All against One: An Assessment of Counterframing

Neither do social movements dispose of a monopoly regarding framing, nor do their framing attempts take place in a social vacuum. Instead, they compete with so-called counterframing agents, for instance social and state actors, about the interpretation of reality.⁸² In the following, the reactions of, first, the Senegalese state and, second, other political and societal actors such as the Catholic Church, oppositional parties, and the cadres casamançais⁸³ (English: Casamançais cadres) will be summarised in an exemplary manner.

6.4.1. Counterframing by the Senegalese Government

The Senegalese state, being one of the conflict parties and the principal target of the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance in terms of armed and verbal attacks, is the most important and influential counterframing agent.⁸⁴ While its early counterframing was passive and unintendedly favoured the MFDC, the government developed a more effective strategy over time.

Especially in the early phase of the conflict, the government mainly attempted to play down and trivialise the incidents in Casamance, the MFDC, as well as its demands. Reports regarding the crisis were surprisingly rare. During the first days after the 1982 march, Le Soleil published little about the march in Ziguinchor and chose concealing vocabulary (for example, ―‘the events of the Casamance‘‖ or ―subversive actions‖) (Le Soleil, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 19 December, 1983; 11 January, 1984; see also Gueye 2010).

82 Opponents of a social movement diffuse counterframes. These contain competing interpretations of the problem and its solution and aim at demobilising potential followers of the social movement on the one hand. On the other hand, they seek to motivate people to support or join alternative action.

83 In correspondence with most of the literature, the French term will be used in the following.

84 The analysis of counterframing by the Senegalese state is based on documents that were published on behalf of the government or its members. Moreover, publications on the issue could only be made with the permission of the government. Hence, they also reflected the official position and are taken into account, even if they were not directly issued by the administration. Finally, the national newspaper Le Soleil (English: The Sun) yields interesting insights. In the early 1980s, the Senegalese media landscape had not yet been liberalised but was dominated by state media. Le Soleil was close to the Senegalese government; it disseminated official statements or press releases and also served as a ―propaganda medium for the party in power‖ (Gueye 2010, 172, 180, 230; see also ibid., 71, 161, 171-172; Wittmann 2007, 238, 241). For almost a decade, the newspaper monopolised reporting on the Casamance conflict and closely reflected the government‘s strategy of denying and marginalising the MFDC. Although some independent media existed (e.g., Sud hebdo (later Sud quotidien), Le Témoin, Wal Fadjri), tight regimentation restricted their room for manoeuvre and freedom in coverage (Gueye 2010, 68-70; see also Loum 2003; Wittmann 2007, 257-268). They only gained strength and could challenge Le Soleil in the 1990s. Then, the private media reported about the Casamance crisis in an often personalised manner, which enhanced the prominence of the movement and its leaders.

For a detailed analysis of the reporting on the Casamance crisis by Le Soleil, see Gueye 2010.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

Sources only mentioned the MFDC in quotation marks or used alternative names. Its goals were – if brought up at all – refuted as unfounded and dangerous or dismissed as pure

―propaganda‖, ―phantasm‖, or ―separatist madness‖. But the actual content of claims was not dealt with (Le Soleil, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 14 December, 1983; République du Sénégal 1991).⁸⁵ Overall, early counterframing deliberately aimed to avoid any reflections on the rebellion through banalising or ignoring it altogether, as if the government could pretend that the movement and the crisis were inexistent if it did not refer to them.⁸⁶

When the crisis could no longer be wished away, the government increasingly sought to delegitimise the MFDC, but still avoided dealing with the underlying reasons of the conflict or the rebels‘ argumentation. In the white book Les faits en Casamance: Le droit contre la violence, the administration praised (in discordance with reality) the democratic and constitutional principles as well as the rule of law, which the Senegalese state was based on, and stressed the existence of national unity and a national sentiment. Against this background, the movement‘s strategy and its major objective, i.e. separation, clearly stood out as unnecessary, unlawful, and unconstitutional. In other instances, the combatants were referred to as criminals, bandits, or terrorists which aimed to stress the movement‘s inhuman and barbaric character.⁸⁷ A specific way of defaming the rebellion was to ethnicise it. The government recurrently presented the MFDC as an ethnically based and exclusively Diola movement. By doing so, it aimed to underscore that it was non-representative with regard to the Casamançais population and lacked a popular basis. Moreover, independence was presented as a purely ethnic purpose threatening the Senegalese nation. Combined with repression, this turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy since members of other ethnic communities distanced themselves from the separatist group (Le Soleil, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 19 December, 1983; 1982-20 December, 1983; 17 July, 1990; 18 July, 1990; 17 September, 1990; 16 October, 1990; 30 November, 1990; République du Sénégal 1991, 18-19, 29; see also Gueye 2010, 180, 235-237).⁸⁸

