The division of labor and financial power: doing gender in couples

“second” income and/or is predominantly responsible for the household. In these separate spheres, financial decision-making would then be part of the household sphere.

Furthermore, cooperation is more likely either if she is employed full-time and her partner has a lower status or if he is employed part-time or not working. Similarly to the asymmetries in relative earnings, partners contain asymmetries in relative employment status through cooper-ation. Interestingly, the male partners seem to be more sensitive to relative employment status and financial power. This could be observed for both the positive relation to cooperation and to her decision-making. Thus, similarly to relative age, relative status seems to matter more for men’s perception of financial power.

But note that the results and the interpretation above should be considered with caution be-cause the number of observations is often very low. Since outliers bias some effects and since the bias is often related to unobserved heterogeneity, the hybrid model might account for this problem. Hence, the analysis in Chapter 12 will be interesting in order to investigate in more depth the relation between relative employment status and the financial power outcomes.

RRR are significant. The predicted probabilities for control over the income support the above findings. The division of housework mainly affects the ratio of cooperation and tion. If he has a higher share of housework the probabilities of cooperation and noncoopera-tion are reversed (Figure 19). This finding is in line with the previous results. Noncooperanoncoopera-tion – the separate system – is related to progressive gender arrangements. Similarly to the rela-tion with household income, the gap between cooperarela-tion and noncooperarela-tion is wider in the female than in the male sample if he assumes all housework. Moreover, the female partners perceive the start of the reverse of cooperation and noncooperation “earlier”: as soon as he has a share of around 80 percent. Again, women seem to be more concerned about matters of cooperation and noncooperation than their partners.

Interestingly, a greater share of housework is related to control differently for men and women.

Both partners perceive his higher share of housework to be negatively associated with her control. The RRR and AME are both significant. Her greater share of housework is a power advantage for women. The probability that she controls is higher if he has a very low share of housework. It is less probable that she controls if he has a greater share of housework. In contrast, his higher share of housework is not related to a higher probability of his control.

His greater share of housework is negatively associated with exclusive decision-making. The effects are significant for his decision-making only in the male sample. Men are less likely to perceive themselves as the decision-makers if they have a greater share of housework. Thus, while the division of housework matters predominantly for noncooperation and her control, more housework is a power disadvantage for decision-making. Since the predicted probabil-ities for decision-making do not vary with his share of housework and child care, the condi-tional effect plots will not be presented. Thus, the division of labor mainly has an effect on control over the income.

In contrast to housework, child care is a power advantage for male partners. If he has a greater share of child care, the chance that he controls the money is higher than that of noncooper-ation. This is also shown by the predicted probabilities (Figure 20). The probability of his control is slightly higher if he has a greater share of child care. In contrast, the chance that she controls money is lower if he cares for the children. Interestingly, the effects are only signifi-cant in the male sample. Both the RRR and the AME are signifisignifi-cant for his control, while only the AME are significant for her control. If they take over a greater share of child care, most of the men perceive her power disadvantage and their own power advantage. Similarly to the division of housework, his greater share of housework and child care reduces the likelihood of the female partners’ control over the income.

These findings can be interpreted as an affirmation of doing gender theory: since the male partner assumes a greater share of child care, he is more and she less likely to control money.

Partners allocate financial power in order to restore their gender identities. Male partners in particular perceive her power disadvantage in the case of an unconventional division of child care. Her power disadvantage if he assumes a greater share of housework can be interpreted

in the same sense: since he does more housework, she gives up financial power. Thus, male partners perceive themselves to be more powerful if they assume a greater share of labor. At the same time, they are less likely to perceive their partner to be the decision-maker. This finding could indicate that it is predominantly the male partners who cope with the violation of their gender identities. Surprisingly, such a coping strategy is not observable for the divi-sion of housework.

0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities

0 20 40 60 80 100

His share of housework

Separate She

He Pool

Her response Control over income

Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008

0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities

0 20 40 60 80 100

His share of housework

Separate She

He Pool

His response Control over income

Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008

Figure 19: Control over the income and division of housework

0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities

0 20 40 60 80 100

His share of child care

Separate She

He Pool

Her response Control over income

Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005 and 2008

0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities

0 20 40 60 80 100

His share of child care

Separate He

She Pool

His response Control over money

Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008

Figure 20: Control over the income and division of child care

The division of housework and child care is primarily associated with the men’s percep-tions of their power outcomes. While the male partners perceive a negative association be-tween their share of housework and their decision-making power, they are less likely to per-ceive their partners to have control over the income if they take over a greater share of child care. At the same time, they perceive themselves as having control. Male partners seem to use financial power as a coping strategy if they take over a greater share of child care. In addition, both partners are also less likely to perceive her to be in control if he has a greater share of housework. These findings support doing gender theory. An unconventional division of labor is associated with male partners’ financial power and with a power disadvantage for female partners.

Furthermore, the results also showed that an unconventional division of housework is associ-ated with noncooperation. Women in particular seem to be more sensitive to the question of cooperation and noncooperation than men.