Muslim countries, in particular those that have been the victims of extremist ideological teaching, have implemented a number of counter-measures aimed at preventing the misuse of mosques for the spread of extremist views and eventual radicalisation leading to possible violent mobilisation. Some of the most notable are:
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■ Criminalisation of hate speech, including within but not necessarily limited to mosques: Most mosques in the Muslim world are government-controlled insti-tutions and religious scholars associated with these instiinsti-tutions are govern-ment appointed, which facilitates their regulation. In contrast, religious institu-tions, including mosques, in other non-Muslim (at least formally) parts of the continent are private institutions. Therefore, it is more difficult to regulate their activities, as well as effectively enforce legislation on such matters. Although security and intelligence agencies might covertly monitor the messages being preached by religious scholars, any indication of this might harm the relation-ship between Muslim communities and the state. Indeed, any indication that a Muslim institution is being targeted by any governmental institution, including for the purpose of intelligence gathering, may well become a further justifica-tion and facilitator for extremists.
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■ Ensuring sound, non-extremist religious educational programmes for the clergy, including the establishment of (re)-education programmes where ap-propriate: Such programmes, together with the vetting of (potential) clergy may be more effective in Muslim countries where the religious establishment is under the control of the state, although such measures are likely to be equally unpopular and controversial in both, not least where the state is seen as inter-fering with fundamental freedoms of speech and religion.
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■ Locking mosques and other religious institutions after hours to prevent uncon-trolled access: Although effective in limiting unauthorised access, radicalisa-tion and recruitment rather takes place in smaller groups formed outside the control of religious establishments. Instead, open sermons are being used for broader ‘talent spotting’ after which the approach takes place outside public view.
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■ Ultimately, encouraging and allowing more open and honest interaction and debate can best counter radicalisation and eventual recruitment: Often, it is when people have profound, unanswered questions and frustrations that they are not permitted to voice (in fear of being persecuted), that they are more susceptible to the approaches of extremists. Terrorist recruiters may therefore exploit this isolation, making those recruited feel part of a select group sharing similar points of view. Being isolated, these views increasingly become more extreme, to become that of an extremist ideology.
Internet
The extensive volume of ‘suspicious’ websites and materials available on the worldwide web, in multiple languages including Arabic and English, not only makes the effective monitoring of them extremely difficult, but also raises a number of practical policing challenges. As Ronald Noble, the head of Interpol, confirmed in September 2010, the threat of serious organised crime attributable to the use of the internet has increased dramatically during recent years. According to him, the 12 websites used to spread radical ideas in 1998 had increased to an estimated 4 500 in 2006.240 This figure is expected to be much higher today.
From a radical and extremist perspective, the internet is an extremely effec-tive and invaluable tool for reaching and radicalising people around the world, not least because of the accessibility of these websites and materials. Many young people, even from poor socio-economic conditions, frequent internet cafés where they have access to video material, training manuals and terrorist messages. It is, however, not only those coming from poor socio-economic conditions who are vulnerable; but also those from wealthier families far from conflict areas, intro-ducing the third facilitator for recruitment: expatriate communities.
Possible counter-measures
The role of the internet in the radicalisation and possible eventual recruitment of suicide bombers is not a new topic of discussion. In response to the threats posed, most countries have reacted by adopting two broad strategies. These are:
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■ Covert monitoring of websites by the security services to spot and monitor users accessing ‘suspicious’ websites and posting materials on it: This is done in order to identify those who may be radicalised and eventually carry out
extremist activities. Although not all people accessing suspicious websites will become radicalised, those visiting these sites may require closer scrutiny.
Caution is, however, key, requiring the involvement of intelligence agencies instead of an open confrontation. For the success of future early detection, these types of intelligence-gathering tactics need to be kept secret.
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■ Close access to certain websites: Although the closing down of specific websites might sound relatively easy, it is often much more challenging in practice for a number of reasons. This includes the fact that not all countries have com-parable or adequate legislation in place to criminalise the different aspects of cybercrime. There may also be associated complex jurisdictional issues with, for example, the website being administered from a different country to the one where a person was radicalised and perhaps eventually recruited. It is, however, not the most appropriate answer for two primary reasons:
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■ Nothing prevents those running the website to create another, and, there-fore, an unknown forum.
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■ For intelligence agencies to reveal that websites are being monitored will influence the introduction of counter-measures on the part of those creating and administrating suspicious websites.
Monitoring and policing of the internet is a very specialised and relatively new discipline for law enforcement and intelligence agencies on the continent.
Additionally, further steps are required to ensure that the correct legal framework is in place, which balances legitimate security imperatives – such as through the criminalisation of incitement – with respect for and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, perhaps most importantly here, the right to information and freedom of expression. It is equally important that national legislation forms part of broader, coherent and integrated regional and international legal frameworks, not least for the purpose of facilitating mutual legal assistance and extradition. In turn, these frameworks must be accompanied by the requisite levels of political will to be effectively enforced, as well as any necessary capacity building activi-ties among the judiciary, legal practitioners and law enforcement and intelligence agencies.