Having a lower employment status:

A power advantage for female partners?

Two arrangements are most common in couples: either the arrangement where both partners have the same employment status or the traditional arrangement where the man is employed full-time while the woman is employed part-time or not working. For the analysis of the partners’ relative employment statuses this means that the number of observations is relatively low for the other arrangements, for example if it is the woman who is employed full-time, and he works part-time or does not work at all. Only a small number of the arrangements of the partners’ relative employment statuses are significant.⁴⁰

Employment status ratio Predicted values He full She full She part He part Female respondents

Her control 4% 3% 5% 4%

His control 2% 3% 3% 3%

Pooled 65% 72% 63% 77%

Separate 30% 24% 29% 16%

Male respondents

Her control 5% 3% 5% 4%

His control 1% 0% 2% 2%

Pooled 65% 68% 58% 80%

Separate 30% 29% 34% 15%

Note: Multinomial logistic regression models; Predicted probabilities; Values rounded; Rest of variables at mean; Unweighted; Dependent variable: control over income; Male and female respondents; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008

Table 16: Predicted values for control over the income and relative employment status

There is a positive relation between cooperation and the arrangement where he is em-ployed part-time. Only the RRR are significant in both samples. If the male partner has a higher employment status but both partners have rather precarious positions, the chance of cooperation is significantly higher than that of noncooperation – compared to the couples with identical employment statuses. This is also supported by the predicted probabilities (Ta-ble 16). The probability of the pooled system is highest if he is employed part-time and his partner is not working. Note, however, that the AME are not significant.

Furthermore, the arrangement where she is employed full-time and he has a part-time position

40The RRR and marginal effects are highly significant and the effect size is zero for his control in the male sample if she is employed full-time. No cases were observed in this category. Another significant effect is observable in the male sample for her part-time employment and his decision-making. The RRR and marginal effects are highly significant and the effect size is rather big (10.21). The predicted probabilities are also surpris-ingly high. Note, however, that the number of observations in this category is extremly low. Only four men who were unemployed with a partner working part-time stated that they had decision-making power. The DFbetas for all of the observations are high. Hence, the interpretation of this effect will be disregarded.

or is unemployed is also positively associated with cooperation. In addition to his part-time employment, the predicted probabilities are also highest for her full-time employment. The AME are only significant in the male sample. The male partners in particular perceive coop-eration if the employment statuses of the partners are unconventional.

These findings indicate that cooperation is likely if she has a full-time position and her partner has a lower status, or if he is employed part-time and she is unemployed. Thus, cooperation is related not only to conventional, but also to unconventional asymmetries regarding relative employment status. This is in line with the descriptive findings that partners compensate for high asymmetries in relative earnings by cooperation – if both the male and the female partner have a very low income.

Employment status ratio Predicted values He full She full She part He part Female respondents

She decides 4% 1% 2% 11%

He decides 4% 3% 3% 4%

Both decide 92% 96% 95% 86%

Male respondents

She decides 4% 2% 2% 12%

He decides 4% 4% 28% 4%

Both decide 92% 95% 70% 84%

Note: Multinomial logistic regression models; Predicted probabilities; Values rounded; Rest of variables at mean; Unweighted; Dependent variable: decision-making; Male and female respondents; Data source: SOEP 2004, 2005, and 2008

Table 17: Predicted values for decision-making and relative employment status

Interestingly, a lower employment status is associated with her decision-making, while a higher employment status is a power disadvantage – significantly so for female partners. The arrangement where he is employed full-time and she is working part-time or unemployed is associated with the perception of her financial decision-making. The RRR are significant for the male and the female respondents, but the AME are only significant for the male respon-dents. The number of observations is not as low as in the other categories: in the female sample, 46 women are said to have decision-making power if their partners are employed full-time. In the male sample, the number of observations is 40. Only eight observations in the female sample and nine observations in the male sample have high DFbetas (Figure 18).

Thus, the effects are less biased by outliers.

The predicted values indeed indicate that the partner with a higher status – either the male or the female partner – is generally less likely to be perceived as the decision-maker (Table 17).

Whereas the probabilties of his or her control do not differ in couples where he is employed full-time, gaps between the probabilities of her or his control exist predominantly in couples

where both have precarious positions.⁴¹ Note that only the effect for her decision-making if he is employed full-time is significant. Thus, a lower employment status is a power advantage primarily for female partners. Since not only the RRR but also the AME are significant in the male sample, male partners seem to be particularly concerned with their relative employment status and her decision-making.

Male respondents; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008 Female respondents; Data source: SOEP 2005 and 2008

Figure 18: DFbetas for her decision-making and his full-time employment

Thus, a lower employemt status is related to financial power – especially for female part-ners. While doing gender theory is able to explain the high probability of his financial power if he has a lower employment status (coping with the violation of his gender identity), the positive relation between her low status and her power cannot be measured by this approach.

Hence, other mechanisms must underlie the relation between employment and power.

When we established employment status as power base, we assumed that a higher employ-ment status would imply both a higher social status and access to social networks. Hence, within a framework grounded in rational choice theory we expected that a higher status would be positively related to power. One explanation for the finding above could be that employ-ment status is not a power base in the first place. Work in the labor market would then be a burden rather than empowering. Having a higher work load outside the household reduces the influence in the household. But if this was the case, we would expect a similar relation between employment status and decision-making for male partners. However, the effects are only significant for the power of the female partners.

A second explanation could be that a compensation mechanism is at work. If one partner is less active in the labor market and therefore has a lower social status and less access to social networks, the partners compensate for this disadvantage by giving this person more power in the household. Note, however, that the effects are primarily significant for the partners’ per-ceptions of women’s financial decision-making. In line with the explanation above, a lower employment status would then be compensated more for women than for men.

A possibly more realistic explanation of the finding could be that a traditional separation of spheres emerges if the patterns of the partners’ employments are rather traditional – especially if he works full-time. He earns the main income in the labor market while she earns only a

41The high probability of 28% of his decision-making if she is working part-time and he is unemployed could be due to the low number of observations in this category.

“second” income and/or is predominantly responsible for the household. In these separate spheres, financial decision-making would then be part of the household sphere.

Furthermore, cooperation is more likely either if she is employed full-time and her partner has a lower status or if he is employed part-time or not working. Similarly to the asymmetries in relative earnings, partners contain asymmetries in relative employment status through cooper-ation. Interestingly, the male partners seem to be more sensitive to relative employment status and financial power. This could be observed for both the positive relation to cooperation and to her decision-making. Thus, similarly to relative age, relative status seems to matter more for men’s perception of financial power.

But note that the results and the interpretation above should be considered with caution be-cause the number of observations is often very low. Since outliers bias some effects and since the bias is often related to unobserved heterogeneity, the hybrid model might account for this problem. Hence, the analysis in Chapter 12 will be interesting in order to investigate in more depth the relation between relative employment status and the financial power outcomes.