The MFDC’s Message: Identification of Collective Action Frames

According to framing theory, collective action frames contain three analytical components, namely diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing provides evidence on what the problem is and its source or the person responsible for it. Prognostic framing suggests options to improve the situation, i.e. it proposes a solution and strategies to get there. The first two dimensions provide a basis for potential collective action, but do not automatically induce it. Concrete protest activities are triggered by motivational framing. It contains ‗calls to arms‘ or rationales, for example, moral or emotional inducements that serve to convince adherents to participate in the movement‘s efforts (see Dahinden 2006, 321;

Polletta and Ho 2006, 190; Snow and Benford 1988, 202).

Before the concrete frames will be outlined, the textual material that provided the basis for the frame analysis will be briefly introduced. The frames of the MFDC were identified by reference to documents that were written by or published in the name of the movement or its main leaders. These include various leaflets that appeared after 1982 and whose author was most likely Father Diamacoune.⁷ The priest also wrote the over 140-pages work Casamance

7 The leaflets were published in secondary sources and will be quoted as such except for the

―Proclamation‖ that was reprinted in the white book by the Senegalese government. The text La voix de la Casamance (English: The Voice of Casamance) edited by Dominique Darbon is considered the

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

– Pays du refus (English: Casamance – Country of refusal; 1995) as a response to the testimony given by Jacques Charpy in 1993.⁸ This text is not coherent or well-structured, but resembles an arbitrary succession of poorly connected claims and arguments that are often very emotional and bear strong historical references. Moreover, members of the external wing of the MFDC, namely Jean-Marie François Biagui and a collective of authors around Mamadou ‗Nkrumah‘ Sané published several pamphlets in the 1990s.⁹ Additional documents, such as an issue of the movement‘s newspaper La voix de la Casamance (English: The Voice of Casamance; 1994), letters by the MFDC to different recipients in Senegal and abroad, speeches by its members, interviews replicated in newspapers, internal documents, and material from websites were also considered.¹⁰ A fundamental complementary source was the ‗Discourse from Diatok‘. This French transcript of speeches in Diola, which two members of the MFDC held in the village of Diatok probably sometime between 1984 and 1988 yields important insights into how the movement mobilised followers on the ground and which frames were taken up in this context (Gasser 2000, xliii-liv). Finally, interviews conducted during field research complete the picture of the frames that were disseminated by the MFDC as they help to identify and verify them.

The combination of different materials provides a solid basis for framing analysis if studied in an integrated manner. If frames repeatedly re-occur in different contexts, this is a sign of their importance (see Hermann 2009). One can assume that these frames were also disseminated through other channels, i.e. orally. The triangulation with the ‗Discourse from Diatok‘ is especially valuable, as it allows for comparing written and oral communication.

6.2.1. Diagnostic Framing

In the diagnostic framing, the MFDC defined the major problems that the region faced and that necessitated collective action. Dominant topics were grievances in various domains but also injustice and colonisation. All difficulties were unanimously blamed on the Senegalese government or ‗the North‘.

manifest of the MFDC (see Darbon 1985, 125; Gasser 2000, 215; de Jong 1995, 141). The origin of the pamphlets published by Joseph Glaise (1990) is not entirely clear.

8 In 1993, Senegal agreed to consult the French archivist Jacques Charpy on the question whether Casamance had disposed of a specific administrative status under colonial rule, as the MFDC claims.

In his report, Charpy refuted this allegation (see Charpy 1993).

9 Biagui was among the young intellectuals of the MFDC, but later distanced himself from the armed movement.

10 There were two journals by the MFDC. La voix de la Casamance, was edited by ‗Nkrumah‘ Sané.

Ousmane Tamba, another leading figure who resides in Switzerland, founded Le Journal du Pays (English: News from the Homeland), which is today available online. Activists‘ websites such as Le Journal du Pays or Essamay‟s Blog occasionally replicated relevant texts and documents from previous decades. Web archives also constituted a useful means to access sources.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

a) Enough is Enough: Multiple Grievances as Root of the Evil

Paramount topics of the diagnostic framing of the movement were existing grievances in various societal domains. The MFDC criticised difficulties that Casamance faced and took up the mismatch between the potential and the actual economic performance of the region.

The grievance-related frame of the MFDC expressed the ―ras-le-bol casamançais‖¹¹, that is, the broadly shared distrust that existed in the region. According to the movement, Casamance was in various respects under-developed and marginalised in comparison to the north, but also lagged behind its actual potential. To illustrate its claims, it cited various examples. Infrastructure, such as streets or health services, was of poor quality or absent.

