The third time the NATO referendum issue arose, was in the spring of 1997. The char-acteristics of parliamentary discussions conceming NATO in that period were: (r) the necessityor desire to join :\fATO was not opposed; (2) :\fATO membership often played
54 AdeClSion which the parliament would have preferred.
55 Resolution of the Constirutional Coun ~o: 3/1996 (TI. 23·)·
:-.' \ TO member.,hip and Hungarian domestic pohtics m the runeoes
a secondaJ1 role to other issues. Prioriry was given to domestic issues which could more readily influence the opinion of the \'orers; (3) e\'en when orher issues were not mixed into the debare, rechmcal or legal questions concerning the referendum were discussed rather than the consequences of membership; (4) the main aim of govemment and op-poslOon was to claim credir for the likely imitation to join A'ATO for themsehe and to sho\\ thar ther were rhe true represenratives people's intere ts. The debares focused around four issues; \\ hether to hold a referendum or not; when to hold it; wh ether to or-ganize an opinion-gathering or a declsion-making referendum; and the inclusion of the agriculturalland issue.s6
Until the end of April, discussions focused on whether the referendum should be held or not. Several specialists argued that according to the constitution, a referendum was only necessaJ1 In the case of accession to the European Union, since that is a suprana-nonal body. Howe\'er, smce ),'ATO works on the basis of consensus, accession would not affect the sovereignry' of the country. Others worried about external factors, such as the ratification process, which could have been hindered by the referendum. The internal de-bate, such as potentially insufficient suppon for ),'ATO membership owing to lack of in-formanon, or the emotional arguments used to influence the population by several anti-'\'ATO groups, were also addressed. The technical difficulties of organizing a referendum bet\\een the two main elections of 1998 (namely, parliamentaJ1' and local elections) were also raised, The main moti\'ation behind these often dubious arguments was the ner-vousne of the pro-),'ATO camp which was worried abom the result of a possible refer-endum. For the government though, there was no other choice than to stick to the orig-inal plan. FaiJure to hold a referendum, c1early presented in its program and confirmed bya decision of Parliament, would have been a very powerful tool in the hands of extra-parliamentary forces, and would result in a risky loss of prestige. Anti-~ATO voices could only be conclusively dimini hed bya referendum, in which a comincing majority voted for ),'ATO. Consequently, they had to go ahead and make the best of the referen-dum. This obliganon was reflected in the declaration ofLiszl6 Kovacs, Minister for For-eign Affairs, on 28 April 1997; 'the govemment is commined to its program of holding a referendum when the negotiations on accession finish'.5" The same commitment was confirmed on 9 July 1997 ar the .\ladrid Summit of NATO - where the first wave of counmes to be lmited to join NATO was determined - by the then Prime :\linister
56 \ \ "lule the agriculruralland lSSue dld not have an)" direcr link \\;th the :\"ATO issue, Ir was considered a \,tal JSSUe in Hunganan domesoc pohtics. The pnncipal debare cenrered upon who should O\\TI Hunganan agn-culruralland. Tirrung was comcldental, bur resulred in clus issue becoming embroiled \\,th thar of J01I1lI1g :-.'ATO.
5" In ':\"epsla\'azaskenyszer (push for referendum)', ;I.1agJar .\'emzet, 29 Apnl 199",3.
Zsuzsanna Ddkal
Gyula Born. He characterized the invitation as 'of great historical importance', and said that 'there will be a referendum in IIungary on NATO membership'.58
The second question to solve was the date of the referendum. The Young Democrats and the Smallholders Party - both of them in opposition at that time - backed hold-ing the referendum after the parliamentary elections of May 1998. The reason for this could have been a hope of winning the elections and forming the govemment which would conduct the event, and thus profit more trom its success than they would have done in opposition - or simply delay or reduce the advantage the sociaLsts might gain.
On the other hand, early 1998 was supported as a date by a number of politicians regard-less of their poLtical affiliation, who argued that this was when the conditions for joining would more or less be known, and the ratification process would already have started.
