Since 2005, the Missiriya migration into Northern Bahr el Ghazal has been much more tenuous than that of the Rizeigat, primarily because the Missiriya are perceived as having played a central role in GoS-sponsored militias during the second civil war.99 There is thus a great deal of suspicion about whether Missiriya herders are simply pastoralists, or whether they are militia members.
This uncertainty could transform a cattle raid into an international incident, and influences the severity with which the Malual Dinka and the SPLA enforce bans on pastoralists carrying arms. Correspondingly, this suspicion makes the Missiriya much less willing to travel unarmed, given the very real risk of revenge killings.
Since the CPA, there have been a series of clashes between Missiriya on the one side and either the SPLA, or Dinka fighters, on the other. Most notably, Missiriya militias worked with SAF during the May 2011 invasion of Abyei.100 As most of the Missiriya pastoralists who come to Northern Bahr el Ghazal pass through Abyei, it should be noted that grazing dynamics on the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–Southern Darfur frontier are also affected by the political situation in that territory; if, as during the 2010–2011 season, attacks or political distur-bances render Abyei impassable, then the vast majority of Missiriya will not get to Northern Bahr el Ghazal either.
In Northern Bahr el Ghazal itself there have also been clashes, primarily between the SPLA and Missiriya pastoralists. The most damaging clashes occurred during the 2007–08 grazing season, and erupted due to a disagreement about disarmament. A peace conference, involving the Malual Dinka and the Fayarin and Awlad Kamil sub-sections, took place in 2008, but conflict erupted again almost immediately afterwards and led to the Missiriya closing the Meiram–
Warrawa road to trade and migrant passage. These clashes show the degree to which trade, migration, and historical memory are delicately intertwined on the borders of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, and the degree to which, in the absence of the reciprocal trust that underpinned grazing agreements before the war, existing state-based safety guarantees for Northern pastoralists will be insufficient for a workable border. It is precisely the SPLA—the sole force man-dated to use violence, and supposed to protect migrants—that the migrants fear most.
While the Missiriya find it more difficult to enter Northern Bahr el Ghazal, they are also more precariously positioned in South Kordofan than the Rizeigat are in Southern Darfur. In Sudan, the expansion of the oil industry and inten-sive industrial farming since the 1970s have reduced the amount of grazing land available for the Missiriya, and increased their dependence on grazing areas in South Sudan (Siddig et al., 2007; IFPRI, 2006).
Over the last 30 years, the Missiriya’s political power base has also been decimated. West Kordofan, traditionally the bastion of Missiriya power, was amalgamated into North and South Kordofan in 2004 as part of an NCP effort to change the balance of power in South Kordofan.101 Many Missiriya were angered by their loss of influence. The Missiriya leadership has also been increas-ingly alienated from its community as the NCP fragmented traditional leader-ship structures and increased the number of chiefs in an attempt to wean the Missiriya away from the Umma Party.102 These machinations have resulted in a leadership that is increasingly tied to—and resident in—Khartoum. Popular paramilitary groups have emerged in the vacuum left by these authorities.103 In terms of North–South relations, the fracturing of the Missiriya political leader-ship has led to a polarization of positions; an elite that is increasingly depend-ent on NCP benevolence refuses to engage in negotiations with the South, and makes maximal claims about the border region, while pastoralists and traders, who are excluded from these networks, either try to maintain passage into South Sudan, or join PDF militias.104
Increased pressure on both grazing land and water has also fuelled tensions between the Rizeigat and the Missiriya. In the post-CPA period, this came to a head in 2008, when there was a series of clashes between the Rizeigat and the Missiriya sub-sections Fayarin and Awlad Jibril. A reconciliation congress was held in June 2010, but more fighting broke out in August (CI, 2010d, p. 42). In 2012, clashes between the two groups resumed, with confrontations west of Kass on 7 February 2012. There was supposed to be a conference between the Fayarin and Rizeigat just after Eid al Fitr, in November 2012, but instead the beginning of December saw residents of East Darfur fearing further clashes (Radio Tamazuj, 2012s). Some of the causes for these clashes are structural; it is possible that the fighting will intensify if access to grazing in South Sudan re-mains as difficult as it is at present, putting further pressure on the limited amount of grazing land within South Kordofan and East Darfur.
Just as with the Rizeigat, the Missiriya have been torn between loyalty to Khartoum and the possibility of joining both the SPLM-N and JEM. Until September 2011, the head of JEM in South Kordofan was Mohamed Bohar, a Missiriya. As JEM moved into South Kordofan, there were also reports of Missiriya members of the SPLM-N leaving to join JEM—beginning with JEM’s main commander in the area, Fadel Mohamed Rahoma, who commanded the JEM troops that participated in the assault on Hejlij.105 One of the largest recruit-ments to JEM occurred in 2004, after the death of Musa Ali Hamadein, the founder of Al Shahama, a former PDF fighter, and member of the Popular Congress Party (PCP). When Al Shahama split, Hamadein’s nephew led one part of Al Shahama into JEM. More generally, JEM has managed to establish itself among the Missiriya—much like the militias who organized among the Missiriya before it—by capitalizing on Missiriya marginalization under the NCP government.
Future prospects
While the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–East Darfur boundary has in many ways been the most peaceful since 2005, it is also the most potentially combustible.
Members of the Khartoum-based Rizeigat elite have already threatened to turn the 14-Mile Area into ‘Abyei 2’ if the SPLA does not withdraw from positions around Samaha. The Malual Dinka are resolutely opposed to a withdrawal. With JEM and the SPLM-N moving through the area, and active PDF recruitment drives, the region could be drawn into the Sudanese civil war, with interna-tional consequences.
Even if the SPLA does withdraw from the 14-Mile Area, it is unlikely the JBVMM will be able to ensure it remains demilitarized: Rizeigat pastoralists regularly smuggle guns and goods past SAF and SPLA positions. Furthermore, while the area is to be demilitarized under the 27 September Security Agree-ment, given the hostility the Malual Dinka have for the agreement and the tendency of the Rizeigat and the Missiriya to travel with guns, there could be a subsequent remilitarization through the use of militias or pastoralists, espe-cially as the ‘joint tribal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes’, specified in paragraph 3 of the agreement, rely almost entirely on a functioning Northern
Bahr el Ghazal government. It is difficult to imagine a successful migration given that the Missiriya have not even attended the grazing conferences arranged under the protection of the state.
Even if the SDBZ is successful, and the NCP and SPLM reach agreement on the delimitation of the border, it is unclear whether border management devices will be able to mediate between three groups with deep historical grievances, especially when the Malual Dinka require government prodding to reach any accord with Northern pastoralist groups.
In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, resolution of the border conflicts, a successful migration season for the Rizeigat and the Missiriya, and the internal situation in Sudan are all inextricably bound together. For instance, current SAF attacks are aimed at cutting SRF supply chains to the South, and many of the success-ful Rizeigat pastoralists in the South are tied to the SPLM-N; any future agree-ments or negotiations that do not treat these three different problems as a whole are likely to fail. Migration agreements which do not also take into account the conflict between the SPLA and SAF along the River Kiir will fail to allow migrants to pass into South Sudan. If the implementation of a SDBZ and an end to SPLA–SAF conflict in the border region are not accompanied by sus-tainable grazing agreements for the Missiriya and Rizeigat, the border region will return to violence, this time between host communities and pastoralists, but with international consequences.