Assessing Frame Resonance and Framing Effects in Casamance

The identification of frames by the MFDC yields important insights into how the movement interpreted the regional situation, what solutions it proposed, and how it tried to motivate potential followers to adhere to its aim and strategy. However, it is imperative to move beyond mere description and analyse the effectiveness of the framing by the MFDC on its

27 This is partly a reaction to counterframing, namely the publication of the report by Jacques Charpy on the status of Casamance under colonial rule. Historical and juridical arguments, as for example provided in Casamance – Pays du refus, should convince sceptics as well as the Senegalese government of the legitimacy of claims. However, the strongly history-centred argumentation provokes a feeling that the MFDC lost relation to reality and the preoccupations of its constituency.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

constituency. Hence, frame resonance will be assessed by studying both successful and failed framing attempts. The credibility of frame articulators will be examined separately.²⁸

6.3.1. A Successful Rebellion? Review of Effective Frame Resonance The framing of the MFDC referred to various issues that were of great importance to the local population. By building on existing protest movements and aptly instrumentalising networks, the group successfully disseminated its message and circumvented political and social obstacles to framing, such as the limited freedom of expression or high levels of illiteracy. As a result, the insurgent group mobilised supporters and participants in the early phase of the conflict and benefitted from the backing of the local population that supported it financially, through food donations, or protection.²⁹ In the following, the elements of the MFDC‘s framing that successfully convinced the local population to support the cause will be systematically assessed.

a) Grievances, Frustration, and Feelings of Injustice as Fertile Ground

As outlined in the previous chapter, concrete socio-economic difficulties and perceptions of being discriminated against in various societal domains had already occupied the local population especially in the municipality of Ziguinchor in the 1970s and early 1980s. This manifested itself in the increasing potential for mobilisation and emerging protest initiatives that should later boost the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance.

The list of grievances and injustices in Lower Casamance is long: Due to the implementation of the land law, local people lost their property and basis of existence at the benefit of migrants from the north without obtaining any compensation. Newcomers were also criticised for increasingly (over)exploiting local resources, for example timber or fish (Interviews with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013).³⁰ Frequently, the regional administration was criticised in this context. It was dominated by officials of northern origin that knew little about the specific

28 Frame resonance is determined by the salience and the credibility of frames. The salience of a frame depends on three factors, namely its centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. The degree of credibility of a frame results from its internal consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of frame articulators (Benford and Snow 2000, 619-622; see 3.3.2.).

29 The MFDC was not uniformly supported throughout Lower Casamance. While some villages collectively backed the movement, others did not.Divergent opinions often divided families.

30 Migrants of northern origin or foreigners remained a minority in demographic terms, but were economically influential. This is partly due to networks, yet their economic performance was often better and more dynamic. They used more modern techniques, were more strongly implicated in trading, and had a better entrepreneurial spirit in comparison to locals (Interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

local context. Moreover, they were accused of privileging migrants at the detriment of native inhabitants as a result of clientelistic networks. Hence, Casamançais felt that the administration appeared unwilling to address regional problems. Instead, the governing authorities were characterised by ineffectivity and pretension and seemed to be more interested in their own profit than regional development and the well-being of the population.

Thus, it is not surprising that the situation was sometimes compared to colonialism (Juillard 1995, 32-34; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013). There were also allegations that Casamance was disadvantaged in terms of socio-economic development and public investment in comparison to the north.³¹ Finally, it appears that Casamançais were discriminated against in recruitment or administrative competitions.³² Although it is difficult to verify in how far such incidences occurred systematically, the numerous accounts by people who experienced disadvantages because of their origin provide evidence that the problem had a noticeable extent (Interview with a member of civil society, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; interview with the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October, 2013). Altogether, these instances promoted a feeling of being discriminated against and second-class citizens. Especially in the municipality of Ziguinchor, locals considered that they were dominated in all societal domains, disenfranchised, and despised by a ‗foreign‘ – northern – minority that seemingly exploited and disproportionally profited from economic revenues in the south. These perceptions came along with discontent and distrust among the local population vis-à-vis the local administration and the national government but also Northerners more generally.

The MFDC took up and denounced such – real or perceived – social, political, and economic ills that were of fundamental importance to locals in different frames and framing dimensions

31 The conflict analysis uncovered that Lower Casamance fared relatively well in terms of infrastructure and development on national average and in comparison to other rural zones throughout the country, which are generally marginalised in the strongly centralised Senegalese polity. Yet, the comparatively more prosperous and privileged urban centres of northern Senegal assumingly constituted the parts of the country that were best known among Casamançais and – incorrectly – equated with ‗the North‘.

Hence, perceptions of marginalisation are not surprising. Moreover, figures on socio-economic development tell little about its relevance for the population. In Casamance, tarred roads served, for example, economic interests, but did not necessarily correspond to local needs (Faye 1994). This suggests that the subjective perception of inequality is more relevant than objective conditions.

