in Seventeenth Century Persia
By Willem Floor, Bethesda
I. A Critique
The study of the pohtical history of Safavid Persia is in its infancy, although
in the last decade important contributions have been made to that subject.
For example. Said Arjomand has analyzed Safavid religious policies, in
particular the anti-clerical policies of Safi I and 'Abbas II, the revival of
Sufism and the struggle between the 'clerical' notables (sayyeds) and the re¬
ligious jurists in the seventeenth century.' Whereas Arjomand has limited
himself to the interaction between religion and societal change, Kathryn
Babayan has studied the changing dynamics of religion and politics at court
during the 1642-1666 period, in particular focusing on the alleged conflict
between the royal slaves (gholam) and the Qezelbash tribal group.^ This has
potentially added an important dimension to the discussion of the Safavid
political process. But as Rudi Matthee has rightly argued that
positing a simple Qizilbash-g/;«/^tw conflict [... results in] a rather formal
and undifferentiated treatment of the fractured political order of late Safavid Iran, [and] has yielded little insight into either the stages of the conflict or the precise nature of the underlying interests. [... There] has been a lack of preci¬
sion in the evaluation of the role and function of key players in the [political]
process. In examination of late Safavid power relations, one looks in vain for
an accurate assessment of the role of the shah in contest between the military, the bureaucracy, and the religious estate. [... The grand vizier's] role remains as understudied as that of the shah.'
To correct this situation and advance our understanding of the problem he
has contributed, amongst other things, two studies on the career of two
grand viziers (Mohammad Beg and Sheykh 'Ali Khan).'' Both studies have
' Arjomand 1984, pp. 109-212.
2 Babayan 1993, pp. 75-147.
^ Matthee 1994, pp. 78-79.
* Matthee 1991; 1994.
indeed provided us with much information about the career and role of the
two grand viziers concerned and has improved our understanding of the
role of the grand vizier. However, there are still many issues that need fur¬
ther clarification, and this is what the first part of this note is about.
Although Matthee has rejected the usefulness of the g/7o/^i;w-Qezelbash
conflict as the defining phenomenon of the Safavid political process, he does
not totally divorce himself from this configuration. For he argues that there
was a triangular struggle among tribal, bureaucratic, and religious forces,
amongst other things for the post of grand vizier.' It is further his thesis that
the office of grand vizier increased in actual power since the reign of Shah
'Abbas I. After his death there was
rivalry between the ranks of the bureaucracy and the tribal elements that
constituted the traditional source of imperial power. The net result was that
that the grand vizier became a highly visible player in the contest between
the 'old' and the 'new' forces. A decisive moment was [...] the coup of 1645
[which] ended Mirza Taqi's life, but at the same time epitomized the triumph
of bureaucratic over tribal interests. Mirza Taqi successors, Khalifah Sultan,
Muhammad Beg, and Muhammad Mirza Mahdi were all exponents of the new
elite in being either ghulams or ulama. The appointment of Shaykh 'Ali Khan,
a representative of tribal and military forces, might suggest a reversal of this trend, but subsequent development were to show otherwise.'
As I have pointed out in earlier publications if you look at the Safavid politi¬
cal landscape during a short period of time one might indeed come to the
above conclusion. However, when looking at it from a much longer period,
say from the beginning of the Safavid era, then other conclusions seem more
likely. In my view.
The usurpation of the exclusive Tajik role by Qezelbash grand viziers after
1669 is a testimony to the successful absorption of the Turkomans into the
Persian administrative culture, and also underscores the persistence of bu¬
reaucratic and administrative tradition. Many of the grand viziers held and
exercised real power and this was not something that all of sudden emerged in
the 17''' century when weak shahs were on the political scene. One difference is that the strong grand viziers of the 16''' century exercised real power whether
there were strong shahs or weak-willed ones, and when the survival of the
regime was at stake.''
Thus, it would seem that the crux of the matter is whether these triangular
forces that both Babayan and Matthee believe dominated Safavid politi-
' Matthee 1991, p. 34.
' Matthee 1994, p. 81.
^ Floor 2001, pp. 23-40.
cal landscape are meaningful concepts. Whereas Babayan strongly argues
that there was a conflict between monolithic blocs, Matthee holds the view
that they were not. He concluded his study on Mohammad Beg with the
statement that, "His appointment can be interpreted as a clear example of
the rise of the ghulams at the expense of the Qizilbash forces and the ulama,
though neither of the two other parties was significantly diminished." How¬
ever, he does not adhere to Babayan's thesis of monolithic power blocs, for
he further concluded that, "Mohammad Beg encountered the most forceful
opposition from within the ranks of the ghulams."^
Thus, it would seem that there are broadly speaking three points of view.
One, which posits a clear-cut gholam-Qeze\ha.s\i conflict, another that sub¬
mits a triangular struggle between non-monolithic tribal, bureaucratic, and
religious forces, and a third one that implicitly rejects the usefulness of these
three labels. The very fact that there is no proper definition of the meaning
of the various labels (gholam, tribal, Qezelbash, etc.) or of the nature of
the Safavid political process in general indicates that this discussion is in its
early stages and that much work still needs to be done.
When analyzing the forces that were at work at court, one thing is clear,
most courtiers were interested to advance their own position. To get ahead
in the world they had to align themselves with other more powerful and/or
like-minded courtiers. If it is true that there really existed cabals that some
now label to be gholam, Qezelbash, tribal, bureaucratic, religious and what
not, then the goals of such cabals must have been at least partially realized
when a cabal won the most important functions of state. For this kind of
labeling of the cabals cannot mean that their interest was purely gratification
of individual interests. For if that were the case the labels loose their mean¬
ing, by definition. Thus, these labels are supposed to say something about the
political ends of the members of the cabal concerned. If that is the case, then
for these cabals and the changes in the power structure that they allegedly
brought about to have some meaning it must be possible to determine that
some of their political goals had materialized. When we look over the period
between 1629-1669, during which much of the so-called g/;o/i3OT-Qezelbash
conflict allegedly was fought, we need to be able to see differences. Not only
differences in persons, but especially in the composition of the most impor¬
tant state functions, and in the execution of certain policies, as well as in the
development of the underlying ideas that gave rise to these cabals.
So far nobody has been able to show any of these things. Certainly, there
was a change of individuals, but not a major shift in the composition of the
Matthee 1991, p. 36.
affiliation (i.e., gholam, Qezelbash, etc.) of the courtiers. In fact, Babayan
who has much made of this conflict has produced a table that is supposed to
prove her thesis. In actual fact, it proves the contrary, for it shows remark¬
able stability in the 'political' composition of the 'cabinets' that she has
studied.' One should, of course, take all court and administrative functions
into account, but these do not seem to show any significant change in com¬
position over time either.
Distribution of 'cabinet' functions
between Tajiks, Oymaqs, Olama and Gholams 1629-1666
Safi I Safi I Safi I 'Abbas II 'Abbas II 'Abbas II 'Abbas II
Khalifeh Soltan
Mirza Taleb
Mirza Taqi Mirza Taqi Khalifeh
Soltan
Moham¬
mad Beg
Mirza Mo¬
hammad Mehdi
Gholam 5 Gholam 6 Gholam 7 Gholam 3 Gholam 2/4 Gholam 5 Gholam 2
Tajik 5 Tajik 5 Tajik 3 Tajik 3 Tajik 4 Tajik 3 Tajik 4
Oymaq 3 Oymaq 1 Oymaq 2 Oymaq 5 Oymaq 6/4 Oymaq 5 Oymaq 5
Olama 2 Olama 1 Olama 1 Olama 1 Olama 2 Olama 1 Olama 2
Source: Babayan 1993, p. 320 (Oymaq = Qezelbash)
This stability was further enhanced by the fact that the Qezelbash, gholams,
and olama traditionally held on to certain posts and they continued to do
so throughout most of the Safavid period, because they often had become
hereditary.