They v;ished to organize a referendum in favor of joining :\fATO, and they considered that one organized after some 0JATO members had already ratified Hungary's accession ,,\'Ould have positive effects on public opinion. However, the majority of the government and some of the opposition preferred to hold the referendum before the ratification process, arguing that a positive answer would faciLtate the ratification process for 'diffi-eult' and unsure NATO members. In addition, such timing would be an excellent tool for improving the image of Hungary, especially since many :\'ATO officials emphasized how important it was to convince the Hungarian population of the necessity of member-ship. Indeed, this last option was aceepted by the parliamentary parties on 10 July, when they opted for an opinion-gathering referendum59 on the :\fATO issue to be held be fore the end ofl\'ovember 1997. ParLament would also issue a declaration in response to the invitation by the :\forth Atlantic Alliance. The text of the declaration, which was prepared by the ~ster for Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the speeialists of the parliamen-tary parties, was sent to a general meeting of Parliament on 15 J uly 1997, where it was accepted unanimously.60 Party leaders stressed the importance of the issue for Hungary, but mainly addressed anti-:\fATO fore es which contested their arguments. The style of debate had changed. Hitherto, :\fATO debates had been dorninated by party skirmishes.
The new consensus indicated thar all the parties were genuinely engaged in Euro-At-lantic integration, and had pur aside daily poLtical battles.61
\\'hiJe there may have been a consensus, there were also differences in nuance between thespokesmen of the different parties. The centre-right parties, for example, emphasised
58 In 'Ev vegi nepszavazas (Referendum at the end of the )'ear)', ;Vep=badsdg, 10 July 1997, I.
59 An opmJOn-screening referendum on I}' gives an mdlcaoon of public opmion and does not bind Parliament tmIike a decision-making referendum.
60 ,\1mutes of the proceedmgs of the Hungarian Parliament, 293m da)" Session 1994-1998, onJuly 15 1997·
61 Ir also mrucated that they knew if an}' one of them made a move to quesoon the ments of~ATO member-stup, all the other pames would regard them as anodemocraoc according to the prevailing Vlew that '~ATO
; \\'est ; Democracy.'
• 'XIO membership and I lungarian domesoc poutics lJ1 the mneoes 93
the importance of the national interest<Sl and historical values - 0JATO membership seen agamst a thousand years of I Iungarian bistory and most notably the events of 1956.63 In addioon the Smallholders Party added apopuLst spin referring to 'EngLsh parachutists' and 'KGB agents'. Both liberals and sociaJists were more value-oriented14 and were con-cemed with the post-1990 present, and concentrated on the prospects for collaboration
\\ith the \Vest. The liberals took an unexpectedly objective stance, weighing up the situ-aoon in an analyocal rather than a poLtical manner. 65 The \'oung Democrats expressed an mteresting mixture of national mteresr66 and ci\ic
values.6-The consensus, however, wa short-Lved. In]uJy 1997, an opposition party, the IIun-garian Democratic Forum, expressed its opinion that the issue of ;\TATO membership and the question of ownership of agriculturalland should be addressed in a joint refer-endum. The latter was one of their chief domestic political platforms. The iilltiati\'e orig-mated from thelr declaration in] une 1997, saying that if the govemment subrnitted its proposal for the Law on agricultural land to Parliament, they would initiate a referen-dum on the issue, Some weeks later, on August 20, they began to collect signatures for a petition to hold a referendum whjch they hoped would prevent foreign ownership of agnculturalland. Sirnilarly, the \'oung Democrats IIungarian Civic Party - again from the opposition grouping - suggested that it would be useful to hold a decision-making referendum linking both causes - 0JATO membership and land-ownersbip. At first, the govemment parties protested that such linkage was as unnecessary as it was undesirable.
lIowever, a week later - on August 28 - they backtracked and agreed to a decision-making referendum in the case of 0JATO membership and to the possibiLty of holding a referendum on the land issue. They also presented their O\m version of questions to be asked concerning the latter, in an attempt to take the iilltiative away from the opposition.
Since alJ the parties had agreed on 15 ]uly that a single-issue opiillon-gathering refer-endum should be held on 0JATO membership, this later debate raises the question of whr such a change m political tactics had occurred. I believe that the explanation can be found in the rapid intemalization and broad consensus on the NATO issue, and the
rela-61 '\n Arm} IS needed. _-\ self-confident high-command WhlCh respecrs lJ1 equal measure European and na-oonallJ1rerests ... sold,ers who can represent the noble \1rnJes ofHunganan mJhrary rradlOons ... ' lJ1 .\lm-ures ofthe proceedings ofthe Hungarian Paruament, 293"' da)" SessIOn 1994-1998, on IsJuly 199-.
63 'OpenlJ1g the doors ro OU! EU!o-Atlanoc communJ(y memberslup is the recogruoon of our reyolunon and war of independence of 1956 and our role lJ1 the collapse of world commwusm.' Ibld.
64 'Tlus ,\lhance 15 the SUIn of common values of democranc countnes and nor slffiply of rockers, solchers and ranks.' Tbld.
