Introduction:
The fall o f the Empire came exceedingly fast; in a brief two years span, the Soviet realm shrunk to its core. Gone was Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, the Soviet
“ interest zones” in A frica and the Far East. Soviet troops were streaming back to the M otherland, selling o ff or leaving rusted machinery and new Kalyshnikovs alike.
The m ilitary-political alliance known as the Pact was no more. Eastern Europe became free, practically overnight.
The changes in the region were deep and deeply felt; the intoxication o f inde- pendence affected the new entities, the new institutions o f state power, the new governments. As the old institutions o f enforced order disappeared it looked as if though true security would be achieved, the threats to the existence o f the states in the region were about to dissipate. Yet, it merely looked that way; the sad reality was vastly different from the hoped for expectations. Perceived threats and new in- securities began to characterize the elites and the population of these states anew, bringing with it instability and turmoil.
The purpose o f this paper is to trace the development and analyze the results of the emergence o f new insecurities in Eastern Europe. In the first part, we w ill look at the causes and consequences o f the fall of the Soviet Empire. In the second part, we will deal with the collapse o f the Kadar dynasty in Hungary. In the third part we will characterize the emergent power vacuum in the region and its consequent instability in the region. In the fourth part we w ill look at the causes and results o f threat perceptions and instabilities. A nd, finally, in the last part, we w ill look at the poten- tial of creating stable relations in the region.
1. The Fall o f the Empire
Death came to the Soviet empire fast; like so many empires before the collapse was almost unnoticable until the very last minute. The outward declaration o f independ- enee from the former allies, the disappearance o f the Wall, the reunification of Germany, the end o f the W TO were all parts o f the process; the external empire of the Soviets simply fell apart. Not hearing commands to the contrary, the Soviet A rm y simply went home - if there was a home for them. Lacking any legitimacy at all, the socialist/communist regimes disappeared overnight.
Historians w ill debate for decades what really happened. A llo w me here, very briefly, to note some o f the elements that contributed to the demise, w ithout, o f course, any attempt on my part to be complete in this analysis o f the recent past. I w ill try to touch on those issues only that impact on our topic, rather than to deal with al catalogue o f the standard explanations.
103
Ivan Volgyes
00063454
104
Simply put. the Soviet system came to a screeching halt. W hile analysts o f the Soviet system noted earlier the increasingly evident failures o f the state socialism in the USSR, ventured forth with derision about the Soviets as a third world country with first w'orld armed forces, or described the ever more clear signs o f the disease, few had guessed o f the extent o f the malaise. The ever inreasing amount o f money spent on defense drained the system far beyond its capacity to replenish other areas o f socio-economic endeavor. By the time Gorbachev came into power it became clear to the Soviet elite that the USSR simply cannot keep up with the West either in regards to the development o f new technology or the modernization o f its outmoded economy as a whole. “ Star Wars” - in its much broader sense as a synonym for modernity - simply won. It is to the credit of the Soviet top elite that they recog- nized this fact and noted the need for change.
The impetus fo r Gorbachev’s reforms, hence, was the recognition for the need for reform ; reform o f the system at home, and for the alliance system abroad had to be undertaken if the Soviets were to be able to play some role in Eastern Europe and if power was to be kept in the party-elites at home. Both o f these processes, o f course, were based on false premises; liberalization o f restrictive systems simply always brings more demands for change; it rarely satisfies “ final demands,” since the latter increase in direct proportion to the amount the restrictive system's decisionmakers are w illing to give in a certain historical period.
The process o f such change can be mapped out fairly easily; the hitherto subser- vient pseudo-“ give-and-take” characteristic o f “ equal socialist relationships” rapidly turned to a “ demand and give” process as the evident lack of Soviet political w ill to pay the harsh price o f armed intervention became clear to both participants and observers. “ Non-negotiable” demands became negotiated away. The demands for
"continuation o f Communist party supremacy” turned into m ulti-party elections, the
“ im m utability o f the W all” into the latter’s demise, “ the permanent reality o f the two German states” into a united Germany, and the “ eternal bounds o f the Warsaw Pact” into its dissolution. To the great surprise o f the world, o f the Soviet citizenry, o f the East European elites and the population o f these states alike, the Soviet A rm y was going home.