Although Casamance was an important player regarding agricultural production and fishing, all manufacturing industries were outside the region. Hence, the north made profits at the detriment of Casamance with the latter lacking paid employment. Besides, despite the high enrolment rates, educational institutions were insufficient and children had to pursue education in the northern cities or abandon it which amounted to discrimination of Casamançais children. Finally, the documents underscored that none of the promises that the Senegalese state had made with regard to development in Casamance had ever been realised and projects were only implemented elsewhere. In the context of socio-economic frustrations, the MFDC paid particular attention to the destruction of natural resources, especially forests and land expropriation. The movement blamed newcomers from the north for overexploiting natural resources in complicity with the state which led to the degradation of the environment in the south. It outlined that not only did this threaten the ecosystem, but also negatively affected the people‘s livelihoods and the cultural heritage due to the importance that the Animist population attributed to holy places (especially, sacred groves) (Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994; 2000). Moreover, it strongly disapproved the unjust and unhuman application of the Loi sur le domaine national due to which the long-established inhabitants of Casamance lost their land, property, and basis of living to immigrants that had only recently arrived. Consequently, the people of Casamance became ―pursued and chased like undesirable‖ in their homeland (MFDC 1994, 5). From the MFDC‘s point of view, these tendencies were no coincidence but the result of deliberate exploitation, neglect, and sabotage of Casamance by the government. It contented that the Senegalese state took resources and taxes out of Casamance without reinvesting in order to destruct the region‘s livelihood, potential, and heritage in all domains (namely, the agricultural, cultural, and intellectual one). Ultimately, this should break resistance in Casamance and destroy the region and the people (Biagui 1994a; 1994b; Darbon 1985; Gasser 2000; MFDC 1991 [1982]; 1994).

11 English: weariness, being fed up.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

Grievances in other societal domains were also taken up, but were less prominent in comparison to socio-economic frustrations and land as well as resource issues. Notably, the lack of awareness and respect with regard to culture was a recurrent theme in the framing.

The MFDC deplored the imperialism or neo-colonialism of the Senegalese who were ignorant of cultural specificities and practices that varied between the northern and the southern parts of the country. As a consequence, policies were not adapted to local realities and caused harm in the region (MFDC 1994; 1995). Likewise, all Casamançais were falsely taken as Diola independent of differences between communities. Moreover, Casamançais and their culture (including animist religious practices) were vilified and belittled by Northerners. The armed group denounced that Northerners considered people from the south as anarchic and backwards, treated them as animals (dogs or hyenas), or imbeciles, and inflicted humiliating treatment on them (Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1997;

Gasser 2000; Glaise 1990; MFDC 1994; 1995). Finally, the MFDC expressed its discontent about the political exclusion of Casamançais. The movement deplored that high-level political positions were inaccessible to politicians of southern origin. In addition, all important administrative posts in Casamance were occupied by ‗Senegalese‘, i.e. officials from the north. Hence, needs of the local population were not taken into consideration and Casamançais did not feel at home any more (Darbon 1985; MFDC 1991 [1982]; Sud hebdo, 15 July, 1988). In sum, the MFDC referred to grievances in various domains that were relevant to different social groups.

b) Injustice and Colonisation: The Denial of Rights

The MFDC pursued its problem definition at a more abstract level by highlighting manifold injustices that the region suffered from and comparing its situation to colonisation.

The injustice-related frame built on the previously discussed naming and shaming of grievances and reinforced their relevance. Yet, it was less factual and more emotional as well as normative compared to the grievance-centred frame. This component of strategic communication underscored that the Casamançais suffered from unfair treatment in all societal domains, which ‗the North‘ inflicted on them, and did not obtain what they were individually and collectively entitled to. These injustices ranged from discrimination in employment to the lack of development and the denial of self-rule to the region. Furthermore, since the beginning of the crisis, the population had fallen victim of indiscriminate repression and humiliation that did not spare the innocent, such as women, children, and elderly.