Babayan's cabinets consisted of the following functionaries: (1) grand
vizier; (2) sepahsalar; (3) vakil; (4) qorchi-hashi; (5) qollar-aghasi; (6) to-
fangchi-aghasi; (7) sadr; (8) divan-hegi (9) ishik aghasi-bashi-ye divan; (10)
ishik aghasi-bashi-ye haram; (11) majles-nevis; (12) nazer-e boyutat; (13)
rish-safid-e haram; (14) sheyk al-eslam; (15) mostowfi al-mamalek; and (16)
mostowfi-ye khasseh.
Of these sixteen posts there was only flexibility in appointing members
of any of these groups to the post of (1) grand-vizier, (2) sepahsalar, (6) to-
fangchi-aghasi, (8) divan-hegi, and (12) nazer-e boyutat. The others were
all spoken for.'° We may leave the function of vakil out of the discussion
' Babayan 1993, pp. 313-320 (she also labeled Mirza Taqi a gbolam, which he was not.
According to her classification he should be a Tajik).
" Floor 2001, pp. 35-39, 42-43, 45-46, 56-57, 140-143, 172-173, 185-186; ibid.
2000a; 2000b.
because after 1631 there was not a vakil anymore in the Safavid administra¬
tive system until 1726.''
(1) grand vizier - free function (2) sepahsalar - free function (3) vakil - vacant
(4) qurchi-bashi - always a Qezelbash
(5) qollar-aghasi - always a gholam
(6) tofangchi-aghasi - free
(7) sadr- always an 'alem
(8) divan-hegi - free
(9) ishik aghasi-bashi-ye divan - Qezelbash - usually a Shamlu
(10) ishik aghasi-bashi-ye haram - Qezelbash of the Chuleh clan
(11) majles-nevis - always a Tajik
(12) nazer-e boyutat — free
(13) rish-safid-e haram - always a eunuch
(14) sheykh al-eslam - always an 'alem
(15) mostowfi al-mamalek - always a Tajik
(16) mostowfi-ye khasseh - always a Tajik
The phenomenon of the reservation of certain functions to certain groups or
clans also occurred among other court functions. For example, the master of
the horse in the 17* century was almost invariably somebody from the Zan-
ganeh clan. When the Qezelbash lost one of the important court functions,
that of master of the arsenal (jabbedar-bashi) it was not to the gholams, but
to the eunuchs, a group that so far has not been inserted into the cabal equa¬
tions. The above table also calls into question the conclusion of many scholar
that there was a "growing interpenetration of the political and religious es¬
tablishments under 'Abbas II", for which no shred of convincing evidence
has been offered.'^
The above does not, of course, by itself invalidate the existence of the
triangular struggle between among tribal, bureaucratic, and religious
forces, flowever, simply stating that there were such forces because people
belonged to elite groups such as gholams, Qezelbash, or 'olama groups is
not very revealing, if meaningful, at all. For example, Khalifeh Soltan was
a theologian ('alem). But, does his appointment reflect the growing promi¬
nence and visibility of institutionalized religion? If this were the case, then
his appointment really must personify "the growing interpenetration of the
political and religious establishment under Shah 'Abbas II". This logically
" Floor 2001, pp. 6-17.
12 Arjomand 1984, p. 148f.; Matthee 1991, p. 22; Luft 1968, p. 101.
implies that Khalifeh Soltan must have been a representative of the religious
class. If that statement is to have any meaning it cannot be that any 'alem is a
representative of the religious class, by virtue of being a religious scholar. If
it is to have real meaning then this presupposes that this class had a clearly
defined agenda that was representative of the aspirations of that class, and
that therefore any major leading member of that class might represent that
agenda on behalf of that entire class. We know that this is not the case, for
the religious class was divided by serious infighting. There was no common
agenda, and leading members of the 'olama fiercely contested one another,
even each other's qualifications.'' Also, Khalifeh Soltan did not appoint a
large number of 'olama to important functions or increased financing for
'olama and their projects significantly.
Mohammad Beg was a gholam, there is no doubt about it. But did he
represent gholam interests and what were these? Nobody has so far, to my
knowledge, defined these gholam interests and therefore they cannot have
had a representative either. Leaving this aside, one might argue that gholams,
without the existence of a gholam-speciüc political agenda, looked out for
one another, and favored iellow-gholams as against non-gholams. If only it
were that simple. Mohammad Beg, for example, was ousted not by religious
or by Qezelbash forces, but by a powerful gholam, in fact his own patron,
as Matthee has pointed out.''' His successor, Mirza Mohammad Mehdi,
clearly was an 'alem just like Khalifeh Soltan, with whom he had a family
relationship. Was he a representative of the religious establishment of which
he, as sadr, had been, until he became grand vizier, its formal head? I do not
think so, and nobody so far has provided any evidence to the contrary."
Finally, we get to Sheykh 'Ali Khan. He clearly was affiliated with tribal
forces; in fact, he had been tribal chief for some time. He was a Kurd, but
the Kurds were part of the Qezelbash establishment as is clear from the way
they were entirely and comfortably embedded in the Safavid administration.
Moreover, the Tarikh-e Qezelhashan lists the Kurds and the Lurs among the
32 Qezelbash tribes.'^ None of the non-Qezelbash tribes was appointed to a
national government function. But was his appointment a victory for tribal
forces over the gholams etc.? Matthee who has studied Sheykh 'Ali Khan's
career did not think so.'''
" Arjomand 1984, p. 148f.; Ja'fariyan 1370/1991; Babayan 1993, chapter three and Abisaab2004.
'■' Matthee 1991, p. 34.
See below, section III, for a biography of Mirza Mohammad Mehdi.
'^ Mohaddeth 1361/1982, pp. 40-44.
'^ Matthee 1994, p. 81. y^'tS3!ßÖ\.
Any change in pohcy over that same time period (1629-1669) seems to
have been determined more by the person of the grand vizier than by the po¬
htical agenda of the group that he supposedly was affiliated with, if not rep¬
resenting. For example, under the 'bureaucratic-religious' Khalifeh Soltan
there was persecution of Christians but this was also the case under the
gholam Mohammad Beg, while the latter's forced conversions were undone
by the allegedly 'bureaucratic-religious' Mirza Mohammad Mehdi. This
case of forced conversions does not seem to be a convincing example of the
often vaunted growing, but undefined, religious influence under 'Abbas II,
for which no convincing evidence is offered either. Why did these persecu¬
tions not take place under Mirza Taqi and Mirza Mohammad Mehdi? Prob¬
ably, because these two grand viziers had no personal axe to grind with mi¬
norities, and/or did not feel the need to gain political coin, being their own
man. Another example also shows that there is no direct relationship with
the grand vizier's alleged 'political' affiliation and his actual behavior, and
a case in point is that of the attitude of all grand viziers with regard to the
Dutch and English East Indies Companies, which was remarkably similar.
There was no letting up in Safavid pressure on the Europeans to make their
presence in Persia also profitable to the shah. There may have been a change
in manner and emphasis as to how this message was communicated to the
attention to the Europeans, but basically the message was the same irrespec¬
tive of the alleged affiliation of the grand vizier concerned.
Thus, it would seem that there is no clear change in concrete results on
the ground to be seen as a consequence of the alleged shifts in power among
the power groups at court. If that is the case then the use of the labels such as
gholams, Qezelbash, tribal, and bureaucratic are meaningless. I have argued
that earlier, but here within the context of a broader time period than in that
earlier study it is even more evident.
To get a better understanding of the role of the grand-vizier it is neces¬
sary to have a good understanding of the functioning of the political system.