While the state aimed to demonise, delegitimise, depoliticise, and criminalise the MFDC on the one hand (Gueye 2010, 178, 193, 225, 229-230), it sought to justify its own position and strategy and win the population‘s approval for them on the other. For this purpose, the executive power and in particular President Abdou Diouf were presented as strong, decisive

85 In the president‘s New Year‘s Speech, the events were merely mentioned at the margin. After all, the government only recognised in 2004, when the peace accord was signed, that a conflict was fought on Senegalese territory (Marut 2010, 265).

86 In 1984, the name Casamance disappeared from the maps when the region was divided into Ziguinchor and Kolda. This was also an attempt to make the issue of the conflict disappear by suppressing references to it (Dramé 1998, 5-6; LD/MPT 1988, 7; Marut 1997, 2).

87 The pejorative and de-humanising rhetoric regarding the maquisards – Le Soleil mentioned ―zones infested by rebels‖ (5 September, 1997) – served to justify resolute action, such as ―cleaning‖,

―combing‖, or ―neutralisation‖ (21 August, 1997; 26 September, 1997).

88 Occasionally, the MFDC was also presented as being masterminded from abroad and thus, constituting an external threat to the nation-state (Marut 2010, 176).

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actors.⁸⁹ They rightfully reacted with ―rigour, firmness, and determination‖ (Le Soleil, 2 January, 1984) to the violence that the MFDC imposed on the region. Hence, they aimed to protect the national project, i.e. national unity and territorial integrity, to re-establish order, and guarantee security of the population (Le Soleil, 5 September, 1997; 13-14 December, 1997). Since the state was allegedly in complete control of the situation, the MFDC‘s aspirations were necessarily doomed to fail which was supposed to discourage potential sympathisers (Le Soleil, 30 December, 1982; 19 December, 1983; 8 September, 1997).

Accusations of excessive violence or human right abuses on behalf of the state were rejected as being ―unjust but also unfounded‖ (République du Sénégal 1991, 24) because such conduct was impossible in a constitutional order. Furthermore, the government presented its action as purely defensive, moderate, and aiming at a peaceful solution (Ibid., Le Soleil, 27-28 September, 1997). Altogether, the state sought to display its proceeding as the only possible and rightful option in the given situation and to discard negative images.

In addition, several documents explicitly or implicitly countering the rebels‘ claims were published by non-official sources. Since the Casamance question was still a sensitive issue, the government had to permit such publications which suggests that their ideas where conform and beneficial to the official line and contributed to the state‘s counterframing.⁹⁰ In this context, the Rapport de Charpy (1993), which was also re-printed by Le Soleil (22 December, 1993) and thus, broadly diffused was especially important. Jacques Charpy, a French archivist, dealt with the historical argumentation of the MFDC and sought to settle the question of the juridical status of Casamance during colonial rule. In this account, Charpy concluded that ―Casamance did not exist as an autonomous territory before colonisation [and has] always been administered by the governor of Senegal during French colonialism‖

(Charpy 1993, 29). This was a clever move to defeat the separatists with their own arguments and strategy since the MFDC‘s reasoning was largely based on historical references. The example illustrates that the government engaged at least to some extent with selected elements of the MFDC‘s framing, namely demands for separation with the aim to deconstruct it. Other publications backing the position of Dakar in the conflict include, for example, a declaration by the cadres casamançais (see 6.3.2.) or pertinent scientific works.⁹¹ Concrete action by the state paralleled its official counterframing. After the first march, the government‘s reaction was harsh and heavy-handed. Not only members and sympathisers became victim of severe repression and human rights abuses. But the security forces indiscriminately targeted the Diola which is why many uninvolved civilians suffered from their brutality. This constituted a prolongation of the verbal ethnicisisation of the MFDC and should

89 One can observe a certain personalisation in the state rhetoric: Abdou Diouf seems to incarnate the government and its actions. This is a consequence of the political system that attributes a central role to the president. Similarly, the MFDC‘s framing attributes responsibility to Diouf.

