At least until the mid-I98os, if not until the end of that deeade, Austria derived its for-eign poliey identity and its international politieal role from the international legal status of perpetual neutrality (cf. Neuhold 1986, 23 I). 0:eutrality was eonsidered to be the guar-antee for Austrian independenee, "Austria's war oflife, and even its raison d'etre" (Angerer 1996, 125)8. Nevenheless, as time passed, neutrality was interpreted in \"arious different ways.
5 Luif derued clus possibiliry in 1981 (cf. 6-f.).
6 The obliganon applies onl)" to stares and nor to pn\"are conracrs, e.g. pm"are cornmerce - which lS not co\"-ered by such a regulanon.
" BelglUffi and Luxembourg also assumed a neutral starus for aperiod of time, but only S\\ltzerland has re-mamed "permanently neutral" until me present.
8 Cf. also Pelinka (1994173), who refers to neutrality as a poLtncal "Leitmotiv".
Ausrrian :-:eurralit}': I Estoncal Development and Semannc Change
Cntil the late 1960s, Austrian neutrality inclined towards the Swiss model. The ideol-ogy and practice of Austrian neutrality changed after 1970: "Ir was situated berween the more passl\'e umlerstanding of the Swiss and the more active and flexible one of the Swedes, \\hieh was characrerized as 'not-allied'. The Austrian understanding of neutrality and of neutral pollCY developed more towards the wedish model" (Höll 1994, 37)' The doctrine of "peaceful eo-existence" became the new benchmark for an "active neutrality poliey" (cf. Kramer 1997, 715) and the guiding principle of foreign poliey' pracoce (cf.
IIummer 1996, 12). As an important element in Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's
"Ausman \Vay" of the 1970S (Reiterer 1988, 172 f.), "aetive neutrality policy" greatly con-tributed to the "success story" of the Second Republic and to the image of Austria as an
"island of the blessed" (cf. Pelinka 1994, 172).9 "The notion of a globally-oriented, aeti\'e neutrality poliey' became the norm of the Kreisky era that had begun in 1970. In his sec-ond initial governmental speech on 5 :\"ovember 1971, Kreish.)' explieitly stated that a successful foreign policy was 'the best guarantor of neutrality and seeurity in times of peace"
CI
Iöll 1994, 37f.)·,. >\ctive neutrality polier" became synonyrnous with Austrian foreign policy in general (Höll 1994, 38). In domestic politics, neutrality functioned as "part of the political carn-paign for an awareness of the responsibilities of statehood" (Prisching 1995,72). For Aus-trian citizens, neutrality offered a clearly positi\'e point of identifieation: "For the Austri-ans, neutrality wa a recipe for suecess: After the i'\azi occupation, the corporative state and ci\'il war, after the state that nobody wanted, the economie crise and collapse, the eountry had (finally) become, under the aegis of Austrian neutrality, everything that the
>\usmans \'alued: a demoeraey', a wealthy country, a country with a just social order, with freedom, in accordanee with European standards" (Khol 1990, 34)'
The official national self-image saw the Austrian state in a balaneing mediatory posi-tion, and especially as the diplomatic host for delieate international negotiations in both the East-\\'est and :\'orth-South conRicts: "\\'hat it [Ca small, neutral eountrv'] could do was to establish channels of eomrnunications, arrange events where political talks on a high or summit level could take plaee or try to make proposals in the search for conRict resolutions" (Höll 1994, 36). lt is in light of this, that the status ofVienna as an impor-tant conference center and as the third U0J city should be interpreted, as weil as the gen-eral acti\'e role taken by Austria in the United ~ations and its partieipation in "peace-keeping operations" (cf. Schrnidl 1996, 1 38ff.). All this gave Austrian citizens a feeling of seeuriry, stabiliry and peaceful continuit:y. In this way, neutraliry gained a high symbolic
\'alue, one that i expressed in the following quotation: "In a crisis-ridden \\'orld, Austria does indeed plal' the role of an irnaginary political first-aid man ( ... ) which eontributes
9 For a cntical appmsal, see Cnterberger, Khol and Steiner (quoted after Höll 19940 50).
28 Kann Liebhan
in a measurable way to ehe seeurity of Austria. The aetive foreign poliey of a small neu-tral eountry, ( ... ) makes \'ienna to an important meeting-plaee for politieal personalities and power-groups, to an East-\\Test hub of eonsrructive politieal ideas, eultural flows and eeonomie eontaets" (Vajda 1980,600).
