Building a New Alliance Military Structure
Section 2
1. Operational Command (OPCOM) The authority exercised by a commander to a subordinate unit in order to carry out an operational mission.
2. Operational Control (OPCON) The authority delegated to a commander to carry out a mission or task as specified in an operational plan or operational order.
3. Nunn-Warner Amendment This refers to the bill that contained the U.S. Congress' proposal regarding ROK-U.S. relations, which was added to an existing bill that had been submitted to Congress for approval of the U.S. defense budget and regulation of the number of troops for the years 1990-1991.
4. East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) A report submitted to the U.S. Congress by the U.S. Department of Defense in compliance as requested under the Nunn-Warner Amendment (submitted on three occasions: 1990, 1991, and
Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military Structure
81
During the 13th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting5 in November WKHWZRQDWLRQVDJUHHGWRUHWXUQSHDFHWLPH23&21WRWKH52.
EHWZHHQDQGDQGWRGLVFXVVZDUWLPH23&217UDQVLWLRQDIWHU ,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWKSHDFHWLPHRUGXULQJDUPLVWLFH23&21ZDV transferred to the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the HQGRI&XUUHQWO\WKH&)&&RPPDQGHUH[HUFLVHVZDUWLPH23&21 as well as Combined Delegated Authority.6 The evolution of operational control is shown in Figure 4-1.
2. Wartime OPCON Transition Timeline 2005-Present
Since the ROK Minister of National Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to 'appropriately accelerate discussions on wartime OPCON Transition' during the 37th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2005, the discussions have gained momentum.
During the ROK-U.S. Summit in September 2006, the two Presidents agreed to the basic principle that Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) would, indeed, be transferred. At the 38th SCM in October of the same year, the two heads of national defense agreed on the 'Roadmap for the New
5. ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM)
The highest body for military cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. and in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior general and flag officers participate.
6. Combined Delegated Authority (CODA)
The authority delegated to the CFC Commander during peacetime for exercise over units of the Korean forces placed under wartime OPCON.
It encompasses six areas: combined crisis management, operational plans establishment, combined exercises, combined joint doctrines development, ROK-U.S. combined intelligence management, and C4I interoperability.
Figure 4-1. Changes in Operational Control
1950. 7. 14.
ⶺ President Syngman Rhee transfers OPCOM to the UN Commander.
ⶺ UN Commander is given OPCON.
ⶺ CFC is established; OPCON is transferred to the CFC Commander.
ⶺ Peacetime operational control is transferred to the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ⶺ ROK-U.S. Summit Talks in which OPCON Transition is agreed.
ⶺ ROK Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense agree to the timing (April 17, 2012) for wartime OPCON Transition.
ⶺ ROK-U.S. agree on the Strategic Transition Plan.
ⶺ ROK-U.S. Summit Talks in which the two nations agree to adjust the timing of transition by the end of 2015.
Alliance Military Structure in the post-OPCON Transition Era' (Roadmap).
The agreement included a plan to disestablish the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and complete the wartime OPCON Transition to the 52.IRUFHVDIWHU2FWREHUEXWQRODWHUWKDQ0DUFK
In January 2007, the permanent ROK-U.S. Military Committee (MC) signed the 'TOR on the Operation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Implementation Working Group,'7ZKLFKZDV¿QDOL]HGLQD)HEUXDU\
agreement during the Defense Ministerial Meetings, to complete wartime OPCON Transition on April 17, 2012. In accordance with this agreement, the Combined Implementation Working Group (CIWG) was formed to establish a Strategic Transition Plan (STP) to transfer wartime OPCON from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; in June 2007, the plan was signed by the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK).
The ROK and the U.S. formed a joint verification group comprised of H[SHUWVDQGGXULQJWKH8)*H[HUFLVHLQWKHJURXSYHUL¿HGWKHVWDWXV of the preparations being made for wartime OPCON Transition and the initial operational capabilities (IOC)8 of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
7. TOR on the Operation of the ROK-U.S.
Combined Implementation Working Group (CIWG)
TOR signed on January 19, 2007, between the ROK and the U.S.
regarding the basic elements (purpose, principle, key players, milestone, etc.) required for the study and report of command relationships, such as the wartime OPCON Transition.
8. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) verification
This refers to the confirmation and evaluation of definitive operational concepts and the extent of achievement of the required operational capabilities regarding newly acquired weapons systems to be deployed in the field, and the extent of readiness of developed fielded support elements.
Scene after tank combat training during the UFG Exercises in 2010 (August 2010) Agreement on the Strategic Transition
Plan (STP) for the implementation of the wartime OPCON Transition (Seoul, June 2007)
Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military Structure
83
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Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting.
The Strategic Transition Plan that the ROK and the U.S. had initially agreed upon was replaced by the Change Two of the Strategic Transition Plan (March 2010), which was prepared based on the supplementary requirements brought to light when the new combined defense system was applied during the UFG exercise.
On June 26, 2010, the Presidents of the ROK and the U.S. agreed to the stable management of security on the Korean Peninsula, assurance of an internally stable wartime OPCON Transition, and the deferral of the wartime OPCON Transition from April 17, 2012, to the end of 2015, in order to alleviate national concerns regarding security issues. This agreement was followed by the ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (2 + 2) of the ROK and the U.S. to discuss stable wartime OPCON Transition.
3. Backdrop and Significance of the Adjustment of the Date for the Wartime OPCON Transition
Throughout the years the ROK and the U.S. have kept a close watch RQWKHPLOLWDU\WKUHDWSRVHGE\1RUWK.RUHDDQGKDYHMRLQWO\YHUL¿HGDQG evaluated the progress of the wartime OPCON Transition. In the process, they became aware of the need to adjust the timing of the transition in light of the increased threat of North Korea and other changes in the security environment. Consequently, the ROK Government requested that the U.S.
Government adjust the timing of wartime OPCON Transition. The backdrop to this is as follows:
First, there has been an increased uncertainty around the security and instability on the Korean Peninsula, including the rise of the North Korean threat. North Korea has continued with its development of nuclear and ballistic missiles and has increased the risk of threat of military provocation through incidents such as the ROKS Cheonan attack, and consequently, the 6RXWK1RUWK.RUHDUHODWLRQVKLSFRQWLQXHVWREHRQHRIFRQÀLFWDQGWHQVLRQ The instability of the North Korean regime is also worsening: the failure of currency reform, the worsening health of Kim Jong Il (the Chairman of the
ROK-U.S. Summit Talks (Toronto, Canada, June 2010)
National Defense Commission), and the attempt to pass power to his son (3rd generation power succession).
Second, the fact that 2012 will be a period of high mobility in terms of politics and security, with a change of leaders in several countries in the region, was taken into consideration. The year 2012 sees the occurrence of several politically sensitive events: general elections (April) and presidential elections (December) in the ROK, presidential elections in the U.S. (November), the fact that it is North Korea's target year for achieving its goal of becoming a "strong and prosperous nation," transfer of leadership within China's Communist Party (October), and presidential elections in Russia (March).
Third, over half of the Korean population wished for the deferral of the wartime OPCON Transition due to the unstable security environment. Over ten million people participated in the campaign to collect signatures, held in May 2010, in opposition of the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Based on opinion polls,9 over 50% of the people were against the wartime OPCON Transition or were of the opinion that it should be delayed.
Against this backdrop, the Governments of the ROK and the U.S., while respecting the decisions of the previous administrations, agreed to readjust the timing of the transition in light of the security environment and the general strategic conditions being demonstrated.
4. Major Content of the Wartime OPCON Transition
Wartime OPCON Transition signifies the transition from a command system centered on the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to a new combined defense system 'led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and supported by the US KORCOM.' The ROK and the U.S. have built a joint implementation system in order to achieve such a new combined defense system. The ROK and U.S. also selected detailed tasks in six areas and are systematically preparing for the wartime OPCON Transition:
commissioning a theater operation command system, inaugurating the ROK-U.S. military coordination system, establishing a new Operational Plan, constructing a theater operation execution system, establishing a combined exercise system, and building the foundation and basis for the
9. Opinion Polls
· The Munwha Ilbo (November 2, 2009)
· The Donga Ilbo (May 22, 2010)
Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military Structure
85
wartime OPCON Transition.
