Conflict Actors

Armed conflicts are defined as confrontations between the government of an existing state and a non-state armed group (UCDP 2015). Hence, the principal conflicting parties in the case of Casamance are the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance on the one hand and the Senegalese state on the other. In the following, the two actors will be briefly presented.

33 It is fair to note that the multitude of actors in the peace process as well as the profitable nature of such commitment are not new to the Casamance conflict.

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

5.2.1. The Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance

a) The Historic and Modern Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)

Today‘s Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance or short, MFDC has a historic precursor. In 1947, intellectuals and politicians from the Casamance region among whom were Emile Badiane, Ibou Diallo, and Édouard Diatta, founded a regionalist political party under the same name in the city of Sédhiou.³⁴ Although the modern MFDC refers back to this grouping and considers itself in continuity with it, the initial MFDC aimed to represent regional interests within the existing constitutional framework. Thus, it wished to enhance development and recognition for Casamance within a system that largely centred around the Quatre Communes, which consisted of the four northern cities Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque, and sought to provide a means for the regional élite to politically participate and access power. Yet, it did not question the integration of Casamance into Senegal. In 1954, the MFDC disappeared from the political arena after future president Léopold Sédar Senghor successfully co-opted and absorbed it in his own party, the Bloc démocratique sénégalais (BDS; English: Senegalese Democratic Bloc). Another group, the Mouvement autonome de la Casamance (MAC; English: Autonomous Movement of Casamance) was created in 1955. Despite its name, the MAC did not have a separatist agenda, either. It was equally short-lived and merged together with other political groupings in 1956.³⁵ This illustrates that regionalism and political activism for it have a long tradition in Casamance.

However, claims for independence did not exist until the 1980s (Diatta 2008, 120-132;

Diedhiou 2010, 265-271; Manga 2012, 69-103; Marut 2010, 69-75; Roche 2001, 117, 164;

Seck 2005, 28-41).

The ‗modern‘ MFDC had developed on the basis of different social movements in the region and made its first public appearance in the context of the peaceful march in December 1982.

36 Unlike its predecessor, the newly created movement adopted an explicitly separatist position and took up arms, although its members see themselves as in continuity with the ancient regionalist party and claim that they resurrected it (African Research Group 1999, 4;

Marut 1992, 210; 2010, 69-76).³⁷ Reportedly, the movement was formed by Mamadou

‗Nkrumah‘ Sané, a Diola from the department of Bignona living in the diaspora, who had

34 Based on the work of Séverine Awenengo, Jean-Claude Marut states that the original MFDC was founded in 1949. Yet, the majority of sources and authors, including Mohamed Manga (2012) who provides a detailed account of Casamançais history mention 1947 as year of establishment.

35 Assane Seck, politician of the MAC, pointed out that the name aimed to demonstrate that it was autonomous from the BDS that had swallowed the MFDC, but did not have territorial aspirations (2005, 29). In 1956, the MAC merged together with other political groupings, among which was the BDS, into the Bloc populaire sénégalais (BPS; English: Senegalese Popular Bloc) that later transformed into the Parti socialiste (PS; English: Socialist Party).

36 In the following, the terms MFDC or Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance will be used to refer to the movement formed in 1982 if not stated otherwise.

37 There is no personal continuity between the historic and the modern MFDC. None of the initial founders of the historic MFDC is alive to rectify the misinterpretation.

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

been politically active before (see 5.1.2. and 6.3.4.). However, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest, was the movement‘s actual intellectual mastermind.³⁸ Even before the creation of the movement, he had not only been known for his profession, but also due to his activist stance and his statements in relation to Casamançais culture and history with nationalist and separatist allusions already shimmering through.³⁹ Although he had not been involved in the preparation of the march in 1982, he was preventively arrested in its context and subsequently tried for having menaced the safety of the state. After his release, he became secretary general of the bureau national of the MFDC in 1991, an office that he held until his death in 2007 (Bassène 2013; Marut 2010; Sud hebdo, 15 July, 1988; see also 6.3.4.).