The Fall o f the Dynasties
For Eastern Europe’s Communist leaders the prospect that the Soviet A rm y was going horne was shattering; it was simply unbelievable. This is not a place to deleve into the psychological make-up of the leaders o f these regimes, or into the question o f how much they really believed in the legitimacy of their own rule. However, we do know that the capacity o f human beings for delusion is infinite, and it is quite certain that most members o f the elite really believed that the population — at least partially - extended some legitmacy to them. And this is not the place either to call to task so many o f our East European specialists who held that these very leaders, indeed, possessed “ significant” attributes o f legitimacy, even if that legitimacy could not be measured. The fact remains, however, that the Communist leaders as well as the Western East European specialists were simply deadly wrong, that the very
Günther Wagenlehner - 978-3-95479-682-3 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:44AM via free access
105 Military Security in the Post-Communist Age
system was held together simply by the Soviet A rm y, by Soviet power, and by the institutions bound together by the latter's finely woven web. Once the A rm y was going home, or more precisely, once it became clear that the Soviet A rm y was not going to be used to maintain the local Communist leaders in power, the Communist dynasties fell practically overnight.
The headlong fall of these dynasties followed a remarkably similar scenario, at least in one respect. Except for Romania, where the “ mamaliga” finally emploded and took the house down with it, elsewhere in the region, the first recognition that the Soviets w ill not intervene with force to keep the local dynasties in power, was followed by attempts to “ save socialism.” Led by reform Communists, mostly honest men with honest - if mistaken - conviction that socialism can only be saved if it is
“ reform ed,” the top elites were overthrown internally. The Groszes and Gysis came to power, “ minutemen” in the stage of history, presenting themselves as the saviors o f the ancien regimes, ready to sit down with the newly emerging opposition elite, to liberalize, democratize, proselytize, in short, ready to do anything that would save
“ socialism” with a *human,’ ‘ national,’ or even ‘populist’ face. By discarding the top layer o f the “ beloved” leaders, they thought to keep at least the lower levels o f the local dynasties in power. Their motives may have been base and personal, or noble and reflecting o f national aspirations, but their motives really did not m atter at all;
they were doomed to disappear in short order; lacking even those minimal attributes o f legitimacy projected earlier by their predecessors - e. g. ideological, economic or nationalist aspects of legitimacy — their tenure was doomed to be short even if they did not know it when they assumed the mantle torn o ff in haste o f their predecessors.
The Power Vacuum and the Emergence o f New Triablism
Democracy “ broke out” in the region without any warning. Popular, m ulti-party elections, or elections where a single force such as Solidarity o r the C ivil Forum was pitted against the Communist party, resulted in the staggering o f the latter. Again, remarkably fast, “ communism” disappeared, leaving little if any visible traces o f its 40 some years tenure.
But the democracy that became visible was not on every decent human being expected to come to the fore; it was not the broad-based pluralist system charac- terized by respect and tolerance found in its broad outlines in Western Europe.
Perhaps one was foolish to expect that that would be the result at all, for the region’s history, coupled with the legacy o f Communist rule in the minds o f the people, all mitigated against such a desired outcome. And yet, alongside with the creation o f the new democratic institutions o f Eastern Europe, the emergence o f a vehement New Tribalism was a shock to nearly erveryone.
The New Tribalism everywhere has been characterized by the same sort o f attributes: provincialism, extreme nationalism, fierce independence based on ethnic- ity, intolerance and a sense of superiority. Its emergence, o f course, is understand- able, once again; after all, these feelings have been suppressed and subsumed earlier under the litle o f “ international brotherhood.” The myriad institutional links result- ing from that “ internationalism” - the C O M ECO N, the W T O , ect. - were there to
Ivan Volgyes
00063454
106
suppress any manifestations o f such aspects of particularity, and — in retrospect, at least - these institutions worked remarkably well during the past decades . . . at least outwardly. Once the institutional strictures melted away, however, the New Tribal- ism appeared with a vengeance.
