After 1945, perpetual neutraliry' slowly became a core element of Austrian post-war iden-tiry.' in the discourse of the elite. J'\'evertheless, acceptance of neutraliry.', which had been irnposed by the allies, was initially quite lirnited among the party eLites, particularly that of
Konn Llebba,t
the SPÖ: "in 1955 perpetual neutrality was in no sense an uncontrollable need of the Austrian population. Instead it sprang from the surprisingly advantageous results of ne-gotiations held in ;\10scow by the Austrian delegation. Since then, it has become the favourite child of the Austrian people. The success of an active neutrality policy in the period of the Cold IVar led to the assumption that neutrality might provide security against external rigors for all time" (KJenner 1992, 13)'
Since 1955, as a result of the public, poli ti cal , meclia and academic cliscourse, neutrality has become embodied in the collective consciousness as a central myth of Austrian iden-tity. Neutrality steadily grew in importance in line -w,th an acceptance of the Austrian na-tion and an increase of "national pride". In the early 199os, neutrality still counted as one of the most favored elements (87%) of Austrian national pride (cf. Bruckmüller 1994, 2 7f.).13 As one of the symbols of national identity, it continued to receive a high rating at least untiJ the &st half of the 1990S: A1though the number of people in favor of neutrality declined in the course of the war in the former Yugosla\ia, the majority of Austrians nev-ertheless continued to support the idea of neutrality (cf. surveys in S\VS-Rundschau 21r991, 231-238 and .v1991, 535-542, as well as the profile survey of 13 January 1992).
For example, in ;\1ay 1993 the Lin-::,er market-Institut (Dokumentation market-Archiv .\12 5) recorded 5 I % agreement -w,th the follo~ing statement: "A goal of negotiations must be to prevent neutrality from being endangered by EC membership".14
13 Surveys dernonsrrate, however, subsranrial dlfferences between age-groups: Thus, at the urne of the SUITe)"
accordmg 10 Bruckmüller (199'h 44) and Halier/Gruber (1996a, 89 and 1I 5), 38% of people und er 30, ver-sus 62% of those o\'er fift)", consldered neurraht)" 10 be ver) unportant.
14 According 10 0plllion poils, m 198874% of the people would have opted for neurrall1:Y, rather than Ausman rnernberslup of the EG. The correspondmg figures were 64% in 1991 and 68% m 1993 (cf. "'erunger 1991, 49'h and Pelinka 199'h 149)·
The followmg are ehe results of a surve)" of 1000 people undertaken tn 1994 (Fessel+GFK-Cmfrage) on
"Idennry and rnernberslup of ehe EF':
• Austna "lIISt co-ordmale Its forelgn and seCUnl)' poltCJ wltb otber EU member-states
probably' 85%
probabi)' not: 11 %
no response' 4%
• Ho 711 tblI entlanger Ausman Identlt)'(
endanger: 39%
not endanger . 51 %
no response: 10%
• Ausma rn/1St gIVe up Its neutralil) Jor tbe benefit of a European secunl)' system
probabi)" 49%
probabi)' not: 46%
no response: 5 %
• Will tbls endanger Austrian Identll)'(
endanger: 53%
Ausman • 'eurrahty. I Iisrorical Development and Semamic Change 33
Thc State Treaty and neutrahty have become, in the course of the Second Republic, codes for .\usman nacionalit} and S}l1onymous ",,;th Austrian sovereignt}, (BriInner 1993, 20 and \\'odak et al 1998). '\"eutralit}· as a policical prerequisite for the State Treaty is still, in pan, an lmponant element of Ausman nacional idencity, an element that is linked ro the imagc of stabilit}, peace and policical concinuiry of the Second Republic. In a certain way, neutralit}' is a symbol far everyrhing that is connected with the successful founda-Don and hisrory of the econd Republic. ~eutrality as a core Austrian symbol and the raising of the pohcical field that surrounds neutrality to the level of a myth are very much embodied m the "collecti\'c memory" of Austrians. The link that is made berween Aus-tria's neutral statuS and the origins of Austria's statehood and independence, limits op-pOrtllntDeS for an objective poliDcal discussion of the purpose and political content of neutrahty. According to :\1arkus Katzenschläger, the provision of useful information to the Ausman people about the current pracocality of the concept of neutralit}, is made more dlfficult by the fact that "neutrality was highly stylized as a panacea promoting peace; as such, it seems to be more of a psychological phenomenon - one that (has been) meaningless at least since the end of the Cold \\'ar ( ... )" (1996, 17)'
Owing ro its high le\'el of acceptance among the population and its identity-providing function, Austrian neutraliry has become a taboo - at least in the eyes of man} politi-cians: "'\"eutralit}, seems to have lost lts Leirmoci\' function intemacionaily. Has it lost its respecove domesoc and s}1nbolic function, roo?" (Pelinka 1994, 1~3). There is a second reason for the placing of neu trali ry under a taboo: The Austrian State Treary includes an obligacion upon Austria to remove all traces of'\"ational Socialism, as weil as a ban upon any union with Germany (Anschlussverbot): "~eutrality had from its inception both an open agcnda - mtemacionallaw and international politics - and a more oven agenda.