In line with the deploring of the rampant injustice, the MFDC declared that Casamance had been illegally annexed by Senegal, had lost its liberty, and had become a victim of foreign rule or neo-colonisation that was ―more perfidious and detrimental than the Franco-Portuguese colonialism‖ (MFDC 1994, 11; see also Biagui 1994a; Darbon 1985; Glaise

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

1990; MFDC 1991 [1982]; 1994; 1999; 2000). Hence, the region found itself in an anachronistic and completely inacceptable situation which was comparable to the South-African apartheid regime (Biagui 1994b, 12; Glaise 1990, 89), the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, or slavery (Diamacoune Senghor 1997; MFDC 1994, 3; MFDC 2011). By framing the underlying difficulties in such a way, the MFDC underscored that the problems that Casamance faced were not just temporary socio-economic ones that could be easily corrected by public policy measures. But it highlighted that they contained a pronounced political and systemic component that a solution necessarily had to tackle. Hence, the diagnostic framing already laid the foundation fort the prognostic one.

c) Attribution of Responsibility

The MFDC did not hesitate to attribute responsibility and define its targets. In line with references to the domination of people of northern origin over Casamançais and alleged colonisation, the grouping generally ascribed responsibility for the problematic situation of Casamance to „the North‟ or „the Northerners‟ (‗les Nordistes‟), Senegal, or the Senegalese government.¹² Independent of the concrete label, the MFDC pictured its opponent as unjust, hypocritical, and dishonest because of its past and present attitude regarding Casamance (Biagui 1994a; Glaise 1990; MFDC 1995; 2000).¹³ In this context, especially the two presidents, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Abdou Diouf were personally accused of their roles in the conflict. From the MFDC‘s perspective, Senghor bore a historical responsibility that resulted from his neglect and disregard in terms of economic development and public policies. Furthermore, he had cheated on Casamance, since he had failed to keep his promise that the region should gain independence from Dakar after a fixed time of cohabitation (Gasser 2000; MFDC 1995; Scoopsdeziguinchor, 14 January, 2007; Sud hebdo, 7 July, 1988).¹⁴ As Senghor‘s successor and incumbent head of state, Diouf was ascribed a more active part in relation to the Casamance question. The MFDC blamed him for the ongoing poor governance and exploitation in the southern part of the country. Furthermore, it accused him of human rights abuses in the region. From the rebels‘ perspective, he had provoked the escalation of violence and imposed a war as a result of his overaggressive and arbitrary ―gunboat diplomacy‖. Thus, both statesmen had infringed laws and principles in many ways and inflicted grave injustice on Casamance and its population (MFDC 2000, 2;

see also, Biagui 1994b; Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; Gasser 2000; Glaise

12 In the context of the Casamance crisis, the terms Nordistes (Northerners) and Sudistes (Southerners) are pejorative.

13 The leaflets published by Glaise (1990) contain open hostilities towards ‗Northern‘ ethnic groups as well as Muslims. In other documents, ethnic and religious accusations are less pronounced.

14 The MFDC claimed that a document had been signed at independence stipulating that Casamance should become independent after 20 years. For more information on the agreement, see 6.2.3. a) and 6.3.1. d).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

1990; MFDC 1994). One also notes that the MFDC described the Senegalese security forces in a pejorative way, for example, as ―Forces of Intervention and Repression‖ that committed violent acts against innocent (Glaise 1990, 88; MFDC 1994; 1995; 1999). Thus, the MFDC defined and constructed a tangible enemy that simultaneously legitimated its political objective and the combat it engaged in.

The MFDC also considered the French government and the international community responsible for the crisis (see Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1994; MFDC 1994; 2000).

In the past, France had ―deliberately violated the status [of the region] as a protectorate‖

(MFDC 2000, 8) and had failed to attribute to Casamance its rightful independence. Due to its passivity, France and other international actors were perceived to approve war and human rights abuses in the region (Diamacoune Senghor 1990). This frame was mainly directed at the international community and France. Yet, it also served to highlight vis-à-vis the Casamançais population that the Senegalese state acted in continuity with the former colonial power, and thus reinforced the image of ‗the North‘ as an illegitimate occupier.

Moreover, it demonstrated that the region had to rely on itself.

In sum, the diagnostic framing takes up several recurrent and well-connected issues and clearly attributes responsibility. By doing so, it provides an argumentative basis for separatist claims by the movement.

6.2.2. Prognostic Framing

The prognostic framing of the MFDC was less developed and multidimensional than the diagnostic framing but brief and simple. Independence was the only solution to all the problems of the region and the ―final objective‖ (MFDC 1994, 2). In this dimension, the movement also connected the use of force to its ultimate aim.

a) ―Independence First‖: Defining the Objective of the Struggle

In view of the regional problems, which were previously outlined, the MFDC argued that Casamance should better ―fly on its own‖ (Sud hebdo, 7 July 1988; see also Sy 2007) and

―re-become itself‖ (Darbon 1985, 137). In other words, separation and national independence were the only conceivable options.¹⁵ From the rebels‘ perspective, independence implied liberation from Senegalese colonisation and exploitation and thus, the end of all its negative consequences. It would bring about better socio-economic development, prosperity, and recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the region (Biagui 1994a; 1999; MFDC 1991 [1982]; MFDC 1994; 1995; 1999). Aside from this, the MFDC‘s maxim can be summarised as

