From the suicide incidents examined it would seem that second and third gen-eration immigrants may be particularly vulnerable to recruitment to participate in conflicts in their countries of origin. Certainly, this appears to have been the case with respect to al-Shabaab’s suicide operations in Somalia, a number of which were executed by the children of Somali immigrants recruited in the US and Europe. The misuse of mosques or other Islamic educational centres can be a facilitating factor here also, as is illustrated by the involvement of Shirwa Ahmed in coordinated suicide attacks on 29 October 2008. A subsequent investigation into the recruit-ment of young members of the Somali community in Minneapolis in the US, where Ahmed had lived, revealed that attendance at the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center in Minneapolis was a recurring theme.241 In this case, the promotion of ex-tremist ideology was assisted by the arrival of first Ethiopian, then AMISOM troops in Somalia, who were portrayed as invading and abusive forces.
Another possible contributing factor to the susceptibility of expatriate com-munities to recruitment is the concentration and/or isolation in a particular area that some diaspora – such as the Somali community in Minneapolis – can feel in their non-native surroundings. While it is natural for people sharing the same nationality, culture, language and/or religion to live and socialise with others sharing a similar background, communities who feel more integrated within their local surroundings are less likely to be open to extremist ideas or organisa-tions, not least when the latter involve directly or indirectly attacking their new homeland. An important factor mitigating against such integration can be the manipulation of information concerning the original homeland – such as its poor conditions or political issues – communicated to these communities through the internet, satellite television etc. This may impact directly upon the willingness of such communities to integrate with their surroundings, especially if their new host country is portrayed as a source of the difficulties facing their country of origin.
In addition to such factors as the concentration of members of the diaspora community, a number of others may be relevant regarding the extent to which individuals have integrated with their surroundings:
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■ The time factor, namely how long an individual has lived in their new host country: Full or even partial integration may take generations. However, a
person who has just fled a conflict in their country of origin (first generation) may be more loyal to the receiving country than a second or third genera-tion individual born there who has not integrated well and so considers their current homeland to be an alien one.
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■ The degree to which the expatriate community shares cultural or other charac-teristics and values with the host country: Clearly, the greater the commonal-ity that exists between them, the more likely it is that at least some degree of integration will be possible; the opposite is true also, namely that the greater the differences, the harder it will be for a diaspora to integrate with its host surroundings.
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■ The political relationship between the host state and the diaspora community:
The US foreign policy supporting Ethiopia when it ‘invaded’ Somalia probably played an important role in finding support, particularly among the youth, in the Somali expatriate communities around the world. While the US supported Ethiopia, it also started to look at Somali communities within its borders dif-ferently. Khat, considered by law enforcement agencies in the United States as illegal, first put the Somali diaspora on the radar, followed by the potential link to extremism and terrorism. Subsequently, members of the Somali community began to experience officially sanctioned challenges such as surveillance and the arrest and detention of its members. Therefore, the degree of integration of the diaspora group within the host society has important implications for potential security challenges.
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■ Political leadership within the diaspora group: This can be of importance in how the community interacts with both the state and militant groups within its ranks. Security challenges are sharply reduced when community leaders have strong community support, good links with elected officials and law enforcement, and speak out strongly against extremist activities. Conversely, where diaspora leaders are weak (or leadership is divided), relations with host authorities are poor, and militant activities are tolerated or supported by com-munity leaders, the security challenges for the host country are exacerbated.
One note of caution here is that it would be a mistake to try to measure the poten-tial for radicalisation based on the overall sentiments of a broader community or the viewpoints of its religious and community leaders. Those who embrace and act upon extremist ideology will be a minority, which ultimately comes down to individual decision-making.
Possible counter-measures
It is important to consider here how to prevent recruitment among expatriate com-munities without marginalising other community members. It is probably more effective here to suggest what not to do rather than providing practical advice. Any policies or practices – such as those of law enforcement officials – should never con-tribute to any perceptions of ‘us (the expatriate community) versus them (the state and its authorities)’. As explained earlier, even if people are not naturally inclined towards the ideas of radicals or extremists, categorising people based on religious or ethnic affiliation, as well as separating them for different, often discriminatory, treatment, will only serve to alienate them with the consequence that even more
‘moderate’ community members may become open to otherwise ‘alien’ ideas.
A preliminary step is probably for law enforcement officials to work with members of the expatriate community in order to identify those members most likely to be at risk for radicalisation. The success of any such process will be largely determined by the levels of trust that exist between governmental rep-resentatives and members of the expatriate community, not least in terms of the former being able to access the latter. Another way of securing some form of access is through employing members of the expatriate community in state structures – which itself may contribute towards improved integration – such as the police and intelligence agencies. Although careful vetting of any such recruits is important, caution must nevertheless be exercised in order not to create, or at least reduce, any impression and suspicions that these community recruits will be used to ‘spy’ on their own community members. Instead, the packaging and presentation of any such recruitment should be a delicate process in order to portray it in positive terms, such as highlighting the benefits of enhanced under-standing of the needs of and particular challenges facing the diaspora in order for the state to respond more effectively to them.
Another important approach is to encourage integration while accepting di-versity. Any attempts to try to force integration through, for example, legislation are likely to have the opposite effect. Instead, it is better to encourage effective dialogue between people of different backgrounds that has not been formally initiated by the state but rather through, for example, civil society organisations.
Such dialogue and exchange of views will also assist state authorities to better identify, comprehend and respond to the specific concerns and challenges facing particular communities, thereby also developing increased levels of mutual trust.