During the second civil war, relations between the Rizeigat and the Malual Dinka were strained, but did not suffer a total breakdown, as was the case elsewhere along the border. During the first civil war and the period of peace (1972–83) that followed the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, Rizeigat and Missiriya militias raided the Malual Dinka, attacking settlements south of the provincial border. As in Abyei (Craze, 2011, p. 12), during the second civil war, these raids were formalized as the government mobilized raiders as part of murahaliin64
militias and, in addition to attacking civilian settlements, also began to abduct women and children. People have still not received compensation for these abductions, despite the creation of committees to resolve the issue. In Gokk Machar and Warrawa, stories of strangers returning home, having spent their whole lives in Southern Darfur,65 are commonplace.66 The Malual Dinka still have vivid memories of the brutality of the war, and these undermine their trust in the Rizeigat. In March 1987, for instance, at Ed Da’ein, over 1,000 Dinka were killed by a group of Rizeigat; around 700 of those people were burned alive in police and railway stations. Stories of such massacres continue to circu-late, and affect relations in the present.
Despite such attacks, relations between the two groups continued during the war. GoS administrators in the main urban centres, which were held by GoS forces, continued to use the Munro-Wheatley line to adjudicate grazing dis-putes (Johnson, 2010b, p. 45), while in rural areas the SPLA made informal arrangements with the Rizeigat, and even the Missiriya. As the SPLA was not in control of the major towns and cities, markets sprang up around SPLA gar-rison towns like Warrawa, Majok, and Warguit.67
These links help explain why the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–Southern Darfur border has been the most peaceful stretch of the Sudan–South Sudan border since 2005. This relative and tenuous peace has also been buttressed by the fact that the working border is the Kiir, rather than the Munro-Wheatley line further south. The SPLA has been in control of the two towns on the river (Kiir Adem on the south bank, and Samaha on the north) for much of the post-CPA period, and, aside from incidents in 2009 and 2010, when Rizeigat merchants were killed, Rizeigat traders have been protected by the SPLA.
The Rizeigat and the Malual Dinka struck a number of grazing agreements in areas of SPLM control. In 2008, agreements were signed in Aweil, Nyamboli, and Warrawa. These accords were moderately successful: while the migration did occur, the Rizeigat said the SPLA killed some of their herders, and the Malual Dinka reported cattle theft. There were further meetings in 2010 in Aweil and Gokk Machar, although participants said both Khartoum and Juba interfered with the negotiations.
Recently, however, tensions have risen in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Anger towards the Rizeigat increased in 2009, when militia fighters blocked the road
from Meiram to Aweil, increasing food prices in Aweil town. The NCP has also attempted to cut contact between the Rizeigat and the SPLA, and SAF troops have increasingly attacked the SPLA’s northernmost positions; Kiir Adem, for instance, came under attack in December 2010.
The grazing agreement for the 2010–11 grazing season was signed relatively late, on 20–22 January 2011, in Aweil town. It had a strikingly pro-SPLM tone, which reflected the extent to which the border region is currently dominated by South Sudan. The agreement asked the Rizeigat to recognize the long history of Southern marginalization by the North, and demanded that the Rizeigat respect Dinka land and culture. It also detailed agreed grazing routes, com-mitted both parties to the establishment of a Joint Chief’s Court (which was never established), and set compensation rates for deaths and rapes that occurred during the dry season migration.68 During these grazing meetings, Malual Dinka chiefs criticized the fact that special courts to adjudicate cases related to grazing during the previous grazing season had not been set up, and also condemned the presence of armed cattle keepers. Nevertheless, the grazing agreements went ahead, and the pastoralist migration was relatively successful.
The reason these grazing agreements were even partially successful is because they deal with such a politically contested landscape; the SPLM attempted to ensure a successful grazing season in part to ensure Rizeigat and Missiriya par-ticipation in the SPLA and SPLM-N, and in part because, if the 14-Mile Area is given to South Sudan during future negotiations, good relations with the Rizeigat will be necessary to ensure such a deal is sustainable.69
State support for inter-community grazing agreements was central to their success in 2011 and 2012. While there is a long history of such agreements, and of good relations between the Malual Dinka and the Rizeigat, in other places along the border with similar histories of cohabitation grazing agreements have not fared as well. The relative success of grazing agreements along the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–East Darfur border emphasizes the primacy of the political in ensuring successful grazing routes.
However, the case of the Missiriya in Northern Bahr el Ghazal underlines the fact that state-level politics on its own is not enough to ensure a successful grazing season: because hostility between the Missiriya and Malual Dinka is intense, the Missiriya have found entering South Sudan almost impossible.
Because of their role in attacks in Abyei, the Missiriya have become less wel-come in South Sudan since 2005. The two Missiriya sections that migrate into Northern Bahr el Ghazal—Fayarin and Awlad Kamil—clashed with the SPLA in 2007 and 2008. When grazing agreements have been made with the Malual Dinka, as in 2008, the agreements have been poorly implemented. One of the principal sticking points is the question of disarmament. The Missiriya formed PDF militias throughout the second civil war, and are relatively well armed.
They are reluctant to come into South Sudan without weapons, citing SPLA harassment. Given this uncertainty, and widespread animosity towards the Missiriya, Fayarin, and Awlad Kamil grazed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in 2005–10 much less frequently than during the second civil war, leading up to the 2011–12 grazing season, when Missiriya pastoralists didn’t enter South Sudan.
The various failures and successes of these agreements tell us much about the potential for successful future grazing agreements, and will be explored below.