For a lang period, Austria's foreign poliey was eonsidered synonymous wieh an aetive neutrality poliey. Nevertheless - and ehis is indieative of ehe ambivalenee of Austrian neutrality - permanent neutrality was understood by many Austrians (primarily) as per-manent impartiality, or as a "happy abdieation from international involvement in gen-eral" (pelinka 1994, 172). Rotter (1990, 10) deseribed chis "non-involvement" in the fol-lowing way: "The real purpose of permanent Austrian neutrality is to stop us from getting involved in eonfuets or even wars that have nothing to do with us" (1990, 10).
Towards ehe end of ehe Kreisky era, ehe demand for "equidisranee" was eritieized by some politieians of ehe Ö\ 'P, f. i. Andreas Khol. Among oeher things, ehey were partieu-larly eritical of Austria's close co-operation wieh the ~on-Aligned Movement (cf. Höll 1994, 50).l' Luif (1981,65) points to ehe tendency of both larger political parties to equate "neutralism" >\ieh "a lack of principles" or even "ideological neutrality", a term connoting disapproval. In an ideologieal sense, Austria had been firmJy anchored to ehe
\\Test from the verl' start and was clearll' eommitted to 'the values' of the \\Test"
(Steininger 1996, 123)' This was expressed in its membership of the Couneil of Europe:
Austria joined in 1956 G'Jeuhold 1986, 245, cf. also IIöll 1994, 37 and Gehler 1995, 65f.)·
After 1955, the \\Test could rell' upon Austria despite its neutrality. The period of occu-pation had already seen attempts to gain aeceptance for the country's western ideologi-cal and econornic orientation. Also, Austria's \Nestern politieal and strategic orientation was also continued after 1955, as long as the Soviet Union raised no major objeetions.
The country's pro-western neutrality policy and the continuation of Austria's policy of seeret allianees after 1955 are best expressed in a Uni ted States' ~ational Seeurity Coun-cil analysis ofOctober I958, in whieh Austria's voting behavior in ehe United ~ations is
10 "~on-ahgrunent" arose out of the process of decoloTIlzacion and agall1St the backgroW1d of the Cold \\"ar tn the 1950$. As a foreign polJC) movement, Jt was supported by states that wished to avoid bemg drawn mto the nvalnes of the twO super-powers. At first, non-ahgrunent was also described as "d)11amic" or "posJOve"
neuualiry and was considered to be dJfferent from uadltional neuuahry and the passJ\1t)' and isolacionism that was assoClated WJth neuuahry. A '"anery of tenns such as "neurrahsm", "non-engagement", "the un-commmed", "the non-alhed" and "non-involvement" were replaced m the mid-19505 by the tenn "non-ahgrunem", whtch became the official tenn at the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The hteral Gennan uans-lanon of "non-aligrunem" is ".Vichtpaktgebwuienheit", which JS a rather awkward word and therefore the tenn "BkK/ifrelheit" tends to be used. In the European come>."t, reference was still made to "neuuahsm" even where a non-ahgned pohc)' was meant. In prinClple, "non-aIigrunem" allows onc to take up apolincal posi-non, and e'"en take sldes, on the basis of each indi\ldual case. Cnlike "neuuality", "non-ahgrunem" tS not an msrirunon of tnternarionallaw. Its prinClples are not legaUy binding upon states (cf. Zemanek 1984, Luif 1981, Verdross 1977 and Ennacora 1975)'
Austrian 1'."eutrahry· H15roncal Developmem and Semancic Change
praised for being just as consistently pro-American as that of the 0.'ATO partners and
"the banana republics of Central America" (Bischof 1996, 149, cf. also IIöll 1994, 36).
