Arguably, the most imporrant reason for the development of the general consensus was the historical experience of the region of Central and Eastern Europe. As Liszl6 Valki has noted, 'the observer of the region could see that it is characterised by the syndrom of anything-can-happen-anywhere-and-at-any-time, and the lack of predictabiLty?.'8 In ad-dition, it was clear that after the end of the Second "Vorld "Var, the Euro-Atlantic region managed to establish the basis of long-term stability and prosperity, a situation which was to large extent associated \.\-1th organizations such as the European Communities and the
;\form Atlantic Alliance.
By contrast, on the eastern side of Central and Eastem Europe one could witness the increase of instabiJiry after 1991, \.\-1th the end of the Soviet Union. Neither the econornic
26 For example, br me Smallholders Part}.
2., - whlch could hardlr ha"e been done \\1mout challengmg melr democranc self-Iegmrmzanon (see p. -.).
28 .\luch of dus secnon 15 based on. Valki, L., 'Szeret nem szeret' A ;\"ATO kioo,·ltes kc~rd6Jelel (It likes me,
Jt does nOt like me' The question marks of~ATO enlargement)', Ki1Ipolmka, 1995, Aurumn-\\-U1ter,
97-123.
Zsw::sanna Dtikm
nor the political situation could be regarded as stable, and the members of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) were struggling with internal and external con-fiicts. In Hungary, however, the econorruc and social situation, after the nadir of 1991, started to improve and politicians intended to do everything to preserve that. Euro-At-lantic integration was seen as joining a more developed region: it not only meant stability in social, political and rrulitary terms, but was also seen as the pledge of econorruc devel-opment. J6zsef Antall- Prime .\liruster between 1990 and 1993 - expressed concern at the Paris Summit of the Orgaruzation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in ~o
vember 1990 about the rise of the 'wall of poverty' after the fall of the Berlin V/all. '9 The image of the waU of poverty, although not in such a strong form, reappeared later on, too as a fear of rrussing out on successful econorruc moderruzation or the loss of the final chance to put an end to the lag between Hungary and the 'de\'eloped world'. Paradoxi-cally, ~ATO - a pohtico-military organization - appeared as a solution to securing such economic development.
In addition to the fears of rrussing the last chance to avoid being on the econorruc pe-riphery, the econorruc image of the country was also brought up as the justification of ac-cession. Liszl6 Kovacs - .\1inister for Foreign Affairs between 1994 and 1998 - de-dared that 'in several countries of the world (for example in Japan and in the US), representatives of the big investment firms stated that for them it is ~ATO membership which signifies the genuine guarantee for the security of their investments. For thern it is more important than any bnd of bilateral agreement on the promotion and protection of investments'.3° The validity of ws argument is questionable, hO"wever, since interviews with leading foreign investors in Hungary show that ~ATO membership was not high on their list of vital conditionsY
Paradoxically, the costs of~ATO membership were often used as an argument in fa-vor of ~ATO accession. It was dear that the myth of systemic change, which said that the socialist regime had spent the wealth of the population on armaments, was un-founded. Rather the new system inherited obsolete equipment which had to be changed, irrespecnve of the status of the counny towards ~ATO. Military leaders emphasized that
~ATO accession would mean reducing apart of these unavoidable costs deriving from the necessity of moderruzation of the army. The main justification for that was the expla-nation that a member of a military aUiance does not have to establish a fully
comprehen-29 Quored m \'alla, L., 'Ervek es ellenervek (pros and contras)' in Duna)", Gazdag, 159-192.
30 ;\agy .\leIylnio, E., 'A jÖ"öre gondolva keil polmulru (polmcians must rhmk of the future)', J.fagym· Hir-lap, I2 ;\ovember 199-, 3·
31 For example, the head of AueL Hungana, the adnsor of General Elecrric and the spokesman of the Durch l:'G group welcomed HungalT ;\ATO memberslup as a factar m increasmg srabihry, bur emphasized that in"estments are based primarilyon econonuc coneLoons. in ';\,ATO panor:ima C\ATO panorama)', "HaJ!J'ar Hfrlap, 12 ;\ovember 1997, II.
0' \TO membership and Hungarian domesric polincs m ehe runenes
sivc dcfense to aim for autarchy in defense mauers. This is what made military integra-tion efficient and less expensIve than neutrality in the eyes of the Hungarian military and polJtical leaders.