The primacy of the shah was absolute; he was the pivot of the universe, the
shadow of God. The grand vizier was his chief executive. At court there
were people that belonged to societal groups such as Qezelbash, gholam,
religious, administrative, and eunuchs. So far many scholars have assumed
that the undeniable existence of these groups or forces also was used as mo¬
bilizing forces for political purposes. This assumes a group identity as well
as a kind of monolithic ideology and adherence to it. Moreover, it chooses
to ignore that this was not the case; not only was there traditional rivalry
between e.g. Qezelbash tribes, but even within one tribe as two civil wars in
the 16'*' century have shown. The religious group was not monolithic either;
there were among the dominant Shi'a group two major trends, shari'a-
orthodox and Gnostic-philosophical with many splits and differences even
within them. Even the gholams were not monolithic; they were drawn from
different groups such as Armenians and Georgians, which did not see neces¬
sarily eye-to-eye, but even between gholams belonging to the same ethnic
group there was fierce rivalry.'^ Thus, not only were these broadly described
groups not monolithic in outlook, they had no common political or other
goal either. Qezelbashism as a mobilizing force was on the wane, and
though it was still a defining factor towards non-Qezelbash it was not a suf¬
ficient one to exclude others.The term tribal or bureaucratic that is often
also added-on to any of these four abovementioned labels does not mean
anything. They are stereotypes that we all use on occasion for lack of better
terms. On top of all these inter- and intra-cleavages there was intermarriage
between all these groups thus further blurring the possible meaning of the
labels used. Finally, since 'Abbas I had suppressed Qezelbashism as an effec¬
tive independent power source and having created its counterbalance in the
gholams he and his successors pursued a policy of evenhandedness. Court¬
iers in most cases were not promoted based on their 'political' affiliation, but
rather on their family's 'claim' to a certain function or functions, for most
court functions tended to be hereditary. Only a few functions, such as that
of the grand vizier, were not 'reserved,' and most of its holders were selected
for the job based on their qualities, not for their 'political' affiliation. True,
a few functions were reserved for the Qezelbash (e.g., that of qurchi-bashi),
the royal slaves (e.g. that of qollar-aghasi), and the religious scholars (e.g.,
that of sadr). But these reservations were functional, for appointing non-re¬
ligious persons to the sedarat or a royal slave as qurchi-bashi would rob the
very essence of that particular function.
To better understand the role of the grand vizier it is necessary to de¬
scribe the context in which he functioned. This will allow to bring out the
profile of his interaction with other sources of power. The Safavid system of
government was built around the person of the shah, he was the Pivot of the
Universe. As I have argued elsewhere,
His authority was never called into question and never did anyone else develop a serious power base independent of, or in opposition to, the shah. As a result
political opposition and infighting only took place between members of the
power elite, both the military, religious and administrative leaders. However,
" Chardin 1811, voh 2, pp. 42-43, 150 reported that the Georgians despised the Ar¬
menians, and that they could not live together in one and the same village.
" See on the function of the Qezelbash in the seventeenth century Floor 2003.
one of the constants of Safavid political life was that the grand vizier as the
executive arm of the shah's authority was and remained the dominant politi¬
cal figure throughout the entire Safavid period. The fact that there were other
contenders for power and the shah's favor does not invalidate what has been
said about the pre-eminence of the grand vizier's position. On the contrary,
it confirms it, for the man to beat, so to speak, was the grand vizier, not the
shah. Therefore, there was a constant challenge of the grand vizier's position
by royal favorites and other powerful lords, who would try and weaken the
grand vizier's powers. They might even be successful at times in doing so, but
it was a temporary gain. For eventually the grand vizier would prevail, as long
as he enjoyed the shah's trust.^°
The Safavid political system was aimed to raise taxes, mobilize and maintain
an army, provide a reliable and secure system of communications, and en¬
sure public safety, with the overall purpose to guarantee the initiator of the
system (the royal dynasty) long-term, uncontested control. Therefore the
executive arm of the political system (i.e., the bureaucracy) was organized
in such a fashion that opposition to the shah was minimized, while internal
conflict among leading courtiers was maximized. James Bill and Carl
Leiden have argued that the Safavid administrative system was divided
into four major functional sectors: Royal Household (khasseh), State Orga¬
nization (divan). Military and Religious/Judicial Establishment. The major
cleavage was between the royal household (dargah) and the state organiza¬
tion (divan)}^ Bill and Leiden are wrong when ascribing to the military
and religious/judicial spheres certain goals of their own, and that they had
a degree of independence. The goal of the administrative structure in all its
aspect was to realize the establishment of the tenets of Islam, in particular of
worship and justice, and it was the shah's task to see to it that this goal was
achieved. His administrative organization served to assist the shah in being
an effective, just Moslem ruler. Any deviation from that goal was opposition
to Islam and the ruler.
The court was a complex of public and private spheres. The public area
consisted mainly of food storage and preparation, bureaucratic, textile,
and equipment facilities, and quarters for the palace staff. The private area
included the royal harem and other buildings where the shahs and their
women lived and amused themselves, and official buildings, which were
separated by a wall from this entirely private part of the complex and which
were used for all kinds of court assemblies. The court complex was more or
2° Floor 2001, p. 2.
2' This conflict between dargah and divan has been characterized by Barthold 1928,
p. 227 as the most enduring feature of Persian pohtics.
\
less self-sufficient, because almost everything (apart from food, other pri¬
mary and intermediate products) was produced in the workshops.
The royal household did not have a monolithic organization as Bill and
Leiden suggest. The court was organized as follows: (i) the staff necessary
for serving the shah, his court and its physical infrastructure, which was
under the nazer-e boyutat. This not only included an administrative and
accounting staff, but also the Mint, the kitchen and other food related ac¬
tivities, textiles crafts, and the library; (ii) the staff necessary to guard the
royal household and take care of its public relations and organization was
under the ishik aghasi-bashi; (iii) the staff necessary to guard and regulate
the royal harem was under the ishik aghasi-bashi-ye haram and the chief of
the harem eunuchs. The latter also held the treasury and as of the 1680s the
arsenal; (iv) the staff dealing with animals, for transportation and amuse¬
ments, which were under respectively the mir akhur-bashis and the amir
shekar-bashi; (v) the staff to divert the shah and his court had separate
chiefs; and (vi) specialized staff such as astrologers and physicians were
also under their own chiefs, whose task it was to look after the shah and his
family's personal welfare.^^
The grand vizier headed the state's administrative apparatus. As to the
financial administration he was assisted by the mostowfi al-mamalek for the
state lands and the mostowfi-ye khasseh for the crown lands. As to official
correspondence the grand vizier was assisted by the monshi al-mamalek and
the majles-nevis. From this description it is already clear that the division as
drawn by Bill and Leiden is incorrect. They equated the royal household
with khasseh and the state organization with mamalek, which is wrong. The
grand vizier was in charge of both khasseh and mamalek administrations,
while the royal household received inputs from both. The importance of
these two administrations has more to do with giving the shah more direct
control of the country's resource base; at the same time it served to weaken
the Qezelbash tribal forces that had twice challenged royal power in the 16'''
century. During that period these tribal forces had direct control of most of
the mamalek lands and enjoyed much more financial freedom. Although the
process to diminish their role had already started as of the 1540s, it was only
after 1590 with the critical reforms initiated by 'Abbas I that their power was
broken by separating the tribes from control over a fixed geographical area
and its economic resources and making them directly dependent for most of
their revenues on the shah.-^'
See Minorsky 1943.
See Floor 2001, chapter 1.
The Safavid mihtary were divided into four army corpses after 1590.
These were headed by the qurchi-bashi (head of the Qezelbash tribal levies
and the royal household troops [qurchis]); the qollar aghasi, head of the royal
slaves (mainly drawn from Christian Armenian and Georgia); the tofangchi-
bashi, the head of the musketeers, who were recruited from among the sed¬
entary rural population; and the tupchi-bashi, the head of the artillery, which
a specialized corps mainly used to carry out siege operations. Of these four
the qurchi-bashi and qollar-aghasi were the most important and they were
important political figures. Bill and Leiden are wrong in stating that they
were respectively attached to the divan and to the royal household.^''
As far as the religious/judicial establishment is concerned this was domi¬
nated by the divan-hegi where the common-law judiciary was concerned,
and by two sadrs (on for khasseh and the other for mamalek lands) who were
in charge of the religious judiciary and the entire religious establishment (all
endowments; all official religious functions; stipends, etc.). The religious
scholars, as long as they did not accept any official functions (few refused)
they were formally independent of the state apparatus, but it was also their
task to provide legitimacy to the shah's rule, and they did.^'
The division of the Safavid administrative system was on purpose, for
it created several separate nodes of power, and at the same time provided
for their conflicting interests. All officials, including the grand vizier, had
a 'shadow', who served as their counterweight and reported on them in case
of any signs of perceived treason and disloyalty.^^ By keeping these power
nodes not too fractioned and in reasonable balance as well as conflicts be¬
tween the holders thereof within bounds the system functioned effectively.
