2 Theoretical background, related work and implications
2.1 Social dilemmas and public goods
2.1.3 Synthesis I: Systems overview
The purpose of this concluding section is to summarise the main relevant findings of empirical and theoretical social dilemma research. In particular, we will provide an integrated systems view on individual decision‐making in public good dilemmas that aims at structuring the relevant entities in a nested and coupled way. Section 2.1.4 will build on this systems perspective and extract the crucial drivers that influence decision‐making in social dilemma situations.
The literature review of the previous subsections was organised along a chronological timeline: Starting out from the historical roots given by variants of the classical prisoner’s dilemma game and their conception in mathematical game theory we concluded with the influential game‐theoretic definition of a social dilemma by Dawes that links the research branch to psychological questions. Furthermore, Dawes’ definition clearly frames the case of public good dilemmas, which is the core of this dissertation, as one instantiation of a social dilemma. The second prominent case of a social dilemma is given by the resource dilemma, which is in many aspects equivalent to the public good dilemma. The main structural distinction between the two cases lies in the characteristic of the shared resource considered: A public good is defined by a production function that immediately reflects contributions by the members of the providing group in the level of the good. In contrast, the resource dilemma has an explicit time dimension reflecting the rate by which the common resource regrows. In addition, public good and resource dilemmas are not necessarily equivalent from a psychological point of view when focusing on the individual decision‐maker and his respective framing of contributions in the public good dilemma compared to extractions in the resource dilemma (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The fundamental subject of research on social dilemmas is to provide an understanding of the mechanisms that enable altruistic cooperation in situations where individual rationality should inevitably lead to collective defection. It is the aim of this dissertation to bring forward this research tradition for the case of public good dilemmas. In doing so we reviewed some of the most relevant empirical findings along the theoretical framework of Kopelman, Weber, and Messick (2003).
One main message from the theoretical framework is on the provided grouping of the multitude of factors which scholars have identified. The two main perspectives on these factors regard the heterogeneity of actors in a social dilemma and the situational embedding of individual decision‐making. While this notion of embeddedness is well in line with the targeted nested systems view, the subcategories that specify the situational context stress the viewpoint of laboratory experiments: How is the structure of the dilemma set up and in what way is the perception of this structure facilitated? In contrast to this view, we argue that the situational context of decision‐making consists of a multitude of different more or less linked sub contexts. Individuals decide within these sub contexts and their actions influence the state of their contexts in a simultaneous way. In general, each context is a dynamical system characterised by its particular structural properties and its spatial‐
temporal dynamics. However, from the perspective of individual agents some of these properties and dynamics may turn out be equivalent to the payoff structure of a social dilemma. Thus, we recognise social dilemma structures as meta‐properties which emerge from the interaction of individuals with their external contexts on the one hand, and from the complex dynamics governing the temporal and spatial development of these contexts on the other hand.
Figure 2 illustrates this notion for the case of public good dilemmas. The left side of the figure shows the spatial context in which a public good is provided and in which its benefits become accessible. In order to capture spatial heterogeneity, it is assumed that diverse public goods exist or emerge on fixed locations in a common environmental context. It is further assumed that each public good has a fixed spatial extent defining the area where contributions are accumulated and where benefits may emerge. As a simplification the extents of the public goods do not overlap spatially. Environmental uncertainty is reflected by assuming that the public goods are sensitive to external conditions, i.e. irrespective of the contributions to the provision the obtainable benefit may vary spatially and temporally. In the context of section 2.1.2, the described facets of spatial heterogeneity and uncertainty of the public goods allow representing important structural (see section 2.1.2.2) and perceptual (see section 2.1.2.4) factors of the social dilemma in bottom‐up manner.
The right side of Figure 2 illustrates the social context of the individuals providing the public goods. It is distinguished between two structural components. Firstly, individuals are embedded in a common network of social influences where individuals are vertices (shown as small circles) that are linked by network edges (shown as arrows). Secondly, non‐
overlapping groups of individuals are formed. Each group is linked to one public good in the environmental context. The contributions of the group members provide the respective public good. Furthermore, individuals obtain a perceptual feedback from the environment which includes the success of the public good provision and local perceptions of other external conditions. The described notion of the social context of decision‐making allows representing social‐structural (see section 2.1.2.3) and perceptual (see section 2.1.2.4) factors influencing cooperation in social dilemma situations. For instance, communication structures or power relations can be represented in the topology of the social network and their local perception by the individuals.
Figure 2. Systems overview of public good provision. It is distinguished between the environmental and social context of public good provision. Public goods are provided by groups of actors. Each public good (PG) has a location and a fixed spatial extent in the environmental context and is provided by a distinct actor group in the social context. In addition, actors are embedded in a common social network. For illustration purpose, three public goods and three providing groups are shown, while arbitrary numbers are possible.
The individual factors (see section 2.1.2.1) influencing behaviour in a public good dilemma are represented in the actor concept that is illustrated in Figure 3. Actors process local perceptions from the environmental and social context in order to derive actions to be forwarded to their environments. This process of action selection is driven by the actor’s subjective preferences. Preferences are understood as individual traits that relate an actor’s preferred means to his desired ends. Hence, decision‐making is highly subjective (at least)
because of (a) the local character of the perceptions, (b) perceptual differences (e.g.
framing), and (c) other subjective preferences (e.g. social orientations).
For the purpose of the systems overview the process of action selection remains a black box.
We will shed more light on this process of individual decision‐making in section 2.3.
Figure 3. Individual perspective of public good provision. Based on its perceptions from the environmental and social context, and guided by individual preferences, an actor decides on his contribution to the public good.