15 Regionalisation or autonomy were dismissed as ―pacifiers‖ or ―lollipops‖ (MFDC 1995; Panafrican News Agency, 30 October, 2000). They were not an option, but could only be a first and irreversible step towards full independence (Biagui 1994a; 1999; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; MFDC 1999).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

―independence first, anything else thereafter‖ (MFDC 1995, 7; see also Diamacoune Senghor 1998b). The group‘s prognostic framing remained vague about the future of Casamance, once separation would be achieved and did not give meaning to the notion of independence, develop a programme, or propose a political or societal vision (Interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; interview with a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).¹⁶

Interestingly, oral testimonies suggest that populist ideas regarding the socio-economic development of the region circulated. This illustrates that grievances, which were highly relevant for diagnostic frames, were mirrored in the solution that the MFDC proposed.

According to the rumours, independence would turn the region into a paradise. Casamance could become prosperous since resources, for example, petrol, which allegedly existed throughout its territory, would be exploited at its benefit. In addition, the region would dispose of a well-developed infrastructure (e.g. an international harbour and airport). In these as well as in the newly created state institutions, everyone would find employment. Existing injustices at the detriment of the local population would be eradicated. There were also references to individual benefits. It is reported that property owned by Northerners – who would leave the region in the wake of independence – was promised to local people (Interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013). Here, one observes that prognostic and motivational dimensions intersect as the propositions regarding the prosperous future also provide an incentive for potential followers to participate in collective action.

b) From Non-Violence to Aggression: The Repertoire of the MFDC

By what means should independence be achieved? Regarding this, the documents by the insurgent group provided some, although not very detailed information and illustrated that its position developed over time. The MFDC pointed out that it did not want to wage a war and put great emphasis on its initially non-violent intensions. It repeatedly reasserted its wish to obtain independence through ―pacifist, juridical, political, and diplomatic‖ means (Diamacoune Senghor 1990; MFDC 1991 [1982]). It also stressed that it had acted

16 Members of the MFDC explained that the events in the early 1980s took them by surprise and they did not have the time to reflect on the future and develop a project for the society (Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013; interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013). Others highlight that they deliberately deferred it to the time, when freedom would be achieved since they understood themselves first and foremost as a liberation movement (Interview with a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; interview with an activist of the political wing, Paris, 6 February, 2014). In this context, the weakness of the political wing of the MFDC also played a role. Later, some propositions regarding independence were made but did not go beyond mere generalities, namely a timetable for independence and the instauration of self-governing structures (MFDC 1999, 4, 10-11; Sané et al.

1995).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

accordingly as the march in 1982 exemplified, which had obviously been a peaceful event (Darbon 1985, 137; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; Gasser 2000, xlix; MFDC 1991 [1982], 34-35; 1994, 2, 11; 1995, 51-52, 109; Sud hebdo, 7 July, 1988). But the prognostic framing of the MFDC had to adjust to the escalation of violence which is why the use of force became an issue. In this respect, one can identify two lines of reasoning. On the one hand, violence was presented as a defensive measure given the aggressive stance of the Senegalese government. On the other hand, there were open calls for violence because the end, i.e.

independence, justified the means.

In line with the repeated references to its non-violent intentions, the MFDC emphasised that it did not want war. It argued that bloodshed resulted from the way how the Senegalese government under President Abdou Diouf reacted to the demands for independence.

Through its ―canon dialogue‖ (Diamacoune Senghor 1997), the state imposed an unjust war on Casamance. The MFDC asserted that in view of this, it was better for the Casamançais to resist and ―to die with arms in ones‘ hands than succumb to tortures, humiliations, abuses, and vandalism by the Senegalese colonialists‖ (MFDC 1995). Thus, the rebel group attempted to frame its violent reaction as defensive, protective, and requisite in the given situation. It externalised responsibility for the outburst of violence to the Senegalese

Through its ―canon dialogue‖ (Diamacoune Senghor 1997), the state imposed an unjust war on Casamance. The MFDC asserted that in view of this, it was better for the Casamançais to resist and ―to die with arms in ones‘ hands than succumb to tortures, humiliations, abuses, and vandalism by the Senegalese colonialists‖ (MFDC 1995). Thus, the rebel group attempted to frame its violent reaction as defensive, protective, and requisite in the given situation. It externalised responsibility for the outburst of violence to the Senegalese