We could not ascertain a continual trend toward a decline in satisfaction with de
mocracy in the aggregate of the population. That does not mean that such trends cannot be found among certain sub-groups. In our attempt at clarifying this question we refer to Inglehart's theory of the "value change" (1977) which was later expanded to become a theory of "cultural change" (Inglehart 1989). A component of this theory of value or cultural change is the hypothesis that political cleavage structures of Western societies are going through a process of transformation from a class-based to a value-based polarization (Inglehart 1989 pp. 323-98; see also Inglehart 1984). The value-based pola
rization takes place along the contradiction between materialist and postmaterialist rating of the government will also play a role regardless of the relative weight of the moral and instrumental factors in different situations.
values. The development of postmaterialist values creates new issue priorities in the political sphere which are labelled "new politics" (Baker et al. 1981) and thus distin
guished from the issue priorities of "old politics". A permanent political cleavage can
not be constituted on the basis of individual issue priorities, but only when they have been transformed into generalized political orientations (Dalton 1986, p. 444; Fuchs 1989, p. 150, 1991a, p. 71). Such a transformation implies changes in the general stan
dards for political assessment which can lead to fundamental changes in behaviour.21 In West European countries the generalization of individual issue priorities takes place through the use of the left-right schema, which is the institutionalized medium for poli
tical orientation and communication in these countries (Fuchs/Klingemann 1989). In accordance with general usage, we call those generalizations which come about by means of the left-right schema "ideological orientations". These can, in principle, be determined by means of self-placement on a left-right scale. As long as we cannot assume that the new cleavage has replaced the old one, however, but that both exist side by side, we have to carry out a respecification in order to be able to separate both cleavages within the left-right schema. We will be using Inglehart's materialism-post- materialism index for this. By combining this index with the left-right scale we separate the postmaterialist left from the materialist left within the leftist spectrum and, likewise, the postmaterialist right from the materialist right. As the analysis of the issue priorities of these groups shows, the postmaterialist left is considerably different from the mate
rialist left, whereas the postmaterialist right is only somewhat different from the mate
rialist right (Fuchs 1991a). The emergence of postmaterialist value priorities apparently acts above all to divide the leftist spectrum (see also Inglehart 1989, p. 325) so that at the ideological level we end up with a triadic conflict structure which consists of the poles postmaterialist left, materialist left and materialist right. We are applying the hypotheses about dissatisfaction with democracy formulated by Inglehart and others to the postmaterialist left.22
According to the value or cultural change theory, there are good reasons for the post
materialist left to show a declining satisfaction with the democratic process and to make the change of representative democracy into an issue for the new political cleavage (see also Gabriel 1988). One of the reasons for this is the systematic neglect of the issue priorities of this group by the established party systems, which are chiefly organized 21 Among these are voting for new parties and participating in new social movements.
22 The relationship with other variables which are presumed for the postmaterialists are empirically almost always more pronounced if we replace postmaterialists with the postmaterialist left.
according to the pattern of traditional politics. The party systems of the Western democracies represent above all the material interests of certain social groups and exhi
bit a deficit in regard to the representation of the general interests which transcend indi
vidual groups (Raschke 1985, p. 37), This is a demand on the political decision making process which has been articulated above all by the postmaterialist left (environmental protection, disarmament, anti-nuclear power etc.). According to the theory, the dissatis
faction of the postmaterialist left does not only limit itself to the lacking responsiveness of the political decision making process for certain demands, but is extended to this decision making process itself. The formal23 and informal rules of the game which are institutionalised in the political system are made responsible for the lack of respon
siveness (Inglehart 1977, pp. 14f, 306f). A further source of dissatisfaction with the democratic process is formed by unconventional forms of political participation which have emerged in the context of the new social movements. These forms of participation are not only a consequence of a deficit in established politics in dealing with certain demands, but also an expression of a genuine need. To this extent there emerges a dis
crepancy between desires for direct participation and the representatively organized political process (Raschke 1985 pp. 192f; Dalton 1988, pp. 72f, 225f; Kaase 1989, p. 23; Roth 1989, pp. 192f). In the framework of the theory of cultural change, structural reasons can thus be found which lead to a less than average satisfaction with democracy among the postmaterialist left. A persistence of the structural barriers would have to lead to an increase in this dissatisfaction.
