Preliminary Conclusions of the Empirical Analysis of the Casamance Case Study Case Study

The chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the framing by the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance and its effects. To begin with, it gave an overview of how the MFDC sensitised and mobilised followers. It yielded insights into the communication means and channels that the group used in order to reach potential followers and supporters.

Furthermore, it examined the different dimensions of the disseminated collective action frames. The analysis of the content showed that the movement‘s diagnostic framing crystallised around grievances and injustices in various societal fields, with the situation being comparable to colonisation. The armed group clearly ascribed responsibility for the difficulties to ‗the North‘. In the prognostic framing, the MFDC presented separation – or liberation – of the region from Senegal as a solution to the previously diagnosed problems, yet did not go into detail regarding the future of independent Casamance. It also agitated for and justified violence as a means to achieve self-determination. In its motivational framing, the group invoked historical and nationalist arguments, but also pointed to the defensive character of its fight to incite followers to join the struggle. Although the three framing dimensions were not equally well-developed, with diagnostic framing being more elaborate than the other two components, the framing by the MFDC was relatively consistent and logical. Yet, the movement did not come up with a sound ideological basis for its struggle, since frame development was overtaken by events.

Based on this, the chapter assessed frame resonance. In this respect, it turned out that a complex interaction of concrete and abstract factors impacted the effectiveness of the strategic communication. Especially in its early days, the MFDC successfully touched a raw nerve by taking up grievances that existed in Lower Casamance and interpreting them in a way that matched everyday experiences of the local population. The Casamançais people welcomed references to real or perceived inequalities and frustrations regarding

112 This does not mean that the actor constellation triggered violent prognostic frames. These had been adopted at a time when counterframing was still weak or absent. Yet, the polarised situation fuelled them or avoided the modification of the strategy.

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

underdevelopment, domination by ‗foreigners‘ from the north in the economic, political, and administrative domain, and the non-recognition of regional culture within the Senegalese nation. They had long suffered from an impression of being second-class citizens in the Senegalese state which was enhanced by the violent repression of protest by the state.

Furthermore, the framing coincided with a highly emotional atmosphere. Due to the application of the new land tenure regime and several single events, such as the disqualification of the Casa Sport in the football final, the appointment of another governor of northern origin, and the strike at the local lycée resulting in the killing of a student by security forces, tensions between the south and the north had further increased in the early 1980s and led to a widespread feeling of ras-le-bol or ‗enough is enough‘. In view of these trends, it was not surprising that frames comparing the present situation with colonialism appealed to local people since such parallels reflected well their experiences and emotional state.

Besides, the MFDC represented a long-awaited opportunity to finally voice concerns and seek change that many people gladly seized. Moreover, Casamançais appreciated the attention that was paid to local culture as it fulfilled expectations of cultural recognition and countered the widespread feeling of exclusion and inferiority that they had been confronted with in the Wolof-dominated post-colonial nation-state. The nationalist frames that the MFDC used to justify its claims for national self-determination and to incite potential followers to fight for its cause were particularly influential among the Diola. Within this community, a strong cultural consciousness had emerged over the course of history as a result of various social dynamics and external influences. Furthermore, the rebels‘ notion of ‗Casamancité‘ was strongly Diola-centred, i.e. referred predominantly to cultural elements of this ethnic group and was therefore, well received by its members. In this context, an interesting interaction of different factors fuelling frame resonance can be observed with regard to the young (mainly Diola) men who had moved northwards to pursue their education or find paid labour. As a result of the economic recession and downsizing, they increasingly failed to gain a foothold in the cities of northern Senegal and saw their prospects fading away. Simultaneously, their cultural and regional awareness had grown as a result of migration and membership in migrants‘ networks. Since they were simultaneously attracted by grievance-based as well as cultural framing and had little to lose, they were particularly easy targets for the rhetoric by the armed movement. In addition, historical frames also resonated despite their abstract and constructed character. They were especially relevant to the segments of the population that had some education and were concerned with questions of national and ethnic identity and its recognition. Since historical aspects intersected with nationalist claims, they benefitted from the same societal trends and underlying discourses as nationalist frames. Finally, historical references were successful as they corresponded to rumours or superficial knowledge regarding past events. Hence, they appeared familiar to large parts of the

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

population who often could not ascertain their correctness. This was an important boost for the movement given the prominent position of historic arguments in the MFDC‘s framing. In the beginning of the crisis, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, intellectual head and leader of the political wing, constituted a special trump in the hands of the armed group. He was widely known and appreciated throughout Lower Casamance because of his profession and previous activism in the region. His legitimacy as a leading figure resided on both modern and traditional sources which assured his appeal to and credibility among different segments of society. Overall, his reputation and personal qualities decisively enhanced frame resonance. Furthermore, the initially weak counterframing by political and societal actors also favoured the movement. After the march in 1982, the Senegalese government was the dominant counterframing agent, with other social forces such as the cadres casamançais and oppositional parties largely aligning to its position. The state mainly trivialised the MFDC without considering or critically dealing with its claims and thus, failed to effectively challenge the rebels‘ frames. Moreover, Dakar reacted with brutal and indiscriminate repression to the events which the MFDC compared to a declaration of war.