65 'From 1990 onwards, Hungary has made grear effons ro wluch each go\"ernment contnbured.' Ibid.
66 'Acknowledgement of the desire for freedom and national self-esreem and deeds of [euch Repubuc, Hun-gar)". Poland) these naoons ... ' Ibld.
67 ' ... ir is necessary ro WlJ1 over ... CIYlUan orgaruzations and the majonry of soclery.' Ibld.
94
Zsuzsanna Dtikattively low importance ofi'JATO in everyday politics, compared to that of the land issue.
There was a clear divergence of opinion between the opposition and the government with regard to the latter. The ruling socialists (who had strong links with agricultural en-terprises) favored the possibility of economic societies being able to buy agriculturalland, no matter where they were from. The right-wing opposition on the other hand (aware of the importance of independent farmers to their voting base) defended Hungarian and individual ownership of agriculturalland. The issue was very delicate, and of vital interest for both parties. As far as i'JATO is concerned, alJ parties had characterized the ~ladrid
imitation as an event of great historie importance.
,\ 'hy then was there a perceived need to combine the 0.'ATO debate v.ith another is-sue, and thereby possibly endanger the smooth running of the accession campaign? Per-haps from the opposition point of "iew such a linkage was deemed desirable because the ),TATO issue had already been integrated into Hungarian political thinking and was taken for granted. The Hungarian Democratic Forum might have thought that a joint referen-dum would have greater credibility, since mare people would come to vote. They could thus ensure that the greatest number possible, would vote on the land issue, so that the referendum on that would be valid. In addition, the governrnent, wanting to organize the i'J -\TO referendum befare the end ofi'Jo\"ember, was in a hUITY, and would be more v.ilJ-ing to agree on a joint referendum. Hence, a deal could be concluded which, v.ithout damaging the ~ATO referendum timetable, would enable them to gain influence on a
\ital issue. As far the Young Democrats, they did not have such a direct interest in the land issue, but as the party seeking to be the leader of the opposition, they tried to playa dominant role in the organization of the referendum. They argued that the anti-::-·JATO farces would be convincingly defeated onJy by a decision-making referendum as opposed to an opinion-gathering one, since the latter did not have such legal weight. Thus they started to lobby far a change in the referendum conditions.
In fact, this argument was not terribly convincing. Although an opinion-gathering ref-erendum was not legalJy binding upon the government, no government would risk ne-glecting public opinion over such an important issue, especially when observed by far-eign countries with whom it was planning to enter into an alliance. Ir is likely that the Young Democrats did not want the government to gain the whole credit far a referen-dum and were thus aiming to stress their sensitivity to public opinion. The government was being pushed by the lack of time and so agreed to the linkage of the 1:WO issues, but took the initiative and composed the questions itself. This action took away any advan-tage the opposition might have gained. Opinion polls68 showed that the result of the ref-erendum on agriculturalland would have been the same irrespecove of whether the
ques-68 In Am/rot a mese d l (Tbe subjea oi tbe tale) analysIS made by the Hunganan Gallup Institute m September 199-·
, 'ATO membership and Hunganan domesoc poliocs m ehe nmeoes 95
tions of govcrnmcnt or opposition had been used. Hence, as the composer of the ques-tions on the referendum, the gO\'cmment would be the main beneficiary of a successful vote In the referendum.
On the first da} ofits aurumn sessIOn (on 8 eptember) Parliamenr started discussing the govemmentallruoative on the referendum. The general debate concluded on 16 Sep-tember. At the same urne, a petioon was submitted containing the questions favored by the 0ppOSlOon, supported by 280,000 signarures, to the Speaker of Parliament, who con-sidered that it was highly unlikely that the referendum would be held on the basis of these questions.6c} However, the :'\aoonal Election Comrruttee promised to examine the valid-itr of the signarures by 13 nober. On IO September, the Hungarian Democratic Fo-rum rurned to the Constirutional Court and asked for its opinion on the priOIity of the initiative of the clozens (thelr version of the questions) as opposed to the initiative of the parhament (the govemmental questions). They also approached the Supreme Prosecu-tor, who on 23 eptember stated that the issue was more political than legal, therefore beyond rus competence. Following this, the Forum turned for help to the Ombudsman for cid rights. \leanwhile, on 30 September. the majority of the governing coalition re-jected the 0pposlOon's referendum questions. 1\~0 days later. the Ombudsman a ked the Constirutional Court for its inrerpretation on wh ether Parliament could decide on the govemmenr's inioative, or whether It had to wait for verification of the signarures. Later on, ix.\ 1Ps asked for a ruling on wh ether the Constirution had been viola ted or not.