23 For example, there are massive institutional barriers against new parties in several West European countries.
Percentage
— Matenalist Lett
■+■ Poetmateital Lett
* Materialist Right
In figure 5 we present the trends of satisfaction with democracy for the three ideological groups which constitute the triadic conflict structure at the ideological level.24 The strong fluctuations in the trend of satisfaction with democracy for the postmaterialist left make it difficult to identify a pattern. Nevertheless, the following phases can be roughly identified: an upward trend, which starts at the beginning of the time series and peaks at the end of 1979; after this comes a downward trend until the spring of 1983 which turns into a phase of strong fluctuations at a low average level; an upward trend began again at the end of 1987: due to the back of more recent data we cannot deter
mine whether this is a longer upward trend which continued beyond 1989 or whether it was a relatively short-term recovery which had already ended again at the beginning of 24 The ideological groups are constructed by combining a trichotomized left-right scale (left: points 1-4 on the scale, centre: points 5 and 6, right: points 7-10) and a trichotomi
zed materialism-postmaterialism index (materialists, mixed types, postmaterialists) so that we end up with a total of nine ideological types. Only the theoretically relevant groups are presented in figure 5. In earlier works (Fuchs 1987, 1989) the groups were constructed on the basis of a dichotomized left-right scale and a dichotomized materia
lism-postmaterialism index in order to reduce the random fluctuations due to low num
bers of cases. In this case we have accepted the risk of such fluctuations so as not to di
lute the result through the inclusion of respondents who actually belong to the mixed types (materialism-postmaterialism index) or the centre (left-right scale).
1989. A clear answer to our opening question ensues from this description: a more or less linear trend toward satisfaction with democracy could also not be determined for the postmaterialist left. In contrast, the following finding could be recorded: the satis
faction with democracy of the postmaterialist left was the lowest among the three groups for almost the entire period covered.25 The level of this satisfaction varied, however, considerably in the period studied (see the strong fluctuations and above all the two upward trends).
These results can definitely be interpreted in the framework of the theoretical expectati
ons. If we can assume that the satisfaction of the postmaterialist left with the democratic process is also dependent on the extent to which their ideological positions are systema
tically represented and realized by the policy-making process - and the formal and informal rules of the game it is based on - then the two upward trends described can at least be made plausible. There are two conceivable ways for their ideological positions to be systematically represented-, first, when one of the established parties adjusts its program to the ideology of the postmaterialist left and, second, through the formation of a new party and its being represented in parliament. A systematic realization of their ideological positions can only be assumed when the corresponding party or parties is or are represented in the governing coalition. There were events in both phases where upward trends are indicated which could be interpreted as signs that such structural pre
conditions could be developing. The process of forming a new party began in 1977 with the first candidacy of "green and multi-coloured lists" at the local level in Lower Saxony and ended at the beginning of 1979 with the founding of the Green Parly (Klotzsch/Stöss 1984). The assumed positive effects of this development on the post
materialist left's satisfaction with democracy broke off again around the beginning of 1980, also due to the period effects discussed above which led to a drop in satisfaction with democracy in all ideological groups. After the elections in 1987 there were several factors which could have played a positive role for the poslmaterialist left: first, the programmatic transformation of the SPD in the direction of the ideological position of the postmaterialist left; second, the in part substantial electoral successes of the Greens in Landtag elections and third, the first cases of government participation of the Greens at the Länder level (Hamburg, Hessen). If these events were interpreted by the postma
terialist left as signs of a beginning change in the rules of the game of the democratic 25 Even if we do not only compare the satisfaction with democracy of the postmateria
list left with that of the materialist left and materialist right, but also with all logically possible ideological groups (see footnote 30), the postmaterialist left still proves to be the group with the lowest level.
process, then the two upward trends in this group's satisfaction with democracy are also plausible in our conceptual framework. A permanent alignment of this group's satisfac
tion with democracy to that of the other ideological groups would then be expected when these beginnings would grow to form relatively continuous experiences.