The late 1980s: "Austria's horne is Europe"II
For a long period, there was a consensus among representatives of the t\\.'o larger political parties in Austria that memberslUp of a supranational organization was incompatible \11th perpetual neutrality (of the Swiss model) and the foreign policy role defined by such neu-tralit) (cf. Falkner 1995, 33 Iff; ~ick, Pelinka 1994, 24; Luif 1982; Rotter 1990). );ever-theless, unlike Switzerland, wlUch has not joined the United ~ations, Austria integrated into that organization a early as in 1955 (Neuhold 1986, 236).
Austrian membership - from 1960 - of EFTA., an exclusively economic-oriented supranational association, was decided upon in parliament \\-ith reference to the exclu-sively military character of Austrian neutrality, wlUch c1id not impinge upon econornic as-sociations (cf. Ilummer 1996, 18)." The position was different in the 1960s and 1970S with regard to possible Austrian memberslUp of the European Economic Community (EEC). \\'ith the exception of the FPÖ, wlUch considered accession to the EEC as com-patible with a policy of neutrality, all other political parties agreed that Austria should not stri\'e for full memberslUp of the EEC, ince the EEC had always seen itself as a political community as weil as an econornic community. As a political community, it could also be identified with ~.\TO (Nick & Pelinka 1994,24),
In the late 1980s, howe\'er, the positions of many politicians changed. One reason for rhis was the changed political environment: as result of"1989" and the coUapse of the "Iron Curtain", Austria's "special intermediate position" bet\\.'een the [Wo opposing ideological blocs, lost its defining character for their national self-image. An additional reason was the threat of deterioration in conclitions for the Austrian economy after the ino'oduction of the single European market (Falkner 1995, 333, Nick & Pelinka 1994, 24, Kramer 1997,728-732). In 1987, an e.\:perr legal opinion commissioned by the Federal Chamber of Com-merce broke through the political consensus concerning the incompatibility of Austrian membership of the European Community (EC) and perpetual neutrality (cf. Pelinka, Schaller & Luif 1994,152, Wodak et al. 1996). Efforts to integrate in both a political and economic sense into the " 'estern European community, led finally to a rupmre in the fun-damental continuity of the political interpretation of neutraliry. In fact, the perpetual neu-tral status of Austria had already been breached on several occasions in the preceding years.
II For Austrian imegraoon poll'), see also Lwf(r99', 759---1).
12 The bilateral trade agreements drawn up as part of co-operacion berween ehe EC and EITA also comall1ed neutrahtyand rermll1anon pro\"\Sos (cf. Hummer 1996, 2 I).
30 Konn Liebha71
For example, the Ausman federal go\-emrnent had permitted state-mmed indusmes to ex-port armaments to belligerent counmes and had also permitted foreign militaryaircraft to fly into Ausma's airspace in the course of the Gulf\\'ar. Furthermore, Ausma did not be-have in a neutral manner in 1991 when war broke out in the former Yugoslavia (cf. Pelinka 1994, 173)' The events of 1989 and the falling away of the "iron curtain" benveen the NO
former blocs, established a completely new framework for Ausman foreign policy and its positiorung as a small (European) state. After the loss of the "special mtermediary position", the customary points of reference were no longer present (Reinprecht 1995, 341), wruch led some commentators to speak of a "crisis of orientation" in foreign polier (ibid.).
The discussion of possible EC membership arose not just for foreign policy reasons, but conceming above all, issues concerning domestic politics. From 1987, EC member-shlp was supported primarily by the FPÖ, Ö\' T, and Association of Indusmalists. The SPÖ was quick to follow. The Office ofInternational Law of the Foreign "-1inistry sup-ported membership of the EC ~ith a neutrality proviso. This was also the position of the leading representatives of the social parmership, who demanded the fulJ retention of Aus-ma's neutral status. On June 19, 1989, the Ausman parliament commissioned the govern-ment to begin negotiations in this matter. On July 17,1989 a "letter to Brussels" was dis-patched, and negotiations began on February 1,1993 (cf. Falkner 1995, 3 Hff.). The NO
governing parties (Ö\ T and SPÖ) attempted to portray themselves as the "European par-ties" (Falkner 1995, 3 H)· In adcLtion, there wa an expectation from the government side, of recei\ing a tool that could be used in domestic politics for the purposes of modemiza-tion and liberalizamodemiza-tion (Schall er 1991, 500). Accession to the EC was to serve as a "rod in the window" ~ith which to begin implementing unpopular political decisions in the eco-nornic and social fields (Schneider 1994, 8f; Kaiser et al. 1994)' At the same time, o~ing
to a number of scandals (\Alne scandal, trade in armaments, the \\'aldheim affair), the Ausman state found itself in a crisis of image (Gehler, Sickinger 1995, 67 1-683)' Ausma sought an intemationally acceptable (\\'est European) identity (Kramer 1991, 192).