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Theater-level Combatant Commands to enable command of theater operations 'led by the JCS and supported by the US KORCOM.' For WKLVSXUSRVHLQ$SULOWKH-&6UHVKXIIOHGLWVRUJDQL]DWLRQLQRUGHU to be able to carry out the functions of a Theater-level Command. The USFK Command Headquarters is also preparing for its transition to the US KORCOM. The JCS Theater Command Facility is being built and is scheduled to be completed in 2012, and the US KORCOM theater command facility is expected to be completed in 2015, in step with the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP).
The second task involves ensuring the supported-supporting command relationship between the ROK and the U.S. and constructing a strong military coordination system for all units and over all functions for the HI¿FLHQWLQWHJUDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQV7RWKLVHQGWKH52.DQGWKH86ZLOO form various military coordination bodies and liaison bodies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the use of these bodies will be expanded even during peacetime.
The third task involves the development of operational plans through a joint planning system for operational planning during armistice and war and establishing a new operational plan to be applied after the wartime OPCON Transition. To this end, since 2008, the ROK and the U.S. have been establishing a new operational plan by setting up a joint planning system.
The fourth task involves the construction of a system that allows the JCS to lead theater operations. To this end, SOPs and directives for executing theater operations, crisis management systems, and an intelligence cooperative structure are being developed, and the ROK and the U.S. are also developing the Alliance Korean Joint Command Control System (AKJCCS) for their joint use.
The fifth task involves preparing a foundation for training exercises to ensure that the Korean forces are equipped with the ability to lead combined exercises. To this end, the ROK and the U.S. have been establishing exercise structures for pre- and post-OPCON Transition and developing their exercise planning and control capabilities, constructing new opposition force simulation facilities, operating after action review teams, and wargame models.
The sixth task involves providing the personnel, material and legal bases and the foundation needed to construct the new combined defense system.
6SHFL¿FDOO\SHUVRQQHOPDQDJHPHQWZLWKLQWKH-&6DQG52.86&RPELQHG Forces Command (CFC) will be improved in order to recruit human resources and replace the standards applied under the CFC, such as the Terms of Reference (TOR)/Strategic Directive No. 2 with the TOR/Strategic Directive No. 3 to be applied under the new combined defense system.
7KH52.DQGWKH86LQWHQGWRHVWDEOLVKDMRLQWYHUL¿FDWLRQVWUXFWXUHWR verify whether the preparations for the wartime OPCON Transition and the furnishing of mission execution capabilities are meeting their targets.
5. The Way Ahead
At the 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)10 in October 2010, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to the 'Strategic Alliance 2015,' which covers the main alliance issues related to the wartime OPCON Transition.
The Strategic Alliance 2015 is a comprehensive implementation plan aimed at creating stable conditions for the wartime OPCON Transition by successfully pushing ahead with the wartime OPCON Transition and all the related issues. A joint working group participated in by related bodies, including the defense and foreign affairs officials of the ROK and the U.S., will evaluate and verify the status of the alliance’s implementation through the ROK-US Security Policy Initiatives (SPI),11 ROK-US Military Committee Meetings (MCM), and ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meetings (SCM).
11. ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiatives (SPI)
A consultative group among the national defense and foreign affairs authorities of the ROK and the U.S. The top representatives of this body are the Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy of the MND and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia of the U.S. Department of Defense.
10. ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)
An annual consultative body held since 1968 in the areas of defense and security between the ROK and the U.S.
defense ministers.
Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK)
87
The ROK Government is making every effort to provide a stable stationing environment for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) and to promote mutual trust in order to solidify and maintain the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The two nations consult closely to ensure seamless implementation of the USFK realignment and the appropriate level of defense cost-sharing. Also, they engage in various activities to reinforce policy consultations and promote trust.