaction with democracy in this phase (end of 1979) comes at the same time as the peak of the first cycle in the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator. Also comparable to the trend depicted in figure 2b is the fact that this is fol
15 The monthly data were aggregated to quarters to reduce random fluctuations.
lowed by a downward phase which had its low point at the beginning of 1982 and a subsequent upward phase which extends until the beginning of 1983. After this point of time there is, in contrast to the time series in figure 2b, no longer any upward or down
ward phase which can be determined, but rather an equilibrium fluctuating around an average value of 75%.
Both time series coincide in showing that the greatest degree of satisfaction with de
mocracy in the period of time considered apparently came at the end of 1979 and the lowest came approximately at the beginning of 1982. Differences arise primarily in the development after the beginning of 1983 (cyclical trend versus equilibrium). Both time series clearly show no sign of a trend toward a decline in the satisfaction with democracy. Therefore, the data we analysed could not confirm the hypothesis of an emergence of legitimation problems due to a continual decline in satisfaction with the democratic political process which could only be overcome through structural reforms.
The same conclusion can - with one limitation - be drawn when we do not consider the trends, but rather the levels of satisfaction with democracy. The average value of satisfaction with democracy was around 72% in the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indica
tor and around 77% in the Eurobarometer indicator. At the lowest point in satisfaction with democracy in the entire period of time we analysed, more than two thirds of the respondents (68%) were satisfied according to the Eurobarometer indicator. According to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator, which apparently reacted more strongly to current events and moods, the satisfaction with democracy was clearly lower at this point in time (54%), the share of those who were satisfied was still a majority of the po
pulation. The "tendencies toward an erosion of legitimacy" (Widmaier 1988), which were expounded in part on the basis of the same indicators, can not be inferred from the time series we present. The difference between our results and Widmaier's analysis could be traced back to the fact that he only had access to data up to 1983 and that he carried out a trend simulation at this point. This simulation was obviously an inadequate expression of the actual development.
The above-mentioned limitation in regard to the levels of satisfaction with democracy refers to a comparison of the time before and after the low point in 1982. After this point, the peaks in satisfaction with democracy no longer attain the level of the peak at the end of 1979. We achieved a similar result when we calculated the averages of the satisfaction with democracy before and after the phase which included the low point in 1982. According to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator, the average satisfaction with democracy before this phase was 79% - after the phase it was 71%. In the case of
the Eurobarometer indicator it was 82% compared to 75%. It appears as if the events in the years 1981 and 1982 have left permanent traces and have brought about a decline in the citizens' average satisfaction with democracy. In this case there was no linear trend of declining satisfaction, but a long-lasting reduction of the average level of satisfaction through a period effect. If this assumption is true, then events must have taken place in these years which had a high degree of symbolic importance for the citizens' assessment of fundamental mechanisms of the democratic political process.16 The behaviour of the political elites in regard to morality probably had relatively direct effects on the citizens' perception of the informal rules of the game. This interpretation also suggests itself from the data presented in table 2.
Table 2: Legitimacy of the present government and the political system (percentage)
1980 1982
(Nov.)
1983
(Feb.) 1989
The present national government
behaves in a just and fair manner 84,0* 68,7 66,8 57,6
protects our basic liberties 89,5 81,6 81,6 79,0
The political system as a whole
is just and fair 87,6 87,2 86,8 77,0
protects our basic liberties 91,8 89,8 90,3 85,0
Sources: Political Action II (1980): Wahlstudie 1983 (1982,1983); Gewaltstudie (1989)
* percentages of respondents who agreed strongly or agreed to the statement
This table presents the distributions for questions which were already described in chapter 2 as indicators of the legitimacy of the government and the system. These indi
cators refer to moral standards of judgement (justness and fairness, as well as protection of basic liberties) with which the two objects "current government" and "political system" are assessed. According to these data there was a drastic reduction in the rating of the government's "justness" in November of 1982, that is, shortly after the change in government. This even became somewhat more pronounced in February of 1983. In the category "protection of basic liberties" we can likewise register a reduction in the posi
tive rating of the government, the extent of this reduction was much less, however.
Remarkably, however, the rating of the political system did not, or not significantly, fall in either indicator in November 1982 or February 1983. The more negative rating of the 16 These events could have been the party donations affair, the permanent dispute in the SPD-FDP coalition and the manner in which the change in government in October 1982 took place (a vote of no confidence).
government thus did not have an effect on the rating of the system. That changed somewhat in 1989. The justness of the government is rated even more negatively in 1989 as in 1982/83. At this time the justness of the political system was also rated around ten percentage points lower than it was at previous points in time. The govern
ment's declining justness rating apparently had a retroactive effect on the political sy
stem. Whereas there was only a minor difference between the (moral) rating of the cur
rent government and the political system in 1980, the difference has become signifi
cantly greater since 1982. This concerns primarily the dimension of justness: in 1989 the difference between the positive rating of the government and the system was around 20%.