1989- 1995: Austria's efforts to integrate into "' Nestern Europe"
The idea of the European single market launched in 1985, led to increased efforts on the part of Ausma to obtain EC membership. The European Econornic Area (EEA), which had been established on the basis of the Luxembourg Declaration of 1984 (Hummer 1996, 22), was considered by most Ausman politicians to be merely a tempora!)' solution, be-cause of the lack of powers of decision. Ausma "still retains the option of joining the EC"
(ibid., 24)' The EEA .. agreement, which posed no problems for Ausman neutrality because it intentionally avoided doser co-operation berween signato!)' states in the field of foreign policy, was signed in Porto in :'I1ay 1992 (cf. ibid., 25)' Unlike the other neutral counmes
Ausman :-,: curraüry: J !Isrorical Developmem and emanoc Change
\\ ho were membershlp candidates, Austria's membership application of J uly 1989 con-tained a formal neutralll:Y proviso. The aim of which was tO ensure the ability of the Aus-trian state tO fulfill "its legal obligations flowing from its status as a perpetually neutral state" even as a member of the European Communities "on account of the treaty of ac-cesslOn" and "to continue its [policy on neutrality as a specific contnbution tO the main-tenance of peace and security !n Europe" (Außenpolioscher Bericht 1989, quoted after I Iummer 1996, z 5). In the negotiations leading up to membership, Austria pragmatically assumed that perpetual neutralJty was compatible with the Treat:y of :'Ilaastricht and the Common Foreign and Secunry Policl' (CF P), the "second pillar" of the European Union (ELl. The treary' of accesslOn of June 1994 no longer contained a formal neutraliry'
pro-\1S0. According to the then foreign minister, Alois .\lock, the A.ustrian government was of the \iew "that there was no contradiction between the obligations of a EU member-state and the co re elements of neutrality, and thus Austria will join the EU as a neutral state"
(Außenpolitische Dokumentaoon 1995, quoted after Hummer 1996, z6). Xevertheless, in agreement \\ith the other candidate member-states G'Jorway, Finland and Sweden), Aus-tria decJared a \~illingness to take a "fulJ and active part" in the common foreign and se-cunry' policy (Falkner 1995, 3 3 ~).
In
199+. the Austrian parLiament enacted an amendrnent to the constitution permitting Austria to participate in the implementation of economic sanctions \\ithin the framework of CFSP (cf. Hummer 1996, 2 ~).In
June 1994, the compulsory referendum on EU membership resulted in a large per-centage m fa\'or of membership (66,6 0/0). Accession into the European Union, which sen'ed to restrict se\'eral of the constitutional principles of Austria, may be seen as a break\~ith pre\10US Interpretation of the responsibilities and obligations arising out of perpet-ual neutraliry': "The rupture lal' in the progression from integration in its \\ider sense (in-sotutionalized European and international co-operation e. g., within the framework of EFTA or international agreements) tO integration in its narrower sense (participation in the supranational exertion of what had been national sovereignry.'). This change deeply contradicted, and continues to contradict, ideas about sovereignry.' that hold sway even toda) m the Second Republic" (.-\ngerer 1996, 124)' .\leanwhile, Helmuth Kramer has tnterpreted the poliocal decision to join the EU in the folJO\~i.ng terms: U[w]ith entry into the European Union [ ... ] the real post-war period [has] finally been cJosed for Austrian foreign poLicy" (1997,737).