When this did not happen, as under Shah Soltan Hoseyn, the system slowly
became unwieldy and inert and failed to perform its vital functions to raise
taxes, mobilize and maintain an army, provide a reliable and secure system
of communications, and ensure public safety. As a result, it was obliterated
when it was challenged by a strong oppositional force in 1722. However,
during the mid-seventeenth century this patrimonial organization still
functioned well and effectively. In addition to its personalism and informal¬
ity, the overlapping of administrative functions
infused the bureaucratic apparatus with much doubt, uncertainty, and insecu¬
rity. [...] Although there was a more formal and official level of indexed offices
and bureaus, ... dominating these kind of organizations were individuals and
See Floor 2001, chapter 3.
" Floor 2000a; IBID. 2000b.
" Chardin 1811, vol. 5, p. 287; see in general Floor 2001, pp. 1-4.
personalities such as shahs, sultans, vazirs, and clerics. There could be no seri¬
ous attempt to relegate such considerations as tribe, religion, and patrimonial leadership to a position somewhere behind formal organizational facades.'^''
But can we dismiss or consider utterly meaningless the inter-elite clashes
and the interests of such constituencies? One would expect grand viziers
to staff state ranks with their own supporters. Apart from family members,
from which ranks were they drawn, from their own immediate elite group
or from across the spectrum of elite groups? If it can be shown that grand
viziers selected their supporters within the state apparatus mainly from
amongst their own elite group then it may be possible to identify Qezel¬
bash and gholam elite boundaries. If we are able to show that grand viziers
choose collaborators from among their personal network from and across
all social strata then these categories are completely meaningless. Matthee
has certainly made that point when he concluded his study on Sheykh 'Ali
Zanganeh: "by building a network of relatives and clients in high positions,
the vizier built a mechanism against the easy removal that threatened all
those whose power became the envy of rival forces."^^ However, whereas
the evidence for his relatives in high positions does exist it has not yet been
offered for his clients, nor has it been shown that these had been recruited
from across the social strata. Furthermore, why is it that eunuchs were able
to claim important state functions for themselves under Shah Soleyman that
hitherto had 'belonged' to Qezelbash emirs? It is not good enough to refer
to Chardin's observation that there was a kind a parallel government con¬
sisting of eunuchs and important harem women after 1670 or thereabouts.
After all, such a phenomenon is neither new in Persian history in general
nor in Safavid history prior to 1670. What made eunuchs all of a sudden
good candidates for such posts when that did happen in the mid-seventeenth
century, despite the fact that Qezelbash, bureaucrats, and eunuchs were also
fighting against other Qezelbash, bureaucrats and eunuchs simultaneously
and fiercely at times?
Can we explain all court appointments simply on the basis of personal
traits and dynamic ties to the shah, particularly when the shah's interest in
the exercise of power did not remain constant and had its ups and downs? If
this is so, then why should we determine the rise or decline of a vizier simply
on the basis of what the shah willed or not rather than on the basis of what
2' The above discussion is based on Bill/Leiden 1974, pp. 159-167. For a discussion of the concept of patrimoniahsm see ibid., pp. 104-123. See also Bill 1972, pp. 1-39 and Floor 2001, p. 31, where it is pointed out that 'Abbas II behaved arbitrarily on purpose, so as to create maximum uncertainty among his courtiers; see also Chardin 1811, vol. 9, p. 449.
2* Matthee 1994, p. 94.
other power groups willed at the time? Above, I have stressed the importance
of the element of 'functionality' as determining the appointments to many
important state offices. But isn't functionality partly at least defined by po¬
litical expedience and thus the need to balance the power groups within this
patrimonial organization? Why are they power groups if there isn't some¬
thing more specific to being a gholam as opposed to being of the Persian aris¬
tocratic, administrative elite? Although I have argued that distinctions be¬
tween Qezelbash, bureaucratic class, etc., seem irrelevant and uninformative
in themselves in the context where these have been used thus far, but what if
we can draw in other elements?^' We don't know what these are yet.'"
It is clear much work still needs to be done before the history of Safavid
politics may be written in such a way that there will be a consensus as to the
forces that shaped the political process. As Matthee has pointed out, there
does not as yet exist an historical assessment of the role of most of the grand
viziers, reason why it is so difficult to ascertain whether what has been said
about them and the political process that gave rise to them is tenable or not.
In his study on Sheykh 'Ali Khan, he has argued:
The challenge to the trend of strong grand viziers, and therefore to administra¬
tive dominance, was more specific and lay in profound changes in the Safavid
power constellation with which it intersected. Among those was the growing
prominence and visibility of institutionalized religion, reflected in the ten¬
dency to appoint chief ministers on the basis of religious propriety rather than
proven statesmanship. Both Khalifah Sultan and Muhammad Mirza Mehdi
exemplified this development."
The above quotation suggests that Khalifeh Soltan and Mirza Moham¬
mad Mehdi were a different kind of grand viziers than Mohammad Beg
and Sheykh 'Ali Khan. Is that a correct conclusion, and if so, what was the
nature of that difference? Were these two persons really a different kind of
grand vizier, and, if so, in what way? I therefore conclude these critical re¬
marks with an analysis of the careers of two grand viziers, Khalifeh Soltan
and Mirza Mohammad Mehdi, thus, hopefully, contributing another piece
to the historical puzzle that political development in Safavid Persia present.
" For example, the Qezelbash still marked off themselves from non-Qezelbash groups by wearing the Safavid taj. On this issue see Floor 2003, pp. 51-86. On the taj see Floor 1999a, pp. 277-289.
'° This critical note has benefited from comments by Rula Abisaab and Rudi Mat¬
thee, who do not necessarily agree with my analysis.
5' Matthee 1994, p. 79.
II. Khalifeh Soltan - Grand-Vizier To Three Shahs
(1624-1629, 1629-1632 and 1645-1654)
Introduction
Although he served three shahs as grand vizier very little is known about
Khalifeh Soltan, and consequently little has been written about him. Paul
Luft has a six-page chapter on Khalifeh Soltan in his study on the reign of
Shah 'Abbas II, but most of the text does not deal with Khalifeh Soltan at
all.'^ This does not differ much from some contemporary Persian texts that
summarize Khalifeh Soltan's tenure as grand vizier. One such summary
is but a string of flowery, well-meaning words that do not tell the reader
anything about his person or his deeds." To fill this gap in our knowledge I
herewith offer what I have been able to find about this grand vizier.
The Khalifeh Clan
Khalifeh Soltan or Sayyed 'Ala' al-Din Hoseyn,''* which was his given name,
was born in Isfahan in 1001/October 1592-September 1593." He was a scion
of a well-known Isfahan family of Mar'ashi sayyeds, locally known as the
Khalifeh sayyeds, who claimed descent from Qavam al-Din Mir Bozorg,
the sayyed who ruled over Mazandaran from 1358-1379/760-781.'^ One of
their ancestors, Emir Nezam al-Din, had been forced by circumstances to
migrate to Isfahan, where he had settled in the Golbar quarter. The family
later became known there as the Khalifeh sayyeds.'^ Despite its prestigious
descent from Mir Bozorg the family of the Khalifeh sayyeds was not yet one
of the most prominent families of Isfahan during much of the 16''' century.
The early Safavid chronicles do not mention any members of the family.
Quiring-Zoche does not mention them either among her list of the promi¬
nent families of that city in her study of sixteenth century Isfahan.'^ But the
" Luft 1968, pp. 86-94.
" For example, Yusef 1317/1938, pp. 259-260.