This less outspoken pan consisted of domestic elements as weil as of symbolic aspects:
neutraht}, as pan of an Ausman idencit}" which no longer should be seen as a German one" (pelinka 1994, 173)' Br declaring itself neutral in 1955, Austria had also "voluntar-ily" endorsed Article 1-of the State Trcaty, which ruled out any form of union ",,;th Ger-many; in doing so, it had sent a clear signal of its distinction from Germany.'5 The So-viet Gnion had not been convinced that the prm;sions of the State Treaty represented a sufficient guarantee of Austrian independence; a similar provision in the Treaty of Sr.
Germam had nOt been adhered to. Thus, neutralit}, was understood by the Soviet side as an addItional constitutional - and, after notification, intemationallaw - guarantee of the independence of Austria (Kirchschläger)" (Koja 1991,62).
not endanger· 3 %
no response' 9%
15 In ehe run-up ro ehe referendum on EC memberslup, thts aspecr of Ausman neucrau[}' served as a poucical argument for ehe opponems of membership.
34 &nn Liebhart
1995- 199T From "active neutrality policy" to
"common security policy" in an integrated (\'Testem) Europe
Despite accession into the EU and the doser attachment of Austria to the \Vestern world (cf. Kramer 1997, 732-736), for a long period Austrian neutrality was not reaUy up for debate at the officiallevel. For reasons that have a1ready been mentioned, most Austrian politicians rejected any statements that were made against neutrality. Thus, it was fre-quently stressed that the issue was not the abandonment of neutrality, but its redefinition (cf. Unterberger 1992, IIf., Thalberg 1993,31, Brünner 1993, 2Off.). However, in terms of content, the definition was very much whatever people wanted it to be: the ideas ranged from the role of mediator in the :-\orth-South conAict and in South Eastern Eu-rope, to the speciaJ responsibility of Austria as counselor and conflict-resolver within the context of European integration and the eastward enJargement of the EU. \''ith refer-ence to political continuity, which was symbolized by the durability of Austria's neutral status, the "traditional" neutral position of Austria was underlined: Trus status could be retained, \\Tote Binter (1992, 14) for instance. Trus could be done under the motto "Sol-idarity In neutrality and neutral in Europe".ln 1993, Ernst Sucharipa argued in a com-mentary that an interpretation of the legal obligations arising out of neutrality that was limited to the original meaning of Austrian neutrality, i. e., the absence of any foreign bases, was quite compatible with membersrup of the EU. Participation in the EU's com-mon foreign policy ,-\"Ould pose no real problems for Austria, especiaUy since "we already hold the same positions in practicaUy aU issues; and do so as the natural consequence of a foreign policy that is oriented towards common values ".,6 Sucharipa continued, how-e\"er, "in the longer term, Austria ( ... ) will ( ... ) aJso have to examine wh ether and to what extent the retention of the status of perpetual neutrality is possible and usefuJ against the background of membership of such a system (security, political, ed.)". Christian Brünner emphasized the important role of Austria as a mediator: "An understanding of neutrality that rules out involvement in armed conflicts can also have a function in a system of col-lective security. Für instance, where parties to a conflict in their dismay are unable to think of imaginative solutions, neutral authorities can help them to find a wal' out. There are judges to whom conflicting parties may turn, and counselors in whom farnilies mal' confide, in order to find solutions to crises; and there are good friends whose detachrnent means that they are able to offer advice wruch can open doors and \vindows" (1993,21).'-The speeches of several ÖVP politicians, as weU as Jörg Haider (FPÖ) and Friedhelm Frischenschlager (FPÖ), wruch have been analyzed in \\Todak et al. (1998), al ready
