What explains what?

Although the coefficients are not significant, all the models indicate that the male partners’

control is related not only to his, but also to his partner’s decision-making. Hence, whereas he is unlikely to make the financial decisions if she controls the income, she is likely to have power in one dimension while he has power in the other dimension. Not only is the relation between both of these power outcomes stronger for the female than for the male partners, she is also more likely to make the decisions if he controls the income than vice versa.

The previous chapter discussed if the joint pool is an “equal” gender arrangement or whether one of the partners still has a power advantage. Since pooling the money can be considered a rather traditional arrangement used most often by married couples with a conventional distri-bution of resources and labor, we might expect that men are the decision-makers if the income is pooled. Women might then be decision-makers in more progressive forms of power allo-cation, i.e. if the partners separate their incomes. Surprisingly, we observe the opposite. The separate system is associated with the male partner’s power and the joint pool is related to the female partners’ power – in both power dimensions. Note, however, that the coefficients are not significant.

This finding is rather unexpected since we know that partners separate their earnings if she has a greater share of income. Hence we could assume that since she has more money, she is also the decision-maker. The same is to be expected for the joint pool. Since she has less money if the partners pool their incomes, she is less likely to be the decision-maker. Although the results are surprising, they are supported by a study based on British data. For British couples, Vogler et al. (2008) also found that the male partner is more likely to make the decisions if the partners separate their incomes. In order to explain the relation between financial power outcomes, future research will have to allow a much more detailed analysis of partners’ power allocations.

Control over the income and financial decision-making are interrelated power outcomes. Their correlation can be tested further by estimating a bivariate probit model. This model also allows to test whether the power bases are more strongly related to one of the power outcomes. Which do the power bases explain better: control over the income or financial decision-making?

power. Does a partner perceive him- or herself as the decision-maker if he or she sees him- or herself as in control over the income, and vice versa? The bivariate probit models for exclu-sive control were therefore estimated for one partner at a time: her power in her perception, and his power in his perception. Since the question of cooperation concerns both partners equally, the models for the joint pool and joint decision-making were estimated separately for the men and the women. The bivariate probit models will test the correlation between the two power outcomes. Note that the association between the power bases, the division of labor, and the power outcomes has been discussed broadly in the previous chapters. The aim of this section is a comparison between the explanatory power of the factors for the power outcomes.

According to the Wald test, joint decision-making and the joint pool are not correlated (Table A.18 together with Tables A.17 and A.19). Whether couples make the financial de-cisions together is not necessarily related to the question whether they pool their incomes.

This is an interesting finding because it again points to the question what exactly is behind the labels “joint pool” and “joint decision-making”. In the previous chapters, we related them to cooperation - without knowing, however, what partners really do if they say that they pool their incomes and make financial decisions together. Future research will have to investigate these “black boxes” in more depth. In this study, unfortunately, no information which would allow further insights is available.

The Wald test indicates that the power outcomes are indeed correlated for the male and the female partners (Table 24). The probability of the chi-squared is even higher for the female than for the male partners. This supports the result of the multinomial logistic regression. The power outcomes are interrelated more strongly for the female than for the male partners.

As regards the power bases, the financial resources – relative income and household income – have a significant effect on control over the income (Table 24). The coefficients for decision-making are not significant. Thus, predominantly income and household budget are related to control.

The partners’ relative commitment to the relationship also significantly affects control over the income. Education, on the other hand, only has a significant effect on decision-making power.

The picture is rather mixed for the partners’ employment statuses. Note that it is primarily the arrangement where she is employed full-time and he has a lower status which has signifi-cant effects. For women, her higher status is negatively related to her decision-making power.

This supports previous findings. For men, however, the chance of financial power, especially regarding control, is lower if he has a lower employment status. Note that, like in the multi-nomial logistic regression models, the small number of observations biases the effects. The interpretation of the other effects, although they are significant, will therefore be disregarded.

We should keep in mind that whereas a lower employment status is a power disadvantage for men, a higher employment status is a power disadvanatage for women. The bivariate probit

models confirm the gender difference for the relation between relative employment status and financial power outcomes.

Power bases – predominantly income, household income, and commitment – explain control over the income better than financial decision-making. Both of these power indicators are strongly interrelated especially for the female partners. In contrast, cooperation in one power dimension is not necessarily related to power in the other dimension.

Differences in the partners’ perceptions of power were already discussed in the previous chapter. One main result was that female partners seem to be more concerned with the ques-tion of cooperaques-tion versus noncooperaques-tion. Male partners seem to be more sensitive to the allocation of power bases. In the next chapter, the partners’ response behaviors will be ana-lyzed in more depth. First we will attempt to answer the question if the partners who perceive their power allocation in the same way have different patterns of the relation between bases and outcomes when compared to the separate models for the male and the female respondents.

In a second step, the differences in the partners’ perceptions of power will be analyzed further.

What associations exist between the power bases and differences in partners’ perceptions of power?

Control and decisions

(1) (2)

Her answers His answers I control I decide I control I decide

Her share of income 0.005 0.011 -0.027*** -0.005

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Household income -0.000*** -0.000 0.000** 0.000

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Same education (ref)

She higher education 0.230 -0.000 -0.075 -0.620*

(0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.26)

He higher education 0.055 0.304 -0.096 0.346

(0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.23) Same age (ref)

She older 0.356 -0.237 0.194 0.427

(0.39) (0.41) (0.52) (0.39)

He older -0.235 -0.238 0.119 0.403

(0.34) (0.35) (0.46) (0.38) Same employment status (ref)

He full-time,she part/not work 0.384 0.357 -0.338 0.030 (0.25) (0.29) (0.31) (0.25) She full-time,he part/not work 0.012 -1.209* -4.114*** -0.242

(0.38) (0.53) (0.96) (0.47) She part-time,he not work 0.287 -0.928 -5.786*** 1.289**

(0.55) (0.53) (0.68) (0.46) He part-time,she not work 1.033 0.661 0.613 -4.545***

(0.62) (0.66) (0.58) (0.53) Same freq meeting friends (ref)

She more friends 0.332 -0.201 0.450* 0.375

(0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21)

He more friends -0.387 -0.002 -0.199 0.112

(0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) Same freq cultural activities (ref)

She more cultural activities 0.194 0.488* 0.592* 0.342 (0.26) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) He more cultural activities -0.240 0.480* 0.279 0.267 (0.27) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) His share of housework -0.023** -0.010 0.009 -0.003

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) His share of child care -0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.005

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Same commitment (ref)

She more committed -0.566* 0.128 -0.630* 0.167

(0.26) (0.35) (0.25) (0.24)

He more committed -0.174 0.168 -0.748* -0.118

(0.31) (0.30) (0.34) (0.35)

Constant -1.921 -2.062 2.873 -6.523*

(2.67) (2.60) (3.08) (2.59)

Chi2 8.075 4.224

prob > chi2 0.0045 0.0399

N 558 533

Note: Bivariate probit models; Probit coefficients; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; Unweighted;

Dependent variables: she/he controls and she/he decides; Basecategories: separate system and joint decision-making; Controls not presented; (1) female respondents, (2) male respondents; *p < 0.05,

**p <0.01, ***p <0.001; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008