Astarabadi 1364/1985, p. 139 has Hasan rather than Hoseyn.
This date has been arrived at as follows. Khalifeh Soltan died in 1654/1064 when he was 63 [lunar] years old. The subtraction of 63 from 1064 yields 1001.
For information on this ruler and his descendants see Calmard. For the entire
genealogical tree of Khalifeh Soltan see Efendi 1369/1990, vol. 2, p. 50. For a partial ge¬
nealogical tree (up to Mir Bozorg) see Daneshpazhuh 1350/1971, p. 98.
" Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 928; translated into English by Savory 1978, vol. 2,
p. 1146; Nasrabadi 1361/1982, p. 15; Daneshpazhuh 1350/1971, p. 98.
Quiring-Zoche 1980.
family was eminent and wealthy enough to intermarry with local prominent
families. Around 1629 Eskander Monshi noted that, "The Khalifeh family
had held estates in the Isfahan area for generations.
The earliest member of the Khalifeh family who made an appearance on
the national scene was Sayyed Hedayatollah, who was a boon companion of
Shah Esma'il I. His son, Mir Sayyed 'Ali, who was also known as Khalifeh
Soltan, was one of the leading sayyeds of Isfahan. According to Eskander
Monshi, "Khalifeh Soltan is an outgoing, witty man who attracted the at¬
tention of Shah Tahmasp.His son Mir Mahmud Esfahani, also known as
Mir Shoja' al-Din Mahmud, was one of the most learned theologians of his
time and was listed among the most important sayyeds of the realm.'" Ac¬
cording to Eskander Monshi, he was
an extremely learned and shrewd man, well versed in the customary sciences,
especially the rational and philosophical sciences (ma'qulat va hikmiyat). He
has never lacked for students, and the poor and needy students and indigent
relatives, have always been provided for out of his own income.''^
The Reign of Shah 'Abbas I
The royal attention that the Khalifeh family had attracted under Shah Tah¬
masp I (r. 1524-1576) came to full fruition under the latter's grandson. Shah
'Abbas I (r. 1587-1629). The Khalifeh family was well-known, but initially
does not seem to have received the royal favor. It may have been that the
dispute about landed property in the old market of Isfahan, where 'Abbas
I wanted build the center of his new Isfahan, has something to do with it.
For a nephew of Mir Shoja' al-Din, Mir Qotb al-Din Mohammad, was one
of the owners of the properties concerned in the old market. Because of the
land dispute. Shah 'Abbas I decided to construct his new center at the Mey¬
dan Naqsh-e Jahan rather than at the old market.'*' In 1033/1623-1624 when
Qadi Khan died Mirza Rafi' al-Din, the son of Mir Shoja' al-Din Mahmud
b. Khalifeh Sayyed 'Ali, known as Khalifeh Soltan Esfahani, was made sadr.
" Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 1040; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1261.
Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 1, pp. 147-148; Daneshpazhuh 1350/1971, p. 98; Savory
1978, vol. l,p. 236.
Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 928; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1146; Valeh Esfahani 1372/1993, p. 421; Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, p. 201.
■•2 Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, pp. 1040-1041, 1013; vol. 1, pp. 147-148; Savory 1978, vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235; vol. 1, p. 236. For the text of Shoja' al-Din's endowment (vaqf) text
see Daneshpazhuh 1350/1971, pp. 98-105 (he made himself the manager of the endow¬
ment, mostly villages, and thereafter his male descendants).
JoNABADi 1378/1999, p. 759. On this construction issue see Blake 1999, pp. 17-27.
According to Eskander Monshi, the new sadr was an extremely learned man, and a person of integrity and charity.'*''
The honors for the Khalifeh clan would not stop there, for they also would
be extended to the sadr's son, Sayyed 'Ala al-Din Hoseyn. His mother was
not a Safavid princess, but from the well-known and prominent Isfahani clan
of Shahrestani sayyeds."*' The son did better than the father. On November
28,1607 (19 Sha'ban, 1017), he married the shah's third daughter. Khan Agha
Begom. Although he also wanted to be given the governorship of Tabriz as
a result of this happy occasion he did not get his way. It showed Khalifeh
Soltan's early interest in getting a function in the government administration.''^
Shamlu commented with regards to Khalifeh Soltan's marriage that he was
the leader of the men of learning (sar kardeh-ye hozorgan-e danesh), which
at the ripe age of 16 is neither very informative nor very convincing.''^ The
marriage was, of course, a significant springboard for the young sayyed's
career, and he would not be disappointed. For in 1033/1623-1624, 'Abbas I
appointed Soltan al-'Olama'i Khalifeh Soltan as grand vizier (vazir-e a'zam).
One chronograph for the date of Khalifeh Soltan's appointment is: "One or¬
nament in the crown of the office of vizier." Another one is "Soltan, the Shah's son-in-law, became vizier."''^ The young grand vizier had been well schooled.
From early youth until his promotion to this high office, Sayyed 'Ala al-Din
Hoseyn had devoted his life to study and scholarship. He was fully schooled
in the fonun-e 'olum as well as in the qavayed-e 'osul-e din. His expertise in
accountancy also was quite well developed.""
It is not known why 'Abbas I selected both father and son for such high
government posts. His father was sadr and Khalifeh Soltan grand vizier,
respectively the highest function in the religious and the civil administra¬
tion, which was the first time that members of one family had been honored
with these two high posts at the same time.'° In view of 'Abbas l's policy of
'*'' Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, pp. 1013; Savory 1978, vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235; Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, p. 201. On the function of sadr see Floor 2000b, pp. 461-500.
Nasrabadi 1361/1982, p. 15. On the Shahrestani family see Quiring-Zoche 1980,
pp. 242-245.
Astarabadi 1364/1985, p. 139; Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, pp. 197, 205. According to Khatunabadi 1352/1973, p. 501, the marriage took place in 1018/1609-1610.
" Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, p. 197.
Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, pp. 1040-1041, 1013; Savory 1978, vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235, 1261; Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, p. 204. For another chronogram (zeybandeh-ye afsar-e vezarat) see Ma'sum 1351/1972, p. 58. When appointed as grand vizier he also received the title of Soltan al-'Olama. Efendi 1369/1990, vol. 2, p. 51.
Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 1090; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1320; Nasrabadi 1361/
1982, p. 15.
" Nasrabadi 1361/1982, p. 15.
embedding the 'olama into his administration to make them adherents and
legitimizers of Safavid royal rule it made sense to marry them to members
of his family. But would not it have been more effective to have another
'alem-szyyed from an equally eminent family rather than have two from the
same family? It clearly would, but we do not know why 'Abbas I took this
decision. Eskander Monshi reported that 'Abbas I reviewed possible can¬
didates and then choose Khalifeh Soltan, "who possessed all the necessary
qualities."'' It may therefore have been for as simple a reason that 'Abbas
I liked the young man or because he was good at doing sums. Anyway, one
year later (1034/1624-1625) the question was an entirely moot one, because
Mirza Rafi' al-Din Mohammad Khalifeh the sadr died. According to Es¬
kander Monshi, "He has been an ornament of his office discharging it with
piety." He died at Shah 'Abdol-'Azim and his son Khalifeh al-Soltan buried
him at Karbala, which at that time was in Safavid hands.'^
When Khalifeh Soltan became grand vizier Baghdad had just been cap¬
tured, the Armenians there were being persecuted by Shah 'Abbas I, and
a military operation to capture Basra was ongoing. Because of an uprising
in Georgia in late 1624, 'Abbas I had left to quell it. He had left his young
untried grand vizier in Isfahan. Just after Nowruz, on March 24, 1626, an
incident happened that "portended tragedy and turned to comedy". On
that day, "His 'Wazir' new to the ofiice", sent 200 soldiers to the convent of
the Carmelites. The soldiers searched the convent, bound the hands of the
monks behind their backs and beat them. Then they were marched away to
appear before the vizier, and they thought they were going to be killed. The
monks allegedly were thrilled that they were going to be martyred. The
vizier greeted the monks politely and asked them to sit down. He was very
upset about their treatment and threatened to kill the officer in charge, but
the monks interceded on his behalf. The vizier and his officials then began
to ask questions about the Christian faith. He then found out that they were
not "the Portuguese fathers", i.e., Augustinian monks, whom he had been
instructed to move to Shiraz, because of Portuguese actions at Basra, which
were considered contrary to Persian interests. He then let the Carmelites go
and had the Augustinians courteously fetched who had to leave to Shiraz
where they stayed till well into 1627."