16 Cf. ~elSser (1993,19).
17 Hans Thalberg meam sometlung sll11ilar when he satd: "The EC could rnake good use of a counny "hose cen-aal rask is the prevention of confliclS and the promotIon of the peace process in Eastem Europe" (1993. 31).
AusITIan "eurrahry IlJsroncal Development and Semanrie Change
35
pointcd to the future obsolescence of Austrian neutrality.'8 This frequently happened
~ithout ncutrality being explicitly mentioned. For example, the security policy arguments put forward in the speeches of Busek and Fasslabend both cited changed external cir-cumstances, thereby preparing the Austrian people for a possible abandonment of neu-trality at some point in the future. Usually the problems associated with neutrality are imphcitly discussed und er the issue ofEU membersrup. SPÖ politicians mostly avoided deaIing \\lth this awkward issue. At the time of the above mentioned project (i.e. 1994-1996), a questioning of neutrality was still a relative taboo in parts of the politicians' dis-course. The exceptions were the FPÖ and the Liberales Forum. Several ÖVP politicians and Fedcral President Thomas Klestil, chose the safer strategy of rustoricisation.
In its party program of 1995, the ÖVP gave unequivocal support to the inclusion of Austria in a European security system and dismissed neutrality as a model that was no longer satisfactory within the framework of current political problems. It was within this context that the idea of a so-called solidarity law arose, the aim of wruch was to perrnit the participation of Austria in a collective European security system in arrangement with the ccntral committee of the ~ational Assembly .• \1eanwrule, neutrality should continue to be cffective where conflicts arose outside of the European system. As time passed, the position of the SPÖ also began to falter. In this regard, Thomas Nowomy (1996, 20) con-cluded the following: "Overall, it is unnatural for a left-wing party to support the status quo and a conservative party to hold a more creative position". '9 The two parties of the coalition drew ever cJoser to each other in terms of their positions.20 The government program of 1996 already had left all of the possibilities open.
18 Dlsungulslung between rhe role of neurrailry' In rhe past and Its role in rhe present, Fnsehensehlager ex-presses Iumself more explieiclr rhan does any orher poiloeIan' ":\5 a secum)' srrateg)' of an indmdual state embedded in rhe secum)' srrueture of rhe POSt-1945 era, neurraliry' dId serve a purpose (fommatel) it was ne"er really ehallenged). Bur It eannot be eonsIdered a sUItable seeunty pohe)' reeipe for rhe future. The best proteerion for AusITIa is offered bya revamped \\'EC: a eomprehensIve eolleeove seeunry system of all rhe democraoc states of furope (rarher rhan sImply collecove defense) based on rhe C"ruted ~aoons' charter and rhe Cru"ersal Declaraoon ofHuman Rlghts,"
19 Aeeordmg to ~owomy, rhe foreIgn poile)' (of rhe SPÖ) was governed by rhe following pnneiples - at least unol1989
- a broad mterpretaoon of neurrailry' poile)';
- detaehment from rhe rruiltary aspeers of seeunry' poliey;
- a ,nllingness to medIate m mternarional eonAIets;
- a enoeal sranee as regards to rhe C"S-dominated "global order";
- eeonomle and culrural onentarion rowards rhe \\'est, eoupled ,nrh simultaneous efforrs ro estabhsh a dlalog \\1rh rhe eounmes of rhe "CommunlSt East";
- emparhy for rhe "tillrd world" (e.g. suPPOrt for rhe someomes preeanous demands for national self-de-ternunaoon);