32 There are multiple accounts that Casamançais were discriminated against in competitive examinations or recruitment processes due to their southern origin. For instance, they were refused places at university, jobs, or promotions in spite of their good performance. Instead, ‗Northerners‘ were privileged although their results were worse. Allegedly, entire selection processes had to be cancelled due to such flaws. It is difficult to get information on the extent of the problem. Yet, many interviewees recounted pertinent experiences that they had made or knew about which is why such allegations cannot be discarded (see, for example, interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; interview with the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October, 2013).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

(see, for example, Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994). These grievance- and injustice-related frames were close to the difficult everyday life experience of the population in Lower Casamance and took up their frustration. Hence, they seemed justified and credible which gave an important boost to the MFDC (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). Moreover, the movement framed the various socio-economic problems and the political marginalisation in an emotional and normative way.

According to the rebel group, Casamance was deprived of justice, honour, and dignity as a result of Senegalese rule. It went even further by equalising the situation of the region with colonisation by Senegal (see, for example, MFDC 1995; 1998). Thus, it invoked painful, but strong memories and enhanced collective emotions, such as frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger. This served to enhance framing effects, justify the group‘s objective and target of collective action, and ultimately mobilise followers. In addition, the MFDC also canalised grievances into concrete action. It gave a voice to the Casamançais at a moment, where they felt particularly marginalised without having an opportunity to express their frustrations through other channels, since political opposition was restricted and southerners were excluded from decision-making as well as informal political networks influencing politics, namely brotherhoods. Thus, the movement filled a vacuum that was left by the Senegalese institutional and clientelistic structures and appeared an attractive alternative through its participative communication strategy which gave the population the impression of finally being heard and taken seriously.³³ As a consequence, one can presume that the majority of the people participating in the march in 1982 and siding with the MFDC afterwards were eager to express their discontent about socio-economic and political ills since enough was enough and to protest for better consideration for their home region. However, it will be seen further down that this was a fragile and short-lived symbiosis that should later turn against the MFDC because the demonstrators and sympathisers were not necessarily in favour of secession from Senegal (Interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013; a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).³⁴

33 Respondents stressed the movement‘s participative communication. Members of the MFDC visited remote villages and communities. They went from door to door to discuss with locals which gave them the feeling of being heard and taken into consideration (Interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 6 November, 2013; interview with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013).

34 While separation from Senegal was explicitly referred to in a leaflet from 1982 (MFDC 1991 [1982]), interviewees occasionally insisted that independence was initially not intended, but was increasingly claimed as a consequence of repression by the government.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

The positive framing effect of grievance- and justice-related frames can be demonstrated by reference to a specific social group. For decades, young (mainly Diola) men left the Ziguinchor region in order to pursue education or seek employment in Dakar or other cities of the north and formed a new, economically successful regional élite. Due to the economic crisis, the labour market could no longer absorb the incoming workforce.³⁵ Consequently, many young Casamançais had to return to their communities without any future professional prospects. Since both education and migration are at the origin of regional consciousness in Casamance, one can assume that their attitudes corresponded at least partly to the MFDC‘s positions. Besides, they belonged to pertinent networks (e.g. migrant associations) and were therefore easily reachable. Moreover, given their frustration and negative experiences in ‗the North‘, the disillusioned young men were receptive to anti-northern propaganda, which matched their emotional state, and could be mobilised to join the rebels. The maquis provided an alternative opportunity for them and increased their prestige compared to inactivity and the image of professional failure that they suffered from (Foucher 2002b;

2005b; Gasser 2000, 250-252; 2002; interview with a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013). In this context, promises regarding the economic development of independent Casamance also proved influential. The MFDC‘s prognostic framing is far from offering an economic programme for independence. However, the movement drew a picture of future economic well-being and prosperity. It highlighted the alleged resource wealth of Casamance, for example, in terms of oil. Moreover, the MFDC lured potential combatants with the prospect that they would obtain jobs or property after independence (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013).³⁶

In sum, the framing regarding grievances of the MFDC stroke a responsive chord and resonated well. Not only did the movement take up issues that were central to the population, but it offered an interpretation that fit the perceptions of the people and were thus experientially commensurable. Furthermore, the framing of the MFDC was in accordance with its action. The emotional and normative presentation of existing difficulties as well as economic promises increased the effect of the grievance-related framing. It took up feelings of frustrations, discontent, and anger among the population and channelled them into concrete activity.

35 In the department of Ziguinchor, 75 per cent of the population was less than 30 years old (Juillard 1995, 53) and school enrolment reached almost 100 per cent. These figures give an idea regarding the number of school-leavers. Yet, only a small fraction of those seeking employment could find jobs (Cruise O‘Brien 1996, 59; Gasser 2000, 250).