One of the constituent elements of the triadic political conflict structure in the Federal Republic of Germany is the formation of continuing coalitions between different ideo
logical groups and political parties. As a result of this complementarity between the ideological level and the level of the party system26 (Fuchs 1991a) the trends of the party supporters would have to correspond to those of the ideological groups which entered the coalitions with these parties.
26 The Greens are primarily a party of the postmaterialist left, the CDU-CSU primarily a party of the materialist right, whereas the SPD is both a party of the materialist left and the postmaterialist left. In this respect the complementarity is thus (still) too un
clear.
Figure 6a: Trend of satisfaction with dem ocracy by vote intention 100 T
-oo
80
70
60
Percentage 60
40
30
- CDU/CSU SPD
★ GRUENE
20
10
0 -|~. | | I — t l- l F t 4 - f -Hl - l l - l I l - H - H F l i t
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
197 6 1977 1970 197 9 198 0 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 198 6 1987 1988 1989 Source: Eurobarometer 6-31 a
The trends of the Greens and the postmaterialist left are almost identical. The high and low points of the Greens' satisfaction with democracy correspond exactly to those of the postmaterialist left.27 The extent of the fluctuations is somewhat less for the supporters of the Greens due to the greater number of cases. The trends for the supporters of the CDU-CSU and the SPD correspond to those of the materialist right and materialist left respectively. These are determined primarily through the govemment/opposition mechanism. Before the change in government in the fall of 1982, the SPD supporters showed a higher degree of satisfaction with democracy than the CDU-CSU supporters, and the ratio reversed itself in almost the same proportion after the change in govern
ment.28 The govemment/opposition mechanism is a structurally created mechanism which leads to a satisfaction with democracy which is relatively high for the supporters of a governing party and relatively low for the supporters of an opposition party. This systematic difference is not a problem as long as it does not become too large and as long as the level as a whole is high. In our case the largest opposition party's (SPD) average satisfaction with democracy after the change in government was still around 65% in the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's indicator and around 75% in the Eurobarometer indicator. The question is, though, to what extent such a limited difference at a high average level is dependent on the fact that there actually are changes in government within reasonable periods of time. If the most important opposition party would have no chance at taking over responsibility for government, then it is quite conceivable that its supporters would generalize this and conclude that the political process is not functio
ning adequately.
A noticeable difference between the trends of satisfaction with democracy for the party supporters and those of the complementary ideological groups pertains to the CDU- CSU and the materialist right. Whereas the level of satisfaction with democracy for CDU-CSU supporters after the change in government corresponded approximately with that of the SPD supporters before the change, this was not equally the case when we compared the complementary ideological groups. The materialist right shows on the average a lower satisfaction with democracy than the materialist left before the change 27 The time series of the Greens' satisfaction with democracy first begins in the fall of
1979 in the Eurobarometer indicator and in the third quarter of 1979 in the Forschungs
gruppe Wahlen's indicator, and that means after the establishment of the Greens as a party at the national level. The question regarding voting intentions can only reasonably be posed as of this point in time.