But the MFDC did not only fight with words. In the beginning, its armed branch was poorly organised and equipped – the first attack was reportedly carried out with traditional weapons and rifles – but developed rapidly under the leadership of its co-founder and initial commander Sidy Badji, an experienced army veteran. After the first protest march, the MFDC started sensitisation campaigns in the region. In consequence, individuals or sometimes entire villages decided to support the movement. Moreover, repression by the government inclined people to join. As a result, the number of combatants that mainly comprised former soldiers of the French or Senegalese army, peasants, and young men, rapidly rose to approximately 2,000 to 4,000 men.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the fighters‘ formation improved over the years and the MFDC obtained more sophisticated weapons, for example hunting rifles, AK-47, and grenade launchers which enhanced its capacity. Strategically, the MFDC engaged in guerrilla warfare that targeted the Senegalese army as well as other symbols of the Senegalese state, such as border posts or local governmental institutions. In this respect, the specific natural environment, namely the inaccessibility of the terrain and the proximity of international borders, were beneficial to the maquisards. Yet, the regional population was not spared. Over the years, civilians of both Casamançais and northern origin became victims of violence, armed robbery, and land mines by the rebels (Evans 2004;

Foucher 2002; Gasser 2002; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 93; Gerdes 2008, 88; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 254, 276; Körner 2007, 84-85; MAR 2003; Marut 2010; Sadatchy 2011;

UCDP 2015). In this context, it is important to highlight that the MFDC is qualified as a ‗poor rebellion‘. Unlike many armed groups during the Cold War, it did not benefit of large-scale

38 There are no family relations between ex-president Léopold Sédar Senghor and Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor. For more information on the latter, see 6.3.4.

39 At a conference held in Dakar in 1980, Father Diamacoune had already made allusions in this regard. See 6.3.4.

40 It is difficult to provide precise numbers of active fighters since many of them switch between their combatant and civil lives. According to estimations, only one-third of the maquisards are permanently mobilised due to financial and logistic restrictions. The remaining engage in economic activities to sustain the movement. The rebels also intermingle with refugees in the neighbouring countries (Evans 2004, 6-7; Fall 2010, 17-19; Florquin and Berman 2005, 360; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 93; Marut 2010, 111, 148-149; Sadatchy 2011, 4).

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

external backing since it appeared relatively late on the international stage. As a consequence, it depended on support by the local population that contributed financially or in kind. Moreover, the rebels increasingly engaged in illicit economic activities ranging from agricultural production, through to cannabis trafficking as well as cattle raiding, to armed robberies of vehicles or villages (the so-called „braquages‘). In addition, they benefitted from humanitarian aid that was destined for the refugee population. While the war economy helped to sustain the movement, income generation remained limited in comparison to economic profits of other armed movements on the continent (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007;

Marut 2010, 147-157; Sadatchy 2011, 6-7).⁴¹

b) One Name, Many Movements: The Internal Structure of the MFDC

From today‘s point of view, speaking of ‗the‘ MFDC as one movement is misleading. The internal structures of the movement had been weak from the outset. However, it increasingly fractionalised over the course of the conflict and nowadays, comprises a confusing number of splinter groups. Since the internal dynamics are relevant with regard to framing, the development of the movement will be summarised briefly.⁴²

While the political leading figures Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou ‗Nkrumah‘

Sané spent several years in prison after the first march, the movement lacked proper political leadership. Meanwhile, Sidy Badji developed, structured, and commanded the military wing.

In 1991, Sané returned to France where he founded an external branch.⁴³ Hence, the MFDC simultaneously comprised a political, a military, and an external section that were headed by three distinct persons. The different wings did not have a hierarchical or complementary relationship and lacked centralisation, institutionalisation, as well as co-ordination. They acted independently of each other and even competed. Over time, the rebel group should disintegrate even further. In May 1991, Sidy Badji signed a ceasefire agreement that the MFDC had wrested from the Senegalese state through its offensive. However, parts of the armed movement rejected it. Consequently, it split into the Front Nord (English: Northern Front) that remained loyal to Sidy Badji and adhered to the agreement. It stopped fighting, but did not disarm. The group controlled the north-western part of the Bignona department close to the Gambian border with tacit consent of the Senegalese army, where it undertook

41 For more information on external support in the Casamance conflict and the MFDC‘s war economy, see 5.3.3. and 5.3.6.

42 The precise internal dynamics and cleavages will not be discussed here. For a detailed overview of the fragmentation of the different wings of the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance and the various leaders or leading committees, see Evans 2004, Fall 2010; Foucher 2003b; 2012;

Gerdes 2006; Marut 2010, ch. 12, 16.