36 This aspect is less pronounced in written material, but seems strongly present in oral communication. Many people in Casamance recount that they overheard members of the MFDC

‗distributing‘ property among themselves, for example, houses owned by Northerners.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

b) The Temporary Success of Culture-Related Framing

In Casamance, local people often say that they ‗go to Senegal‘ when they travel north to Dakar, as if Casamance and Senegal were effectively two countries. One should not easily take this phrase as an indicator or even a proof of Casamançais separatism. However, it exemplifies that there was a specific regional identity and alludes to a feeling of being different or detached that existed among people (Gasser 2000, 228). Casamance has some culturally distinctive features that distinguish it from the northern part of the country. These and the geographic remoteness of the region are at the origin of a specific regional identity (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). As previously outlined, the ethnic composition in the northern and southern parts of Senegal deviated. While the Wolof predominated in the north, Lower Casamance is mainly inhabited by (different fractions of) the Diola that constituted a minority at the national level. Moreover, a variety of smaller identity communities live in the region. Thus, there are differences in culture, tradition, and language use. Moreover, many of the ethnic groups present in Casamance have close ties to the neighbouring countries, namely Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia due to trans-border settlement patterns and family ties. Like the northern part of the country, Casamance is mainly Muslim. Yet, the regional population was Islamised later and in a less complete manner which is way there are differences between the Muslim communities, e.g. in terms of organisation in brotherhoods. Moreover, a considerable share of the Senegalese Christians concentrate in Lower Casamance and adherence to traditional religions has remained strong in the area. These variations between the two regions should not be exaggerated or interpreted as being dualistic or even antagonistic and leading naturally to violence (for such a culturalist perspective, see Darbon 1984). On the one hand, both regions are internally heterogeneous which is why it is impossible to identify unambiguous features of ‗the North‘ and ‗the South‘. On the other hand, there are various cultural interactions and connections between the regions (Faye 1994; Foucher 2002a;

2005a; 2011; Marut 2010).

Although there were no primordialist tensions between communities that account for the conflict, the specific cultural context contributed to frame resonance. Inter-regional relations were strained due to political decisions and societal attitudes. The Senegalese nation-state is predominantly based on elements of Wolof culture and Islam which had repercussions on the everyday life. Wolof developed, for example, into a second lingua franca (apart from French) that increasingly played a central role in the media, administration, and economy.³⁷ National history was strongly influenced by a Wolof perspective and Casamançais history or local heroes were absent from the national narrative, but also school curricula. Muslim brotherhoods interfered in national politics and impacted economic activities (Cruise

37 According to statistics, close to 50 per cent of the Senegalese population speak Wolof as their first and approximately 22 per cent as their second language (Ngom, Gaye, and Sarr 2000, 6).

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

O‘Brien1998; Gasser 2000; Juillard 1995, 31-35; Marut 1997, 2; interview with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013; interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013). This ‗Wolofisation‘, as the domination of the Islamo-Wolof model is referred to, had exclusive effects and fostered perceptions of marginalisation among Casamançais.

Ethnic communities in Casamance felt that their specific cultures were not sufficiently respected and taken into account by the national project and feared that their cultural heritage might ultimately be superseded.³⁸ Additional difficulties stemmed from – apparent or real – hierarchies between communities. In Casamance, people perceived that Northerners despised them as uncivilised and subordinate. This impression cannot be repudiated in view of labels such as ―forest people, pagans, palm-wine drinkers (or drunkards) and pork eaters‖

that Northerners used to describe Southerners (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275).

Besides, Casamançais denounced the ignorance and lack of interest in their cultural specificities, since they were all universally considered as Diola independent of their actual ethnic identity. Finally, Wolofisation was not a purely cultural phenomenon, but had economic and political repercussions. Communities could become marginalised and felt excluded from professional activities due to lacking language skills and networks. The influence of brotherhoods constituted a disadvantage for those regions and groups that were not well organised and represented by them. Hence, communities in Casamance felt marginalised within the Senegalese nation-state which culminated into an inferiority complex and an identity crisis.³⁹ Altogether, a combination of factors, namely geographic distance, existing cultural variations, post-colonial nation-building, and inter-regional relations fostered the emergence of a specific Casamançais identity (Faye 1994, 71; Gasser 2000, 217;

Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275; interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013; a former MFDC combatants, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013;

a former commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013).

Against this backdrop, the MFDC‘s framing filled a gap from the local population‘s perspective since cultural topics were central in it. The movement stressed – and often exaggerated – the differences between the south and the north and recognised Casamançais tradition, history, and values. It expressed esteem regarding local culture and its specificities, for example the prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta, and hailed its superiority in

38 Not only the Diola, but also other minority groups such as the Manjack or Mancagne felt that their culture and tradition were not taken into consideration within Senegal.

39 Socio-economic and political grievances as well as the incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased that perception.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

comparison to northern culture.⁴⁰ Simultaneously, the group blamed the north of deliberate a-culturation that aimed to supersede the cultural heritage of Casamance. Hence, the framing came up with an antithesis to the cultural discourse that dominated in Senegal since such a valorisation of the regional culture was unknown to the population. These propositions attracted attention and met so far unfulfilled expectations of cultural recognition and countered the widespread feeling of exclusion and inferiority. Thus, culture-related frames were welcomed (Lambert 1998, 587-589; interviews with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; former MFDC combatants, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013).

The severe repression by the Senegalese state enhanced the feeling of alienation among Casamançais and thus, increased frame resonance. People had expected the state to react responsibly to the expression of discontent. But the brutality on behalf of the government was

The severe repression by the Senegalese state enhanced the feeling of alienation among Casamançais and thus, increased frame resonance. People had expected the state to react responsibly to the expression of discontent. But the brutality on behalf of the government was