Theoretical approaches to power in intimate relationships

“In reality, of course, income is earned by individuals, not households, and goods and services are purchased not by households, but by individuals” (Pahl, 1990, 120).

When analyzing social stratification, for example income inequality or poverty, social sci-entists often use the household as a unit of analysis. Research questions such as how income inequality between households develops over time or what kinds of households move in and out of poverty are frequently tackled in studies which measure social stratification on the household level. Although such an application makes perfect sense for answering these ques-tions, researchers are often not aware of the theoretical implications of research designs based on an inter-household comparison. This is due to the fact that while being used as a unit of analysis, the household is at the same time assumed to be a unit of action and the preferences of the individuals living in the household.

This theoretical assumption goes back to Becker (1981) and his well-known and often-cited work “A treatise on the family”. Becker states the following two main theses conceptualizing economy in the family: First, all of the family members have the same preferences, which are identical to the preferences of the head of the household (who is generally defined as the father). The common goal of all the family members is to maximize the household income.

Therefore, the household members will abandon egoistic action if this action risks minimizing the family income (Becker, 1981, 69). The household is thus regarded as one actor. Second, Becker (1981, 295) defines the individual income of the head of the household as the family income. He assumes that all family members have free access to this income and that all resources are distributed equally within the household.

These are rather strong assumptions when considering the fact that individuals, even though they belong to one family and live in the same household, may still have different prefer-ences. Furthermore, the access to the “family income” may not be as unrestricted and equally

distributed within the household as Becker expects it to be. Whereas in recent economic re-search the assumption of identical preferences has been criticized predominantly by applying bargaining theory, social research has questioned the access and distribution of incomes by applying social exchange theory, resource theory, and also gender theory. These theories, which contradict the Beckerian model by focusing on individuals’ interaction and bargaining over the distribution of resources, can be clustered into two main classes. One class encom-passes rational choice theories, i.e. social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), with the resource theory (Heer, 1963) and the equity theory (Grau and Bierhoff, 2003) as its variants, and the bargaining model (Ott, 1992, 1997, 1999). The second class implies norm-oriented theories such as doing gender theory (West and Zimmerman, 2002) and gender theory (Lorber, 2003).

In this study, a combination of social exchange and resource theory as well as gender theories will be applied to the empirical analysis of power in couples. Before discussing these theories in detail, their main assumptions will be presented briefly, in order to give the reader a general understanding of the theoretical framework of the study.

All rational choice approaches have in common the idea that each individual strives to maxi-mize his or her gain or accomplish personal aims. In order to achieve these goals, individuals employ their resources or alternative social relations. Exchange theorists define social struc-ture “as a configuration of social relations among actors” where relations involve the exchange of valued items (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992, 110). Nearly every social relation is based on social exchange. Individuals enter a relationship because they aim at a reward. In exchanges, they tend to maximize their utility by minimizing emerging costs. Although rationality domi-nates the actions of individuals, norms such as reciprocity or justice are fundamental elements of every social exchange (Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1964; L´evi-Strauss, 1964; Mauss, 1968;

Simmel, 1966). In order to get something out of a relationship, individuals have to make in-vestments. They either have to make an advance when starting a relationship, or they have to return a comparable resource. An exchange is just if the individuals’ costs are covered by their reward relative to the gain-cost ratio of the other.

Since each individual is in need of the resources the other has, a social relation is based on the interdependence of at least two individuals (Blau, 1964, 4). If one individual is more dependent on the other’s resources, there will be a power imbalance. Power is defined as a situation between individuals in which one individual induces the other to do something the other would not have done otherwise by manipulating his or her gains and costs (Baldwin, 1978, 1232). It is primarily exchange relations with third persons offering the possibility of obtaining resources with a better gain-cost ratio primarily that provide an individual with power. Alternative social relations are used in two ways to purchase power. First, they can be used as a means of threat in the relationship, in the sense that individuals are able to manipu-late the exchange by threatening the other to leave the relationship. This aspect is highlighted in particular by cooperative bargaining theory. Second, alternative social relations are sources of resources. An individual with more alternative relations also has more resources, and

vice versa (Emerson, 1976; Blau, 1964). Exchange theorists like Homans (1964), Emerson (1962), Ross (1921), Waller and Hill (1951) and bargaining theorists such as Ott (1999) define the interest in the relationship as another power resource beside alternative social relations.