43 In connection with the first march in 1982, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou ‗Nkrumah‘

Sané were arrested and stayed in prison until 1987. Diamacoune was rearrested in June 1990 and remained in custody until May 1991. ‗Nkrumah‘ Sané was caught in Guinea-Bissau in 1988. After his extradition to Senegal, he was convicted to ten years in prison in 1990, but was liberated in 1991 and left to France shortly after. He became Deputy-Secretary General and headed the external wing.

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

illicit economic activities. Furthermore, it engaged in some cooperation with the state in exchange for financial or material support for reintegration and reconstruction projects.

Despite its moderate and cooperative position, the Front Nord continued to represent a lurking threat and ultimately returned to the battlefield. By contrast, the more radical Front Sud (English: Southern Front), initially led by Léopold Sagna, rejected the accords with the Senegalese government. It considered the Front Nord as corrupted and re-started fighting in 1992. The fraction retreated to the south of Casamance and benefitted from the porous border with Guinea-Bissau to seek refuge. Later, it branched off again into hardliners led by Salif Sadio and ‗hesitants‘ under the command of Léopold Sagna who was succeeded by César Atoute Badiate.⁴⁴ The splits within the maquis were reflected in the political and external wing that equally became divided. Father Diamacoune headed the radical political wing and should only later renounce violence which allowed political leaders to re-approach.

In the diaspora, Sané adopted militant views, while Jean-Marie François Biagui, a much younger migrant and intellectual who lived in Lyon and wrote several pamphlets for the MFDC, distanced himself from him in favour of moderate perspectives.

The internal fractionalisation had serious consequences for the movement. Often, splinter groups only comprised a small part of the movement, but they all pretended to incarnate the MFDC and acted under its name. However, neither did they have a coherent overarching structure, nor did they share a common position.⁴⁵ One wing could negotiate an agreement, but lacked the capacity to enforce the accord on others that rejected it. At various occasions, fighting erupted between different armed factions. Moreover, the maquis increasingly emancipated itself from the civilian leadership and acted independently from it. Parts of the combatants considered political means as betrayal to the idea of independence and opposed them which undermined the political component of the movement. The factionalism, changing loyalties, confusion about leadership, and lack of control over combatants harmed the reputation of the movement and weakened the movement in the face of the Senegalese army. Moreover, the internal difficulties impeded and continue to obstruct the peace process.

While no faction or individual is legitimate or representative to talk to the state on behalf of the MFDC, it is impossible to re-unite the factions and find a universally accepted spokesperson and common ground for talks.⁴⁶

44 Since the late 1990s, the radical Southern Front became also active in the department of Bignona.

45 This became well obvious during field research: A variety of members of the MFDC presented themselves as exclusive spokespersons and representatives of the movement. Interestingly, while the different camps are referred to by names indicating their original position (e.g. the Front Nord, Front Sud or the Cassolol camp named after the location of its basis), none of them changed names, but all perceive themselves to be the real MFDC. To top it all, Jean-Marie François Biagui, launched a new political party in 2011 – the MFDC or Mouvement pour le fédéralisme et la démocratie constitutionnels (English: Movement for Constitutional Federalism and Democracy).

46 Between 1999 and 2001, meetings were organised in Banjul that aimed to re-unite the movement in view of potential talks with the state. Yet, the process failed and was ended when Abdoulaye Wade

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

5.2.2. The Senegalese State

The second conflicting party is the Senegalese state. Senegal is often considered as an exemplary democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose origin goes back to the early and very restricted democratic experiences of the Quatre Communes during colonialism (Hartmann 2010; Tine 1997). Compared to other countries in the region that were marred by brutal dictatorships, civil wars, and military coups, the Senegalese political system has been doubtlessly more democratic and functional for a long time. Besides, elections were regularly held as foreseen in the constitution. However, this image should not hide the fact that especially during the rule of the socialist party from 1960 to 2000, the polity suffered from important deficits that could impact the risk of armed conflict.⁴⁷ Léopold Sédar Senghor, who became the first president after independence in 1960, successfully concentrated political power in his hands and created a political system with strong authoritarian features. By abolishing the position of the prime minister, he installed a presidential regime – or a presidential dictatorship, as critical observers noted (Hesseling 1985, 223).⁴⁸ By restricting or co-opting opposition parties, he gradually neutralised political opponents and created a de facto one-party state by 1966, in which the Socialist Party held a hegemonic position. The regime resorted to intimidation and judicial and violent repression against political critics, for example clandestine opposition parties, students, or unions. In addition, the voting system disproportionally favoured the ruling party and electoral fraud was common. Finally, political patronage and clientelism were used to consolidate political power of the PS. Hence, political authority became strongly personalised and centralised, while the legislative and judiciary remained weak and incapable to effectively control the executive (Cruise O‘Brien 1967, 558-562; Diouf 1993, 234-263; Hartmann 2010; Ndiaye 2000; Ottaway 2003; Polity IV 2011;