The single most observable element o f the New Tribalism is its emphasis on national/State/ethnic independence unfettered by supranational, inter or intra-state, or interethnic allegiances or — where possibly - formal relations. Identifying the nation w ith ethnicity, and the state with the nation, the New Tribalism makes a cult o f historical myths at the expense of observable realities. It exults the nation, and - consequently - blames all o f its existing problems on “ alien” (read: Czech, Russian, Jewish, Bolshevik, etc.) domination. For the New Tribalism ethnicity is almost “ sac- red” and - in its adherents’ view - the “ Untermenschen" hitherto exercized their rule only in order to try eradicating the rightful national aspirations. The “ Christ of Nations” reappears in national form , the “ betrayed innocence” of the idealized
“Volk" shows up time and time again.
The predictable result of the emergence of New Tribalism is the break-up o f the hitherto existing unitary institutional boundaries; Czecho-Slovakia tumbles tow׳ard separate state organization with Moravia demands independence, while Jugo-Slavia - as much as the USSR as a whole - lurches forward toward dissolution. The predictable result is the growing identification o f national aspirations with pre- scribed modes of individual behavior; if someone behaves in manners that appear to be inconsistent with those group expectations, he becomes the “ enemy,” the member o f a “ medget-sized m in o rity,” or a “ tra ito r” to the “ sacred” cause. And the predictable result also is a growing tolerance with anyone who is less than vocal in the support o f this Born Again Tribalism. Patriotism, thus, gives in to nationalism.
The born-again Tribalists also succumb to provincialism soon after coming to power. Emphasizing the “ unique value,” hence the “ uniqueness,” o f their Volk or nation, they reject tried and true solution that worked elsewhere, claiming the overriding importance o f the local environemnt. They long for the “ T hird Roads”
and “ national solutions,” out o f the mire they find themselves in. They look with suspicion at their form er allies, seeing every move not from the perspective of real threats, but from inside the “ besieged fortress” occupied by the “ Just” against the onslaught o f “ E v il.” They cling to dreams o f “ neutrality,” while the rest o f the world marches by.
A caveat, here, must be entered. My purpose is not to suggest that the New Tribalists have won everywhere or that all the governments o f the region follow the policies of the New Tribalists. Yet, there are clear warning signs o f the influence of these throwbacks to a by-gone age to warrant caution and to sound the early voices o f alarm. The elites o f these states must realize that they are playing with fire . . . and playing with the future o f these states.
Uncertain Threats
For the world outside the events in Eastern Europe appeared truly wonderous - at least, at the beginning o f the transformation of the region. The rapidity o f the
Günther Wagenlehner - 978-3-95479-682-3 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:44AM via free access
107 Military Security in the Post-Communist A ge
changes, their generally civil and generally bloodless character, astounded the obser- vers in and out o f the region. Yet, as democracy began to come to life, as in the nations of the regions the New Triablism began to take popular hold, the West began to worry. The cause o f their worry was not the New Tribalism p e r s e, but the result o f potential instability in the region as a whole.
This was quite understandable, of course. The developed states o f Europe as a whole had already passed through their periods o f uncertainty much earlier. They had to overcome piece by piece the provincialism, the narrow nationalism, the
“ populism,” the anti-Semitism, the particularism that characterized so many people and institutions of the new׳ democracies. Institutionally and individually as well the nations of Europe were all beyond that by a long shot in 1991.
What they saw in Eastern Europe was the re-emergence o f a past they did not want to see returned in a region they really knew little about. The presence o f such states that possessed those dangerous ideas that characterized in their minds the 1930s in the “ European” community was not quite what they wanted. For these European states had already developed some common bases for their community, especially common values concerning stability, predictability, negotiation and com- promise. When the unwelcome aspects of the New Tribalism began to surface in the region with some vehemence, the European and American governmental elites as well as their publics began to have second thoughts about the processes o f change in Eastern Europe. If the change was to bring instability and reversion to prim itive patterns of national behavior that were clearly unwelcome by the Western actors, then their own dark suspicions about the region they held so long were, clearly, well founded.