20 See also ='oU (1996, 8,ff,).
Kann Lubhart
The eurrent domestie politieal debate focuses on the (supposed) neeessity of a collec-tive European seeurity policy in a situation of supranational threats arising out of the al-tered geopolitical constellation.21 The "new" security needs ofEurope (and in particular of Austria as the external fron tier of the EU) form the most important argument in the present politieal discourse on neutrality." On 2 7 April 1995, when Austria was eelebrat-ing the 50th anniversary of the Seeond Republie, Federal Chancellor Vranitzl'y said:
"Austria finds itself in the middle of a world whieh, \\ithout the balance of the great blocs, is less seeure than it used to be. Migrations, fundamentalism, nationalism, and interna-tional eonfliet concerning the distribution of resourees, are contributing to this inseeu-rity. As a neutral and new member-state of the European Union, Austria must make Its contribution to stabilizing transnational security struetures" (quoted after V\'odak et al 1998). These problems would require a new and intensive solidarity within the frame-work of a funetioning European security system, whieh even neutral states eould not evade in the long term (I-Iagen 1994).23 Aecording to one of the main arguments, neu-trality offered only relative proteetion from the new threats, just as at the time of the Cold \Var it had only been effieient in eombination with the 0JATO deterrent. IfXATO was a produet of the Cold \\'ar, argued Manfred Katzenschläger (1996), then so was neu-trality. Geopolitical changes required a rethinking of Au s tri an seeurity polie)', and Aus-trian Soeial Democrats should play an aeti\'e role in the construction of a European se-eurity system. A "eommon foreign and sese-eurity poliey" was one of the main aspects of European integration: "Austria must decide whether it should simply aeknowledge the result of this process or play an aetive role in its design. The latter was in line with the ideas of the EU eommission: A eommon foreign and security poliey cannot be estab-Iished where there is a lack of a deterrnined political will on the part of member-states and there are no dear objectives (position of the Commission at the intergovernmental Conference of 1996, EUR-OP Office for Publications, page 16, Luxembourg 1996)"
(ibid., 16f.). In any future European security structure, NATO would play an important role, and the \NEU would be the European arm of NATO, "for this reason Austria should not dose its mind to a frank discussion ofl\'ATO membership" (ibid., 17)' Ac-cording to the coalition agreement, by the Spring of 1998 at the latest (i.e. be fore the start of its EU presideney), Austria should have decided whether it wished to join the \VEU, an alliance "ith a compulsory obligation to provide assistance and thus ineompatible \\ith
21 Cf. Gärmer (1996), Schmidt (1996), Kux (1996) and Sk'llhra (1996)· Ineidentally, in 1994 13 % of those who voted lI1 favor of Et.: memberslup clauned that domestie and forelgn polley secumy had been a mouve for doing so (cf. Plasser & t.:lram 1994, 1l0).
22 See the ruscusslOn bet\\'een Caspar Einem and Hemrieh r>:elsser lI1 Der Standard, .\1ar 281291997, the pam-phlet Et.:ROPAperspek-oven 1/97 issued by the Dr. Kar! Renner Institut, and Gärmer (1996)·
23 For the lI1lpaet of de\'elopments in Ausman secumy policy on the Austrian Stare Treaty and Ausman neu-rraliry, see Skulm (1997, -54--57).
:'I.usman '\;eurralIt} I !Jstoncal Development and Semanoc Change 37
neutrality (cf. ~owotny 1996): "In a military-operative sense, the 'VEU is simply a shell behind which NATO is hiding. The WEU is the organizational tramework through which the military arm of~ATO can be employed by the EU alone, \.\-1th the support of the Uruted States" (ibid., 23f.).