As a reaction, the movement presented its recourse to arms as an unintended and predominantly defensive move that had resulted from the situation. Moreover, the experience of violence further alienated the Casamançais and especially the Diola, who were most seriously affected, from ‗the North‘. This, together with fear or the wish to take revenge, made violence appear as a justified means and drove followers towards the movement and into the maquis.

Despite initial successes regarding mobilisation, frame resonance did not last. Over time, divergences between the MFDC and its constituents became increasingly apparent.

Although the armed group had its finger on the pulse of the people at first and successfully instrumentalised their grievances and emotions, it did not manage to re-adjust its framing. It failed to react to modifications in the societal context, better accommodate the needs and aspirations of the population, and combine them with its own goals. This led to a spiral of unsuccessful framing attempts and increasing alienation between the rebel group and the people it pretended to represent. Although the inhabitants of Casamance had welcomed demands for greater appreciation and recognition of their cultural specificities, they refuted the exclusive and Diola-centred nationalism since it did not represent their concerns. It failed to widely appeal to them, since various communities did not share the same cultural background. References to elements of Diola traditions or narratives were meaningless outside this group. Furthermore, the multi-layered and dynamic character of patterns of identification negatively impacted frame resonance. Identity can encompass various allegiances whose intensities differ and can change over time. Depending on what identity or what aspect of it is most salient at a given moment, the effectiveness of pertinent frames

6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

varies. Concretely, while there was a feeling of regional identity in Casamance, it was neither territorialist nor separatist. Moreover, it intersected with other both sub- or supra-regional attachments. Considering themselves, for example, as ‗Senegalese from Casamance‘ was not contradictory for many Casamançais. Besides, the regional population praised – rightfully or not – the tolerance and multi-cultural character of their home region. The MFDC‘s negative nationalist rhetoric could not sustainably entrench itself on this basis. Furthermore, the prognostic framing dimension was problematic in two respects. First, expectations regarding the desired outcome of the struggle fundamentally differed. Although the population welcomed the bottom-up movement denouncing regional problems and the domination of

‗Northerners‘, the majority in the Ziguinchor region did not agree with the MFDC‘s demands for independence. Instead, they aspired to better political and economic integration and appreciation of their homeland within the Senegalese state, that is, to be full citizens.

Second, the prognostic framing referring to collective strategy lost its mobilising force.

Justifying violence through self-defence became increasingly incredible because the population became victim to attacks by the MFDC and was thus caught between the two sides. The enemy-image of ‗the North‘ also crumbled due to a change in the government‘s attitude towards the rebellion (see below). Moreover, offensive calls for violence, which pretended that the use of force was the only possible means, contradicted societal predispositions including, among others, shared values, extant beliefs, (self-) perceptions, expectations, and underlying discourses. While these incongruences could be overcome in the short-term, they proved harmful in the long-term, since the constituency increasingly rejected the MFDC‘s propositions as too radical. In addition to mismatches between the framing and popular opinion, there were also growing inconsistencies between the behaviour and the rhetoric of the movement. Neither did the rebels make any progress in achieving their goals, nor were they able to provide a prospect of the future by establishing parallel state structures or improving infrastructure in the zones they controlled. Instead, the armed group increased the difficulties through violence against civilians and its illicit economic activities. It appeared increasingly engulfed by profit-making and internal rivalries between multiple competing factions. Hence, its framing appeared unrealistic and lost relevance as well as credence in the eyes of the majority. In consequence, resonance decreased and support for the armed group faded away. In addition, the movement suffered from a leadership crisis that contributed to reducing the effectiveness of collective action frames. Father Diamacoune had been losing influence and unifying power since the mid-1990s. Although several members of the MFDC in Senegal or the diaspora claimed leadership, they were contested within the movement and unknown or despised by the population for being detached from realities on the ground. Thus, they could not fill the vacuum at the group‘s head. Altogether, the failure to maintain mobilisation exemplifies that