In parallel with the events described in the previous section, al-Qa’eda exploited ongoing regional instabilities to strengthen its influence in Somalia, especially following Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2006, which resulted in the subse-quent deployment of AU peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi. As explained earlier, during bin Laden’s stay in Sudan between 1991 and 1996, he facilitated the
establishment of al-Qa’eda’s East Africa cell, the one that had been responsible for the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam in August 1998.
Of particular interest to the current discussion, the presence of extremists in Somalia and the involvement of foreigners from 2006 onwards in a conflict stretching back to 1991 (see the earlier section in this chapter on al-Qa’eda’s influ-ence in the region) provided the necessary justification for invoking jihad for the defence of Muslim territory against a ‘Christian invasion’. In turn, these factors impacted upon terrorist activities in the region, not least the joining of forces against a common enemy.
Although the ICU, including its al-Shabaab element, declined formally to align itself with Qa’eda in 2006, its earlier allegiance with key members of al-Qa’eda and the involvement of foreigners in its operations were unmistakable.
For example, in July 2006, Sheikh Yusuf Indha’adde, the former defence minister of the ICU, was featured in a video that showed ‘Arab fighters preparing for a major battle on the northern outskirts of Mogadishu. Arabic anthems and poetry play[ed] on the audio track urging Muslims to join the global holy war to advance Islam and defeat its enemies’.168
On 18 September 2006, as previously mentioned, the first suicide bombing in Somali history occurred, which targeted President Yusuf outside the Parliament building. The blast and a subsequent gun battle killed 11 people, including Yusuf’s brother.169 Within weeks, the ICU declared a jihad on Ethiopia due to its intervention in the Muslim territory of Somalia. Following this attack, the TFG lost a number of its high-ranking security officials and political leaders.
The deployment in 2006 of Ethiopian troops acting under the AU mantle – which was backed by the US, but which some regarded as an invasion of Somalia – prompted an outcry among the Somali diaspora worldwide. Within Somalia, a foreign enemy provided al-Shabaab with a new resolve. Under Sheikh Abu Mukhtar Robow (alias Abu Mansur), who served as a military commander and spokesperson for al-Shabaab, the group began to post propaganda videos on the internet. Through this platform, al-Shabaab managed to connect with hard-core Somalis within the diaspora, leading to their radicalisation and eventual recruit-ment for terrorist activities. In one weekly forum in September 2008, Robow stated that the establishment of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Somalia’ was ‘imminent’.170
Despite the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia in January 2009, al-Shabaab continued aggressively to recruit foreign fighters through its internet-driven propaganda network. Then, in response to the subsequent deployment
of AU peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, al-Qa’eda used this platform to enhance its influence in Somalia and beyond. With Ethiopia leading the initial campaign to stop the spread of the ICU in Somalia, followed by Uganda and Burundi, extremists used this external interference to their advantage in pre-senting it as a Christian invasion of a Muslim country. It was this sentiment that attracted members of the Somali expatriate communities to return to Somalia to fight for the ‘liberation’ of their former homeland. Among them was Shirwa Ahmed, originally from Minneapolis in the US, who was one of the suicide attack-ers that executed attacks in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland (the self-declared autonomous region in the north-west of Somalia) on 28 October 2008. Attackers targeted the presidential palace, the UNDP compound, and the Ethiopian embassy. Almost simultaneously, two additional suicide bombers attacked the intelligence services in Bossasso, Puntland. At least 20 people were killed, and more than 30 others injured, during these attacks.
Additionally, because of Somalia’s close proximity to Yemen, the threat of closer ties with al-Qa’eda through al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) only increased. This possibility grew as the result of growing pressure al-Qa’eda faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the death of Saleh Al-Nabhan in a US strike off Baraawe, al-Shabaab expressed its growing allegiance with al-Qa’eda in a video.
In this video, which was distributed in September 2009, national emir Moktar Abu Zubair (alias Muktar Abdirahman ‘Godane’ or Ahmad Abdi Godane) for the first time declared the organisation’s loyalty to bin Laden. The video featured among other things a large crowd waving guns and chanting: ‘Here we are Osama! We are your soldiers Osama!’ as well as audio clips from a previous bin Laden video that encouraged followers to ‘Fight on O’ Champions of Somalia’.171
Significantly, in February 2010 Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki (commander of the Kamboni militia and a previous commander in the ICU) and Ahmad Abdi Godane (from al-Shabaab) issued the following statement: ‘We have agreed to join the international jihad of al-Qa’eda ... We have also agreed to unite al-Shabaab and Kamboni mujahideen to liberate the Eastern and Horn of Africa community who are under the feet of minority Christians.’172 Following this declaration, al-Shabaab, under the direction of Godane, executed the twin suicide attacks on 11 July 2010 in Kampala. Despite its clear intent to execute attacks beyond Somalia, all of its attacks (with the exception of the Kampala bombings) appear to have occurred within Somalia.