The question which arises here is: to what extent is this erosion in the government's ju
stness rating a lasting effect of the events of 1981/82 and to what extent can it be attri
buted to the fact that conservative parties make up the government. It is possible that, due to their ideological tradition and party image, socialist or social democratic parties have a greater advance in trust from the start than conservative parties in the question of justness. For the question we pose it can be noted that, first, more than three quarters of the respondents still gave a positive rating of the justness of the political system and, second, looking at the time series in figure 2b it can be seen that the survey in 1989 took place at the low point of a cycle. The previous assertion that there is an extremely high degree of approval for the political system as such in the Federal Republic of Germany does not have to be revised because of the data from 1989, which are shown in table 2.
3.2 Attempts at explanation
Both time series show fluctuations in the satisfaction with democracy which go beyond random fluctuations. This is above all the case with the cycles of satisfaction with democracy which emerged on the basis of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator (see figure 2b). In the following we will briefly discuss some possibilities for interpre
ting these fluctuations which have been offered up to now in research in this area. More concretely, this means that we will look to see if the fluctuations can be traced back to economic developments, periodic elections or to variations in satisfaction with the government's performance.
The influence of the economic development on the support for political systems has been a permanent object of empirical research since the classic works of Lipset (1981),
Almond and Verba (1963) and Easton (1965).17 The reason for the prominence of this topic lies in the assumption that the stability of a democracy is endangered by the fact that the acceptance of this political system is highly dependent on the material output.
There is a large degree of consensus in the meantime that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a "fair weather" democracy in the sense that support for the basic structure of its political system would be dependent on positive economic output (Conradt 1980; Fuchs 1989; Gabriel 1989b). This does not rule out, however, the possi
bility that the relative concrete attitude to the democratic political process is shaped considerably by the current economic situation. This possibility is at least plausible for the cycle of satisfaction with democracy in Germany from 1979 to 1983 (see figure 2b).
This cycle runs virtually parallel to the objective economic development - as shown by time series of objective indicators which are not presented here (unemployment rate, rate of inflation, gross national product) - and by the subjective perception of economic conditions (see Fuchs 1987, p. 366). This parallelism in the course of the curves makes an influence of economic development on the satisfaction with democracy plausible, but does not prove it. Gabriel (1989a) showed in a systematic analysis at the individual level that there was only a weak connection between satisfaction with democracy and the respondent's perception of the economic development in this phase. This result is supported by the further development after 1983. Since this time an almost continuous increase in the growth rates of the gross national product and an increase in optimistic expectations for the future could be seen in the Federal Republic of Germany.18 At the same time, however, the satisfaction with democracy continues to run cyclically, that means with upward and downward trends (see figure 2b). The equilibrium of satisfac
tion with democracy after the beginning of 1983, which was established for the time series in figure 2a, does not indicate a stronger effect of the economic development either, at least at the aggregate level.
There are several ways in which the periodic elections can have positive effects on the satisfaction with democracy. First, they make clear the central mechanism through which the sovereignty of the people in representative democracies is realized in prac
tice. This mechanism allows citizens to select the persons who will occupy positions of authority - and thus also the agendas. Widmaier (1988, p. 147; 1990, p. 221) refers to a further, though performance related, effect of the periodic elections. Through the act of 17 More recent analyses of this topic have been presented by Weatherford (1984), Finkel et al. (1989) and Gabriel (1989a).
18 According to data from the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach which are not dis
played here.
voting the citizens have the possibility of reacting to perceived performance deficits of the old government. The new government takes over with a trust advance in regard to its future performance, which could have at least a short-term effect on satisfaction with democracy. A further positive effect could come from the pure chance that the various party adherents give their party to participate in the next government. This positive effect should decrease again after the election, at least among the adherents of the party which was not successful, and to this extent holds true especially for the election cam
paign. Though, even the subjectively assumed possibility for the preferred party to par
ticipate in government makes the fundamental democratic mechanism visible and, even after a failure, alludes to a renewed chance in the next election.