Stetter and Voll 1983; Tine 1997). In the 1970s, the ruling party introduced a controlled liberalisation. Senghor re-established the prime ministerial office. In 1976, a restrained number of political parties whose political ideology was fixed became tolerated.⁴⁹ These limitations were abolished in 1981 and Senegal turned (at least, formally) into a multiparty democracy with few remaining restrictions, such as a ban of ethnic and regional groupings.

Consequently, the number of political parties rapidly increased. However, they were mainly centred in the capital with little connections to rural areas. Due to its fragmentation into became president. Hence the Senegalese government shares responsibility for the stalemate (Evans 2004; Foucher 2003b; Marut 2010; see 5.1.3.).

47 The democratic performance in Senegal improved in recent years. Both in 2000 and 2012, opposition leaders won the presidential elections with the incumbents respecting the results and ceding power peacefully. At the same time, constitutional reforms, such as the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years were criticised for obstructing the further democratisation of the country. Ottaway (2003) adopts a critical perspective on the apparent democratic turn of the country and argues that while the political élite changed, practices remained largely the same.

48 The office of the Prime Minister was abolished from 1963 and 1970 and again from 1983 to 1991.

49 Already in 1974, Abdoulaye Wade‘s Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS; French: Parti démocratique sénégalais) was authorised.

5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

numerous small political parties, the opposition remained weak and did not represent a threat for the Parti Socialiste until 2000 (Hartmann 2010; Hesseling 1985).⁵⁰ Equally in 1981, Senghor ceded power to his protégé and then incumbent Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, a contested step that was perceived as ―constitutional coup d‘état‖ (Ndiaye 2000, 131). Diouf, a technocrat, won the 1983 presidential elections that confirmed him in office and maintained the dominant role of the head of state. This brief overview of Senegal‘s post-colonial political history shows that despite its relatively positive trajectory towards democratic overture, the Senegalese polity restricted activities by political opponents and did not refrain from using repression and force.

Accordingly, the position of the Senegalese state towards the Casamançais separatists reflected the way the government had previously dealt with other oppositional forces. It was marked by a combination of rigorousness and intransigence on the one hand and a limited degree of accommodation on the other. At first, the Senegalese reaction to the Casamance crisis was predominantly military. Approximately, 5,000 to 8,000 soldiers were present in Casamance, but additional troops could be drawn together from other regions (Marut 2010, 163-165).⁵¹ Despite its reputation as being democratic and well-trained, the army and other security forces reacted with severe repression and committed serious human rights abuses in the course of the Casamance conflict that often concerned uninvolved civilians (Amnesty International 1998).⁵² At the political level, the government initially ignored or downplayed the events in the south of the country. When it could no longer overlook the armed opposition, it attempted to delegitimise it, for example, by presenting the MFDC as an ethnic movement without a broad support basis, and denied the political dimension of the conflict. Although the state appeared willing to talk to the MFDC later, it confirmed throughout the crisis that territorial integrity and national unity were unnegotiable and demonstrated its firm stand by fixing additional conditions for negotiations with the rebels (see 5.1.3. and 6.4.1.).

50 In 2000, Diouf did not lose the election as a result of a strengthening of Wade‘s PDS, but because Wade successfully created a coalition of several parties.

51 Some units are not included in these calculations, namely the mobile intervention groups. The figures suggest that the ration of state soldiers and rebels was not overly favourable to security forces.

Yet, one has to take into consideration that not all maquisards were permanently mobilised. Moreover, parts of the MFDC did not constantly engage in fighting. Thus, the number of combatants that the Senegalese troupes confronted was smaller than their actual total (Marut 2010, 163-165).

Yet, one has to take into consideration that not all maquisards were permanently mobilised. Moreover, parts of the MFDC did not constantly engage in fighting. Thus, the number of combatants that the Senegalese troupes confronted was smaller than their actual total (Marut 2010, 163-165).