7 Resources, social relations, and gender arrangements – which power bases are associated with financial power?
7.2 Bases and outcomes – are they related?
7.2.1 Money matters
In both partners’ perceptions, a higher relative income is related to power for control over the income and decision-making. Note that the RRR and AME are significant for the male partner’s control over the income and her decision-making. The AME are also significant for his decision-making in both samples. Hence, compared to the separate system, her higher income has a negative effect on his control, whereas her higher income is positively related to her decision-making and negatively related to his decision-making.
Figure 14 and 15 show the predicted probabilities for her share of income and control over the income and decision-making. The results are similar for the male and the female respondents.
If she has a very low income, the predicted probabilities are slightly higher for his control and lower for her control. With an increase in her relative income, the probabilities are higher for her control and lower for his control.
The positive relation between her power and her higher income and the negative relation be-tween his power and her higher income can also be observed for decision-making. Here, the predicted probabilities differ for the female and the male partners’ power. If she earns less, the probability that the partners perceive his decision-making is higher, and the probability that they perceive her decision-making is lower. This relation is reversed if she has between 30% and 40% of the total income. If she earns a higher income, the probability that the part-ners perceive her as the decision-maker is higher and the probability that they perceive him as decision-making is lower. Cooperation – both partners deciding together – barely changes with an increase of her relative income.
The relation between income and control over the income and decision-making is in agree-ment with rational choice theories: it is more likely that the person with the higher income controls the finances than that the separate system is used. This is also supported by the other nonsignificant effects for the ratio of partners’ incomes.
For the joint pool, only the RRR are significant in both samples. They support the descrip-tive findings. The chance of the separate system – noncooperation – is significantly higher than the joint pool – cooperation – if she earns more. In figure 14 and 15, we see that the pre-dicted probabilities are lower for cooperation and higher for noncooperation with an increase in her relative income. Cooperation is more probable if he earns more, while noncooperation is more probable if she earns more. Note, however, that the AME are not significant.
These findings are in line with the descriptive results, which showed that couples often co-operate in the case of unconventional asymmetries (see Chapter 7.1). Cooperation seems to be associated with a rather conventional or traditional arrangement where the female partner earns less. Noncooperation, in contrast, is associated with a rather unconventional asymmetry where she earns more. This finding indicates that the idea of the male breadwinner still pre-vails. If the male partner earns a higher income, his money is perceived as family income and
pooled in the household. If the female partner is the breadwinner, however, it is more likely that the incomes are separated.
One could argue that the pooling of incomes, which we have termed cooperation, implies more equality than the separate system. Especially if one partner earns less and the incomes are pooled, the unequal allocation of earnings is compensated for. However, as discussed above, the pooled system is a bit of a black box. For instance, we have no way of telling whether the partners pool the entire income or whether one or both partners set aside a part of his or her own incomes as personal spending money – this information is not provided.
Hence, one should be cautious to evaluate this finding as evidence that cooperation is more equal than noncooperation. Further research will have to gather more information on the way couples manage their earnings.
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20 40 60 80 100
Her share of income
Separate She
He Pool
Her response Control over income
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20 40 60 80 100
Her share of income
Separate He
She Pool
His response Control over income
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008
Figure 14: Control over the income and her share of income
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20 40 60 80 100
Her share of income
She He
Both Her response Decision−making
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20 40 60 80 100
Her share of income
He She
Both His response Decision−making
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008
Figure 15: Decision-making and her share of income
A similar relation between cooperation and noncooperation is observable regarding the couples’ household incomes. When the household income increases the chance of couples cooperating and pooling their incomes is significantly lower than the chance of noncooper-ation. The predicted probabilities support the above interpretnoncooper-ation. Figure 16 and 17 nicely show that the probabilities of cooperation and noncooperation are actually reversed with an increase of household income. In households with a rather low income, the probability of co-operation is much higher than the probability of noncoco-operation. In households with a higher income, the opposite is the case: the probability of noncooperation is much higher than that of cooperation. Note that the AME are not significant.
It is a difference between the male and the female respondents that the point where the relation between cooperation and noncooperation is reversed is at a slightly lower amount of money in the female sample than in the male sample. Thus, female partners seem to perceive the reverse of cooperation and noncooperation “earlier” than male partners. Furthermore, the gap between cooperation and noncooperation is wider in the female than in the male sample. Male partners seem to be less sensitive to the issue of cooperation and noncooperation. One reason for this could be that male partners perceive income as family income rather than individual income. Hence, they are more likely to perceive cooperation than their partners.
Furthermore, the results confirm Pahl’s study (1983). Pahl found that women have a power disadvantage in higher-income households. Indeed, the multinomial logistic regression mod-els show that the chance of her control is lower when the household income increases.39 The effects are significant. Figure 16 shows that the probability of her control is higher than that of his control in lower-income households. The probability of her control decreases with an increase of household income. In higher-income households, the probabilities of her and his control are both very low, but the probability of his control is slightly higher than that of her control.
A higher household income, in contrast, is positively related to his decision-making. Whereas the probabilities that partners perceive her or his decision-making are both very low in lower-income households, the probability that they perceive his decision-making is higher with a higher household income (Figure 17). The probability of her decision-making, in contrast, is equal to zero in higher-income households.
In addition, we observe that the male partners in the higher-income households are even more likely to perceive their control and decision-making. For the male respondents, both the AME and the RRR are significant. Thus, male partners are more likely to perceive themselves as decision-makers in higher-income households. The probability of his financial power out-comes in higher-income households is higher in the male than in the female sample. Not only
39Since according to the theoretical background household income is more important for control over the income than for decision-making, an interaction term for her relative income and household income was intro-duced in the model for control over the income. Neither the t-value nor the LR test for the interaction term were significant.
are men more likely to decide in higher-income households, it is also more probable that they perceive their decision-making more strongly than their partner.
These results indicate that there are gender differences regarding control over the income and decision-making and the household budget, which has to be controlled and decided upon.
Although the models also show, in accordance with rational choice theory, that the ratio of the partners’ incomes has an effect on control, rational choice cannot explain the association between household income and control over the income. As discussed in the previous chapter, women have a greater share of income in the highest income group and a lower share of in-come in the lowest inin-come group. According to rational choice theory, we would expect that she is more likely to control in the highest group and less likely to control in the lowest income group. However, other mechanisms are at work in this case. The gender theory explanation is that gender as a social institution frames partners’ interaction and (re)produces inequalities between male and female partners. Since women are assigned a disadvantaged social position by society, female partners have less financial power if the budget allows a larger degree of freedom for control and decisions.
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
Yearly household income
Separate She
He Pool
Her response Control over income
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
Yearly household income
Separate She
He Pool
His response Control over income
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008
Figure 16: Control over the income and household income
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
Yearly household income
She He
Both Her response Decision−making
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008
0.2.4.6.81Predicted probabilities
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
Yearly household income
He She
Both His response Decision−making
Rest of variables at mean; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008
Figure 17: Decision-making and household income