In the first half of 2011, the security situation in Mayom county was explosive, with several Bul Nuer commanders leading insurgencies against the SPLM.
In April 2011, Bul Nuer commanders came together in a Unity state-centered alliance, the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A),191 under Gadet,192 a former SSDF commander answering to Paulino Matiep. Shortly after founding the SSLM/A, Gadet issued the Mayom Declaration, which accused the SPLM of tribalism, and also alleged corruption within the government.
Gadet’s forces then launched a serious assault on Mankien, just south of the county capital, Mayom town. Another attack was launched in May 2011. During fighting around Mankien and Mayom town in April–May 2011, the commis-sioner of Mayom county, Charles Machieng Kuol, accused the SPLA of delib-erately burning down over 7,000 houses. While this allegation could not be confirmed, Amnesty International quoted multiple civilian witnesses saying the SPLA deliberately torched houses (AI, 2012, p. 13). Such actions, if confirmed, will widen the rift between the Bul Nuer and the state authorities and army.
After Gadet was reintegrated into the SPLA in August 2011, the other com-manders decided to keep the SSLM/A moniker and remain in the bush, with James Gai Yoach assuming the leadership. These fighters were involved in clashes in Mayom county on 29 October 2011, and elsewhere in Unity state in April 2012, around the same time as the clashes in Hejlij.
An incursion into Abyei on 26 May 2012 demonstrated that the SSLA was relatively well armed: the attack involved a force of 700–800 men with 60 vehicles, heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft guns. The SSLA’s dependence on SAF was clear: it was by negotiating with the GoS, rather than with the SSLA directly, that UNISFA managed to get the SSLA troops to withdraw. Bapiny Monytuil, at that time an SSLA commander, said in December 2011 that he had bought 10 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. This claim has not been verified.
The SSLA seems to have been based in and around Garasna, otherwise known as Kilo 23, between Kharasana and Hejlij. This is extremely inauspi-cious for the Missiriya because it was the site of a market until its destruction at the hands of Missiriya militias in April 2008. In Bentiu, local politicians allege
that groups of Missiriya stay with the SSLA at Garasna, and that they coordi-nated cattle raids in Sudan and South Sudan.193 Regardless of the truth of these accusations, they revealed the suspicion and hostility felt towards the Missiriya and the militias in South Sudan.
Puljang, one of the SSLA commanders and a Bul Nuer who left the SPLA in 2010, was reportedly based at Kelea at the time.194 But, by June 2013, he was with his forces in Mayom town, near one of the main Missiriya grazing sites in Mayom county.
In the second half of 2012, militia forces in Mayom county were on the decline and struggled to get supplies from the North. In July 2012, there were at least seven defections from Puljang’s group. The Sudanese army seems to be, at least formally, cutting ties with the SSLM/A, further isolating them. On 30 Septem-ber, just after the signing of the 27 September agreements, Sudanese security forces attacked Yoach’s home. The police arrested 75 people, but Yoach myste-riously escaped, lending credence to the theory that this was a deliberate effort to make it seem as if the GoS was stopping its support for militias inside South Sudan, in accordance with its obligations in the 27 September agreements.
However, it seems unlikely that the attack signified a complete break between the GoS and the SSLA. In August 2012, internal divisions emerged within the SSLA, and clashes took place between Yoach and Nyang, on one side, and Monytuil and Puljang on the other. Nyang was killed. After the raid on Yoach’s house, Monytuil assumed command of the SSLA (Small Arms Survey, 2012f).
On 24 April 2013, President Salva Kiir offered an amnesty to a series of mili-tia leaders, including Bapiny Monytuil. Shortly afterwards, on 26 April, the SSLA, including Monytuil and Puljang, announced they were to return to South Sudan and negotiate their integration within the SPLA, and then arrived in Unity with around 3,000 men.
Stakeholder positions The SPLM
At the beginning of 2013, there was still no agreement between Sudan and South Sudan over the status of the ‘claimed’ areas, including Hejlij. With nego-tiations deadlocked, there is little incentive for the SPLM to compromise. In
any event, control over the Unity–South Kordofan border is a priority objec-tive for the SPLM.
It is no accident that Kiir Adem, on the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–East Darfur border, and Jaw, on the Unity–South Kordofan border, have witnessed the most intense fighting between the two countries. Both are vital military bases posi-tioned on important supply routes. Moreover, both are crucial sites for the SRF, and enable supplies to move from South Sudan into Sudan. It is likely that March–May 2013 will see renewed fighting in these two locations, as the floods recede and the dry season reaches its peak, providing the best fighting condi-tions of the year.
Even if Jaw were not such an important location militarily, there are other reasons the SPLM does not want to compromise on the border. Long-held Rueng Dinka sentiment about its former villages (discussed below); increasing nationalism within Unity state; and the potential oil wealth of Hejlij conspire to make the Unity–South Kordofan border one of the most tense and disputed parts of the Sudan–South Sudan frontier.
With the potential for further fighting, it is likely that Northern pastoralists will continue to struggle to enter Unity state. Missiriya pastoralists, who almost always come armed, will be viewed as a security threat by the SSPS and the SPLA. Furthermore, even if the state government does make an agreement with Northern pastoralists, it is unlikely to be upheld on the ground. An agreement in March 2010, and another in Kadugli in January 2011, which guaranteed Missiriya entry with a minimal number of small arms, were not honoured;
SPLA units refused to allow the Missiriya entry. The lack of state control over military and political forces at the border means that formal negotiations will not be sufficient to create substantive changes in relations between groups along the border.
The NCP
As with other locations along the frontier, the NCP views the Unity–South Kordofan border primarily through a security lens. For the NCP, it is of para-mount importance that it manages to sever links between South Sudan and the SRF, links that run from Bentiu through Yida to Jaw. To do this, the NCP is trying to get the SPLM to implement the 27 September Addis Ababa agreements, and
it has also carried out relatively continuous air and ground campaigns against Jaw since 2011—a combination of diplomatic and military strategies. Given the NCP’s single-minded focus on security, it is unlikely it would be willing to compromise on locations such as Hejlij. Furthermore, since South Sudan’s seces-sion took some of Sudan’s oil wealth away, extant oil production sites, like Hejlij, have become even more important to the country’s economy.
Finally, an NCP compromise on the border is rendered almost impossible by the changing ethnic dynamics of Sudan’s internal conflict. Frustrated by years of empty promises, the Missiriya are increasingly turning away from the NCP.
Shortly after the occupation of Hejlij, Missiriya politicians from the NCP tried to get the Missiriya PDF to move against the occupying SPLA/JEM forces. The Missiriya refused, saying those who fought and died for the government were not recognized as martyrs, and their families had not received compensation (ICG, 2013). A second recruitment drive in South Kordofan failed because the Missiriya said there were now Missiriya fighting with the SRF, and they did not want to get involved in internal clashes. The NCP will increasingly need to look for ways to convince the Missiriya to return to their sponsorship.