28 The satisfaction with democracy among SPD supporters after the change in govern
ment is, though, somewhat lower than that of the CDU-CSU supporters before the change. This is probably due to the share of the postmaterialist left among SPD sup
porters.
in government. There are apparently people within the ranks of the right who also see themselves to be inadequately considered in the political process by the CDU-CSU, so that the government/opposition mechanism does not suffice to raise the satisfaction with democracy of the materialist right to the "expectation value". The satisfaction with democracy shown by the supporters of the extreme right-wing party "Republikaner", which has been assessed since 1989, also points in this direction. According to figure 6b, the satisfaction with democracy of the supporters of the Republikaner has clearly been the lowest among the different party supporters since this time and, moreover, it shows a tendency towards further decline. In the second quarter of 1991 only 27% of the supporters of the Republikaner were satisfied with democracy. We suspect that the ideological group which is overrepresented among the supporters of the Republikaner is the extreme materialist right. Due to the small sample size we could not reasonably test this thesis by differentiating the materialist right again into an extreme and a moderate materialist right. If we look at the period in which all four parties were represented, then it is apparent that the supporters of the Greens and the Republikaner constantly showed the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy. These were the supporters which for
med the respective extremes on the one dimensional left-right continuum. This confirms Miller and Listhaug's (1990, p. 11) hypothesis "that fringe groups cannot easily find their ideological position rewarded by any government".
5. Discussion
The term crisis has been used so frequently in the last two decades to characterize the condition of representative democracy in Western industrial societies that its capacity for diagnosis has been totally depleted. The problem today is no longer seen in terms of crisis-prone developments, but as a challenge as a result of modernization processes.
Even if this challenge does not relate to the fundamental formal structure of the regime, but to the informal structure of the political process, our empirical results can, in our opinion, not be seen as a confirmation of this hypothesis for the Federal Republic of Germany. First, the theoretically expected trend of a continually declining satisfaction with democracy cannot be determined and, second, even at the low point of the entire period we investigated, there was still a majority of the citizens satisfied with the func
tioning of democracy.
In view of such results, we must pose the question of whether the interpretative para
digm which postulates this challenge can still be maintained. One of the assumptions of
The emergence of new collective actors and actions beyond the bounds of institutionali
zed politics should therefore be understood more as a further diffentiation of the in
termediary system of politics which provides citizens with additional options for arti
culating their interests. The informal structures of the regime have changed, but in the end the regime remained the same. Precisely the capacity for limited self-transformation appears to be one of the reasons contributing to satisfaction with the system (Stöss 1990, p. 24). The "challenge" to representative democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany thus is that it, like all political systems, is constantly confronted with the pro
blem of adapting to changes in the societal environment. The democracy in the Federal Republic has reacted to this problem by changing to some extent. The manner of change, however, meant realizing possibilities which are inherent in representative de
mocracy itself and not changing representative democracy as such.30
If we assume that representative democracy as a form for ordering the political system has, in principle, a considerable adaptive capacity in respect to a changing societal environment, this does not rule out that this adaptivity can be more or less successful.
This aspect shifts the perspective of the analysis to variations in different structural arrangements of representative democracy and their consequences for the performance of the political system and, mediated by this, also for support of the political system.
There are surely a multitude of criteria which the citizens can use to evaluate the (moral) performance31 of the political system. This includes, in our opinion, two factors 29 Analyses at the individual level also show that there is only a weak correlation bet
ween a positive attitude toward actors and forms of non-institutionalized politics and a negative attitude toward actors and forms of established politics (Gabriel 1990; Fuchs
1991b; Hofrichter/Schmitt 1991).
30 To formulate it as a paradox: the challenge is already the solution. The function of the emergence of a non-institutional sector of politics is in articulating interests which are systematically ignored by established politics. This function can be fulfilled prima
rily because of the non-institutionalization. The way, for example, the new social mo
vements are anchored in certain societal networks makes possible a rapid mobilization of citizens to directly influence the political decision-making process when necessary.
The capability for mobilization is primarily a potential which is relatively seldom trans
formed into actual actions (Fuchs 1991b).
31 Because the representative democracies of the West are justified primarily on the ba
31 Because the representative democracies of the West are justified primarily on the ba