In the second half of the 1990'S the meclia cliscourse reduced the function of neutrality primarily [0 the security policy aspect: In its traclitional form, neutrality was thus consid-ered outJated and obsolete; after the end of the East-\i\Test controntation aredefinition was most urgent. lnstability in South Eastern Europe and particularly in the former Yu-goslavia was a threat to Austria's security. Thomas Nowotny argued that neutrality had never been a complete security poliey, but simply an element of security policy or a means to an end, and thus it could be interpreted only within a certain temporal conte>.'t: "Even as an element of this security poliey, neutrality was still bound to time and external cir-cumstances: and these happened to have changed" (1996, 22). There was no possibility of retaining neutrality and simultaneously recei,;ng security guarantees trom third par-ties. Aretention of neutrality would also mean increased military expenditure: "If Aus-tria insists upon aretention of neutrality, then it must pay the price of military rearma-ment, and join those European states -like Sweden and Finland - that wish to remain neutral and very well-armed even under the new circumstances" (ibid., 21). Opposing views were given little coverage by the media: "I find it paradoxical that the end of the Cold \Var and the dramatic threats that were associated with it are used as an argument for joining an anti-threat federation. The sneering question 'against whom should Aus-tria be neutral -' seems to me to be less plausible than the question 'against whom should Austria or Sweden now join a military alliance ?'" (Fischer 1996, 31).
For Katzenschläger (1996) just two strategies of Austrian foreign policy were up for cliscussion: Either aretention of observer status in the \i\'EU and continued co-opera-tion with NATO \\1thin the tramework of the "Partnership for Peace" (under this op-tion, neutrality could be retained, but would have to be redefined) or full membership, which would allow Austria to have its say and take an aetive role. Katzenschläger argued for the latter option. His argument ran as follows: "Our country would then have the op-porrunity to make its mark as an aetive partner on the unploughed field of European se-curity policy after the end of the Cold V/ar. A new image as a social state in Europe would considerably strengthen Austria's position when it eame to European integration. \i\Te would then no longer have the image of an E member-state that applies pressure and demands common solutions in areas such as the struggle against unemployment, but which clismissively falls back on neutrality as soon as mention is made of solidarity in con-nection 111th security policy. Thus, if we really want to achieve our goal of having a strong voiee in Europe, then we cannot remain silent on one particular issue. Otherwise Aus-tria's great efforts in European politics will rurn out one day to have been a complete waste of time" (18). In Albrecht K. Konecny's \1eW (1996), however, involvement in a
&rin Ltebban
common security system did not necessarily mean an abandonment of neutrality and the country's joining ~ATO: "For the altemati\'e cannot be getting in\'olved in 'lashing out'
\'ersus bandwagon neutrality" (ibid., 6). The idea of the European Gnion as a military al-liance stands in contrast to the concept of developing new forms of security poliey for which "our form of neutrality" (ibid.) could serve as a model. As an example of how Aus-tria could participate in European securil)' poliey in a manner that was compatible \\ith its neutralil), Konecny clted the deplopnent of Austrian military volunteers on OSCE missions (cf. ibid., 6). Even after the end of the bloc frontiers, inten'ention still primar-ily meant political inten"ention that was "unbiased, bur not blind to the varying degrees of worthiness of suppon of the conflicong parties (ibid.)", as weil as the prO\ision of
\'ersus bandwagon neutrality" (ibid., 6). The idea of the European Gnion as a military al-liance stands in contrast to the concept of developing new forms of security poliey for which "our form of neutrality" (ibid.) could serve as a model. As an example of how Aus-tria could participate in European securil)' poliey in a manner that was compatible \\ith its neutralil), Konecny clted the deplopnent of Austrian military volunteers on OSCE missions (cf. ibid., 6). Even after the end of the bloc frontiers, inten'ention still primar-ily meant political inten"ention that was "unbiased, bur not blind to the varying degrees of worthiness of suppon of the conflicong parties (ibid.)", as weil as the prO\ision of