90 Journalists or authors who did not align with the government were often intimidated or censored.

91 An example of such a publication is Makhtar Diouf‘s Sénégal: les ethnies et la nation (1994).

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deter potential supporters of the rebellion. Over the years, the government also acknowledged grievances, which were voiced by the MFDC, to some extent and took (partly symbolic) actions to alleviate them. It included, for example, regional politicians in the government to improve the representation and say of the area. The administration also reacted to criticism that the Casamançais history and culture were neglected at the national level and recognised their importance; for instance, the Casamançais prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta became part of the national narrative and namesake for various public places.⁹² Moreover, several matches of the Africa Cup of Nation in 1992 took place in Ziguinchor to underscore the allegiance of the region to Senegal and boost infrastructure. In addition, socio-economic grievances were addressed. The Casamance saw an increase in development initiatives that were mainly shouldered by international donors such as the German Technical Cooperation and USAID or non-governmental organisations (de Benoist 1991; Foucher 2009; 2011; Marut 2010; Toliver-Diallo 2005).⁹³

Overall, the effects of the counterframing by the government were as diverse as its strategies and only partly produced the expected results. Indiscriminate repression led to a climate of fear and passivity in Casamance which hampered sensitisation to some extent, because people avoided openly talking about the MFDC. Simultaneously, the government left the public arena to the MFDC since it did not de-construct or disprove frames by the rebel group.

Hence, the armed movement, which had not yet lost is appeal, profited from the weak counterframing. Furthermore, while deterring some, repression contributed to the radicalisation of many others. The violent reaction further discredited the government in the eyes of the regional population and drove many sympathisers into active rebellion. Thus, the initial avoidance strategy coupled with repression did not contribute to weaken or eliminate the MFDC, but even favoured it in some respects. Only later, the government opposed the separatists more actively and effectively. The MFDC‘s reaction to Charpy‘s report – the publication of a 140-page document listing historic justifications for separation – shows that the movement interpreted the counterframing as a potential threat that required reaction.⁹⁴ Moreover, the shift in public policy was important. By addressing existing grievances, the government cut the ground from under the movement‘s feet as it rendered its claims at least partly obsolete. It offered a better performance in terms of service delivery in comparison

92 Among other things, the Ziguinchor stadium, a roundabout in Ziguinchor, a quarter in Dakar, and the ferry that has been connecting Dakar to Ziguinchor since 2008 bear her name.

93 The peace process in Casamance and related development initiatives became a lucrative business for public and private actors, including the MFDC (Foucher 2009; Marut 2010, 281-287). This tendency intersected with counterframing and fostered its deterring effect.

94 The MFDC reacted to Charpy‘s report by publishing Casamance – Pays du refus. It also repeatedly highlighted its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character as a response to the ethnicisation by the government.

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with the rebels, compensated their inaction, and satisfied expectations on the ground.⁹⁵ Besides, it countered the image of ‗the North‘ as the principal source of the problems and matched the expectations of those parts of the population that had supported the MFDC because they wished to be better integrated within the country. Through this, the government might not have immediately won hearts and minds and eradicated all scepticism in Casamance. Nonetheless, it successfully weakened the MFDC.

6.4.2. Other Societal and Political Actors

In addition to the government, there were also other socio-political actors that engaged in counterframing, namely the cadres casamançais, oppositional parties, and the Catholic Church whose positions will be considered subsequently.⁹⁶ As in the case of framing by the MFDC, there is a lack of data that a framing analysis can be based on. Thus, the following presentation is exemplary, but cannot depict all alternative frames in detail.

a) The Cadres Casamançais

There were counterframing efforts within Casamance, namely from the so-called cadres casamançais. In the past, the cadres had migrated from Casamance to the north where they continued to live. They were well-integrated in the northern society, and remained unaffected by the crisis. Hence, they formed a well-educated, economically successful élite that was also present at the political level (Foucher 2002a, 399-400; 2002b, 194-195; 2011, 91-93).⁹⁷ The cadres rejected the MFDC and its ideas and took the government‘s side.

Simultaneously, they presented themselves as mediators (Le Soleil, 24 January, 1991). On the one hand, they highlighted their attachment to their home region and their good connections to different societal groups in order to demonstrate their ability to speak for the Casamançais population. On the other hand, they were well represented in state institutions, with many holding offices or mandates in the government or parliament, respectively. Hence they appeared to be influential advocates of Casamance. The cadres acted collectively, for example within the Collectif des Cadres Casamançais (English: Collective of the

95 The government‘s action and its effects should not been overestimated. Despite improvements through initiatives of development, people remained critical of it and the deficiencies of such projects.