According to the “principle of least interest”, the person who is less interested in the exchange will have more power in the relationship. “In any sentimental relation the one who cares less can exploit the one who cares more.” (Ross, 1921) The social exchange theory will be further discussed in Section 3.2.

Resource theory (see Section 3.3) is an application of social exchange theory to couples and – originally, married couples (Bahr, 1982, 83). Blood and Wolfe (1960) introduced resource theory into the context of a study on couples’ decision-making and, more precisely, on the decision-making power of married women in the United States. The main assumption of the theory is that the person with more resources has power within the relation. Here, power is defined as decision-making power. Heer (1963) extended resource theory by integrating the social environment of the couple. In his approach, the partners compare the value of the re-sources they obtain in the partnership with the resource value outside the partnership. The more alternative resources are available to a partner, the more power to manipulate costs and gains in the partnership he or she will possess. Since individual resources are perceived to be necessary for providing access to alternative sources, resource theory focuses on the consid-eration of the individual resources available to partners.

In contrast to resource theory, cooperative bargaining theory stresses predominantly the role of alternative social relations for the interaction of the partners. As mentioned above, bar-gaining theory understands alternative relations as a means for threat in a relationship. The bargaining model is an application of game theory to the household context. While resource theory considers decision-making statically, the bargaining model refers to the dynamics of decision-making processes in households. The household is regarded as a repeated game. It is assumed that individuals have varying preferences and that “each person knows the prefer-ences of the other people in the household” (Browning and Chiappori, 1998, 1243). In this model, individuals prefer one action to another if the expected utility of this action is greater than that of the alternative action (Chadwick-Jones, 1976, 28). Since cooperation leads to higher gains in repeated games, cooperative action is essential in households. However, every individual has the potential of posing threats of noncooperation. A family member who pos-sesses alternative sources (Ott, 1997, 49), is less interested in cooperation. Such a person has bargaining power and can influence the bargain according to his or her preferences. As in so-cial exchange theory, individual resources, in addition to alternative soso-cial relations, provide power in partnerships.

Even though the bargaining model is a formal model which cannot be operationalized within the research design of this study, it will be presented to encompass the theoretical framework of power in intimate relationships in a broader way. This is also true for equity theory, which highlights the role of norms for social exchange. Equity theory is an extension of earlier

justice theories on intimate relationships developed by Homans and Blau (Chadwick-Jones, 1976) and is used predominantly in social psychological research (Grau and Bierhoff, 2003;

Hatfield et al., 1985; M¨uller and Crott, 1978). Equity theory underlines the norm of equity or fairness in exchange relations. An exchange is perceived as equitable or fair if the exchange costs of the partners are covered by their gains (Sprecher, 1998, 33). Equity theory predicts that the more equitable a relationship is, the higher the satisfaction of both partners with the relationship will be and the more stable the relationship will be (Rijt and Macy, 2006, 1457).

In the case of inequity, even the privileged partner will be less satisfied, predominantly be-cause he or she experiences more guilt. As a consequence, both individuals try to restore equity. If this restoration fails, the final option open to the individual is to end the relation (Sprecher, 1998, 33). The cooperative bargaining model and equity theory will be discussed in detail in Sections 3.5 and 3.4.

A major shortcoming of rational choice theories, however, is that they do not account for structural categories such as gender, race or religion, and related social norms, which (re)produce social inequalities in society. According to these categories, which imply asym-metries such as male/female, white/black and Muslim/Christian, individuals are assigned cer-tain social positions by society. These positions determine the access to resources and al-ternative social relations – to crucial power bases. In addition, because power bases are the powerpotentialof an individual, holding power bases does not necessarily mean possessing power outcomes. Structural categories have an impact on individuals’ decision to make use of their potential and their perception of the power potential they have. Thus, considering such categories is crucial for understanding social relationships and relationship dynamics.

In intimate relationships, gender is a major “baseline category” (Lorber, 2003) which orga-nizes interaction between the partners, and the household a place where gender inequalities are reproduced. In this study, gender theory and doing gender theory will therefore be used to extend the rational choice understanding of power in couples (see Section 3.6).

