Grazing routes into eastern Upper Nile, 2011–12

Map 11 Grazing routes into eastern

Upper Nile, 2011–12

Sudan border, the route between the two countries was officially closed by Sudan in May 2011. For three months, however, the border remained informally open, with border guards at Jordah allowing smugglers to pass. Following South Sudan’s formal declaration of independence in July 2011, however, it was much tougher for merchants to get through on the Sudanese side of the border. By June 2012, border trade had almost ceased.

This created an extremely difficult situation in Renk, which has much stronger transport ties to Sudan than to South Sudan. The scarcity of provisions in Renk made manifest its tensions with Malakal. Earlier in 2012, the Upper Nile gov-ernment had refused to allow goods to move north from Malakal, in a tit-for-tat measure designed to respond to Sudan’s closing of the border. This restriction was also designed to ensure sufficient supplies stayed within the state capital, where the price of many basic commodities had doubled over the year because of the trade embargo.²²⁴ The decision affected food security in Renk county, which was already suffering from the trade embargo. On 4–5 June 2012, a reported 112 trucks, which had crossed the border from the North at Jordah, were prevented from going further south by authorities in Renk, partly because of concern about the amount of food needed in the county, but also in revenge for the earlier decision by the state administration in Malakal.

The situation worsened last year because of a lack of fuel, caused by the border blockade. Farmers had difficulty getting fuel for the planting season that began in May 2012, and were also crippled by a lack of funding from the South Sudanese government. As a result, much of Renk’s farmland is not being used. On 2 November, the Upper Nile state ministry of agriculture said Renk county did not spray its agricultural schemes for the third year in a row, due to a lack of resources (Radio Tamazuj, 2012m).

Following the 27 September Addis Ababa agreements, and in anticipation of the border’s reopening, prices dropped dramatically in Renk, with the cost of a sack of sugar falling from SSP 700 to SSP 400.²²⁵ However, this decline was not sustained, and the borders were not fully reopened. By mid-December 2012, prices had risen again, amid reports of vehicles being confiscated in White Nile while travelling to Upper Nile (Radio Tamazuj, 2012t).

The standoff over the border is a vivid reminder of how difficult it is to con-solidate South Sudan’s economy; Renk county has better economic and transport

links with Khartoum than it does with Juba, and Sudanese business interests in Renk are closely entwined with the local economy, leading to massive dis-ruption when the border is closed.

Jordah—the border town between the two countries—typifies the difficulties faced by Renk county. Border guards from Sudan and South Sudan face each other over the line that divides the town. In 2012, Seleim merchants would cross over to their shops during the day, before returning home at night. The goods they sold, however, would have to be brought up from Juba, at least officially, and South Sudanese merchants could not cross into Sudan. Instead, young men would cross freely, ferrying allowable goods back and forth across the border.²²⁶ These arrangements increase fears that national politics will interfere with what was a very practical arrangement between the Sudanese and South Suda-nese communities. During a consultation carried out by Concordis International in Renk in 20–22 May 2010, the Seleim and the Abialang Dinka proved remark-ably prescient in predicting the consequences of South Sudanese secession. They said if the South seceded, the Northern government would close the border, the GRSS would restrict oil production to influence talks, and there would be restrictions on commerce, grazing, and revenue collection from trade (CI, 2010c, p. 12). Unfortunately, their predictions were accurate and stand as gloomy indicators for communities along the Upper Nile–White Nile border.

Armed actors

Renk county is home to the SPLA’s 1^st Division. In 2011 and 2012, there was significant troop build-up in the area.²²⁷ SAF has also been moving troops into the area; on two occasions, it sent forces dangerously close to the border. These worrying movements were likely meant as provocations as they took place during crucial stages of the Addis Ababa negotiations.

Since independence, the SPLA has been more assertive in establishing its con-trol over the circulation of people and goods in Renk county. It has stopped boats from Kosti and traffic along roads from the north. Civilians living in White Nile say these restrictions have been accompanied by harassment and theft.

Whilst the 1^st Division is considered one of the most effective fighting forces in the SPLA, it also contains a number of factions. Following the Juba Decla-ration in 2006, a number of militia commanders were assimilated into the 1^st

Division, including Gordon Kong’s fighters²²⁸ and troops loyal to several of Paulino Matiep’s former commanders, including Samuel Both and Chol Lueth, under the command of Tahib Gatluak (Rands, 2010, pp. 15–16). However, a claim by Bapiny Monytuil, then of the SSLA, that Lieutenant Colonel Deng Tito Lual Ajak rebelled with the force under his command, on 9 September 2012, is false.²²⁹

In August 2012, there were several SAF attacks in Upper Nile, centered on agricultural land in the east. At the beginning of August, SAF occupied farms owned by Northern Sudanese investors in Renk county, some 20 km south of the border (Gurtong, 2012b). There was also an earlier attack by SAF in December 2011, and these attacks seemed designed to aggravate food shortages and eco-nomic losses in Upper Nile. Visiting the farms after the attacks, John Ibo Muntu, the deputy governor, said much of the mechanized industry had been destroyed (Radio Tamazuj, 2012g). These attacks suggest that any South Sudanese attempt to take over Sudanese farmland within Renk could fuel inter-state violence.

On 4 February 2013, SAF launched ground attacks on positions inside Renk county, at Babanis and Adahm. Guot Akoi, Renk’s county commissioner, said SAF was moving troops towards the border.²³⁰ This militarization sealed the border even further, with the price of a sack of flour in Renk town rising from SSP 250 to SSP 350.

Stakeholder positions