\\lthOut wainng for the interpretation of the Court the govemmental majority in Par-liament declded, on ~ October, to hold the referendum on 16 :'\ovember 199- using as a basis, their own questions, while opposition \1Ps walked out in protest against such methods. Despite fierce criticizm, not to mention the legal problems, the Presidenr of the Republic announced the very next day that the referendum would occur on the basis of the parliamentary decision taken effectively by the Govemment on - October.
Here we can \\1mess the un\\ise haste of the govemment coalition. They were bound by their prorruses for a :'\ATO referendum (made both inside and outside of the coun-try) and the opposition appeared to have begun to poil their plans. Hence they opted for strong-arm politics and tried to push their \'ersion through by using their parliamentary majority. Behind their decision wa the hope that the opposition would not risk the suc-cess of the :'\ \TO referendum by objecting to their preferred questions, and that the Constirutional Court would stick to its decislOn of Febru3l)' 1996 and would not become Invoked in pohtical issues. They were, however, eriously mistaken.
On 13 October the Constirutional Court concluded that an initiative of the citizens (I.e. the 280,000 signatures supporting the opposition's proposal) definitely had priori[}' over a govemmental initiative. On the same day, the :'\ational Election Committee
fin-69 In " 'ATO panor:ima • 'ATO panorama)', .Hll[!Jar Hr'rlap, 11 ~o\'ember 199-, 4.
Zsuzsanna Dtikar
ished certifying the signatures and found at least 200,000 yalid signatures, hence malcing the petition legalJy binding.-o
The Constitutional Court had changed its policy entirely and in an unprecedentedly short time. Ir had also ruled on an issue which had direct political consequences. This was contrary to its decision of February 1996, but the circumstances had changed drastica11y.
On the first occasion, there had been a parliamentary consensus, and the verclict of the Cltizens had only been postponed until some future date. This time, there was a battle be-tween the opposition and the government, and the initiative of the citizens was clearly being overridden by the government.-I
In response to the decision of the Court, the Government proposed the next day (14 October 199~) to Parliament that, in view of the problems of ownership of agricultural land, the referendum of 16 i':ovember should only put :\TATO membership on its agenda. As this proposition would have required an exemption from the rules of Parlia-ment (which needed the 0/5 of the votes) the opposition had an opportunit)' to torpedo it.
After an emergency Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister asked the Constitutional Court to decide whether the referendum could be held on the question of :\TATO membership alone. At the same time it continued to put pressure on the opposition to force it to ac-cept the new proposition. At the Constitutional Stancling Committee of Parliament, gov-ernment 2VIPs rejected putting the petition on the agenda of the general meeting. The Prime :'.linister declared that, aalast res ort, the government would decide by itself on :'\ATO membership, without a referendum, and postpone discussion of the land issue untiJ the next session.-' Adding to the confusion, the Constitutional Court then rejected the Prime .\linister's request for further clarification, referring to its lack of legal compe-tence. On 17 October, after another emergency Cabinet meeting, the government de-cided, despite everything, to hold a referendum but on I)' on the :\TATO question, and thus the initiative passed to Parliament for appro\·al.
Finally, on 2 I October both the opposition and the government agreed that Parlia-ment would examine the possibiliry of a referendum soleI)' on the question of:\TATO membership. On 4 :\Tovember Parliament decided ,",1th 323 votes for, and 16 against, that a referendum would be held on Hungary's :\TATO membership on 16 :\'ovember 1997."3 The issue had at last been resolved.
This messy period clearly showed that although there was a consensus amongst par-liamentary parties on ~ATO membership, and that a11 of them considered it to be a ver}' important opportuniry, it was not handled in Parliament as an issue of primary
impor--0 The mod,fied Consoruoon of 199- reqwred zoo,ooo "alid slgnarures far holding a referendum.
-1 Resoluoon of me Consoruoonal Court :-';0: 5 z1r99-(X. 14')'
~2 In 'Vegs6 esetben a korminy döm (As a last resort me govemment will decide)', ,l1agyar .\'em::n, 16 Oerober
199~, 3·
~3 ,\1inutes of the proceedings of me Hungarian Parliamenr, 3 19th da)" SessIOn 1994-1998, on 4 :-.'ovember 199~
:-: \TO mcmbcrship and Hungarian domesnc pohrics m the nineties 97
:-: \TO mcmbcrship and Hungarian domesnc pohrics m the nineties 97