While gender role theory accentuates the impact of social norms and values for the socializa-tion of individuals in certain roles, West and Zimmerman (2002) underline thedoingof gender in interaction. Individuals do nothavea gender role into which they have grown but have to produce and reproduce their genders in everyday life. And since gender is done, partners al-ways choose positions in the household which correspond to their gender identities (Blossfeld and Schulze, 2006, 29). In relationships where both partners are employed, the partners may strive to compensate this comparability of similar professional careers or incomes by con-forming to traditional gender arrangements within the household (Brince, 1994).

While doing gender theory accounts for gender on the micro-level of partners’ interaction, gender theory broadens the picture and includes the institutional and structural dimension of gender. Lorber (2003) argues that society, in order to organize itself, uses gender to (re)produce differences between individuals and to formulate rules and duties for men and

women. Gender as a social institution is used to create social differences. In this “socially constructed stratification system” (Risman, 2004), differences can also be detected on the structural level of society, e.g. regarding upward mobility in the professional life or wage gaps, and in the physical world (Goffman, 2001), e.g. separate toilets for men and women. In this setting, individuals do gender in two ways. Individuals adapt their actions to the gendered environment, but they also have an impact on this environment through their actions.

This interrelation of doing gender and gendered structure, that is the interplay between agency and structure, evokes Giddens (1984) and his duality of structure. Giddens’ idea of the inter-play between structure and agency is especially helpful because he assumes that social insti-tutions are internalized by individuals and social structure embedded in individuals. Hence, instead of thinking of agency, social institution, and social structure as separate levels of social life, all three aspects overlap, are internalized in each individual, and link individuals to each other.

Although rational choice theories and gender theories are generally treated as exclusive con-cepts, the explanatory power of the theories lies in their combination. Recent research on power allocation in German couples has shown that combining these two approaches enables a better understanding of interactions between partners (Lott, 2009). The actions of individ-uals, which follow rational choice, are embedded in gendered structures. Thus, individuals’

rational actions are framed by gender. Both mechanisms are working at the same time and might lead to gendered power outcomes. Perceiving power allocation within couples from these two complementary perspectives avoids limiting the complex nature of intimate rela-tionships and accounts for contradictions which occur in each and every partnership. Hence, it is not expected eitherthat resources and alternative social relations explain everything or that they explain nothing. Rather, it is assumed that they are related to power, while other mechanisms are also working at the same time.

A crucial aspect of power relations, which has not been mentioned so far, is that they change over time. Social relations are neither ahistorical nor static (Emerson, 1976). Due to the interplay between agency and structure, they change constantly. Power relations do change not only within society, but also throughout the individual’s life course and the “linked lives”

of individuals (Elder, 1985). Since the life course is structured by transitions from one status to another, e.g. from cohabitation to marriage or from employment to unemployment, transi-tions may especially affect power within partnerships. Analyzing the impact of transitransi-tions on power within couples is one aim of this study.

When considering transitions in the life course, the modern welfare state has to be taken into account as well. The modern welfare state indirectly structures the lives of individuals (Leis-ering et al., 2001). Individuals benefit from the welfare state if they adapt to its policy. The welfare state particularly regulates the life course of the individual within transitions from one status to another. When partners get married, a child is born, or one partner becomes

un-employed, welfare state policy implements its ideologies concerning family and employment (Heinz, 1991). Thus, gender is not only reproduced by individuals who interact with each other, but also by the welfare state.

In this study, we deal with the German welfare state who applies rather traditionally-oriented ideologies of the family and women’s professional lives. Thus, when analyzing the role of transitions for partners’ power allocations, we also deal with the policy of the German welfare state. It is important to note that the impact of policy regulations cannot be measured directly in this study. Rather, the role of the welfare state is used for the interpretation of results.

Hence, in addition to rational choice theories and gender theory, a life course perspective will be applied to the analysis of power within couples (see Section 3.8). In the following sec-tions, the above-mentioned theories will be presented in more detail. As explained earlier, the cooperative bargaining model and equity theory will not be applied in the empirical analysis of this study. However, they provide further insights into the theoretical framework of this study and highlight two aspects which are also crucial in social exchange theory and resource theory: the norm of justice in social relations and the dynamic character of power relations, and the issue of cooperation versus noncooperation. Thus, even though neither theory was tested empirically, they will be discussed briefly in the following chapter. Furthermore, ratio-nal choice approaches and gender theories will be brought together before discussing the life course perspective on power.