According to Tonakabuni, Khalifeh Soltan went on the hajj pilgrim¬
age during his tenure as grand vizier, which seems highly unlikely. Equally
unlikely is the anecdote related by Tonakabuni that on Khalifeh Soltan's
51 Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, pp. 1040-1041,1013; Savory 1978, vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235.
" Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 1040; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1261.
" Anonymous 1939, vol. 1, pp. 281-282, 271.
return 'Abbas I heard that his grand vizier had not performed a highly
recommended ritual, the harvaleh. 'Abbas I allegedly considered such an
omission arrogant and forced Khalifeh Soltan to don a dervish cloak with
an axe (tabarzin) on his shoulder and perform the harvaleh in the Meydan-e
Naqsh-e Jahan in front of the shah and his court.'''
There are no other facts known about how Khalifeh Soltan went about
being grand vizier, for we know next-to-nothing about his activities as
grand vizier under 'Abbas I. Why is it that? The most obvious explanation
is that 'Abbas I dominated court and political life so much and carried on
business with foreign ambassadors and visitors himself rather than delegat¬
ing this to his grand vizier. However, this is only part of the explanation.
For Herbert and Stodart, two members of the English embassy led by
Sir Dodmore Cotton, mentioned other important courtiers (Mohammad
'Ali Beg; Emam Verdi Khan) whom they had contact with." Moreover, on
January 8, 1629 the dominant 'Abbas I had died and Khalifeh Soltan was
one of the most important magnates in the country. Nevertheless, the Dutch
ambassador Jan Smidt, who arrived at the Safavid court just after 'Abbas Fs
death, mentioned having contacts with several important courtiers (Moham¬
mad 'Ali Beg; Emam Verdi Khan), but not with the grand vizier. The latter
is not mentioned either in the VOC correspondence during the 1624-1632
period.'^ Khalifeh Soltan is not further mentioned either in the published ac¬
counts of the Carmelites and of other Catholic monks during that period.'^
Was it because he preferred not to have any contacts with Christians or was
there another reason? I do not know and have not been able to find any in¬
dication for his quasi-absence from the political scene. The only reason that
I can think of is his relative youth. In 1629, he was about 33 solar years old,
but it seems unlikely that this was a handicap.
Whatever the reasons were, Eskander Monshi reported at the end of
'Abbas l's life that Soltan al-'Olama'i and Dastur al-Vozara'i Khalifeh Soltan
had "assumed the office of vizier with full authority. He was a sayyed of
high rank and a scholar of fine character. He had acquired great competence
in accountancy, and his sound judgment enabled him to make great progress
in the office of vizier. His mastery of accountancy was such that the records
''' Tonakabuni 1364/1985, p. 268 {harvaleh is a pace adopted by hajj pilgrims at
Mecca). Babayan's (1993, pp. 73-74) exegesis of this anecdote is not evident to me.
" Herbert 1929; Stodart 1935, q.v. index (Imam Quli Khan and Muhammad 'Ali
Beg).
5' Dunlop 1930. For a Persian translation of Jan Smidt's travel account see Floor 1978, pp. 60-113.
" Anonymous 1939; Pacifique de Provins 1939.
kept during his incumbency are free from error. He has brought distinction to the office of vizier, which he stiU holds."'^
The Reign of Safi I
When 'Abbas I died his succession had not been arranged. There were
various candidates, each with their own supporters. Khalifeh Soltan, who
was with 'Abbas I when he died, went post-haste to Isfahan and was one of
the people stating that, "the late Shah had proclaimed Sam Mirza his heir-
apparent.After Sam Mirza's accession to the throne as Safi I, Khalifeh
Soltan remained in function and was considered as one of the trusted stal¬
warts of the court (mo'tamadan-e dargah).^° Shah Safi I bestowed upon
him many favors including the traditional gem-studded pen-case, the sign
of his confirmation as grand vizier.^' Khalifeh Soltan kept a number of
'olama attached to his establishment, such as Soltan Jaber the father of
'Abdol-Hey Razavi Kashani, while he also received them in his meetings
and paid great respect to them.^^ On one occasion Safi I allegedly said
to Khalifeh Soltan that the reason that Soltan Jaber gathered 'olama and
others around him on Friday was because he wanted to be appointed as
Emam-e Jom'eh. At that time, when he wanted to begin to recite the khot-
beh Khalifeh Soltan told him that he had to recite the noon prayer instead
of the Friday prayer, showing that Khalifeh Soltan was on the more con¬
servative side of that issue.
Although the succession had been relatively smooth there still were prob¬
lems among the various power groups at court, some of which felt that their
candidate should have become shah. Whether that was really true or not,
that is what Safi I thought. After one of the women in the harem had made
an attempt to poison him, allegedly to substitute him with another Safavid
male scion, Safi I reacted quickly and brutally. A number of leading court¬
iers who had married into the Safavid royal house, were killed as were their
male children. A number of women in the harem also were killed. Khalifeh
Soltan was dismissed on February 14, 1632/1633 Rajab 1041, while his four
5* Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, p. 1090; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1320.
5' Monshi 1350/1971, vol. 2, pp. 1075-1076; Savory 1978, vol. 2, p. 1302; Esfahani 1368/1989, p. 33; Yusef 1317/1938, p. 6.
'■° Esfahani 1368/1989, pp. 33, 40.
" Esfahani 1368/1989, p. 47.
" Ja'fariyan 1370/1991, pp. 339-340.
" Ja'fariyan 1370/1991, p. 342; Mirza 1379/2000, pp. 40-41. On the Friday prayer issue see Newman 2000, pp. 34-52.
454 Willem Floor
sons born to a Safavid princess were blinded.^'' He was ordered to stay at
home and not to interfere in government business anymore. Nevertheless,
the shah declared that the trust and devotion of Khalifeh Soltan towards
him was so great, that the latter would have killed his own children himself
without hesitation, if he had ordered it.^'
After his house arrest, Khalifeh al-Soltan spent much of the reign of Shah
Safi I in Qom, where he devoted his time to religious studies writing "havashi
va ta'liqat on important books such as Sharh-e Mokhtasar-e Osul".^^ Ac¬
cording to Efendi, Safi I recalled Khalifeh Soltan after a period of time to
Isfahan.^'' This is what one would expect, otherwise it cannot be explained
why Shah 'Abbas II had chosen him as grand-vizier the day after the mur¬
der of his predecessor when he had only just returned from a pilgrimage to
Mecca. The 'Abbas Nameh clearly infers that Khalifeh Soltan felt that there
was more in store for him than religious studies and that he knew that the
shah would have a need for him.'^ This hope may have been fed by the fact
that Sheykh 'Ali Naqi Kamira'i, qadi of Shiraz and later Sheykh al-Eslam
of Isfahan under 'Abbas II, expressed some resentment in one of his works
that after Khalifeh Soltan's dismissal the kingdom was not administered
anymore by an 'alem, but by a courtier.^' Khalifeh Soltan probably returned
to Isfahan by 1639. This may be inferred from the fact that Khalifeh Soltan's
made a translation of the Taqvim-e Boldan for Shah Safi I in 1050/1640-1641.
Whether this was done at the shah's request or at his own initiative to bring
himself to the shah's attention is not known.^° But it may explain why in the
short write-up of the grand viziers of Safi l's reign, the Dheyl devoted some
lines of flattery to Soltan al-'Olama va Mofakhkhar al-Omara Khalifeh
Soltan, indicating that he had become a persona grata once again.
Esfahani 1368/1989, p. 126; Yusef 1317/1938, p. 90; Valeh Esfahani 1380/2001, pp. 104-108; Efendi 1369/1990, p. 52; Mirza 1379/2000, pp. 80-81.