The reasons named can be used to formulate a "cycles of attention hypothesis" (Kiichler 1985, p. 2), that is, through the periodic elections, cycles of attention emerge with regard to a fundamentally democratic mechanism. These cycles of attention could, on the other hand, be one of the causes for the cycles of satisfaction with democracy. If we look at the cycles of satisfaction with democracy in figure 2b then this hypothesis only holds true to a very limited extent. The peak of a cycle is only identical with an election campaign in one case, the beginning of 1983. In the other three cases, that is in the elections in 1980, 1987 and 1990, we can see short term increases in the satisfaction with democracy, but only in the framework of downward trends which, moreover, al
ready had begun beforehand. The upward trends of the individual cycles, on the other hand, begin so long before the next election that they could hardly have been influenced by it.
Besides the interest groups, the social movements and the political parties, the govern
ment is one of the collective actors which buttress and structure the democratic process.
Seen from this perspective, the rating of the government's performance should also have a more or less strong effect on the satisfaction with democracy (see Widmaier 1988, 1990; Gabriel 1989b). Figure 3 gives a time series of the satisfaction with the perfor
mance of the current government which is based on the following indicator from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: "Are you satisfied or unsatisfied with how the current SPD/FDP (or CDU/FDP) government in Bonn has performed up to now?". The re
spondents could answer with the help of an eleven point scale from +5 to -5, where +5 meant that they were altogether satisfied with the current government and -5 meant that they were altogether dissatisfied with the current government. In figure 3 the mean values of this satisfaction with the governmental performance are recorded on the time axis.
Source: Forschungsgruppe W ahlen
Like the satisfaction with democracy (see figure 2b), satisfaction with the performance of government follows a cyclical pattern over time, and the course of these cycles is also very similar to those of satisfaction with democracy. This appears to confirm Widmaier's thesis (1990, p. 233) that the popularity of the government is a reasonable predictor for the satisfaction with democracy. This, on the other hand, poses the question of whether support for the political system in the Federal Republic of Germany is dependent on the material output of the political system for the individual citizen or his reference group after all. This question can ultimately only be clarified through systematic analyses at the individual level. But on the basis of the time series presented here we can argue against such a conclusion. First, the parallelism of the curves is only ascertainable with regard to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator and not for the Eurobarometer. We can thus assume that at higher generalization levels of political support its dependence on governmental performance will also diminish. Second, the perceived governmental performance is not necessarily based on the material output for the respective citizen himself or his reference group, but also on questions like the gene
ral governing style and the integrity exhibited by members of government in their beha
viour (see also Gabriel 1986, pp. 243f and 1989b, pp. 78ff on this point). In other
words, the perceived governmental performance rests both on instrumental and on moral standards of judgement.
This conclusion can also be reached on the basis of some regression analyses. In a bi
variate regression of governmental performance on satisfaction with democracy the ß- value is .25. If, however, we additionally include legitimacy of government as an inde
pendent variable in the regression equation, then this effect of governmental perfor
mance disappears almost entirely. The effect of governmental performance on the satis
faction with democracy determined at the bivariate level can therefore be traced back to the influence which the legitimation of government has on governmental performance (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Causal model of satisfaction with democracy
Satisfaction with democracy*
(Rz.15)
Source: W ahlstudie 1983
Note: The coefficients are standardfized regression coefficients.
* Indicator of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
** Preference for a party in government or in opposition
According to the model in figure 4, only the moral performance of the current govern
ment has an effect on the satisfaction with democracy.19 When, therefore, the assump
tion that the cycles of satisfaction with democracy can be explained through variations in governmental performance holds true, then we are more likely dealing with moral than instrumental performance.20 We can thus sum up our arguments:
19 The direct effect of party preference on satisfaction with democracy is .043 (ß-weigh- ting) and is not significant at the .10-level.
20 The causal model is based on data which were collected in November 1982, that is, shortly after the change in government following a vote of no confidence, which was not seen as legitimate by a majority of the population. This meant that due to the situa
tion the moral rating dimension became more important than the instrumental dimen
sion. At later points in time we would rather expect that the instrumental ratings would have a considerable effect on the satisfaction with democracy. In any case, the moral
(1) the performance of the respective government has an effect on satisfaction with de
mocracy,
(2) this effect is based more on the moral and less on the instrumental performance and it is
(3) only one effect among others as the explained variance (15%) shows.
This argumentation is based on the premise that the parallelism in cycles of govern
mental performance and satisfaction with democracy is an expression of a causal dependence of the second factor on the first. This assumption is by no means secure. In examining the cycles more closely we see that the high and low points in governmental performance appear after the respective highs and lows in satisfaction with democracy.
According to the common wisdom of causal analysis this would mean that the causality would tend to be reversed, that is, that the more fundamental attitude (satisfaction with democracy) would, paradoxically, determine the more specific attitude (governmental performance). There is obviously a need for both conceptual clarification and empirical analysis here. It is possible that each of the cycles are influenced differently by a third factor. The empirically determined causal connection between governmental perfor
mance and satisfaction with democracy would then be a spurious correlation. This unknown "third factor" could be a complex general mood which comes about through a multitude of concrete political events and behaviours of the political elites.