Thus, frustration and scepticism persisted. Incidences, such as the wreck of the ‗Joola‘ in 2002 seriously strained the relationships between the regime and Casamance. In sum, the government rather appeared the better of the worse options in comparison with the MFDC.

96 In the early years of the conflict, there was a climate of fear that impeded public debate. Civil society and consequently, its counterframing attempts gained strength in 2000 when Wade won presidential elections and ended the socialist hegemony. Today, there is a variety of civil society actors that speak out against separation and the MFDC. Since their emergence is relatively recent, their positions will not be discussed here. For an overview of such opposing voices see Awenengo 2006; Awenengo Dalberto 2010; Foucher 2003b; 2009.

97 Unlike many young men who failed to gain a foothold in the north due to the difficult economic situation, previous generations of migrants had successfully integrated into the northern society with numerous of them occupying important economic and political positions.

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Casamançais cadres) or as a cross-party group of Casamançais parliamentarians. Some are also known for their individual commitment and continue to be involved in the peace process until today.⁹⁸

In 1984, the Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie (English: Extended Delegation of the Casamançais cadres) published a memorandum on the Casamance crisis that yields thorough insights into the cadres‘ position concerning the conflict. In addition, newspaper articles were analysed to specify their stance. In the memorandum, the cadres acknowledged that a number of problems negatively affected Casamance, namely concerning the politico-administrative, socio-cultural, and socio-economic domains and had been at the origin of the crisis. They urged the government to tackle them in order to allow for better development and peace in the region (Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie 1984). Yet, the delegation presented the difficulties in a very technocratic and rational manner which is why they appeared easily solvable and neglected political and emotional aspects connected to them. Furthermore, the cadres made clear that secession was not the right way to improve the situation and rejected it as being utopian, inacceptable, and contradicting the need of greater continental integration (Le Soleil, 30 December, 1982; 18 January, 1984, 21-22 July, 1990; 15 February, 1994). Thus, they explicitly spoke out against the MFDC‘s major goal and presented their opinion as being supported by the majority of the regional population (Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie 1984, 53; Le Soleil, 18 January, 1984; 27 February, 1990). Instead, the cadres supported national unity, stressed the fact that Casamance was part of Senegal, and referred to the long tradition of constructive collaborations, interaction, and commonalities between the north and the south to underscore that what united the two parts of the country was by far stronger than existing differences (Collectif des cadres casamançais 2005 [2000]; Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie 1984; Le Soleil, 10 April, 1991; see also interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). They also warmly welcomed the report by Jacques Charpy which they considered as supporting their position and representing a step into the right direction, that is, towards settling the conflict (Le Soleil, 22 December, 1993; 30 December, 1993; 15 February, 1994; see also Collectif des cadres casamançais 2005 [2000]). The cadres also condemned violence and thus the MFDC‘s means and pointed to the negative effects that armed struggle had for the region. Instead, they called for dialogue in order to find a non-violent solution for the conflict and stressed the importance of peace and democracy as prerequisites for development. Ultimately, the cadres

98 Among them were Marcel Bassène (PDS, member of parliament (MP), mediator of a ceasefire agreement with the MFDC, and coordinator of the Commission de gestion de la paix), or Louis Dacosta (PS, MP, and vice-president of the national assembly; as president of the Collectif des députés casamançais he sent missions to Casamance to reduce violence), Pierre Atepa Goudiaby (architect and president of the Collectif des cadres casamançais as well as advisor of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade) and Robert Sagna (PS, minister under Abdou Diouf, first Diola mayor of Ziguinchor, and leader of the Groupe de réfléxion pour la paix en Casamance).

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expressed their appreciation and support for the steps taken or intended by the Senegalese government (Le Soleil, 18 January, 1984; 11 June, 1990; 18 June, 1990, 24 January, 1991;

Mané 2013). In addition, they took concrete action to reach out to and get in contact with the local population, community leaders, or the rebels (Le Soleil, 30 December, 1982; 11 June, 1990; 19 July, 1990; 21-22 July, 1990). These initiatives served to seek support for their message, sensitise local actors concerning the devastating effects of the fighting, and reduce support for the MFDC. Moreover, they should establish and improve links between Casamance and the state.

In many respects, the counterframing by the cadres was close to the position of the

In many respects, the counterframing by the cadres was close to the position of the