" Esfahani 1368/1989, p. 126; Yusef 1317/1938, p. 90; Rettelbach 1978, p. 111.
Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 66; Efendi 1369/1990, vol. 2, pp. 55-56 (Hashiyeb-ye Sbarb-e Mokbtasar-e 'Azudi and Hashiyeh-ye Sayyed Sharif Jor jani) as well as other texts that are hsted, some of which have appeared in print. Nasrabadi 1361/1982, p. 15; Fasa'i 1378/1999, vol. 1, p. 480; Khvansari Esfahani 2537/1978, vol. 3, p. 156; Tonakabuni 1364/1985, pp. 268-269. For another list of Khalifeh Soltan's writings see Tabrizi Modar- RESi 1331/1952, vol. 2, pp. 214-215 (this text also mentioned that for some time, probably during his 'retirement' in Qom, that he had vision problems with both his eyes).
'7 Efendi 1369/1990, vol. 2, p. 52; Khvansari Esfahani 2537/1978, vol. 3, p. 155.
'•^ Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 68.
Babayan 1993, p. 136.
^° Ja'fariyan 1372/1993, p. 413.
Yusef 1317/1938, pp. 259-260.
The Reign of 'Abbas II
Khahfeh Sohan completed a Persian abridgement of the Akhlaq-e Naseri
by Khvajeh Naseri Tusi for 'Abbas II in 1051 (1641/1642), thus right after
the shah's accession to the throne. Khalifeh Soltan's presence in Isfahan was
important because people once again took note of him. Even his temporary
absence on the hajj pilgrimage via Iraq, probably in 1644-1645, did not di¬
minish his chances. For on October 12, 1645 one day after the assassination
of Mirza Taqi, the grand vizier,''-^ 'Abbas II appointed Khalifeh Soltan as his
successor. According to the Dutch merchant Winninx, who was in Isfahan
for negotiations with the royal court.
He first refused to accept the post claiming to be too old and not competent
enough to carry out the task. However, everybody expected him to accept
the function. Ghalifeh solthan was universally liked and considered to be an
upright person.
Jani Khan, the qurchi-bashi and killer of Mirza Taqi, told Winninx that
Khalifeh Soltan would be authorized to act as grand vizier two days later.'''
But before Jani Khan's prediction could be realized he and his co-conspira¬
tors were killed at 'Abbas II's order. On October 16, if not earlier, Khalifeh
Soltan was already active as grand vizier, and the Dutch were in regular
contact with him about the commercial conflict that had arisen between the
VOC and the shah. In fact, the Abbas Nameh implies that Khalifeh Soltan
was also actively involved in the clean-up operation after his predecessor's
(Mirza Taqi) murder.^'* On November 30, 1645 'Abbas II sent Khalifeh
Soltan the traditional gem-studded pen-case, "with which the shah signaled
^2 On this murderous event see Floor 1997, pp. 237-266. According to Shamlu 1371/
1992, vol. 1, p. 287 the date was 23 Sha'ban, 1055 / October 14, 1645. The chronogram for Khalifeh Soltan's appointment is: Again Soltan became Trusted of the State (Baz Soltan
E'temadal-Dowleh Sbod). Khatunabadi 1352/1973, p. 515; Valeh Esfahani 1380/2001,
p. 415.
Algemeen Rijks Archief (General State Archives or ARA), the Hague, the Nether¬
lands. Koloniaal Archief (Colonial Archives, henceforth cited as KA. These archives are
known as Archives of the Dutch East Indies Company or VOC since 1979, and have
a VOC rather than a KA number. ARA has files which indicate which old KA is which
new VOC number) KA 1057, f. 359-385, "Dagh Register gehouden bij den oppercoopman Leonard Winninx 'tsindert den 6 Julij anno 1645 dat uijt Gamron naer Spahan vertreckt,
tot den 24e November, daeraen volgende, als wanneer in gemelte Gamron wederom gear-
riveert is." (Henceforce cited as Winninx, referring to the dates rather than folio numbers for easier reference), s.v. October 12. On the function of qurcbi-bashi see Floor 2001, pp. 138-144, 152-154, 162-164.
Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 66.
that he had entrusted him with the country's revenues and was pleased with his service"/'
Several theories have been advanced as to why Khalifeh Soltan or some¬
one like him was chosen as grand vizier. Matthee has suggested that his ap¬
pointment was a victory of the 'bureaucratic' forces over tribal ones, while
Rula Abisaab has taken the position that it was a practical balance between
the gholams and Qezelbash interests.''^ As I have argued above, none of these
issues played a role. There were several power groups operating at court,
which all were jockeying for power. They had no ideological objectives, but
only very a worldly one, power. People on both sides of the aisle were from
the same social strata and even the same clan. Thus rather than juxtaposing
gholam against Qezelbash, members affiliated with both these groups were
found among the opposing factions.I think it is more likely that 'Abbas II
and those advising him wanted an experienced man to guide the state after
the upsetting assassination of Mirza Taqi and its aftermath. Khalifeh Soltan
had an excellent reputation, he was an experienced statesman, and because
he was universally liked he was the ideal candidate in those difficult times. A
similar situation that comes to mind is the year 1632, when Khalifeh Soltan
was dismissed as grand vizier, and his children as well as other male chil¬
dren of the Safavid female line were blinded or killed. This together with
other political executions created a climate of great uncertainty. At that time
Shah Safi I appointed Mirza Abu Taleb Ordubadi as grand vizier, who had
already been grand vizier (1610-1621) under Shah 'Abbas I. He was a known
quantity, experienced, and above brought some measure of normalcy to the
heated political situation.''*
Khalifeh Soltan, having just returned from the hajj pilgrimage''^ and being
in a pious frame of mind, started his government with a ban on wine drink¬
ing, prostitution and pederasty. The measures were in particular aimed at
coffeehouses and bordellos, which, except at Ardabil, were to be found in all
'5 ARA, KA 1057, "Extracqt uijt dachregister door den coopman Bastijncq in Spahan gehouden sedert 23 October tot 14en December 1645", f. 246-249 (henceforce cited as Bastijncq, referring to the dates rather than folio numbers for easier reference); see also Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, pp. 286-287; Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 65; Nasrabadi 1361/1982, p. 15. On this custom of the bestowal of the pen-case to the grand vizier see Floor 2001, p. 27.
^' Matthee 1991, pp. 21-22; Abisaab (forthcoming), pp. 168-169.
" Floor 1997, pp. 263-265.
See on these events, for example, Molla Kamal 1334/1955, p. 84; Esfahani 1368/
1989, p. 126; Yusef 1317/1938, p. 90
Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1, p. 284; Khvansari Esfahani 2537/1978, vol. 3, p. 155;
Molla Kamal 1334/1955, p. 100.
major cities/° Despite the fiscal loss that this ban would bring about 'Abbas II gave in to Khalifeh Soltan.*'
To further safeguard Moslems from ritual contamination, in this case by
Christians, Khalifeh Soltan had it publicly made known on December 3,1645,
that henceforth Christians were not allowed to have an open shop in the market
or elsewhere in the city to make a living making fur hats, coats, etc. that are
much worn here, and which were mostly made by Armenian Christians, and
that in the future only Moors [sic; Moslems] were to be engaged in this craft.
The next day, all Armenian fur-makers, most of whom were poor, and would die
if they were not allowed to work in their craft, came en masse with their wives and children to the Alij Cappij [sic; Ala Qapi*^], where the royal council daily
meets. Such were their lamentations and crying because of hunger and cold that
every Christian felt pity for them. On December 5, the Colar Agassij [Qollar
Aghasi]," who had been a Christian, took mercy on these poor people because of their lamentations. He advised them to write a petition to the shah, in which they
would request, as being the shah's slaves, to allow them to make a living or to
allow them to return to their homeland, or to request that they might offer their lives to him in Gods name, in which case he would see to it that the shah would get the petition the next day. On December 6, the shah ordered in response to the
foregoing that the said Christians on one side of the Meydan [Naqsh-e Jahan]
will be ordered to go to the other side to open their shop and sell to whomever comes to them; [further] stating to those who oppose this that whoever is afraid
that they will become unclean because of this work, may avoid their shops and
buy from native Moors, where they believe [the work] is the cleanest.^''
*° Floor 1999b, pp. 155-159; see also Chardin 1811, vol. 4, pp. 68-69 and vol. 7,
pp. 475-477 and Ja'fariyan 1372/1993, p. 41.
Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 72. According to Molla Kamal 1334/1955, p. 102
the loss amounted to 3,000 tumans per year.
*2 This is yet another contemporary example that the proper correct orthography of
the Turkish name of the main gate to the royal palace on the Meydan-e Naqsh-e Jahan is Ala Qapi or Many-colored Gate rather than the usual form of Ali Qapu (the High Gate),
which is wrong. See, e.g., al-Qomi 1363/1984, vol. 2, pp. 604, 607, 623 (Alah Qapi); Ole¬
arius 1656, p. 556 (Allacapi); Kaempfer 1712, pp. 180, 183 (Ali Kapi); Fryer 1909-1915, vol. 3, p. 61 (Alacoppe); Thevenot 1686, vol. 2, p. 80 (Aly-Capi); Chardin 1811, vol. 9, pp. 226, 433 (Alicapi); Sanson 1695, p. 39 (Alla Capi); Nasiri 1373/1995, pp. 33, 67, 70 (Ala Qapu); Aubin 1971, p. 70 (Alicapi); Bell of Antermony 1788, vol. 1, p. 115 (Alla- capy); Valentyn 1726, vol. 5, p. 207 (Aly Capi).
Siyavosh Beg (later Khan) was a hundred-man (yuzhashi) in the gholam corps. He
became commander of the gholam corps (qollar aghasi) in 1634, which post he kept till his death in 1663. In July 1637 he also became general (sardar) of Khorasan. Esfahani 1368/
1989, q.v. index; Yusef 1317/1938, q.v. index (Siyavosh Beg); Shamlu 1371/1992, vol. 1,
p. 283; Vahid Qazvini 1329/1950, pp. 58-66,114,135,137, 183. On the gholam corps see
Floor 2001, pp. 166-176.
ARA, KA 1057, Extracqt uijt dachregister door den coopman Bastijnc; Vahid
Qazvini 1329/1950, p. 72.
This seemed to have put the matter at rest. However, on December 9,1645 it
became clear that the problem was not so much ritual cleanliness, but rather
filthy lucre. For
the leaders of the Armenian community were clapped in irons and imprisoned
and falsely accused of having promised to raise fl. 40,000 [1,000 tumans] for the
shah, if they were given permission to work in peace next to the native [Mos¬
lems]. On December 12, the leaders of the Armenian community were released
and each one instructed to open a shop in his own quarter among their own
people. In short it seems that this new Douleth [sic; E'temad al-Dowleh, the
official title of the grand vizier] (who is of the family of the false Mahometh [sic;
the prophet Mohammad]) is totally opposed to the Christians; some Moors
spread the rumor that their wise men have stated that this kingdom is in danger of being conquered within a few years by the Christians and that is the reason why they try to oppress these Armenians or to convert them to Islam."*'
The matter did not end there. For in March 1646, the Carmelites reported
that, "Things are not going well at present for the poor Armenian and Syrian
Christians, because of a new Grand Wazir has been made ... he is a bigoted
Muhammadan, and antagonistic to Christianity."*^ This persecution of the
Armenians seems to be out of character, if we may believe Chardin. He re¬
ported how Khalifeh Soltan had intervened to thwart a son (Eghaz) of a rich
Armenian merchant (Shafraz) who had turned Moslem to become the owner
of his father's wealth. Khalifeh Soltan bought the father's property valued
at one million and later sold it back to them for the same price. Given the
fact that this must have taken place in 1638, it is more in character that the
grand vizier concerned was Mirza Taqi.*'' Moreover, elsewhere Chardin
reported that the grand vizier during the period that 'Abbas II was a minor
hated Christians. He was a devout Moslem, who continuously urged 'Abbas
II to make them wear a distinctive mark just like the Jews. 'Abbas II refused
this, however.** Any remaining doubt disappears in the light of what the
English reported. After his appointment the agent of the English East India
*5 ARA, KA 1057, Extracqt uijt dachregister door den coopman Bastijnc.
Anonymous 1939, vol. 1, p. 353. The Dutch also considered Khalifeh Soltan an
enemy of the Christians. ARA, VOC 878, Batavia to Gamron, 22/9/1654, f. 428.
Chardin 1811, vol. 9, pp. 43-44. Chardin learnt the story from the family of
Shafraz, and that it was supposed to have taken place in 1638, when Khalifeh Soltan was not grand vizier anymore. The doubtful honor of having made this practice enforceable goes to 'Abbas 1, who issued a royal edict to that effect in the 1620s. It may well be that Khalifeh Soltan had a say in convincing the shah to issue this edict, see Anonymous 1939, vol. 1, p. 288. According to the Carmelites, its effect was that between 1624-1654 some 50,000 Christians turned Moslem.
Chardin1811,vo1. 9, pp. 516-517.
Company, Mr. Pitt, called upon Khalifeh Soltan, who promised him that he
would show his favor to the EIC. "But since wee understand hee is an in¬
veterate enemy to all Christians, and soe hath already shewed himselfe unto
the poore Armenians above in Spa[han], endeavouring what he can to make
them turne Moores."*' Fortunately for the Armenians the situation changed
for the better thereafter, at least until 1656-1657, when another period of
persecution followed.'"
It is not known whether the ban on wine, prostitution and sodomy also
was settled with money. This seems likely given the fact that this was the
usual solution to these occasional royal bouts of religious repentance as well
as the fact that hard drinking, prostitution and sodomy continued almost
unabated under 'Abbas II and thereafter." Almost, because once again, in
July 1653, 'Abbas II decreed "that none whatsoever shall drink wine; and,
that this his commaund may be the exactlier kept, all wine was seized on
and spilt, and all vessels to make it in broken, no mans excepted". Although
the ban was strictly respected, the grapes were ripe, "which makes men sup¬
pose that this commaund will last no longer then the moneth of remzaune
[Ramazan], which will begin about four dayes hence."'^ The ban on wine
was repeated during the grand vizierate of Mohammad Beg."
In March 1645 (Moharram 1055), a few months before he became grand
vizier again, Khalifeh Soltan had made the hajj pilgrimage.'"* In Mecca he
had a good relationship with 'Ottaqi Efendi, the Sheykh al-Haram of Mecca.
The latter wrote about Khalifeh Soltan that, "he is a man of great scholarship
and perspicacity, and the writer has had many enjoyable sessions of learned
discussions with him"." Khalifeh Soltan continued to enjoy a reputation of
being a learned scholar after he had become grand vizier. In a letter from
'Allami Sa'dollah Khan, the vizier of Shah Jahan, the Moghul emperor, to
Molla 'Abdol-Hakim of Siyalkot the former wrote that
it has been learnt from the news-reports received from Iran that Khalifa Sultan,
the highly learned wazir of Iran, posed certain questions on Imam Ghazzäli's
philosophy to Muhammad Faruq Mushrif und Muhibb 'Ali Waqi'a-nawis who
are both in Iran in the train of the Mughul envoy Jan Nithar Khan. Those two
boasters found themselves at a loss to reply. His Majesty has therefore ordered 8' Foster 1914, p. 43.
'° For the 1656-1657 persecution see Anonymous 1939, vol. 1, pp. 364-367; Moreen 1987; Floor 2000c, pp. 17, 20.
Floor 1999b, pp. 155-159; Shamisa 1381/2002, pp. 227-228.
'2 Foster 1915, p. 189.
" Brosset 1875-1876 [Amsterdam 1979], vol. 1, pp. 482-485.
'"i Molla Kamal 1334/1955, p. 100.
" Riazul Islam 1979, vol. 1, p. 179.