In this respect the perception of threat coming to the new democracies from the actors in their neighboring states played a major role. These states, without excep- tion, saw it desirable for the Soviet-dominated international infrastructure to disap- pear, for the Soviets to “ go home” . Yet as soon as the international institutions they formerly were joined to disappeared, the region was left bereft o f protector or promoter, occupier or ally. The West clearly would not have them as full partners;
N A T O shuddered when it considered how the Transylvanian question might be brought up before it by two o f its potential allies, and the Common M arket consi- dered the addition o f these states as member states in 1995, clearly “ premature” for consideration. Belonging to the Council of Europe was one thing, but belonging to a
“ real” m ilitary o r a “ real” economic institution was quite another. Europe as a whole had little or no real use as respected “ partners” for states that spent their day depicting their neighbors as “ evil” . Rejecting, at least initially, their Eastern Euro- pean neighbors as partners in the future out o f hand, in turn being rejected by the West as full partners outwright. the New Tribalists both boxed themselves in and were boxed in; the only option that occured to them was to go it alone.
Security in the post-Communist Age: Lessons to M emorize
As a consequence of the aforementioned, therefore, it seems to me today that the new democracies of Europe must make a deliberate choice. That choice is between
00063454
vehement provincialism, devil-may-care independence and galloping nationalism, on the one hand, and a slow adoption of values that are regarded as a norm in the o f immediate support, usually, does not result in teleological performance.
Yet, rejecting the New Tribalism is the only real guarantee for the nations of the region that they w ill eventually become a part of what we call the developed world.
Overcoming the comparative backwardness of their economies vis-a-vis the West, integrating their institutions with the developed world, and thereby becoming a part o f the international guarantee-system that operates in “ the West” is the ultimate security they must have. W ithout the latter their security w ill always be based on flimsy calculations based on the number of ancient tanks or cavalry horses.
Hence, first of all, the nations of Eastern Europe must learn to distinguish be- tween real and perceived threats. Among the real threats are: economic, m ilitary and political problems. Though one could offer a litany o f such ills, allow me merely to offer a catalogue of each, a sampling from this otherwise altogether too rich a menu.
Economic threats: collapse of domestic and foreign markets, the resuiting domes- ticism, galloping inflation, starvation, inability to pay for energy needs, etc.
M ilita ry threats: potential m ilitary dictatorship, civil war as a result o f secessionist tendencies, insufficient and badly trained force, domestic use o f the army for party- political considerations;
Internal Political: failure o f democracy, apathy, civil war, loss o f national author- ity, uses o f instruments o f force for domestic political purposes (fo r instance, terror- ism as tool for separatism);
External Political: spillage o f civil war onto te rrito ry from neighboring state, spillage o f refugees, inadvertant wars resulting from New Tribalism.
A ll o f these threats are real and more real than any other threat used and found in the vocabulary o f the Born Again Tribalists. They are more real than considerations that a national army - in fact, any national army! - w ill march onto the territory of a neighboring state in Eastern Europe. They are more real than the professed desires for the Great Romanian Empire extending from Odessa to the Tisza, or the Great Hungarian realm encompassing the Carpathians. And they are more real than setting up neutral states in the heart of Europe, going it alone.
In short, the road to real security leads through a distinct road, the milestones of which, once again, are fairly visible. They include a series o f regional compacts dealing first with functional subjects, and culminating in general regional arrange- ments. They include a simoultaneous Europeanization o f institutions and pro- cedures, extending from European threatments of m inorities to observence of press
108 Ivan Völgy es
Günther Wagenlehner - 978-3-95479-682-3 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:45:44AM via free access
freedoms. They include an adherence to international norms, for example, in regards to refugees or internationally protected labor rights. A nd, above all, they include adoption o f a European value system, the most significant elements o f which are tolerance, the willingness to compromise, respect for others, and an acceptance
freedoms. They include an adherence to international norms, for example, in regards to refugees or internationally protected labor rights. A nd, above all, they include adoption o f a European value system, the most significant elements o f which are tolerance, the willingness to compromise, respect for others, and an acceptance