The 2011–12 migration season was relatively successful for those Rizeigat who entered Northern Bahr el Ghazal (see Map 3).80 One of the reasons for this was that the state government carried out a sensitization campaign 4–6 weeks before the start of the migration, and told people at the payam and boma level about the routes the Rizeigat would take.81 In line with the 20–22 January 2011
Aweil
Map 3 Grazing routes into
Northern Bahr el Ghazal,
agreement, the Rizeigat coming into Northern Bahr el Ghazal were to pay tax in Gokk Machar, although there was some resistance to the tax rates. The Rizeigat were also supposed to carry no weapons, but subsequent events, detailed below, make it clear that at least some of the Rizeigat migrants took weapons into the state.
Many inside the political administration of Northern Bahr el Ghazal attrib-uted the relative success of the migration to the strength of a cohesive Rizeigat leadership.82 In this line of explanation, the Rizeigat position differs from that of the Missiriya, whose leadership was fragmented by the NCP in order to isolate it from the Umma Party.83 Some in the administration claim that the Rizeigat leadership has maintained its centralized power, and is able to ensure grazing agreements are respected.
However, the evidence suggests that this is not the reason for the migration’s success. Since the CPA, there has been further recruitment of Rizeigat into the SPLA’s 3rd Division, which is based in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and there is widespread discontent among the Rizeigat about the benefits they gained from membership in the PDF during the second civil war (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2012, pp. 57–58). With many Rizeigat pastoralists staying away, and none of the Rizeigat elite from Khartoum and Ed Da’ein attending migration confer-ences, it seems more likely that the migration was successful because the Rizeigat are relatively divided, and politically weak. At grazing conferences in South Sudan in 2012, several pastoralists referred to recent PDF recruitment drives in South Darfur, and to the fact that they had not participated because they were concerned about their relationship with the Malual Dinka.84 In this light, the reason raiding was minimal during the grazing season was that there was a lack of political force underwriting the migration. This meant that the Rizeigat who came to Northern Bahr el Ghazal wanted to ingratiate them-selves with their hosts. This differs significantly from the situation in Abyei, where the Missiriya are backed by a powerful political lobby.85
However, the migration did not pass without incident. Eleven people were killed during the 2011–12 grazing season. Several of these deaths were due to local dynamics: in Marial Bai, Rizeigat pastoralists grazed their animals on Malual Dinka agricultural land. In the ensuing standoff, two Malual Dinka were shot, and their killers fled. Other deaths were caused by tensions between the
SPLA and the Rizeigat. While compensation for the Malual Dinka deaths was agreed at the migration review conference held in June 2012, there was a linger-ing sense of anger in the community, and people accused the Rizeigat of hidlinger-ing the killers.86 During the conference, the Rizeigat said they did not know the killers and could not bring them to South Sudan to stand trial; this lack of unity among the Rizeigat, as shown by the participants’ lack of accountability for other members of their group, and the thin attendance at grazing meetings, mean that the Malual Dinka still feel the Rizeigat are not being honest.
The Malual Dinka also say the Rizeigat stay too long. It was agreed that during the 2012–13 grazing season the Rizeigat would be allowed to enter Northern Bahr el Ghazal on 15 November, but they would have to leave by April 2013. The anger felt over this reflects a fundamental asymmetry in relations along the Sudan–South Sudan border. Since 2005, in general, Northern pasto-ralists have wanted to enter South Sudan to access grazing land, but have had little to offer in return.87 Prior to 2005, South Sudanese would go north for wage labour. Increasingly, this opportunity is closed. Furthermore, trade—explored in more detail below—has been shut down by the GoS’ closure of the border.
This makes the arrangement with the Rizeigat seem increasingly one-sided, and explains Malual Dinka disgruntlement when the Rizeigat overstay their welcome.
Arrangements with the Missiriya were much less successful. While there was a meeting between the Malual Dinka and the Missiriya in Aweil in February 2012, very few Missiriya crossed through to Aweil East. In part, this was due to the SPLA’s insistence that they must cross without guns. Given the degree of animosity felt by the Dinka towards the Missiriya—in part for historical reasons and in part due to the ongoing situation in Abyei—few Missiriya felt safe without weapons.88 Missiriya merchants in Warrawa also said there was heavy pressure from the NCP not to come into South Sudan, and that the Missiriya leadership, which is largely dependent upon NCP largesse (Pantuliano et al., 2009, p. 25), had encouraged people not to cross over into South Sudan. Large numbers of Missiriya pastoralists gathered on the Northern side of the River Kiir at Grinti. The SPLA and SAF allowed them to water with their animals there on occasion, but only at night. The result, Concordis International reports, was the loss of 70 out of every 200 head of cattle (CI, 2012e, p. 24). Without strong state-level support for the Missiriya migration inside Northern Bahr el Ghazal,
and a lessening of the hostility felt by the Malual Dinka, it is difficult to envis-age a workable Missiriya migration during the 2012–13 grazing season. While very few Missiriya pastoralists migrated to Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrawa, one of the traditional destinations of the Missiriya, did see Missiriya traders arrive.
Towns like Warrawa played an important role during the second civil war.
While access to major towns was blocked, SPLA garrisons, like Warrawa, were privileged sites for trade with Northern merchants. However, following the closing of the Sudan–South Sudan border in 2011, it is precisely these towns—
located close to Sudan and along major transport routes—that have suffered the most from the GoS-imposed trade blockade. In Warrawa, there was a dra-matic increase in the price of a jerry can from 2 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) in 2011 to 13 SSP in 2012.89 At the beginning of 2012, while the route from Nyala to Kiir Adem and on to Gokk Machar remained open, the road through to Warrawa and Wanjok was closed.
Unlike in parts of Upper Nile, trade was still possible in Northern Bahr el Ghazal following the border closure in 2011. Supplies were being smuggled in by motorbike from Meiram, and the road to Kiir Adem was still open in July 2013. However, merchants in several border towns expressed anxiety about the amount smugglers would be able to bring during the rainy season. Supplies were still coming through as of January 2013, albeit in reduced quantities.90 The passage of goods from the North really dried up after the conflict in Hejlij in April 2012, when it was made a criminal offence to bring commercial goods into South Sudan. Several Rizeigat and Missiriya vehicles were stopped, and the drivers were arrested. Nevertheless, while the trade axis running through Meiram is shut down, goods are now coming up from Uganda and Kenya through Juba. Because the SPLA control Kiir Adem and positions just to its north, it is relatively easy to acquire goods from Sudan. However, it is unlikely that this would continue to be the case if the SPLA retreated from the 14-Mile Area south of the Kiir. If the SDBZ was implemented, and the GoS decided to impose a trade blockade, the results could be disastrous for the Malual Dinka because the abandonment of Kiir Adem would leave smugglers struggling to get through to South Sudan.
The acute food shortage experienced in Aweil over the last year is not pri-marily due to trade blockages with the North, but is the result of a bad harvest.
Aweil Rice Scheme’s production fell 20%, and the sorghum harvest declined by 34% (Gurtong, 2012a). Northern Bahr el Ghazal state has received a large number of returnees, further compounding the food problem; food prices have skyrocketed, with the price of a bag of onions increasing around 500% from 2011 to 2012.