The lack of other options also worked in favor of accepting :\'ATO acceSSlOn. In the ycars 1990-1991 with the restoration of sovereIgnty, the country faced the task of choos-ing Its onentation. In the light of the strategie and geopolitical SItuation ofHungary, five different opnons emerged: (I)The option of a reformed or modemized \\'arsaw Pact, but only considcrcd as a temporary solution if the peaceful, prompt, secession of Hun-gal) was unfeasiblcY (2) :\'eutrality was vel)' popular in Hungarian political circles espe-ciall} during 1989-1990)3 Trus was based primarilyon a perceived traditional and emo-tional attachment of the population to neutrality,H owing to the bad experience of prC\1OUS alliances. I Iowever, the end of the bipolar world undermined the possibility of a neutral Hungary or a neutral bloc in Central Europe. The lack of any superpower guar-antce, the posslble increase in defence costs, and the quest for self-justification of the Eu-ropean neutral states made the maJority of the polirical elite renounce the illusion of neu-trabt}·. (3) The Central-European option; there were effortS to rein force regional cooperanon, but none of the initiatives could become a genuine catalyst of an emerging Ccntral-European bloc35 . In realit}, the years of separation since " 'orld " 'ar I, reduced the Importance of factors wruch could have sen.·ed as the basis of a genuine regional co-operation ( uch a economic complementarit}', cultural and political homogeneit},), but could not resolve the unsettled issues separating thc counmes (such as territorial debates, mutual rnistrust or even hatred)l6. Thus today, there are few possibilities for genuine co-operation, only for loose contaets. (4) The European option, wruch reckoned on joining a European Gnion wruch was stronger in political and securit}' terms. Trus option would have handJed the securit}, challenges of the region in more complex and wider tenns (in-cluding deploying econornic integration in order to reduce instabilit},), and was more
F 'Our aim 15 ehe secesslOn ofHungary from the \\'arsaw Pact ... 1:ntil this becomes realizable ... a resolu-tion must be raken on ehe reJecnon of ehe Brezhne,' docmne ... \\'e fee! ehe reform of ehe srrucrure of ehe
\ \ 'a1>a \\' Pact necessa ry.' m Alliance 0 f F ree Dem ocra IS, A rends-..ervtilttr.:.ds progr071lJo (Tbe progrom of sysremlc change), Budapest, 1989, 19.
33 'The Hunganan chplomaq must formulare neurrallt)' as a genuine future rum.' in ehe program of ehe Hun-ganan Democranc Forum lfl 19l19, p. 157. 'Our declararion on pnnclples considers ehe Declaranon of neu-rrahty of ehe re"olunon of 1956 as lts rradinon.' lfl.-\lhance of Free Democrats: A rends-..erJtilr=r prOgr071ljO, Budapest, 1989, 18.
H See for example the long-term effeclS m ehe memory of ehe populanon of the Declaration of neurrality of ehe 1956 re"olunon
35 For more der:uls see' Pataki, 1., 'Hunganan foreign poliq; ehe European 1:ruon and regional cooperanon' m Glatz., F., Europo uruf C'ngorn, Budapest, Europa Insotute, 1996, 17-24.
36 For more details see Kende, P.: J1iirr nzncr rrrui KeIer-Nr.LfJ Europdbon? (U-~ zr Ir rhor rbfTl! zr no order zn Eosr-ern Cmtrol Europe?), Budapest, Osins-Szazadveg, 199+
Zsuzsanna Dtikai
popular in the eyes of the voters, too. However, as the further withdrawal of the United States from Europe and the strengtbening of the European defense identity were taken off the agenda, this orientation became unlikely, prirnarily because of factors outside the region. (5) The only possible and likely orientation thus, remained the Euro-Atlantic one.
Another irnportant reason which contributed to the general parliamentary consensus behind :\fATO membership was the democratic self-Iegitirnization of the parties them-selves. All of the major parties had built their foreign and security policy (and to some ex-tent their domestic policy) on \'\'estern values and value systems. The airn of joining the
\Vest and 'Vestern organizations became an integral part of the legitimization basis of these parties. The word 'Vlestern-oriented' became equal to 'democratic' in political thought. In other words, only those parties which accepted the aim of integration into the '\Testern system could be regarded as democratic political forces. In these circum-stances, none of the major political fore es could have risked saying 'no' to the quest for NATO membership.
The irnportance of cultural identity is controversial. Although politicalleaders, espe-cially conservatives,r usuaUy emphasized the irnportance and continuity of the European, Euro-Atlantic and \\Testern cultural and historicallinks (from A.D. 1000 onwards), \\ith which I Iungar-y was tied to '''estern Europe. Judging whether Central and Eastern Eu-rope has its own identity or can be regarded as a region which was always part of\\'estem Europe or Europe in cultural terms is far beyond the scope of this article. One must, however, keep in mind the fact that such a \iew was \\idespread among political fore es in Hungary especially after I990, and acted in part as a justification for full organizational integration within the Euro-Atlantic region.