4. Trends of political support and new political cleavages
We could not ascertain a continual trend toward a decline in satisfaction with de
mocracy in the aggregate of the population. That does not mean that such trends cannot be found among certain sub-groups. In our attempt at clarifying this question we refer to Inglehart's theory of the "value change" (1977) which was later expanded to become a theory of "cultural change" (Inglehart 1989). A component of this theory of value or cultural change is the hypothesis that political cleavage structures of Western societies are going through a process of transformation from a class-based to a value-based polarization (Inglehart 1989 pp. 323-98; see also Inglehart 1984). The value-based pola
rization takes place along the contradiction between materialist and postmaterialist rating of the government will also play a role regardless of the relative weight of the moral and instrumental factors in different situations.
values. The development of postmaterialist values creates new issue priorities in the political sphere which are labelled "new politics" (Baker et al. 1981) and thus distin
guished from the issue priorities of "old politics". A permanent political cleavage can
not be constituted on the basis of individual issue priorities, but only when they have been transformed into generalized political orientations (Dalton 1986, p. 444; Fuchs 1989, p. 150, 1991a, p. 71). Such a transformation implies changes in the general stan
dards for political assessment which can lead to fundamental changes in behaviour.21 In West European countries the generalization of individual issue priorities takes place through the use of the left-right schema, which is the institutionalized medium for poli
tical orientation and communication in these countries (Fuchs/Klingemann 1989). In accordance with general usage, we call those generalizations which come about by means of the left-right schema "ideological orientations". These can, in principle, be determined by means of self-placement on a left-right scale. As long as we cannot assume that the new cleavage has replaced the old one, however, but that both exist side by side, we have to carry out a respecification in order to be able to separate both cleavages within the left-right schema. We will be using Inglehart's materialism-post- materialism index for this. By combining this index with the left-right scale we separate the postmaterialist left from the materialist left within the leftist spectrum and, likewise, the postmaterialist right from the materialist right. As the analysis of the issue priorities of these groups shows, the postmaterialist left is considerably different from the mate
rialist left, whereas the postmaterialist right is only somewhat different from the mate
rialist right (Fuchs 1991a). The emergence of postmaterialist value priorities apparently acts above all to divide the leftist spectrum (see also Inglehart 1989, p. 325) so that at the ideological level we end up with a triadic conflict structure which consists of the poles postmaterialist left, materialist left and materialist right. We are applying the hypotheses about dissatisfaction with democracy formulated by Inglehart and others to the postmaterialist left.22
According to the value or cultural change theory, there are good reasons for the post
materialist left to show a declining satisfaction with the democratic process and to make the change of representative democracy into an issue for the new political cleavage (see also Gabriel 1988). One of the reasons for this is the systematic neglect of the issue priorities of this group by the established party systems, which are chiefly organized 21 Among these are voting for new parties and participating in new social movements.
22 The relationship with other variables which are presumed for the postmaterialists are empirically almost always more pronounced if we replace postmaterialists with the postmaterialist left.
according to the pattern of traditional politics. The party systems of the Western democracies represent above all the material interests of certain social groups and exhi
bit a deficit in regard to the representation of the general interests which transcend indi
vidual groups (Raschke 1985, p. 37), This is a demand on the political decision making process which has been articulated above all by the postmaterialist left (environmental protection, disarmament, anti-nuclear power etc.). According to the theory, the dissatis
faction of the postmaterialist left does not only limit itself to the lacking responsiveness of the political decision making process for certain demands, but is extended to this decision making process itself. The formal23 and informal rules of the game which are institutionalised in the political system are made responsible for the lack of respon
siveness (Inglehart 1977, pp. 14f, 306f). A further source of dissatisfaction with the democratic process is formed by unconventional forms of political participation which have emerged in the context of the new social movements. These forms of participation are not only a consequence of a deficit in established politics in dealing with certain demands, but also an expression of a genuine need. To this extent there emerges a dis
crepancy between desires for direct participation and the representatively organized political process (Raschke 1985 pp. 192f; Dalton 1988, pp. 72f, 225f; Kaase 1989, p. 23; Roth 1989, pp. 192f). In the framework of the theory of cultural change, structural reasons can thus be found which lead to a less than average satisfaction with democracy among the postmaterialist left. A persistence of the structural barriers would have to lead to an increase in this dissatisfaction.
23 For example, there are massive institutional barriers against new parties in several West European countries.
